SOPHOCLES AND THE GREEK LANGUAGE

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SOPHOCLES AND THE GREEK LANGUAGE

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ASPECTS OF DICTION, SYNTAX AND PRAGMATICS

EDITED BY

I.J.F. DE JONG AND A. RIJKSBARON

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PREFACE

In September 2003 the Department of Classics, section Classical Greek, of the University of Amsterdam organized a three-day conference on 'Sophocles and the Greek Language', to commemorate the publication, fifty years earlier, of the first volume of J.C. Kamerbeek's complete commentaries on Sophocles.

This book contains a selection of the papers presented at that conference, complemented by a number of papers which were solicited by the editors afterwards. Taken together, these papers offer a fairly complete overview of the various ways in which Sophocles' use of the Greek language is currently being studied.

Already in antiquity Sophocles' linguistic skills were greatly admired, as is illustrated by the following two quotations: ἠθοποιεῖ τε καὶ ποικίλλει καὶ τοῖς ἐπινοήμασι τεχνικῶς χρῆται, Ὁμηρικὴν ἐκματτόμενος χάριν (*Vita Sophoclis*, chapter 9) and Σοφοκλῆς [unlike Euripides] μὲν οὐ περιττὸς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖος (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De imitatione* fr. 31). Modern scholars, starting with Campbell's detailed 'Introductory Essay' from 1879, have done much to substantiate this general feeling of admiration. The first aspects of Sophocles' language to be investigated were his style or diction, including the use of imagery and figures of speech, and syntax. To these recently a third angle has been added, that of pragmatics, his use of language to 'do' (let his characters do) things. In accordance with these three areas of interest, we have grouped the papers in three sections: diction, syntax, and pragmatics.

Diction

Modern research on Sophocles' diction can be said to start with Earp, who in the best Sainte Beuvian tradition aims at capturing the style of the man, or as he himself writes, wants to ascertain 'if possible, how and why the style of Sophocles is so surpassingly good' (1944: 1). To this end, he lists words of various origins, ranging from Homer to prose, which are used by Sophocles in one play only and

words which only he (or later authors) uses, and which can therefore be considered his coinage. In the end Earp's objective is a literary-historical one: to trace the development of style in Sophocles. This line of research has been continued in various ways. Long (1968) analyses Sophocles' ample and ever increasing use of abstract nouns.[1] This predilection marks an important difference both with respect to his colleague Euripides and to the everyday Attic of his time,[2] and brings him closer to a prose writer such as Thucydides. Sophocles' adoption of Homeric and other archaic Greek diction has been investigated by Davidson (1975, 1988, 1995) and Garner (1990).

In 1951, another topic, that of recurrent imagery and metaphors, was forcefully put on the agenda by Goheen. Soon the hunt for metaphors in Sophocles (and for that matter, Aeschylus) became a popular pastime. It was the Dutch scholar Van Nes (1973) who—in Dutch—warned against the broadening of the definition of imagery in such a way that almost everything would be included. Others reached the same conclusion, and scholars have, it seems, sobered down. Whatever its drawbacks may be, one of the valuable points of this imagery research was that it looked at the way in which the repetition of words can add to the thematic unity of a work. A related, and perhaps more successful approach has been the search for such theme words. Important work has been done in this respect by Winnington-Ingram (1948, 1980), Kirkwood (1958: 215–246), Knox (1964: 1–61), and Segal (1981). This kind of research has been given a new impetus by Vernant (1981) and Goldhill (1997), who drew attention to the fact that the same words may have different meanings for different characters, or for the spectators as opposed to the characters. Here the initially text-immanent and formal investigation of Sophocles' style is entering the territory of pragmatics, on which more will be said below. Good general discussions of Sophocles' diction and style are still Webster (1969: 143–162) and Lesky (1972: 262–267).

No less than three out of the six contributions in the section on diction focus on Sophocles' oldest extant play, the *Ajax*. Buxton, calling Ajax' famous and notorious 'Deception Speech' the 'Speech of Day's White Horses', immediately reveals which particular aspect he deals with: rather than exploring whether Ajax is sincere or not, he calls attention to the linguistic register which this hero turns to at this

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[1] See also Nuchelmans (1949).

[2] For Sophocles' use of colloquial expressions, see also Stevens (1945).

climactic moment in his life and in the play. Through a decidedly un-Homeric density of imagery, Ajax briefly looks at human existence from a uniquely broad perspective, and strikes a chord which will not be heard again in the play.

If for a brief moment Ajax is speaking here in an unhomeric fashion, the *Ajax* otherwise is one of the most Homeric of Sophocles'plays, and in his contribution Davidson, who is a long-time participant in the 'Sophocles and Homeric intertextuality' debate, raises the important if difficult question as to whether the presence of an echo of Homeric *words* also entails the evocation of Homeric *context(s)*. And what about the literature lying in between Homer and Sophocles, which may also have contributed to the complex process of Homeric language becoming Sophoclean language? His sobering conclusion is that there are no all-embracing rules when it comes to discussing Homeric intertextuality in Sophocles. Rather, each case merits to be looked at on its own.

The third paper on the *Ajax* is by De Jong. She further pursues the road sketched above of investigating the function(s) and effect(s) of the repetition of words in Sophocles. Here the *Ajax* offers a perfect opportunity for research, since the central event of Ajax' mad attack on the herds is presented no less than seven times. Not surprisingly, repeated words point up similarities in focalization between different characters, though the resulting combinations of characters may be unexpected (as when both Ajax and Athena think it 'pleasant' to laugh at one's defeated opponents). But quite often one and the same word has very different nuances: Ajax acting 'alone' for some characters increases his guilt, for others is puzzling, and for yet others marks him as unheroic.

The *Oedipus Tyrannus* and *Oedipus Coloneus* are central to the paper by Van Erp Taalman Kip, who investigates how Oedipus' blindness affects his language. His inability to see the people he talks to forces him to use different words, addressing the chorus of his dependents as 'friends' and 'people who take care', or make gestures complement words. But his blindness, perhaps made visible by his mask, also influences the way his interlocutors address *him*.

In his paper, Griffith explores the stylistic differences between satyr-drama on the one hand, and tragedy and comedy on the other. Although satyr-plays share some characteristics of diction and style with comedy, he concludes, from a thorough examination of compound adjectives occurring in (the fragments of) satyr-plays and in

a number of tragedies and comedies, that the stylistic register of the satyr-plays, and especially those of Sophocles, is on the whole almost identical to that of tragedy. In the second part of his paper Griffith turns to the 'comic' side of the vocabulary of the satyr-plays. Against the widespread view that in this field, at least, satyr-play comes close to comedy, he argues that the language is actually much less coarse and obscene than in comedy. In fact, satyr-play has a position of its own, being distinguished from both tragedy and comedy by its sophisticated and 'romantic' language of love and desire.

The last paper in this section again deals with imagery, that which is connected with the word 'fire', metaphorically applied by Philoctetes to Neoptolemus in the *Philoctetes*. Casting his net widely, Rehm discusses its many associations, which range from positive (fire as the symbol of civilization) to negative (fire as a destructive element) and thereby suggest the many options for action open to young Neoptolemus.

Syntax

'It would be absurd to represent Sophocles as an eccentric writer. But he made subtle use of a material full of subtlety, which was plastic to his touch, and the resulting lines are more difficult to trace than those which have been impressed by some generally accepted mould.' 'Sophocles is distinguished in point of syntax from other contemporary writers chiefly by his noble sense of harmony and by the combination of extreme refinement with moderation and simplicity.' With passages like the ones quoted here from the Introductory Essay 'On the language of Sophocles' to his edition of Sophocles (1879, p. 4), Lewis Campbell set the tone for all subsequent work on the syntax of Sophocles. Although the language in which they are put is less high-flown than that of Campbell, the judgments of e.g. Moorhouse (1982) and Lloyd-Jones & Wilson are basically similar. Thus, Moorhouse writes in the preface to his *Syntax of Sophocles* (p. xiii): 'The end result (viz. of the ways in which Sophocles combines 'old-fashioned' constructions with innovations) is an unusually rich and varied collection of uses.' And Lloyd-Jones & Wilson remark, while discussing the difficulties one encounters in editing Sophocles' text (OCT, preface p. v): 'There are many passages where it is scarcely possible to know what the author wrote, since he took pleasure in experimenting with the syntactical resources of Attic Greek . . .'.

Now while this emphasis on what may be called, with a collective term, the innovative side of Sophocles is no doubt justified, one runs perhaps the risk of losing sight of the more pedestrian features of his language, the 'generally accepted mould', as Campbell put it. In the papers of this section both the 'subtle', innovative side of Sophocles' syntax and the 'accepted mould' are critically reviewed.

In his paper, Allan addresses a question that would seem to involve indeed a high degree of subtleness, viz. possible semantic differences between active and middle forms of 'the same' verb. Along the lines set out by him in his dissertation (Allan 2003), he argues that such differences do, in fact, exist, and that Sophocles exploits them to great effect. He illustrates his point in a discussion of verbs like ὁρᾶσθαι/ἰδέσθαι, κλαύσασθαι, τιμωρεῖσθαι. Other issues addressed by Allan are the interpretation of ambiguous verb forms like ὑπεζύγην, ἀπαλλαχθείς, χρησθείς (passive or intransitive?), and semantic differences between the two futures of φαίνεσθαι, φανεῖσθαι and φανήσεσθαι. In the process Allan points out that Kamerbeek, unlike most commentators, shows a keen interest in voice differences.

The relationship between syntax and the constitution of Sophocles' text forms the subject of Rijksbaron's paper. There are a number of verb forms that, when unaccented, are ambiguous between a present tense and an imperfect reading, e.g. κυνει, καλει, κυρει. Our modern Sophocles (and Euripides) texts accent these forms, which occur especially in narrative passages, in general as presents, which entails that they must be taken as historic presents. After a discussion of the function of the historic present in general and of the conditions under which it is used, Rijksbaron returns to the ambiguous forms and concludes that some qualify as historic presents, while others do not; the latter should accordingly be taken (and accented) as (unaugmented) imperfects.

In her paper, Wakker discusses the semantics of past counterfactual as opposed to past potential states of affairs. Like other texts, Sophocles' plays contain a number of past indicatives plus ἄν which, according to many commentators and grammars, should be interpreted as 'past potentials' rather than as counterfactuals. Familiar examples are εἶδες ἄν and ἔγνω τις ἄν. On the basis of a full analysis of the Sophoclean material Wakker concludes that there is no need, neither in terms of the theory concerning the characteristics of the past indicative + ἄν nor as regards the actual interpretation of the examples, to introduce the category 'past potential' into Greek syntax. All instances

can satisfactorily be taken as counterfactuals.

Sophocles' use of the pronouns ὅδε, οὗτος, and ἐκεῖνος is analysed in the paper by Ruijgh, who forcefully defends the views of Kühner-Gerth against Moorhouse, who claims that the differences between these three pronouns are not always maintained by Sophocles. Making use of Brugmann's categories *Ich-Deixis, Du-Deixis*, and *Jener-Deixis*, Ruijgh shows that Sophocles adroitly exploits the semantic-pragmatic differences between the three pronouns as described by Kühner-Gerth. Especially interesting are examples where ὅδε and οὗτος or ὅδε and ἐκεῖνος are used to refer to the same person. The pronouns retain each their own specific semantic value, as in ὅδ' ἐκεῖνος ἐγώ (*OC* 138): the identity of the 'I', unknown in the past (ἐκεῖνος), is revealed at the moment of utterance (ὅδε).

With Ruijgh's article we have passed more or less to the third section of this book, which is devoted to the question as to how things are done with words, in short, the domain of pragmatics.

Pragmatics

Above, in the section on diction, it was shown how gradually a strictly text-internal and formal analysis of Sophocles' style developed into one where the spectators, who of course as recipients and decoders of the playwright's linguistic play had never been totally absent, gain center stage. An important recent contribution here is Budelmann's (2000) monograph *The Language of Sophocles*, in which he explores in much detail the ambiguity of that language. He argues (16–17) that 'Sophoclean language can get different spectators (and readers) involved because it does not communicate a straightforward message in a straightforward way but rather gives them a degree of understanding and lets them struggle for more (*involvement*).'

What Sophocles can *do* with language immediately becomes clear from the contribution by Dunn. Discussing the remarkably long description of the setting of the *Electra*, he shows how literal meanings may generate figurative ones. The catalogue of landmarks mentioned in the prologue by the Tutor has different associations (mythical and contemporaneous, heroic and democratic) and thereby raises a set of multiple ethical frameworks, both for Orestes (how is he to take revenge for his father?) and the audience (how are they to evaluate Orestes' act of revenge?).

An even more dramatic speech-act topic is discussed in the paper by Heuner: are words able to kill? Combining the performative framework of Austin (1975) with some ideas advanced by Hölderlin, he argues for an important difference between Homer and tragedy. In Homer, the heroes are subordinated to the divine world, which means that time is of little importance to them, because it is the gods who decide their fate. But in tragedy there is a tension between the time of the gods and the time of the heroes. The heroes are no longer part of the divine temporal order, but live in their own restricted time. Now it *is* important when they speak and act. Using the *Antigone* to illustrate his point Heuner argues that this play is essentially a play about the Too-Late of words: Creon's words always lag behind Antigone's deeds.

Lloyd's paper introduces us to the world of politeness phenomena, which has so far not been studied systematically for Greek literature. Using the theoretical apparatus of modern politeness theory, Lloyd argues that many passages in Sophocles can be elucidated with the help of the notions 'positive face', 'negative face', and 'face threatening act'. Among other things, Lloyd points out that friendship terms like φίλος are often used to redress a face-threatening act, e.g. a request, and that counterfactuals can be used to express criticism in an indirect way ('off-record'). Difficult and controversial expressions discussed by Lloyd include ὦ οὗτος οὗτος at *OC* 1627 and ὦ φίλτατον γυναικὸς Ἰοκάστης κάρα at *OT* 950.

Ajax's deception speech in the *Ajax* figures—once again—in the contribution by Lardinois, who argues that the hero does not deliberatley try to deceive Tecmessa and the chorus, but that it is *they* who fail to understand his words. Central to his discussion are the six gnomic expressions in Ajax' speech, which by definition are polysemous (it is up to the hearer to decide which particular application a general expression may have) and thereby quintessentially exemplify the ambiguity of this speech.

The volume opens with a biographical sketch of its *laudandus*, J.C. Kamerbeek, painted by one of his pupils, Jan Maarten Bremer. For those of us, indeed the majority, who know Kamerbeek only via his scholarly work, this will provide a welcome, if perhaps slightly melancholical, background to our consultation of his commentaries.

The publication of this volume—unexpectedly—has acquired a sad

aspect, in that two of the contributors, both highly distinguished Dutch scholars of the Greek language, died before it saw light: C.J. Ruijgh and S.R. Slings. The second of these gave an oral presentation of his paper, but eventually expressed the wish that it would not be published, since he felt that his topic (hyperbaton in Sophocles) had not been worked out properly. As for Kees Ruijgh, he did not participate in the conference, but wrote a fairly advanced version of a contribution, which was actually found on his desk after his sudden and unexpected death. It has been prepared for publication by the joint efforts of two of his former pupils, Frits Waanders, who reconstructed the footnotes on the basis of two different draft versions, and the second editor of this book, who turned what was deemed by its first readers, the members of the Amsterdam Hellenistenclub, a highly interesting but somewhat erratic manuscript into what we hope is a readable and valuable contribution.

The organizers of the conference and editors of this book wish to express their gratitude to the Institute of Culture and History of the University of Amsterdam and to the curator of the Van der Valk-foundation, Jan Maarten Bremer, for generous financial support, and to Wim Remmelink for his speedy and expert assistance in making the manuscript ready for publication and in compiling the indices.

Irene J.F. de Jong
Albert Rijksbaron

J.C. KAMERBEEK. THE MAN BEHIND THE BOOKS

Jan Maarten Bremer

It is not my intention to present a retrospective assessment of Kamerbeek's performance as a *scholar*. That has been done respectfully, though not uncritically, by Stefan Radt in *Gnomon* 72 (2000), 187–188, and several contributors to this volume touch upon the scholarly merits of Kamerbeek's work on Sophocles. Thus I feel free to concentrate on a more Plutarchean biographical sketch, as a means of getting closer to his *êthos*.

Much of Kamerbeek's person can be better understood by taking into account the circumstances of his youth. In Rotterdam, that rough and industrious city, his father worked hard to support his family. Having started out as a primary school teacher, he spent his free time studying, in order to acquire higher qualifications, and ultimately became a history and geography teacher at a secondary school. His long teaching days were followed by evenings in which he taught extra hours at other institutions or gave private tuition. Even so, he was very much a family man, and he devoted what leisure time he had to his children: two sons, Jan and Coen, and a daughter, Bep. Both parents wanted their children to get the best education available. In fact, all three of them consistently obtained high marks.

In these early years Coen's elder brother Jan seems to have been his best friend. During the summer holidays the Kamerbeeks invariably went to the same small family pension in Laag Soeren, a wooded area in the eastern part of Holland, and the two boys took long walks together, or went off on their bicycles, no doubt chatting about school and exchanging the fruits of their reading, for they were both fanatical readers. Many years later Coen himself told me that on summer afternoons the two of them left the pension and went to the woods each with his own book, where they looked for a comfortable place to read. There was one particular tree Coen liked to climb into, in order to read undisturbed for hours at a stretch. When his little sister grew up to be a reader as well, he occasionally helped her to climb up and then settled her on another branch. Another pleasure the family shared during these early years was music: Jan and Coen

studied the violin, Coen later piano as well; Bep wanted to play the violoncello so she could play trios with her brothers, but unfortunately it never quite came to that. Actually, Bep is still very much alive, over ninety years old, and one of the sources for the early chapters of this narrative.

When he had reached the age of 12, Coen entered the best grammar school of Rotterdam, the Gymnasium Erasmianum. There is no evidence that he was particularly influenced by Erasmus, the scholar who lived four centuries earlier and was (still is) the 'patron saint' of this school. But there was someone else at the Gymnasium Erasmianum, a living person who *did* make a deep and lasting impression on the young Kamerbeek. It was Jan Hendrik Leopold, one of his classics masters, who would later be universally admired as the most profound Dutch lyrical poet of the period. Leopold was also a distinguished scholar: his edition of Marcus Aurelius *Ad se ipsum* in the Oxford Classical Texts (1908) has not yet been replaced. For three years, from 1922 to 1924, Dr Leopold taught Latin in Coen Kamerbeek's class. He dutifully introduced his pupils to Caesar, Cicero, and Sallust, but it was in reading Vergil and Ovid that he opened a world of humanity, beauty and rhythmical refinement to these pupils, who were aware that their teacher was himself a poet. Although Leopold was then already approaching 60 and was quite deaf, they never made fun of him. Coen Kamerbeek, who often amused his parents, his brother and sister with his perfect imitations of the peculiarities of his teachers, never mimicked Leopold. For him Dr Leopold was in a class of his own.

He completed his studies at the Gymnasium Erasmianum in the summer of 1925, with high marks for languages (classical and modern) and history, and moderate results in maths, physics and chemistry. He then followed his brother to the University of Utrecht, where Jan had chosen to read Dutch and Comparative Literature. Coen initially hesitated between History and Classics and opted for the latter. This was a decision he would never regret: for it was here that he discovered the texts, the themes, and the authors which were to occupy his eager mind for life. At Utrecht, Coen was very much disappointed by the professor of Latin, Damsté, who was a dull and uninspiring teacher, but he was greatly impressed by Vollgraff, who taught Greek, and by Bolkestein, the ancient historian. But Bolkestein was ahead of his time in his preference for social and economic history, which did not appeal to Coen. And so it happened that Coen Kamerbeek

was inspired most of all by Vollgraff, who had himself studied under von Wilamowitz at Göttingen and Berlin, and hence was an outspoken defender of *Altertumswissenschaft* as a multi-disciplinary approach to Classical Antiquity. In his teaching Vollgraff concentrated on Greek literature, but for his research he also made use of papyri, inscriptions and the *data* of classical archaeology; in fact, he even conducted several excavation campaigns at Argos. So, in the end, Coen Kamerbeek took Greek as his main subject.

Those student years were no doubt fairly Spartan. He lived in Utrecht in digs, and he wanted very much to join the official Student Union (the *Utrechts Studentencorps*). But as dues were quite high he did not dare to ask his parents for the money. He certainly was not the sort of adolescent to hang around in pubs; there was the occasional evening spent in the theatre or concerthall, but most of his evenings were solitary. I imagine the young Kamerbeek sitting at his desk, concentrating on the finer points of Latin and Greek grammar, metre and textual criticism, but also engaged in a silent communication with the great minds of the past. His weekends were spent in Rotterdam with his parents, no doubt often in the company of his brother. Some years later there was a third undergraduate coming home for the weekends, for his younger sister Bep had decided to go up to Leiden University to study medicine, where she completed her studies; she practised her profession in Rotterdam until her retirement.

Coen passed his final exams in the spring of 1930, certainly not with 'a pass degree' (to use an Oxbridge term), but rather *cum laude*. Perhaps he was already planning to write his PhD on Sophocles, with Vollgraff as his supervisor. But it was the thirties, and there was no chance of getting a scholarship and spending three or four years on uninterrupted research. He found a job teaching Latin and Greek at the Gymnasium in the city of Alkmaar. That was in the summer of 1931. Coen was then 24 years old. On the 24th of July in that same year he married Alie Evers, a young lady four years his senior; she had also studied Classics at Utrecht University, but never got round to taking her final exams.

In Alkmaar a new side of the man came to the fore. The many testimonies of his former students are unanimous: Kamerbeek was a born teacher. This young man, whose marriage would be childless, proved to be as dedicated to his pupils as he was to the Latin and Greek he wanted to teach them. This dedication was rooted in a deep sense of duty and a powerful urge to give them the very best

he could. Half a century later my wife and I came often to see him during his retirement, and when the name of one of his pupils popped up in the conversation, he still knew which class she or he was in, and which year, and he even remembered the names of her/his classmates. He must have been very close to his pupils: they respected him and he respected them. He was not the type of person to seek intimacy with them, but I dare say that in his own stern way he loved them. And there will have been many pupils, especially the girls, who were fond of him, for he was a man of unmistakeable charm and wit, and he was famous for his—of course didactically relevant—theatrical performances in class.

In the first year of World War II the German authorities forced the headmaster, Dr J. Hemelrijk, who was Jewish, to resign from office. The board of trustees of the school asked Kamerbeek to become acting headmaster. Then 33 years old, he would have been one of the younger teachers; and yet he must have stood out as a man of authority. He accepted the responsibility. Many years later he talked about what inspired him, then in 1940: 'I wanted to maintain the school and the quality of its teaching—what Hemelrijk had made of it, in order to give it back to him if he were to return'. This, *mirabile dictu*, actually happened, for Dr Hemelrijk, who had been sent to Buchenwald, survived the war.

For the young acting headmaster the five years of German occupation became a nightmare: the Germans quickly took over the new Gymnasium building for their own purposes, and the teachers and pupils were bundled together with those of two other schools in one totally inadequate building. Some classes were held either at very early or late hours in the day, and during the last year of the war often at the teachers' own homes, including Kamerbeek's. He had to invest an enormous amount of time and ingenuity into keeping his school going. But this was also a period rich in experience. Looking back, he wrote: 'Teaching under these depressing circumstances was actually a more fertile and productive process than in more normal times. The very best which teachers and pupils had in them grew in answer to the pressure from outside.' *Palma sub pondere crescit.*

During those years of teaching and school management Kamerbeek also spent much, if not all, of his spare time in scholarly research. Only three years after his appointment at Alkmaar, in 1934, he presented his doctoral thesis to the University of Utrecht. In the years that followed he published school editions of Sophocles' *Antigone, Trachiniae*, and *Philoctetes*, and of Euripides' *Medea* and *Andromache*. While these

editions were intended primarily for the pupils, they were at the same time based on highly accurate scholarship. Almost every year he published one or more strictly scholarly articles in the periodical *Mnemosyne*, often written in Latin, in which he dealt with textual and interpretative problems of Greek poetical texts, especially Sophocles, Sappho and Alcaeus. If we take into account that he had a full-time job, and that he spent a great deal of time preparing his classes, we realize how much self-discipline and *askêsis* must have gone into these publications. The reward for these scholarly labours came in 1951 when he was invited to become professor of Greek at the University of Amsterdam. This appointment was without doubt the fulfilment of his cherished hope of one day being admitted to Academia.

He soon discovered that things were far from ideal at Amsterdam. His predecessor in the chair of Greek, W.E.J. Kuiper, who had been in poor health for several years and almost blind, had been anything but an inspiring teacher. Nor had Kuiper's *collega proximus*, A.W. de Groot, the professor of Latin, built up an enthusiastic audience of students of the Classics, as his personal preference was for general linguistics. This meant that Kamerbeek had to start almost from scratch. Fortunately, only a year later, in 1952, he was joined by a young and enthusiastic colleague for Latin, Anton Leeman. Both were excellent teachers, although their teaching styles differed, and they built up the *Klassiek Seminarium* by outlining an interesting but demanding syllabus, by appointing *medewerkers* (assistant professors), by greatly improving the quality and quantity of the Classics library, and by setting two of their brightest students, first Kees Ruijgh and later Harm Pinkster, on the track of Greek and Latin linguistics, ultimately managing to establish a professorial chair for both. Although this was a healthy and happy period for Classics at the university, there were occasionally difficult moments in 'the room at the top'. Leeman confided to me that he sometimes found it far from easy having Kamerbeek as senior colleague: when he (Leeman) wanted to introduce innovations like teaching by means of seminars for which students had to prepare and write contributions, Kamerbeek continued to lecture in the time-honoured professorial manner, and there was a rigidity about him which prevented him from taking any decision which did not conform to his own highly personal didactic and scholarly standards.

For us, his students, Kamerbeek's lectures had a unique authority and charisma. Like his own teacher Leopold, he had an outspoken preference for poetry. He dutifully introduced us to the great Greek

prose writers: Thucydides (regularly), Plato (not often) and Demosthenes (seldom), but his heart lay with the Greek poets. His inaugural address in 1951 had been a sophisticated discourse on how to interpret Greek poetry, and he taught us to understand and appreciate Homer, the Lesbian poets, and the tragedians. He was particularly keen on presenting to us fragments of tragic poetry which had recently come to light as a result of papyrological discoveries, such as Euripides' *Erechtheus*. He was a man of great seriousness, but there was also a strain of comic talent in him which enabled him to interpret Aristophanes with surprising gusto. Occasionally he roguishly acted out a scene for us. Looking back, one sees the continuity between the little boy who impersonated his teachers, the young classics master whose theatrical talents fascinated his pupils, and the highly serious professor who cursed and groaned during an impersonation of the protagonist of Menander's *Dyscolus*. On another occasion he recited for us a musical passage from Aristophanes (the song of the Hoopoe in the *Birds*), and 'such was the spell he cast on the whole company that not a sound was heard throughout the shadowy hall' (*Odyssey* 12.1–2).

However, there must have been a world of difference between his Alkmaar and his Amsterdam years. His Alkmaar classes consisted of relatively small groups of pupils, between twelve and eighteen years old, he saw them every day; so that the contact with his pupils was continuous and close. In Amsterdam he gave weekly lectures to larger audiences, audiences made up of adolescents, and there was now much less interaction between him and his pupils. This biographer is convinced that in terms of human experience the twenty years (1931–1951) at Alkmaar had been the warmest and richest of his life. He himself once admitted in a private conversation—not to me, but to a fellow-classicist—that it had taken him ten years to get over the nostalgia to his school and his pupils at Alkmaar. In Amsterdam he was now a university professor, then still an august and uncontested position. For us he remained at a distance. It was certainly not a lack of kindness which kept him from making any kind of off-hand, impulsive contact, but a kind of discretion which made him unable to speak spontaneously from heart to heart, a discretion which I would call an emotional 'modesty'. I use this word deliberately and I would like to illustrate this by means of a personal recollection.

After my final exams, when I was a grammar school teacher myself and had made a decision which entailed a great change in my life, I came to consult him on a possible PhD subject. He knew about

my decision, but in our conversation he kept meticulously to the topic on which I had come to consult him. A week later a letter arrived in his characteristically minute but clear handwriting, saying: 'You remember that in Euripides' *Hippolytus* Phaidra distinguishes two kinds of αἰδώς. I do not know whether in this case it was a good or a bad αἰδώς which kept me from speaking to you about that other subject, the new direction in your life. At any rate, I did not allude to it, although I realized that this must have preoccupied you much more than the topic of your PhD. Believe me when I say that the course of your life is something to which I am not indifferent.' At that time his letter made me happy; I felt honoured by his discreet and personal attention. Looking back, I realize that he himself was painfully aware of his inability to make direct contact.

This aloofness also exercised a lasting influence on his scholarly work. He was the opposite of what today is known as a 'networker', and he kept very much to himself. Nowadays scholars frequently go abroad in order to attend large conferences and to participate in specialized colloquia which touch upon one's research. Kamerbeek hardly ever left the country. Only once did he attend a FIEC conference (Philadelphia, 1964), and when invited to participate in a specialized colloquium, the Entretiens Hardt of 1958 on Euripides, he spent a week in Geneva. Most of us ask friends to read chapters of a book we are working on; quite a few books are co-productions, and nowadays it is hard to find a preface to a scholarly book in which the author does not thank friends and other colleagues for having assisted at the birth of the book. Kamerbeek never consulted colleagues or friends about his work. If we look at the prefaces of his commentaries, we find him expressing his gratitude to a British friend, David Reid, who had corrected his English, and to student assistants who had checked bibliographical details for him. But he never showed any of his work to others in advance, not to Kees Ruijgh, not to Stefan Radt, not to me or to Marietje van Erp Taalman Kip. We would have been honoured and delighted to assist him, but we were never asked to do so. In his work he was—of course I exaggerate—a Simon Stylites; his study was a sanctuary, his field of work a sacred meadow, which no one else was allowed to enter. That was his strength but also his weakness.

Here I add a piece of what one might call circumstantial evidence which seems prima facie to relieve the painfulness of my description of Kamerbeek's attitude; but it does not invalidate my description,

it makes it even more painful. The circumstances were as follows. As a good *Doktorvater* he not only allowed but actually encouraged some of his pupils to go abroad for their graduate studies: Stefan Radt went to Hamburg to work with Bruno Snell and his *Thesaurus* and to prepare his PhD on Pindar's paeans; in Paris Kees Ruijgh became a Homerist and Mycenologist under the guidance of Chantraine and Lejeune; as for myself, he encouraged me to apply for a graduate scholarship at Cambridge, where Denys Page was the Master of the College to which I belonged and where Donald Lucas of King's taught me the intricacies of Aristotle's *Poetics*. So Kamerbeek knew perfectly well the importance of scholarly contacts abroad. But he preferred to remain in his Santpoort study. When he was a young and promising scholar, there had been no opportunity for him to go and work abroad, and he had gradually become addicted to this isolation. The saying used by medieval monks—*cella continuata dulcescit*—applies to Kamerbeek. But I am afraid that in his cell there was not always sweetness, sometimes also bitterness.

In 1976, when he was almost seventy, he retired from Amsterdam University. One would expect a scholar who had devoted all his intellect and energy to 'things Greek' to have traveled extensively throughout Greece and Turkey, eagerly inspecting the numerous sites where it had all happened. In actual fact, Kamerbeek had visited Greece only once, when he took a guided group tour lasting a fortnight. We, his pupils, hoped that once retired, he was at last going to enjoy a series of Greek holidays. But he never returned to Greece. The only extravagance he allowed himself was occasionally spending one or two weeks with his wife in an old-fashioned hotel on Lake Como. Apart from these few interruptions, they continued to live quietly in their modest villa at Santpoort.

I have often wondered about his reason or reasons for remaining so close to home. One thing is certain: Kamerbeek was very anxious to finish his series of commentaries before his death. For this stubborn concentration on Sophocles, so very characteristic of Kamerbeek the man, I refer to the last paragraph of Stefan Radt's obituary. The years of his retirement were indeed highly productive: he published his *Antigone* in 1978, *Philoctetes* in 1980, and *Oedipus Coloneus* in 1984. But surely the occasional trip to Greece would not have interfered with this productivity? Another possible reason: having grown up in a family where it was unthinkable to spend much money on travel, and having lived through two world wars and their economical after-

math, he was too parsimonious for this kind of luxury. A third reason was certainly the fact that his wife, who had always suffered from a *petite santé* and often complained about back pain, disliked any sort of moving around. During his working years she had necessarily been alone most of the time; now she wanted to keep her husband *at home*.

The inevitable consequence of this state of affairs was that in the twenty-odd years between his retirement and his death, the solitude and silence around him became more and more intense. Some of his old friends and students got the impression that they were no longer welcome; and very few visited him. If anyone wanted to come and see him, the visit had to be arranged far in advance and often it was ultimately postponed. I attribute this attitude in part to his own character: think of the boy who climbed into a tree so that he could not be disturbed. But—as we know—there was also his wife. She clearly did not encourage her husband to lead an active social life. And in the last few years of their life together her physical and mental health declined to the point that he found it embarrassing and virtually impossible to receive visitors. Notwithstanding his own ailments—he had grown stiff in the joints and even before his retirement he had lost the use of one eye—he spent all his energy and most of his time on keeping the simple *ménage* going. He did the cooking and shopping and whatever else was necessary. His wife never left the house, except to see a doctor.

And so their life drew to a close. He had always been unfailingly loyal to his wife, and when her mind began to fail, he could not bring himself—nor could his doctor persuade him—to have her taken care of in a nearby geriatric home. It was only when he fell down the stairs in his own house and broke a finger that he agreed that this was the best solution. He remained alone in the house, and as he was now no longer in a position to care for her, his life had lost its purpose. His own mind began to wander, and shortly afterwards he died.

It was a sad end, as death always is. Even so, I venture to say that his life in all its austerity was not a sad one. I am convinced that there were four goals which he hoped to realize and to which he devoted all his energy. First, he wanted to read extensively and to become a man of wide erudition; second, he hoped to become an inspiring classics master for his pupils; third, he wanted to be an excellent university teacher and researcher, and last but decidedly not least, he was determined to be a devoted and reliable companion to his wife. I would venture to say that he achieved all these aims.

There must have been moments when he was aware of these achievements, and I hope that that gave him the occasional brief moment of happiness and fulfilment. But his friends, and I reckon myself among them, often felt that the price which he paid for this, in terms of human comfort and happiness, was high.

I would like to end with a quatrain composed by Leopold, Kamerbeek's classics master at Rotterdam. In these four lines Leopold refers to what he sees as a lack of understanding and appreciation for his poetry on the part of the outside world. In similar fashion Kamerbeek had been hurt by the fact that in some quarters his work on Sophocles had not found the esteem he had hoped for. Master and pupil were not unalike in this respect, and I believe that the following poem by Leopold is also relevant to Kamerbeek's life. I shall quote it first in Dutch, and then in an English version:

Het antwoord, en al het verweer van dezen
zal arbeid, eenzaamheid en zwijgen wezen;
dit bij zijn leven, maar na zijnen dood
dan wordt hij door zijn werken uitgewezen.

The answer, and his sole defence
will be labour, solitude and reticence;
this while he lived, but after death
his works will give his life its sense.

PART ONE

DICTION

WEAPONS AND DAY'S WHITE HORSES: THE LANGUAGE OF *AJAX*

Richard Buxton

Three or four years ago I had the pleasure of visiting a friend in Budapest. At the time, my friend was one of the members of the jury for the Budapest Academy of Theatrical Art, which was running its annual competition to see which of Hungary's current generation of budding stage-directors should receive funding to continue their development. The jury consisted of some of the country's leading directors and theatrical luminaries, but my friend had obtained permission for me to be present as an observer. On the first day of competition, each of the competitors (about twelve in number) had to direct an abbreviated version of any Greek tragedy of their own choosing, in whatever style they liked. That four or five of the competitors chose *Oedipus Tyrannus* was in itself revealing as a minor footnote in the modern *Rezeptionsgeschichte* of Sophocles. One of these versions made a particularly strong impression on me. For the entire duration of the play Oedipus stood in a basin, which was filled with a mixture of water and a substance which resembled liquid white clay, or perhaps quick-drying cement. As each character conducted a dialogue with Oedipus, that character smeared Oedipus with the clay or cement, moving progressively up the body to the face and head: Creon the feet, Tiresias the knees, Jocasta—unsurprisingly—the genitals. By the end, Oedipus was covered in a semi-solid white substance, so that he resembled a statue: Oedipus as Niobe.

My reaction to this performance was mixed. Part of me felt that this young director's interpretation of the play was gratuitous, self-indulgent and, not to mince words, absurd. But at the same time I could not remove from my mind the sense that there was method in his madness: here we were witnessing—bit by bit, smear by smear—the construction of Oedipus as the classic paradigm of the tragic hero, a construction to which each of the characters made their contribution, as each subsequent generation of theatrical re-interpreters would do. Or possibly—this might be an alternative or complementary interpretation of what was being staged—here was an Oedipus who, thanks

to the symbolism of the cement, was relentlessly being deprived of every vestige of freedom of action until, with no other avenues open, he was obliged to look straight ahead and to confront the truth.

The startling image of a gradually solidifying Oedipus has stayed with me. In fact I am tempted to borrow it, in order to apply it to the academic study of tragedy. For I believe that we too, as scholars, may produce a comparably cementifying effect when we tackle some of the notorious 'problems' in the plays. Once commentary on this or that 'problem' has developed a momentum of its own, each successive interpreter feels an obligation to add his or her own handful of wet plaster before moving on, leaving the underlying dramatic tissue to become ever more inflexibly encased in the doxographical structure which has been created around it.

In the case of *Ajax*, the central 'problem'—the point of cementification—has been, I think it would be generally agreed, the so-called Deception Speech. Is Ajax lying? But how could Ajax lie? If he is lying, to whom is he lying? Or is the bulk of his speech perhaps a soliloquy? What does Ajax 'really' intend by his words? The interpretative variations which have been performed on these aspects of this speech are legion, and show no sign of coming to an end.[1] Now of course the issues raised deserve painstaking scrutiny, and I do not mean to belittle the ingenuity and skill of the arguments which have been deployed. But in the present paper I want to focus on a slightly different aspect of Ajax' words: their linguistic register in relation to what comes before and after them. Doing so will, I believe, offer the possibility of looking again at the development of the whole play. But before we get to what, for the moment, I shall continue to call the Deception Speech, I shall take one or two steps backwards.

Different Sophoclean plays have different semantic landscapes, whose topography we can crudely plot by looking for recurring patterns of vocabulary and imagery.[2] *Oedipus Tyrannus* is about the inter-

[1] A handful of contrasting opinions from the relatively recent past: Simpson (1969); Leinieks (1974); Moore (1977); Sicherl (1977); Taplin (1978: 127–131; 1979); Knox (1961); Machin (1981: 191–198); Stevens (1986); Poe (1987: 50–71); Bradshaw (1991); Seaford (1994: 392–405); Garvie (1998: *ad loc.*) (I have frequently borrowed from or adapted Garvie's translation in the present paper). Lardinois (this volume) offers a detailed analysis of the ambiguities in Ajax' speech, especially in connection with the *gnomon* used by him.

[2] Extensive discussion of this aspect of Sophoclean language can be found in Knox (1964) and Segal (1981). See also the discriminating article by Easterling (1973). Still valuable is Goheen (1951).

weaving of knowledge and sight: οἶδα ('I know'), ὁράω ('I see'), τυφλός ('blind').[3] *Trachiniae* has much to say about bringing into the daylight that which lies hidden, for example the riddling, oracular past, or a seemingly innocuous piece of wool; the play is written under the sign of the verb φαίνω ('I reveal', 'I bring to light'). What of *Ajax*? Its semantic landscape is dominated by weapons and armour. Weapons and armour are central to the motivation of the plot, to the visual action, to the way in which different characters are represented and estimated, and even, in one case, named. The ὅπλα ('weapons') of Achilles, whose loss motivates Ajax' vendetta (41, 1239, 1337); the μάστιξ ('whip') with which Ajax flogs the beasts (110); the δόρυ ('spear') with which he captured Tecmessa (211, 515, 894); the σάκος ('shield') which, alone of his armour, he bequeaths to his eponymous son Eurysaces (574–577); the ἔγχος or ξίφος ('sword'), alias σφαγεύς ('killer'), which Ajax buries hilt-down in the ground, before burying it blade-up in himself (658, 815, 828).

Ajax is of course by no means the only character in Greek tragedy to be closely identified with armour and weapons: the shields in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* and the bow in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* are obvious examples, as is the bow in Euripides' *Heracles Furens*, the play in which Heracles takes into his Athenian future the weapon with which he has just slaughtered his family, thereby graphically symbolising the implications of his cruelly difficult moral decision about whether or not to go on living.[4] But in *Ajax* the pervasiveness of the semantic strand of armour and weapons is, I think, even greater than in any of these other cases. To see how this strand interweaves with, and occasionally strongly contrasts with, the rest of the play, we need to look at the work's linear development.

From the outset, the prevailing condition of Ajax' weapons is their being soaked in wet blood.[5] Ajax leaps over the plain σὺν νεορράντῳ ξίφει, 'with freshly wetted sword' (30); 'Did you dip (ἔβαψας) your sword well into the Argive army?', Athena mockingly asks him (95); just as the animal victims are αἱμοβαφῆ, 'dipped in blood' (219), so Ajax kills κελαινοῖς ξίφεσιν, 'with dark sword(s)' (231), where, as Jebb observes in his commentary, 'κελαινοῖς suggests both the dark, gleaming metal,

[3] See, for example, Buxton (1980; 1996); Vegetti (1983); Ugolini (1987); Segal (1993); Calame (1996).

[4] For a good account of the issues see Yoshitake (1994).

[5] See the perceptive article by Cohen (1978).

and the dark stains of blood upon it'; Odysseus, Ajax believes, will be φοινιχθείς, 'whipped red' (110). Given the hacking and slaughtering which has gone on ('He cut the throats of some [sheep], while others he turned upside down and slaughtered, and broke their spines . . .', 298–299; 'I made dark blood flow . . .', 376), it is no surprise that the coincidence of blood and metal keeps forcing itself upon us.

To what extent does this pervasive combination of weapons and carnage count as an 'Iliadic' feature of this notoriously Homeric play?[6] In the *Iliad* there is no shortage of passages of bloody carnage. Within the epic, one of the most potent ways of defining a man (alongside his relationship to his father, as spelled out by patronymic epithets) is through his armour and weapons: the central aim of the victor in a combat is to gain honour by stripping the armour from his vanquished adversary; the central aim of the companions of the vanquished is to prevent that act of stripping, by recovering the corpse together with its armour and taking both back to base camp. In spite of their unflinching bloodiness, however, such passages are framed and balanced by constant shifts in perspective—drawings-back and contextualisations, both through reference to the quite different perspective of the Olympians, and through the similes, which set the slaughter against a background of, especially, the regular (though by no means always non-violent) rhythms of the natural world. Is the dripping blood of the first part of *Ajax* similarly mitigated and contextualised by counterbalancing perspectives?

A little: but not much. Generalisations by Athena and Odysseus transport us briefly into a linguistic territory characterized by generality and reflectiveness: 'For I see', observes Odysseus, 'that all we who live are nothing more than phantoms or an empty shadow' (125–126), which Athena caps with 'For a day can cause all human affairs to sink and bring them up again' (131–132).[7] But the vista momentarily opened up by these observations is clouded by their grounding in self-interest: in Odysseus' case explicitly (οὐδὲν τὸ τούτου μᾶλλον ἢ τοὐμὸν σκοπῶν, '(I am) looking to his case no more than to my own', 124), in Athena's case implicitly: the cause of human

[6] See e.g. Easterling (1984); Valakas (1988); and Davidson in this volume.

[7] This is reminiscent of the 'distance' achieved by Cassandra immediately before she goes to her death in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (1327–1330).

instability is quite simply the power of the gods to crush those mortals who display arrogance towards divinities (127–133).

What of the chorus? They are ἄνδρες ἀσπιστῆρες, 'shieldsmen' (565) as Ajax calls them—*their* identity defined by *their* shields. In the parodos, when they do venture a generalisation, it is one which centres on the very type of 'tower-like' shield often associated with Ajax himself: 'Small men without the great are a treacherous protective shield' (158–159).[8] A tiny choral glimpse into a broader, natural world ('Your enemies' aggressive arrogance stirs so fearlessly in the glens where the winds blow freely', 196–197) is quite insignificant compared with—to take an obvious example—the vast cosmic scope of the parodos of *Trachiniae*, where the spangled night, the full geographical extent of the world, the surging sea, and the wheeling paths of the Great Bear, are all brought into counterpoint with the fate of Heracles.[9]

If we look to Tecmessa to invoke a broader context for what is so mystifyingly happening to her, we look in vain: it is hardly an exaggeration to say that her view of the action is, linguistically as well as scenically, restricted to the tent which has become her entire world. It is, rather, in the words of Ajax himself that, already before the astonishing speech at 646–692, we find a willingness to look beyond the tent and the camp. Given his obsession with what he has suffered and done, it is unsurprising that the 'other places' he mentions are extensions of his own self: parts of his past, present, and possible future. So he appeals to the darkness of the Underworld to receive him (394–396); he calls upon the sea, caves, pastures and rivers of the Troad, which will see him no more (412–420); he mentions, only to reject them, two possible destinations: his homeland, and the city of Troy (460–470).

In the scene with Eurysaces, the obsession with self, with armour, and with the continuity between self and armour enacted in the name and person of 'Broad Shield', these things are almost all-consuming. Almost, but not quite. For there is one moment when the brows become unfurrowed, and the clouds of martial intensity part. 'Until you reach fighting age', Ajax tells his little boy,

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[8] Cf. *Il.* 17.128: Αἴας δ' ἐγγύθεν ἦλθε φέρων σάκος ἠΰτε πύργον, 'Ajax came near to him bearing his tower-like shield'; cf. Whallon (1966); Garner (1990: 60–61).

[9] *Tr.* 94–140. One might also note, by way of contrast with *Ajax*, the broad scope of two odes from *Antigone*: πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ . . . (332–383) and Ἔρως ἀνίκατε μάχαν . . . (781–800).

κούφοις πνεύμασιν βόσκου, νέαν
ψυχὴν ἀτάλλων, μητρὶ τῇδε χαρμονήν. (*Aj.* 558–559)[10]

be fed by light breezes, nurturing your/young soul, a joy to your mother here.

This is a preludial chord of the music which will strike up in full force at line 646, at the start of what is usually called the Deception Speech.

The breadth of perspective in that speech is immediate:

ἅπανθ᾽ ὁ μακρὸς κἀναρίθμητος χρόνος
φύει τ᾽ ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται. (*Aj.* 646–647)

Long and immeasurable time brings forth all things/that were obscure, and hides those things that have come to light.

Because time is so inconceivably long, there is no change which it cannot effect. Even Ajax, as the hero himself assures us, has been feminised, though formerly he was hardened by dipping, βαφῇ (651): again the identity of man and weapon. But the paradox for this archetypal warrior is that he is going to *hide* his sword. Nor, Ajax maintains, should anyone be surprised by the giving way of something strong: for such a process of giving way is replicated in four areas of experience: seasonal, astronomical, meteorological, human:

τοῦτο μὲν νιφοστιβεῖς
χειμῶνες ἐκχωροῦσιν εὐκάρπῳ θέρει·
ἐξίσταται δὲ νυκτὸς αἰανὴς κύκλος
τῇ λευκοπώλῳ φέγγος ἡμέρᾳ φλέγειν·
δεινῶν δ᾽ ἄημα πνευμάτων ἐκοίμισε
στένοντα πόντον· ἐν δ᾽ ὁ παγκρατὴς Ὕπνος
λύει πεδήσας, οὐδ᾽ ἀεὶ λαβὼν ἔχει. (*Aj.* 670–676)

Winters which cover the paths with snow/give way to summer with its lovely fruit;/the eternal rotation of the night gives way for day,/with its white horses, to kindle its light;/the blowing of terrible winds puts to sleep/the groaning sea; moreover, omnipotent Sleep/releases what it has fettered, and what it has seized it does not hold for ever.

The density of this sequence of four images is wholly unHomeric: in the *Iliad* each of the first three images, at least, would have been expressed through a simile several lines long. Yet for all its density, the *Ajax* passage opens out the auditors' perspective in a way unparalleled earlier on.[11]

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[10] For possible Homeric antecedents, see Easterling (1984: 5).
[11] Cohen (1978: 29) puts it well: '[. . .] Ajax [. . .] begins a speech whose elevated

The Speech of Day's White Horses—as I shall call it from now on—has a galvanising effect on the chorus. Not only do they take their emotional cue from what they assume to be Ajax' change of mind; their linguistic horizons are transformed also. As usual they follow Ajax' lead; but the direction he leads them in this time is shaped by that remarkable imagery. They invoke Pan from the snows of Cyllene, and summon Apollo from across the sea; above all, 'the white light of a happy day' (λευκὸν εὐάμερον . . . φάος, 708–709) can now draw near to the Greek ships. And even—can one believe it from *this* chorus?—πάνθ' ὁ μέγας χρόνος μαραίνει τε καὶ φλέγει, 'great time extinguishes all things and kindles them . . .' (714)—if 'and kindles them' is indeed to be retained in the text, as some have certainly argued.[12] In any case, the chorus have taken wing, inspired by Ajax' music. It is one of the genuinely tragic aspects of this play that the music is never heard again.[13]

The messenger's report of Calchas' prediction decisively re-inflects the play's representation of time. From the measureless expanse evoked in the Speech of Day's White Horses, time—all the time that matters—has been reduced to a single day: the duration of Athena's wrath. In spite of this drastic reduction in temporal scope, there is, as one might expect from a prophet, a broader perspective: a man who does not κατ' ἄνθρωπον φρονεῖν, 'think human thoughts' (761), is liable to be struck by misfortunes from the gods, an echo of Athena's counselling against human arrogance (127–133). What is absent is a replaying of the Ajax music.

At 815–865 Ajax delivers his second speech focussed upon a sword—a sword soon to re-attain what the play has defined as its proper condition as νεορράντῳ, 'freshly wetted' (828). There are farewells to the springs, rivers and plains of Troy (862–863), and, if line 856 is genuine, a reassertion of the theme of daylight: ὦ φαεννῆς ἡμέρας τὸ νῦν σέλας . . ., 'O present light of the shining day'. But we should note the qualification: it is *today's* shining light which is invoked. Light, like time, has become concentrated—no longer endlessly cyclical,

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poetry, metaphysical speculation, and human insight are totally unlike anything he has said in the play thus far'. Cohen does not, however, discuss the breadth and poetic intensity of Ajax' language in his article.

[12] For the honorand of this volume (Kamerbeek 1963, *ad loc.*) the words 'probably belong to the text'.

[13] For other Sophoclean 'touches of extraordinary poetry' evoking the landscape, see Segal (1995: 4–5).

as it was in the Speech of Day's White Horses. The focus is sharper, like Ajax' purpose, and his blade.

The discovery of the corpse drives Tecmessa to refocus the visual action in terms of a familiar theme:

> νεοσφαγὴς
> κεῖται, κρυφαίῳ φασγάνῳ περιπτυχής. (*Aj.* 898–899)
>
> newly slaughtered/he lies, folded around his (now) hidden sword.

Ajax' sword once more displays its quintessential characteristic: dripping red. The hero has become literally inseparable from his weapon; indeed, Teucer's very practical dilemma is: 'How am I to pull you away from this cruel, glittering spike?' (1024–1025).[14]

The final sequence of the play, with the successive arrivals of Menelaus, Tecmessa and Eurysaces, Agamemnon, and Odysseus, could in principle generate fresh perspectives. But what happens, in fact, from this point onwards, to the theme of weapons, and to the music of the Speech of Day's White Horses?

In the scene between Menelaus and Teucer, the limited horizon within which Menelaus operates is summed up by the terms in which he illustrates the proposition that things go παραλλάξ, 'in alternation' (1087): 'This man was formerly full of fiery *hybris*, but now it is my turn to be proud' (1087–1088). When Teucer retorts in kind, the quarrel descends to insults about weapons: 'The archer is getting above himself' (1120); 'Even lightly armed I would be a match for you, though you carried full armour' (1123). *Arma virumque*: arms *are* the man. There is no distance and no music.

Menelaus' exit is followed by the entry of Tecmessa and Broad Shield, who express their emotional and physical solidarity with the corpse: what strikes us is not their distance from the dead man, but their intimate proximity to him. Broad Shield is to hold his father tight at all costs: Ajax will be inseparable from a shield as well as from a sword.[15]

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[14] On the expression see Garner (1990: 63).

[15] Incidentally, there is no suggestion that the sword itself is to be regarded as in some way to be ritually condemned, *qua* agent of suicide—in the way that some of our sources refer to the destruction of ropes, roof-beams etc, in the case of suicide by hanging. For Ajax' enemies, the fact that he has killed himself is irrelevant: what matters is the fact that he plotted against the lives of other Greek leaders. Cf. Garrison (1995: 13–16; 53).

How about the choral ode at 1185–1222? Will it return us to the register of the Speech of Day's White Horses? Not a bit of it. Apart from their expression of the wish to be at Sounion, the chorus' attention is fixed upon the idea of weapons: a plague on the man who first introduced into Greece the στυγερῶν . . . ὅπλων κοινὸν Ἄρη, 'the communal warfare of hateful weapons' (1195–1196). No more does Teucer's altercation with Agamemnon contain an echo of Ajax' music. The insults this time are about genealogy rather than weaponry, but the framework remains resolutely politico-military.

But surely with Odysseus, we shall hear the music again? He did, after all, give a hint of greater breadth in the opening dialogue with Athena. But, again, no: his dispute with Agamemnon turns on how to think about morality within the present politico-military situation. 'I say bury him—for one day I too shall come to that need (sc. I shall need someone to bury *me*)' (1365). The terms of the argument allow no room for the kind of distance or music which we are listening out for. As for the final action of the play, this re-affirms the identification of warrior with armour, as Teucer bids an attendant bring out the armour which Ajax wore beneath his shield. Visually, the identification of armour with warrior is total.

Linguistically, however, the play has shown us an Ajax who, briefly but sublimely, touched a quite different realm of experience. But does this mean that the Sophoclean Ajax is to that extent richer and deeper *as a character*? That is not, I believe, quite the way to put the matter. In order to explain what I mean, I would like to suggest a Shakespearian analogy.

Macbeth is a man of arms, and a shedder of blood: the first description we have of him is as one who

> with his brandished steel,
> Which smoked with bloody execution,
> Like valour's minion carvèd out his passage
> Till he faced the slave—
> Which ne'er shook hands nor bade farewell to him
> Till he unseamed him from the nave to the chops,
> And fixed his head upon our battlements. (1.2.17–23)

He remains a warrior to the last:

> I'll fight till from my bones my flesh be hacked.
> Give me my armour. (5.3.32–33)

In terms of his human qualities, Macbeth is no Ajax, and Lady Macbeth most decidedly no Tecmessa. Macbeth's regal ambitions are tyrannically realised, at a spiralling cost in the dreadful suffering of innocents. But there is one significant similarity with *Ajax*, which relates to the capacity of Macbeth to transcend his role through the language which the playwright has created for him. This is noticeable much earlier and far more extensively than it is in Sophocles' play: in Act I Macbeth likens pity to 'a naked newborn babe striding the blast' (1.7.21–22), and in Act II talks wonderfully of 'sleep that knits up the ravelled sleave of care' (2.2.36). But it is as late as Act 5 Scene 5, just before the final battle, that, jolted by the news of Lady Macbeth's death, this despicable tyrant achieves linguistic sublimity:

> Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,
> Creeps in this petty pace from day to day
> To the last syllable of recorded time;
> And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
> The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
> Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
> That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
> And then is heard no more. It is a tale
> Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
> Signifying nothing. (5.5.19–28)

For Macbeth, as for Ajax, the extent of time is very, very long; and yet, in their respective crises, neither has much time left. Both men think of the light; but, whereas Ajax can imagine the daylight, the disenchanted Macbeth can only refer to the artificial light of a candle.

I believe it would be inaccurate to say that it is, precisely and without qualification, Macbeth's *character* which enables him to achieve these insights. Rather is it the case that, to his extreme *position*—now more than ever a position of isolation after Lady Macbeth's death—there corresponds an extraordinariness of linguistic capacity. As the Shakespearian critic G.K. Hunter remarked of this murderous butcher, 'The poetry [. . .] carries our sympathy beyond the point where ordinary human identification can expect to operate'.[16] *Mutatis mutandis*, we may say something similar of Ajax. Just as it is the suddenly marginal *position* of the blinded Polymestor at the end of *Hecuba*, rather than any instantaneous change in his character, which authorises his acquisition of the power of prophetic language, so in the case of

[16] Hunter (1967: 29).

Ajax his self-constructed isolation, growing out of his status throughout the play as an extreme outsider, has as its counterpart the power occasionally to rise up and, in quasi-choral fashion, to sing.

But my suggested de-coupling of language from character should only be regarded as partial. Macbeth's nihilistic atheism is all of a piece with his character as (in the words of one critic) 'a hardened sinner'.[17] The fact that Oedipus in *Oedipus Coloneus* can generalise about changeability and the shift from loyalty to disloyalty (616–620) is a function, to be sure, of the extreme marginality of his position (through age and exile and blindness), but it stems also from an aspect of his individuality—his personal experience of disloyalty. So too in *Ajax*. The Speech of Day's White Horses is spoken by Ajax, and not by someone else. Part of our sense of loss at his passing is surely occasioned by the feeling, which inexorably intensifies as the play goes on, that, with the death of this particular hero, something remarkable and individual has been lost, and has not been replaced.[18]

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[17] Bethell (1944: 74).

[18] I am extremely grateful to Jon Hesk for making available to me a pre-publication draft of his *Companion* to Sophocles' *Ajax* (Hesk 2003); I found particularly helpful his discussion of competing interpretations of the so-called Deception Speech. For other advice I am indebted to my fellow-participants at the Amsterdam colloquium, especially André Lardinois. The friend I visited in Budapest (see the beginning of the paper) is Gyorgy Karsai; I thank him both for his incomparable hospitality and for his comments on the present paper.

SOPHOCLES AND HOMER: SOME ISSUES OF VOCABULARY

John Davidson

It has become a truism that Sophocles is 'Homeric' or indeed the 'most Homeric' of the Greek tragedians. The idea is well established in the ancient testimonia[1] and has been taken up with enthusiasm by modern scholarship. There is, however, no comprehensive work devoted to it, the main problem being the sheer enormity of the task.[2] In addition to aspects of setting, characterisation and dramatic structure, numerous features of vocabulary, syntax and poetic style testify to points of contact at many levels between the works of the fifth-century poet and the Homeric texts.

It is easy enough simply to identify such points of contact. Sometimes more challenging, however, is an attempt to trace the precise process of poetic assimilation. This will be illustrated at the end of this paper through an example from the *Oedipus Tyrannus*. Always challenging, whenever Sophocles appears in some way to be echoing, imitating, exploiting or reworking language from a Homeric context, is the question of exactly why he is doing it. In any given instance, can we validly speak of a conscious choice involving a particular strategy, rather than just the reflection of a poetic mind steeped in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*? To what extent too, more generally, is there some overarching principle connecting all the points of contact? Or should we rather think in terms of localised inspiration?

Within the limited scope of this paper, it would be unrealistic to attempt answers to the larger questions. What we can do, however, is to explore a number of Sophoclean contexts which contain palpable echoes of Homeric vocabulary and see whether or not a consistent pattern of application emerges, and whether or not we could be justified in using one and the same approach in a critical assessment of them. The main part of the discussion will focus on the expression

[1] Cf. Radt (1977: 75).
[2] Cf. Fraenkel (1977: 15).

Αἴαντι τῷ σακεσφόρῳ in line 19 of the *Ajax* (Odysseus speaking to Athena), the assumption being that Sophocles is, in *this* instance anyway, indeed consciously choosing his words or rather forming his epithet in the light of a particular Homeric formulaic expression. This will become the test case, so to speak, in reference to which some other instances will be (more briefly) considered.

On *Ajax* line 19, the connection with the *Iliad* is made already by the ancient Scholiast: σακεσφόρῳ—οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὁπλο<φόρῳ> ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐξοχήν· Ὅμηρος—Αἴας δ' ἐγγύθεν ἦλθε φέρων σάκος ἠύτε πύργον. The reference is to *Iliad* 7.219, a line after which the shield itself is further characterised as χάλκεον ἑπταβόειον at the start of line 220, ahead of a brief acknowledgement of the craftsman, and an elaboration of the materials used and method of manufacture (lines 220–223). The basic formulaic expression in *Iliad* 7.219 (without the further elaboration) is then subsequently repeated in *Iliad* 11.485 and 17.128.

Among *modern* commentators, Lobeck and Campbell appear to pass over the passage completely.[3] Schneidewin & Nauck have this to say:[4] 'τῷ σακεσφόρω, wegen des gewaltigen Schildes[5] [. . .] wodurch er von dem 'Οιλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας unterschieden wird. Zu dieser Ehrenwaffe bildet die μάστιξ des später als μαστιγοφόρος heraustretenden wahnsinnigen Helden einen grellen Gegensatz.'[6] Jebb simply quotes *Iliad* 7.219 plus the χάλκεον ἑπταβόειον at the start of line 220 and then explains how the shield was made (paraphrasing the Homeric original).[7] Kamerbeek offers: 'the heavy shield of seven oxhides is by tradition the attribute of Ajax: cf. 576, *Iliad* VII 219 [. . .]'.[8] Stanford has a great deal to say about the shield as such throughout his commentary and certainly refers to *Iliad* 7.219 and other Iliadic passages.[9] However, he never specifically links τῷ σακεσφόρῳ to the Homeric expression, his note at line 19 on the epithet merely stating: '"Ajax the shield-bearer" (see on 576), to dis-

[3] Lobeck (1835); Campbell (1881).

[4] Schneidewin & Nauck (1888: note *ad loc.*).

[5] Here they refer to line 576 of the play, pointing to the later manifestation of the ἑπτάβοιον ἄρρηκτον σάκος, as will be discussed below, and then cite *Iliad* 7.219ff.

[6] The revision of Radermacher (1913: note *ad loc.*) has exactly the same comment, except that the words 'zu dieser Ehrenwaffe' are replaced by 'zu dieser berühmten Waffe'.

[7] Jebb (1896: note *ad loc.*). He then says: 'Cp. 576', before quoting Ov. *Met.* 13.2—*clypei dominus septemplicis Aiax.*

[8] Kamerbeek (1963: note *ad loc.*).

[9] Stanford (1963).

tinguish him from the "lesser", Locrian, Ajax [. . .]'. Garvie has slightly more to say, his note on 'the bearer of the shield' (his translation of τῷ σακεσφόρῳ) being as follows:

> the epithet is not ornamental. We are meant to recall the *Iliad*, in which he [i.e. Ajax] is the possessor of the great, tower-like, body-shield, made of seven layers of ox-hide (7.219–20, etc.); cf. 574–6n. [. . .] This kind of shield was already obsolete long before the Trojan War. In *Il.* only Ajax carries it, apart from Hector at 6.117–8 and Periphetes at 15.645–6. Even more than his sword (10), which will turn into a symbol of his destructive madness and tragedy, his shield symbolises his status as a warrior and hero, and as the protector of his people [. . .][10]

A significant critical mass, so to speak, is building up around Αἴαντι τῷ σακεσφόρῳ, and there is more to come. In his classic study of the Sophoclean play, Bernard Knox espoused the view that the frequent Homeric reminiscences served to characterise Ajax as the last of the Homeric heroes, whose death would leave a vacuum to be filled by men of very different qualities.[11] One could imagine that, for Knox, Αἴαντι τῷ σακεσφόρῳ was an early, if not the earliest signpost of this. Winnington-Ingram, on the other hand, took a very different approach.[12] For him, the Homeric reminiscences served to point up the *contrast* between the Sophoclean Ajax and his Homeric models—and here, of course, we have to take into account not only the Iliadic *Ajax*, but also other figures such as Achilles and, as Pat Easterling has so notably shown, Hector.[13] However, whichever of these approaches one took, Αἴαντι τῷ σακεσφόρῳ would be part of a significant Homeric nexus, consisting of both linguistic and situational features.

But there are other ways of looking at all this. Even if we accept, as we are virtually forced to do, the 'presence' in general of the *Iliad* in the Sophoclean play, such acceptance would not necessarily require us to subscribe to either the Knox or Winnington-Ingram view of the *significance* of this 'presence' for a global interpretation of the play. For that matter, whatever global interpretation we took of the play, would we be bound to link each individual Homeric moment *into* such an interpretation?

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[10] Garvie (1998). He finally refers to Segal (1981: 116).
[11] Knox (1961).
[12] Winnington-Ingram (1980: 15–19).
[13] Easterling (1984).

With regard to Αἴαντι τῷ σακεσφόρῳ as such, we have seen how Garvie states categorically: 'The epithet is not ornamental. We are meant to recall the *Iliad* [. . .].' What exactly, though, are we meant to recall? As we have noted, there are three places in the *Iliad* where the expression Αἴας δ' ἐγγύθεν ἦλθε φέρων σάκος ἠύτε πύργον occurs. At 7.219, the context normally cited, because it is the fullest, the shield is part of the overall picture of *menace* which Ajax presents as he approaches Hector. In the following description of the duel, however, the shield serves to protect *Ajax himself* from Hector's spear. At 11.485, the two concepts of threat and protectiveness are combined in the expression itself, since Ajax here approaches not only as a figure of menace to the Trojans, but also as a source of protection for Odysseus. In the expression as used at 17.127, on the other hand, the shield is primarily part of a portrayal of Ajax' *defensive* aspect, since he approaches this time to help Menelaus protect Patroclus' body from Hector. At the same time, of course, the shield is part of the overall threat which Ajax is presenting to Hector. However, it is the protective aspect which then becomes most prominent as the shield is used (at 17.132) to cover Patroclus' body.

If we recall all this, then, what are the implications for Αἴαντι τῷ σακεσφόρῳ in *Ajax* line 19? Are we being reminded at the start of the play that Ajax represents a threat to his enemies and protection for his friends? If so, this could signal the irony in the play by which Ajax has become, in fact, no real threat to his enemies, and unable to protect his friends. Moreover, if we privileged *Iliad* 11.485 over the two other Iliadic passages where the φέρων expression occurred, on the grounds that it involved protection for *Odysseus*, we might point to the further irony by which Odysseus later on in the play is, in one sense, going to protect Ajax, even if that is not evident from the situation pertaining at line 19. Or, if we privileged *Iliad* 17.127, we might point to another irony by which the Homeric Menelaus, whom Ajax assists in *this* context, has become the Sophoclean Ajax' enemy.

But the question remains about line 19. In how much detail are we meant to recall the *Iliad* and reinvest it in the play? Would we necessarily have to recall one or more of the three Iliadic passages where the particular expression occurs, rather than the *Iliad* in general, or at least all the passages where Ajax was associated with his famous σάκος? If we were going to privilege any one of the Iliadic passages, it would probably be 7.219ff. because of the echo of χάλκεον ἑπταβόειον

in line 576 of the play. But this is not necessarily operative at line 19.[14]

Irrespective of all this, if, with regard to line 19, we do just think in more general terms, given that the shield as such functions as basically a defensive piece of equipment, used, for example, to save Teucer at 8.331, we might conclude that it was just the protective, or ironically the non-protective aspect, of Ajax which was signalled by τῷ σακεσφόρῳ. And we could add that the threatening, or ironically non-threatening aspect, had already been flagged by Athena's prior reference in line 10 to Ajax' χέρας ξιφοκτόνους. For that matter, if we just focussed on the protective aspect of the σάκος, we might at a pinch privilege *Iliad* 8.331, where, as we have seen, it is used to save Teucer, and then point to the irony in the Sophoclean play, by which the shield-bearing Ajax is, in turn, going to be saved, in another sense, by none other than Teucer, although again, of course, at line 19 we do not yet know this.

But there are yet further angles to consider. Is the whole point of τῷ σακεσφόρῳ in the end simply to identify *which* Ajax we are dealing with, to distinguish him from the so-called lesser Ajax? This is *one* of the points made by the commentators, but could it in fact be the only significant function of the word in this context? If it were, it would still certainly be a Homeric allusion, but a very light-weight one.[15] Then again, thinking back to Garvie's categorical denial that the epithet is 'ornamental', would it be possible to argue that in fact it *is* basically ornamental, since though it would certainly serve to identify the hero, it would also be highly inappropriate in its immediate context, as it would be stretching credibility to argue that Odysseus, in using it, could imagine that Ajax was at this very moment, inside his hut, strutting round and round carrying his shield (unless of course he had a shield fetish, to go with his general madness!). In a sense, τῷ σακεσφόρῳ for Ajax at this precise moment is no more pertinent than, for example, χρυσόθρονος as a qualifier of

[14] Worth noting too is the interesting point made by Garner (1990: 60), who draws attention to the fact that Teucer calls for Eurysaces to be brought 'in case some enemy snatches him, like the cub of a lioness bereft of her mate'. He then suggests that this is specifically designed to recall the Iliadic scene *initiated* by 17.127 (Ajax protecting the body of Patroclus), where Ajax is likened to a lion protecting its young.

[15] As light-weight as the description πολύτλας ἀνήρ which the chorus, more or less out of the blue, are made to apply to Odysseus at line 956, whether ironically or not.

Hera lying in bed with Zeus at *Iliad* 1.611. If we took this line, of course, Sophocles could still be said to be very much behaving epithetically *à la* Homer.

But there is yet another question. How far should we in any case be looking *back* at the *Iliad* rather than focussing on the work which τῷ σακεσφόρῳ may be doing in the Sophoclean play, irrespective of Homer, even if Homer is the ultimate source? We might say, in this connection, that the primary importance of τῷ σακεσφόρῳ is its function in pointing forward to lines 574–576 where Ajax will command Eurysaces to take and wield the shield after which he is named. Indeed, we might say further that τῷ σακεσφόρῳ is a pointer to the process by which Ajax will, so to speak, retire into the shadows in favour of his son and heir. At the same time too, in its immediate context, Sophocles may be deliberately using τῷ σακεσφόρῳ to point up an ironic contrast not only with the sword slaughtering hands of line 10, but also, as noted by Schneidewin, Nauck & Radermacher, with the whip which is what Ajax actually has in his hands when he first comes in sight of the audience.

Still more could be said. We have been been considering τῷ σακεσφόρῳ in the light of Homeric vocabulary and the range of applications associated with the noun σάκος. What if we were to take a totally different approach? What if we were to see Αἴαντι τῷ σακεσφόρῳ as basically just the first element of a profile gradually building up around the hero's name, which also included the descriptive expressions ὁ δεινὸς μέγας ὠμοκρατὴς Αἴας (lines 205–206), δυσθεράπευτος Αἴας (line 609), Αἴας λαθίπονος (lines 710–711), ὁ δυστράπελος δυσώνυμος Αἴας (lines 913–914), δύσμορ᾽ Αἴας (line 923), and θούριος Αἴας (line 1213)? Or we could follow yet another line of thought.

In the play's prologue and parodos alone, starting with ἴχνη νεοχάραχθ᾽ (line 6), there are at least twelve examples of striking noun-compound epithet combinations, not involving the hero's name, each one carefully tailored to suit its immediate context. And there are many other examples after that. Thus it might be argued that it should be in *this* context primarily that we should consider Αἴαντι τῷ σακεσφόρῳ, in other words, that Sophocles just enjoyed playing with compound epithets. Interestingly, if we took that view, we could still say that Sophocles was being at the same time creatively Homeric.

The preceding discussion may seem to have been somewhat inconclusive. On balance, it seems most likely that the expression Αἴαντι τῷ σακεσφόρῳ is in some way closely tied to Homeric language and

a Homeric context. However, at this stage it would be rash to claim that we knew exactly what duty it is doing, or what the implications of the Homeric factor are for an interpretation of the Sophoclean phrase, in both its immediate and wider dramatic contexts.[16] Against this background, let us now turn to another expression in another play.

At lines 17–19 of the *Electra*, the Paedagogus heralds the arrival of day:

> ὡς ἡμὶν ἤδη λαμπρὸν ἡλίου σέλας
> ἑῷα κινεῖ φθέγματ' ὀρνίθων σαφῆ
> μέλαινά τ' ἄστρων ἐκλέλοιπεν εὐφρόνη. (*El.* 17–19)
>
> For already we have the sun's bright light / awakening the clear bird-song of morning, / and the black night of stars has ended.

This time the Scholiast does not trumpet a passage in Homer that he sees reflected in the Sophoclean passage, though he does quote a linguistically unrelated Homeric expression in discussing Sophocles' grammar.[17] And indeed it is the problem of explaining the grammar of line 19 that exercises the minds of most of the earlier modern commentators as well. Kaibel,[18] however, brings Homer into the picture as follows: 'Dem λαμρπὸν ἡλίου σέλας weicht der bleiche Lichtschimmer der dunklen Nacht, μέλαινα ἄστρων ἐκλέλοιπεν εὐφρόνη, ähnlich wie Homer' (and he gives as reference *Iliad* 8.485–486: ἐν δ' ἔπεσ' Ὠκεανῷ λαμπρὸν φάος ἠελίοιο,/ἕλκον νύκτα μέλαιναν ἐπὶ ζείδωρον ἄρουραν.)

So it is *like Iliad* 8.485–486. Is that all that can be said? Jebb, Kamerbeek, Kells and Schneidewin, Nauck & Bruhn are totally silent.[19] March simply comments: 'The light of day traditionally symbolises salvation', and she points to *Iliad* 6.6, 17.615 and 18.102 as well as to various passages in Aeschylus.[20] Kaibel, then, it seems, is the only modern commentator even to place the Sophoclean expression *alongside something similar* in Homer. Yet I do not think that I was really going too far, at least with regard to the Sophoclean echo of Homer, when I wrote the following in 1988:[21]

[16] We must also acknowledge that if we possessed the text of the *Little Iliad* in particular, not to mention Aeschylus' relevant dramas, we might have to revise our entire approach.
[17] *Il.* 4.535—ὁ δὲ χασσάμενος πελεμίχθη.
[18] Kaibel (1896: note *ad loc.*).
[19] Kells (1973); Schneidewin, Nauck & Bruhn (1912).
[20] March (2001: note *ad loc.*).
[21] Davidson (1988: 59).

> In this description of sunrise, the expressions λαμπρὸν ἡλίου σέλας and μέλαινα [. . .] εὐφρόνη are paired in the same way as the Homeric λαμπρὸν φάος ἠελίοιο and νύκτα μέλαιναν (found separately in other Homeric contexts) are paired (in the same order) in the description of sunset at *Iliad* 8.485–6. Soph. seems basically to be applying two Homeric ornamental epithets to nouns that are not the same as, but synonymous with those used in the similar Homeric context [. . .] There is a contrast implied, no doubt, between the brightness of the dawn and the 'dark' deeds past and future associated with the royal house of Mycenae. However, the very cast of the Homeric passage upon which Soph. appears to draw as a model perhaps suggests that Segal[22] [. . .] is overstating the case for the predominance of Sophoclean 'darkness' when, taking note of μέλαινα [. . .] εὐφρόνη, he finds the dawn to be described '[. . .] in part, in a curiously contorted, indeed a negative manner [. . .]' Moreover, the Homeric darkness itself was a source of relief, at least to the Greeks!

It is that last sentence of mine, however, that I want to pick up on. This implies that the Homeric context might have significance for the interpretation of the Sophoclean passage. Let us examine this Homeric context in more detail. Hector has been pressing the Greeks hard and is already threatening the ships. Hera and Athena have planned to intervene but have been prevented by Zeus, and their complaints have been silenced. Then comes our passage, which is followed by words to the effect that the failing light came unwelcome to the Trojans, but that the darkness of night was most welcome to the Greeks.

Now Sophocles, as we have seen, appears to have transformed the Homeric description of sunset into a description of sunrise. So we might say that this implies that the fierce battle which has been temporarily put on hold in the *Iliad* is about to *begin* in the Sophoclean play. Sunlight signals battle,[23] which in turn signals cost in human terms. But does that serve to cast the shadow over the Sophoclean proceedings, which a number of critics have detected? It appears hard to argue this, especially as the coming battle in Sophocles is

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[22] Segal (1966: 491–492).

[23] An instance of this in tragedy can be seen at E. *Supp.* 650–651, where the messenger commences his battle narrative with the words: λαμπρὰ μὲν ἀκτὶς ἡλίου, κανὼν σαφής,/ἔβαλλε γαῖαν· In that case, of course, the sunlight reference also anticipates the 'light' of victory which the messenger will go on to report. See Collard (1975: note *ad loc.*). Sunlight primarily as a symbol of victory, the battle already having been won, is exploited dramatically by Sophocles in the parodos of *Antigone*.

totally different in every respect from the Homeric one. On the other hand, it might be equally specious to argue something *positive* into the Sophoclean context, on the grounds that the end result in the Homeric context was 'rescue' for the Greeks. We might be better to concentrate on the contrast within the Sophoclean play itself between what the daylight means for Orestes, namely positive action, as opposed to what it means for Electra, namely dirges and breast-beating, as we find in the opening words of her monody at lines 86–120, especially when the context of the φάος ἁγνόν (line 86) which she greets as witness of her lamentation, is expressed through the clause ὁπόταν δνοφερὰ νὺξ ὑπολειφθῇ (line 91).

But what if we conclude that in this case Sophocles is simply reworking *Homeric language* without importing anything of the Homeric context into his new context, whether in terms of reinforcement or contrast? Might this in turn have implications for Αἴαντι τῷ σακεσφόρῳ? The cases are rather different, of course. But should we be forced at least to consider the possibility that the Homeric *context* after all had only minimal input at *Ajax* line 19?

Let us consider a further example—*Antigone* 944–945, the opening lines of the fourth stasimon: ἔτλα καὶ Δανάας οὐράνιον φῶς/ἀλλάξαι δέμας ἐν χαλκοδέτοις αὐλαῖς. There is nothing touching on Homer from the ancient scholia. However, the verbal connection with the consolation offered to Aphrodite by Dione, similarly citing three precedents (τέτλαθι . . . τλῆμεν . . . τλῆ . . . τλῆ . . . τλῆ—*Iliad* 5.382–404), is noted by Schneidewin, Nauck & Bruhn,[24] who also comment: 'Von selbst ergibt sich aus ἔτλα ein τέτλαθι (the word with which the Homeric sequence begins)'. Jebb, Kamerbeek, Brown and Griffith all duly note the Homeric connection,[25] as does Müller who, however, adds: 'Nur der Doppelsinn von ἔτλα, 1. sie musste es erdulden, 2. sie hatte den Mut dazu, ist sophokleischen Ursprungs'.[26]

But are the general consolation context, the three mythical *paradeigmata*, and the employment of a particular verb in a particular position, all that need be said about the Homeric-Sophoclean connection? For a start, one suspects that the expression ἐν χαλκοδέτοις αὐλαῖς, applied to Danae, owes something to the scenario associated

[24] Schneidewin, Nauck & Bruhn (1904: note *ad loc.*).
[25] Jebb (1888: note *ad loc.*); Kamerbeek (1978: note *ad loc.*); Brown (1987: note *ad loc.*); Griffith (1999: note *ad loc.*).
[26] Müller (1967: 219).

with Ares, the subject of the correspondingly first of the three *paradeigmata* in the *Iliad* 5 passage. This is Ares whom Otus and Ephialtes δῆσαν κρατερῷ ἐνὶ δεσμῷ (line 386). Moreover, the god χαλκέῳ δ' ἐν κεράμῳ δέδετο τρισκαίδεκα μῆνας (line 387). At the very least, we have the connection, at the purely linguistic level, between binding and bronze.

But if we investigate the contexts further, what might we come up with? For a start, we have in the *Antigone* passage a chorus of elders offering consolation to a young woman, as a mother, in the Homeric context, offers consolation to a daughter. The Iliadic daughter has been worsted in a battle where she does not belong, a battle which serves to display Diomedes' *aristeia*. Might this imply that Antigone has been worsted in a situation where *she* does not belong, namely a 'battle' which could be seen as confirming Creon's '*aristeia*'? It is unlikely that anyone would push that line of argument. But there would at least be some point in the thought that, in a sense, Antigone *was* operating in the wrong context, that is, as a woman entering the political preserve of the male. At the same time, what would have to be taken into account in this particular pair of contexts is the significant contrast of tone—almost comic in the case of Aphrodite where we also know that she has only been wounded and will recover, deadly serious in the case of Antigone who is going to die. So might the Homeric context be working here subtly at more than just the surface level after all, on the basis of that seemingly inoffensive little word ἔτλα supplemented as this is by the consolation context, the three *paradeigmata*, and the juxtaposition of ideas in the epithet χαλκοδέτοις?

The plot thickens, so to speak, when we turn to yet another Sophoclean consolation context. The chorus of the *Electra*, at their entry, attempt to comfort the grieving heroine, pointing out certain truths associated with her social situation and human mortality. At line 220, both Lloyd-Jones & Wilson and Lloyd-Jones adopt Wakefield's emendation τλᾶθι for the MSS πλάθειν, so that lines 219–220 would read . . . τὰ δὲ (τάδε Lloyd-Jones)—τοῖς δυνατοῖς/οὐκ ἐριστά—τλᾶθι.[27] If the emendation is correct, we would have another verbal link with the Homeric consolation prototype. Once again too, we would have advice being given to a female who had ventured into an inappro-

[27] Lloyd-Jones & Wilson (1990a); Lloyd-Jones (1994–1996).

priate 'battleground'. In this case, interestingly, the chorus also say . . . αὐδῶ, /μάτηρ ὡσεί τις πιστά (233–234), which echoes the maternal role of Dione vis-à-vis Aphrodite. Given Sophocles' almost certain exploitation of the Iliadic passage in the *Antigone* context, there is at least a strong possibility that the same passage is behind the genesis of the *Electra* context, and if so, the case for the τλᾶθι emendation is considerably strengthened. Of course, no mythical parallels are given by the chorus after τλᾶθι. However, it should be noted that Electra has already referred to both the nightingale and Niobe as precedents for her lamentation. Moreover, the chorus have also mentioned three individuals (Chrysothemis, Iphianassa, and Orestes) who share the sorrowful situation with Electra, the point being that she indulges in her grief more than they do and beyond what is fitting.

Our final example again raises the question of the extent to which Homeric *contexts* themselves, as well as the Homeric language which happens to be used in those contexts, become relevant to Sophoclean contexts which echo the Homeric language. It also, at another level, well illustrates something of the complexity of the process by which Homeric language may be transmuted into Sophoclean language. The fourth stasimon of the *Oedipus Tyrannus* begins with the lamenting cry ἰὼ γενεαὶ βροτῶν,/ὡς ὑμᾶς ἴσα καὶ τὸ μη/δὲν ζώσας ἐναριθμῶ (1186–1188). As parallels the ancient Scholiast cited *Ajax* 125–126 and Pindar *Pythian Ode* 8.95–96, passages which both stress the insubstantiality of human life, and many modern commentators have followed his lead. For others, however, the Sophoclean lines have rather been primarily reminiscent of Glaucus' words to Diomedes at *Iliad* 6.146–149: οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν . . . ὣς ἀνδρῶν γενεὴ ἣ μὲν φύει ἣ δ' ἀπολήγει.

Kamerbeek establishes the connection between this Homeric passage and the Sophoclean ἰὼ γεναὶ βροτῶν by implication, his explanatory note on γενεαί simply reading '"generations", as in οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή [. . .]'.[28] The comment in Schneidewin, Nauck & Bruhn, however, is more specific: 'wohl in Erinnerung an Z 146ff. ist dieses Wort gewählt'.[29] And Dawe comments on the phrase as a whole: 'very likely a deliberate echo of Homer's famous line [. . .] (*Iliad* 6.146)'.[30] Is it possible, though, to demonstrate the connection more precisely?

[28] Kamerbeek (1967: note *ad loc.*).
[29] Schneidewin, Nauck & Bruhn (1897: note *ad loc.*).
[30] Dawe (1982: note *ad loc.*).

Garner presents just such a case for this particular Homer-Sophocles connection.[31] Firstly, he notes Sophocles' propensity for using the opening line of a choral song for an allusive poetic tag of this kind. Next, he draws attention to Sophocles' use (unique in extant tragedy) in the first line of the *OT* parodos (151) of the Homeric ἡδυεπής (used, as a *hapax*, of Nestor at *Iliad* 1.248), pointing out that this is then echoed by θεσπιέπεια in the opening line of the *OT* first stasimon (463), which, like the parodos, begins with a question about the significance of the oracular utterance from Delphi. And finally, he points out the surely more than coincidental link between the expression ἀμαιμακέτου πυρός used by Sophocles at line 176 of the *OT* parodos and Glaucus' description of the chimaera which occurs soon after the generations of mortals passage in *Iliad* 6; specifically the chimaera is ἀμαιμακέτην (179) and breathes πυρὸς μένος αἰθομένοιο (182).

Garner's argument, then, is that the existence of specific Homeric precedents (especially the one from Glaucus' speech in *Iliad* 6) for aspects of the language of the *OT* parodos, taken in conjunction with the poetic linkage between separate choral songs of the *OT*, as demonstrated by the relationship between the opening lines of the parodos and first stasimon, makes it most likely that it was in fact οἵη περ φύλλων which Sophocles primarily had in mind when he introduced ἰὼ γενεαὶ βροτῶν as the launching pad for his fourth stasimon.

Now there is surely no doubting at least the likelihood that the particular Homeric words and phrases singled out by Garner have had an important influence on Sophocles' final text. However, the process possibly at work in this particular instance can be shown to be even more complicated.

For a start, as Garner himself notes, the loss of so many of the poetic antecedents of the *OT* means that we can never appreciate the complete picture. But the incomplete nature of Garner's analysis itself can in fact be illustrated from a further examination of one of Garner's own Homeric contexts. As far as formative influences on Sophocles are concerned, this will both take us beyond Homer, and also broaden the scope of the Homeric network itself.

On the one hand, the epithet ἡδυεπής, though certainly a Homeric *hapax*, is not confined to Homer as far as extant pre-Sophoclean literature is concerned. One of Pindar's applications of it, for exam-

[31] Garner (1990: 136–137).

ple, is to Homer himself (*N.* 7.21), but, more significantly, Hesiod uses it of the Muses. And indeed, it would seem more likely for the impulse behind Sophocles' invocation of the inspired oracle (ὦ Διὸς ἁδυεπὲς φάτι) to have been the range of concepts represented by expressions such as the Hesiodic ἡδυέπειαι Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες (*Th.* 965–966),[32] rather than the Homeric association of sweet speech with the mortal hero Nestor.

On the other hand, the description of Nestor in *Iliad* 1.247–251 includes a statement relevant to our investigation and is worth quoting at greater length: τοῖσι δὲ Νέστωρ/ἡδυεπὴς ἀνόρουσε, λιγὺς Πυλίων ἀγορητής,/τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή. /<u>τῷ δ' ἤδη δύο μὲν γενεαὶ μερόπων ἀνθρώπων</u>/<u>ἐφθίαθ'</u> (247–251). If the Homeric ἡδυεπής from this context does, as it may well do, lie as one of perhaps a number of formative influences behind the Sophoclean ἁδυεπές, then it would seem to follow that the γενεαὶ μερόπων ἀνθρώπων may also be somehow mixed up in the process that has led to the formulation ἰὼ γενεαὶ βροτῶν. And even if it could be proved that the Sophoclean ἁδυεπές stemmed primarily from a Hesiodic or other source, this unique Homeric combination γενεαὶ μερόπων ἀνθρώπων in itself[33] could still not be ignored as possibly having some significant bearing on the shape of ἰὼ γενεαὶ βροτῶν.

This would not be to say, of course, that the demonstrably better known *Iliad* 6 passage was not at the same time directly or indirectly relevant, or that Garner's general understanding of the Homer-Sophocles intertextual relationship was not at least partly correct. However, our conclusion must be that a most complex poetic nexus begins to emerge even from the texts available to us, and that we should tread with extreme caution when attempting to close the brackets around Homeric-Sophoclean intertextuality.

Even although we have done little more than scratch the surface of this vast topic, we may offer a tentative conclusion. As far as Sophocles' use of Homeric language is concerned, there is no all-embracing pattern to be seen. Each Sophoclean context with Homeric verbal connections has to be treated separately, the Homeric factor

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[32] Cf. the description of the Muses as ἡδυεπεῖς κοῦραι Κρονίδεω Διός (*h.Hom.* 32.2).

[33] The expression μερόπων ἀνθρώπων itself occurs a total of nine times in Homer but is combined with γενεαί only here. The slightly different γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων and μερόπων γένος ἀνδρῶν (ἡμιθέων) are found at *h.Cer.* 320 and *h.Hom.* 31.18–19 respectively.

operating with different strengths and different results in each case and always open to differing interpretations. In the case of Αἴαντι τῷ σακεσφόρῳ, there does, in the final analysis, seem to be a strong case for the thesis that the Homeric context as well as the language is working in the new Sophoclean context and verbal formulation, even although the precise effect achieved is difficult to pin down.

In other cases, however, an attempt to find a 'working' connection between the Homeric and Sophoclean contexts, beyond something which can be expressed only under some extremely general and thus ultimately unhelpful rubric such as 'consolation context', seems to result in a forced and artificial reading. In the case of the *OT* nexus, the two Homeric contexts seem to have little or no relevance. The Sophoclean chorus are lamenting the inability of humans to retain happiness, whereas it is Nestor's longevity which is the focus in one of the Homeric contexts, and the succession of fragile human generations in the other. Thus we are forced to adopt the position that Sophocles may on occasion be simply delving into the poetic treasure house of the Homeric texts rather than making Homeric contexts work for him. On the other hand, the poetic processes at work may sometimes be so complicated as to be ultimately unrecoverable, leaving us simply to marvel at Sophoclean genius.

WORDS IN THE CONTEXT OF BLINDNESS

A. Maria van Erp Taalman Kip

In this paper I deal with words, their shades of meaning and their context, words spoken by Oedipus or addressed to him, following his discovery of the truth and his self-blinding, in both *Oedipus Tyrannus* and *Oedipus Coloneus*.

1. *Oedipus Tyrannus 1321–1326*

When, in the exodos of *Oedipus Tyrannus*, Oedipus enters the stage, he sings his lament into the dark, not knowing where his voice is borne, whether there is anyone to hear it. However, the chorus is still present, and at 1321 he reacts to their words:

> ἰὼ φίλος,
> σὺ μὲν ἐμὸς ἐπίπολος ἔτι μόνιμος· ἔτι γὰρ
> ὑπομένεις με τὸν τυφλὸν κηδεύων.
> φεῦ φεῦ·
> οὐ γάρ με λήθεις, ἀλλὰ γιγνώσκω σαφῶς,
> καίπερ σκοτεινός, τήν γε σὴν αὐδὴν ὅμως. (*OT* 1321–1326)[1]
>
> O my friend, you are still my steadfast companion, for you still persist in caring for me, the blind man. Ah. For I am not unaware of your presence, no, despite my darkness I recognize clearly your voice. (unless indicated otherwise, the translations are mine)

It has often been observed that there is a striking similarity between ll. 1321–1323 and *Ajax* 348–350.[2] In both cases we have the hero's first address to the chorus after his fall, and in both cases the speech opens with φίλος/φίλοι. We do not know how Ajax used to address

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[1] I quote from the edition Lloyd-Jones & Wilson (1994).

[2] ἰὼ
φίλοι ναυβάται, μόνοι ἐμῶν φίλων
μόνοι ἔτ᾽ ἐμμένοντες ὀρθῷ νόμῳ, . . .

O my dear sailors, you who alone, alone of my friends, still loyally stay at my side . . .

his men before his fall, but we do know how Oedipus addressed the chorus. As a king he felt responsible for the welfare of his citizens; he was filled with pity for their suffering and eager to protect them, but he never called those citizens, represented by the chorus, φίλος or φίλοι. In fact, only once did he address them with a vocative: πρέσβεις at 1111. Now, however, their relationship has changed. It is Oedipus who needs protection and pity and this change is immediately apparent in the way he addresses them, both here and at 1339 (φίλοι) and 1341 (ὦ φίλοι).

Oedipus calls the chorus his steadfast ἐπίπολος, using a substantive that occurs nowhere else in Greek literature as we know it. The scholiast explains: περιπολῶν ἐμὲ καὶ περιμένων, but most modern scholars largely ignore the word. Kamerbeek, however, notes: 'ἐπίπολος = πρόσπολος'. The same explanation is found in LSJ, but the makers of the dictionary do not seem fully convinced of the equivalence of the words, since they render ἐπίπολος as 'companion' and πρόσπολος as 'servant' or 'attendant'. Ellendt-Genthe, who renders ἐπίπολος as the Latin word *minister*, refers to Eustathius, but Eustathius (642.39–41) does not actually confirm this rendering. He makes an emphatic distinction between πρόσπολος and ἐπίπολος, which he says is not a δουλικὸν ὄνομα, but rather denotes τὸν μέχρι τέλους πολοῦντα καὶ παραμένοντα. Unfortunately his only example is this same line from *Oedipus Tyrannus*, and I am, therefore, inclined to think that he deduces the meaning of ἐπίπολος from the context. In any case he is no doubt correct in concluding that ἐπίπολος cannot be the equivalent of πρόσπολος.

Πρόσπολος is not a δουλικὸν ὄνομα in the literary sense. It does not necessarily refer to a slave, male or female; even the Eumolpidae are called πρόσπολοι (*OC* 1052), because they are servants of the Πότνιαι. However, the substantive always implies a hierarchic relation to someone superior, whose orders must be obeyed. And it is unthinkable that Oedipus would call the members of the chorus, who represent the people of Thebes, his πρόσπολοι, not even before the disaster and certainly not now. According to the scholiast, however, there was a *varia lectio*: ἐμοῖς ἐπὶ πόνοις. That reading is metrically impossible but, as Kamerbeek points out, ἐμοῖς πόνοις ἔπι 'would be good Greek and good metre'; in that case the first ἔτι must be dropped. Kamerbeek does not adopt this reading, but I think it is attractive. I strongly suspect that the word ἐπίπολος did not exist, but *if* it did, it cannot have been identical to πρόσπολος.

With regard to the next line Kamerbeek comments: 'κηδεύων = θεραπεύων', referring to *Oedipus Coloneus* 750. There is, however, a subtle difference here, again one which is related to hierarchy: θεραπεύειν implies the care of a servant, κηδεύειν the care of a protector. In tragedy we find several instances of θεραπεύειν with a god as object, but none of κηδεύειν. The verb again stresses the reversal in the relationship between Oedipus and the chorus: his citizens are no longer dependent on him, but he is dependent on them. At *Oedipus Coloneus* 750 κηδεύουσα has the same implication. Creon is feigning distress about the situation of Oedipus and Antigone, a situation that involves a reversal of the normal relationship between father and daughter: it is the father who ought to be the κηδεμών, not vice versa. Note that Creon—at 746—refers to Antigone as a πρόσπολος, another way of suggesting that she is leading a life that does not suit her; she ought to be neither a κηδεμών nor a πρόσπολος.[3]

Oedipus then goes on to say: 'for I am not unaware of your presence, no, despite my darkness, I recognize clearly your voice'. In this sentence, introduced by γάρ, Oedipus answers a question which he senses must have presented itself to the chorus: How do you know who we are? A comparable answer to the same unspoken question is found in Euripides *Hippolytus* 1392 and [Euripides] *Rhesus* 608.[4] The characters who speak these lines (Hippolytus and Odysseus

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[3] . . . ἀλγῶ τοῖσι σοῖς κακοῖς γέρον,
ὁρῶν σε τὸν δύστηνον ὄντα μὲν ξένον,
ἀεὶ δ' ἀλήτην κἀπὶ προσπόλου μιᾶς
βιοστερῆ χωροῦντα, τὴν ἐγὼ τάλας
οὐκ ἄν ποτ' ἐς τοσοῦτον αἰκίας πεσεῖν
ἔδοξ', ὅσον πέπτωκεν ἥδε δύσμορος,
ἀεί σε κηδεύουσα καὶ τὸ σὸν κάρα
πτωχῷ διαίτῃ, τηλικοῦτος, οὐ γάμων
ἔμπειρος, ἀλλὰ τοὐπιόντος ἁρπάσαι. (*OC* 744–752)

I sorrow for thine ills, when I see thee, hapless one, a stranger and a wanderer evermore, roaming in beggary, with one handmaid for thy stay. Alas, I had not thought she could fall to such a depth of misery as that whereunto she hath fallen—you hapless girl!—while she ever tends thy dark life amid penury,—in ripe youth, but unwed,—a prize for the first rude hand.' (translation Jebb)

[4] ὦ θεῖον ὀσμῆς πνεῦμα· καὶ γὰρ ἐν κακοῖς
ὢν ᾐσθόμην σου κἀνεκουφίσθην δέμας, . . . (*Hipp.* 1392–1393)

Oh divine fragrance; for even in my troubles I recognized you and my body was lightened.' (translation Halleran)

δέσποιν' 'Αθάνα, φθέγματος γὰρ ᾐσθόμην
τοῦ σοῦ συνήθη γῆρυν· . . . (*Rh.* 608–609)
Mistress Athena,—for I heard the familiar sound of your voice—. . .

respectively) are not blind, but they have been addressed by a goddess they cannot see, so the same question might arise: How do you know who I am? Then there is Euripides *Hecuba* 1114.[5] Agamemnon enters the stage, alerted by the screams and the noise he has heard, and the blinded Polymestor calls out to him: 'my dear friend Agamemnon—for I recognized your voice on hearing it—do you see what I suffer?' He realizes that Agamemnon, once he has heard his voice, will notice him and see what has happened; so he explains how he knows to whom he is speaking, despite his blindness. A clear example from Sophocles is *Oedipus Coloneus* 891–892. Theseus has entered the stage, like Agamemnon alerted by the noise, and Oedipus responds:

> ὦ φίλτατ', ἔγνων γὰρ τὸ προσφώνημά σου,
> πέπονθα δεινὰ τοῦδ' ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς ἀρτίως. (*OC* 891–892)
>
> my dear friend—for I recognized your voice—this man here did terrible things to me a moment ago.

According to Rijksbaron Oedipus explains 'why he addresses Theseus with precisely the word φίλτατ',' but I do not think this is quite correct. Oedipus could have offered the same explanation if he had addressed Theseus by his name or as 'king'.[6]

2. *Oedipus Coloneus 138–139*

At the approach of the chorus, old men from Colonus, Oedipus has gone into hiding. He learns from their song (118–137) that they are searching frantically for the man who is trespassing on the holy ground of the Σεμναί. They have been told that he is old, they assume that he is a wanderer, but apparently they do not know he is blind. Then, at 138, Oedipus materializes and says:

> ὅδ' ἐκεῖνος ἐγώ· φωνῇ γὰρ ὁρῶ,
> τὸ φατιζόμενον. (*OC* 138–139)
>
> Here is the man you are after; for I see by the sound of a voice, as the saying goes.

The γάρ-clause may remind us of the above mentioned examples, but its interpretation is less straightforward. Oedipus does not explain

[5] ὦ φίλτατ', ᾐσθόμην γάρ, Ἀγάμεμνον, σέθεν
φωνῆς ἀκούσας, εἰσορᾷς ἃ πάσχομεν; (*Hec.* 1114–1115).

[6] Rijksbaron (1991: 29).

how he knows who they are, but how he knows that they are present. However, why this explanation to strangers who do not seem to know that he is blind? Jebb calls his words an *announcement* of his blindness and, in keeping with this explanation, he argues that the chorus' first reaction (δεινὸς μὲν ὁρᾶν, 141) has nothing to do with Oedipus' eyes, since they do not immediately perceive that he is blind. But Kamerbeek disagrees, maintaining that δεινὸς μὲν ὁρᾶν refers to Oedipus' blinded eyes.

Neither of them relates this question to Oedipus' physical appearance, although Jebb, in his general introduction, describes his face as follows: 'the wounds by which [. . .] he has destroyed his sight, have left ghastly traces on the worn face', and, once again, in his introduction to the prologue: 'the haggard face bears the traces of the self-inflicted wounds'.[7] Did Jebb imagine that Oedipus wore a mask that showed these traces? And if so, would it be possible *not* to immediately perceive them?

In the commentaries and the literature I consulted, I found only two references to Oedipus' mask. In the view of Schneidewin, Nauck & Radermacher it must have shown that his eyes were 'in furchtbarer Weise zerstört' ('terribly mutilated'). And according to Seale 'his mask [. . .] shows the horror of self-mutilation',[8] or rather 'mutilation', since the wounds cannot show that he did it himself. Unfortunately, we cannot be sure about the mask. We must turn to the text of the tragedy to guide our imagination in this respect, and I think that the first lines spoken by Theseus[9] are decisive. Theseus has heard the tale of Oedipus' self-blinding and, seeing his face, he knows that this indeed must be him. And Oedipus himself, when speaking of his δυσπρόσοπτον κάρα (285–286), apparently realizes that his face must be a shock to others. I assume, therefore, that the words φωνῇ γὰρ ὁρῶ are inspired by his conviction that the chorus will know that he is blind, as soon as they see him, and that their reaction (δεινὸς μὲν ὁρᾶν) is elicited by his scars.

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[7] Jebb (1885: xii–xiii and 10).

[8] Schneidewin, Nauck & Radermacher (1909; *ad* 149–150); Seale (1982: 114).

[9] πολλῶν ἀκούων ἔν τε τῷ πάρος χρόνῳ
τὰς αἱματηρὰς ὀμμάτων διαφθορὰς
ἔγνωκά σ', ὦ παῖ Λαΐου, τανῦν θ' ὁδοῖς
ἐν ταῖσδε λεύσσων μᾶλλον ἐξεπίσταμαι.
σκευή τε γάρ σε καὶ δὸ δύστηνον κάρα
δηλοῦτον ἡμῖν ὄνθ' ὃς εἶ. . . . (S. *OC* 551–556)
(554 λεύσσων Nauck: ἀκούων codd.)

3. *Oedipus Coloneus 149–151*

When Oedipus has stressed his unhappy fate and his dependence on the eyes of others, the chorus respond:

> ἐή· ἀλαῶν ὀμμάτων
> ἆρα καὶ ἦσθα φυτάλμιος; δυσαίων
> μακραίων θ', ὅσ' ἐπεικάσαι. (*OC* 149–151)
>
> (punctuation of Lloyd-Jones & Wilson, Dawe and others)

The interpretation of these lines is uncertain. Here again, I believe that Oedipus' appearance plays a role, but let us first look at the Greek. The keyword is φυτάλμιος, a fairly rare adjective meaning 'begetting, generating'. In tragedy we find it in

(i) Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 327, where Clytaemnestra imagines how children fall upon the dead bodies of φυταλμίων γερόντων, according to Fraenkel probably their grandfathers;
(ii) Sophocles *Fr.* 688: προσῆλθε μητρὶ καὶ φυταλμίῳ πατρί;
(iii) [Euripides] *Rhesus* 920, where the Muse speaks of her marriage to Strymon: λέκτροις ἐπλάθην Στρυμόνος φυταλμίοις.

Then there is Lycophron *Alexandra* 841, where Antenor is called ἀπεμπολητὴς τῆς φυταλμίας χθονός. Moreover, as is clear from inscriptions and from Plutarch, φυτάλμιος was a cult title of Poseidon, probably because he was also the god of fresh water, water that brings forth plants by fertilizing the soil. In our case, however, the scholiast must have assigned a passive meaning to φυτάλμιος; otherwise I do not understand his rendering ἀπὸ φύτλης, clarified by ἀπὸ γενέσεως and ἐξ ἀρχῆς.[10] He seems to consider ἀλαῶν ὀμμάτων an exclamation, connected with ἐή, followed by the question: Were you born this way? Were you blind from birth? Dindorf adopts this interpretation of φυτάλμιος, connecting it with δυσαίων: Were you hapless (i.e. blind) from birth?[11] But in view of the other instances of φυτάλμιος I do not consider this solution convincing.

Hearing from many in time past concerning the cruel marring of thy sight, I have recognised thee, son of Laius; and now, through hearsay in this my coming, I have the fuller certainty. For thy garb, and that hapless face, alike assure me of thy name; [. . .]' (translation Jebb, who does not adopt Nauck's conjecture)

[10] φυτάλμιος ἀπὸ φύτλης· ἀπὸ γενέσεως καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τυφλὸς πέφυκας;

[11] Likewise, apparently, Pearson, who prints the text as follows:
ἒ ἔ· ἀλαῶν ὀμμάτων.
ἆρα καὶ ἦσθα φυτάλμιος δυσαίων;
μακραίων γάρ, ἐπεικάσαι.

Ellendt-Genthe, LSJ, Jebb, Kamerbeek, Lloyd-Jones and a number of other scholars agree with the scholiast as to the content of the chorus' question, but try to preserve the basic meaning of φυτάλμιος. They connect it with the genitive ἀλαῶν ὀμμάτων, which results in: 'Did you generate your blind eyes?' And we are asked to believe that this might mean: 'Were you blind from birth?' As a parallel, *Ajax* 1077 is referred to and Ellendt-Genthe also mentions *Oedipus Coloneus* 804 and *Electra* 1463.[12] But these parallels will not do. One's body and one's mental faculties can grow and develop during one's lifetime; blind eyes cannot. Moreover, the tone of these three passages is coarse and derisive, and why would the chorus choose to be offensive to Oedipus? Then there is the genitive ἀλαῶν ὀμμάτων, which seems naturally to belong with ἐή, while its connection with φυτάλμιος forces ἆρα into an unusual position in the sentence. The function of καί is likewise unclear and, last but not least, the question itself would be quite absurd. If we are indeed supposed to imagine that Oedipus' face bears the traces of cruel mutilation, he certainly cannot have been born that way.[13]

Kamerbeek rightly rejects this solution, especially because of the unfortunate conjecture γάρ.

[12] ἀλλ' ἄνδρα χρή, κἂν σῶμα γεννήσῃ μέγα,
δοκεῖν πεσεῖν ἂν κἂν ἀπὸ συικροῦ κακοῦ. (*Aj.* 1077–1078)

A man should think that, even if he grows a great body, he could fall as a result even of a small misfortune.' (translation Garvie)

ὦ δύσμορ', οὐδὲ τῷ χρόνῳ φύσας φανῇ
φρένας ποτ', ἀλλὰ λῦμα τῷ γήρᾳ τρέφῃ; (*OC* 804–805)

Unhappy man, shall it be seen that not even thy years have brought thee wit? Must thou live to be the reproach of age?' (translation Jebb; literally: that you have not grown wit)

οἴγειν πύλας ἄνωγα κἀναδεικνύναι
πᾶσιν Μυκηναίοισιν 'Αργείοις θ' ὁρᾶν,
ὡς εἴ τις αὐτῶν ἐλπίσιν κεναῖς πάρος
ἐξῄρετ' ἀνδρὸς τοῦδε, νῦν ὁρῶν νεκρὸν
στόμια δέχηται τἀμά, μηδὲ πρὸς βίαν
ἐμοῦ κολαστοῦ προστυχὼν φύσῃ φρένας. (*El.* 1458–1463)

Open the doors, I say, and display for all the people of Mycenae and Argos to see, so that if any of them were once buoyed up by empty hopes because of this man, they will now see him dead and accept my bridle, and not become wise against their will through punishment from me.' (translation March; literally 'and not grow a (sensible) mind through punishment from me')

[13] As for this final objection it does not matter whether we take φυτάλμιος in a passive or an active sense; in both cases it is equally weighty. For the sake of completeness I note that Campbell, like the other scholars I mentioned, does connect ἀλαῶν ὀμμάτων with φυτάλυιος, but offers a different translation. In his view the

The interpretation of Schneidewin, Nauck & Radermacher is the only one I have come across that gets around at least some of these objections. In their view the chorus asks: ‘hast du etwa deine Blindheit auch selbst verschuldet?’ (‘did you cause your blindness yourself?’) However, the word ‘selbst’ is not in the Greek and the wording would be unnecessarily cruel. Moreover, why would the chorus ask such a question, why would they even suppose that he did it himself? As is clear from what follows, they have not the faintest idea that this man is Oedipus.

The only solution I can think of is to take ἆρα καὶ ἦσθα φυτάλμιος; as a separate question, which refers not to Oedipus’ eyes but to his fatherhood.[14] The chorus do not know for sure that Antigone is his daughter—he has not said so—but she may well be. They are slightly perplexed by the idea that this haggard old man with his shocking face could be the father of the young girl who accompanies him and they ask: Were you really the begetter of a child? In this way φυτάλμιος has its normal meaning, ἆρα its usual position, while καί expresses their surprise. Their staccato and somewhat hurried reaction (exclamation, question, observation) is in keeping with their agitation. At this point they are not really interested, but are rather entirely preoccupied by the fact that Oedipus is trespassing on holy ground. Immediately after line 152 they begin to press him to leave the spot.[15]

4. *The value of touching and being touched*

I now turn to *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1510. Oedipus has implored Creon to take care of his daughters and now concludes his appeal with the words:

> ξύννευσον, ὦ γενναῖε, σῇ ψαύσας χερί (*OT* 1510)
>
> Grant me this, noble man, by a touch of your hand.

---

chorus merely ask: ‘And art thou then blind?’ (Campbell 1879) or: ‘And art thou also blind?’(Campbell 1907). But his explanation of the Greek is utterly unconvincing and his assumption that the chorus only now perceive that Oedipus is blind is hardly tenable.

[14] If I am right, the punctuation would be:
ἐὴ ἀλαῶν ὀμμάτων.
ἆρα καὶ ἦσθα φυτάλμιος; δυσαίων
μακραίων θ’, ὅσ’ ἐπεικάσαι.

[15] There is no need for them to repeat the question later on, since at 170 Oedipus calls Antigone θύγατερ.

Creon must consent by means of a touch of his hand. The object of this gesture is not specified in the Greek. According to Campbell, it is the children Creon must touch, but both Wilamowitz ('gib *mir* die Hand') and Mazon ('en *me* touchant la main') opt for Oedipus. In the opinion of Kamerbeek, we cannot decide. The actor, however, must make a choice, and in my view this choice cannot be difficult. After 1510 it is clear that Oedipus is satisfied, for he goes on to speak to his daughters without repeating his request. But, being blind, how would he know whether Creon actually touched his daughters? So apparently he wishes himself to be touched—a wish that is granted by Creon.

Then there is the verb συννεύω, which as a rule is not commented upon. However, Fraenkel & Groeneboom (1935) note in their school commentary: 'ξύννευσον instead of the more usual κατάνευσον'. The verb συννεύω is very unusual indeed. It does occur in Greek literature, but only from Theophrastus onward and in the intransitive meaning of 'to converge'. However, in the tragedies we know κατανεύω is not customary either. In fact it does not occur at all; it is always the simplex νεύω that is used. This may mean 'grant' or 'permit',[16] it may be connected with an infinitive, in the sense of 'give a signal to somebody to do something',[17] or it may be said of someone who bows his head. The guards in *Antigone* bow their heads to the ground,[18] Creon says to Antigone: σὲ δή, σὲ τὴν νεύουσαν ἐς πέδον κάρα (441), and in Euripides' *Electra* τοῦ δὲ νεύοντος κάτω (839) is said of Aegisthus, who is bending forward to observe the entrails of the sacrificial animal. So we may assume that, even when meaning 'to grant', the verb still suggested a movement of the head, a nod, and that it is more expressive than πείθομαι or καταινέω. And the same must be true of the unusual συννεύω. Oedipus cannot see the nod that is implied in the verb, so it must be replaced by touch.

For the blind man not only hearing is a substitute for seeing, but also touch. At *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1467 Oedipus asks Creon's permission to touch his daughters, and he adds:

> χερσί τἂν θιγὼν
> δοκοῖμ' ἔχειν σφας, ὥσπερ ἡνίκ' ἔβλεπον. (*OT* 1469–1470)

> by touching them with my hands, I would think to have them with me, as when I was still seeing.

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[16] S. *Ph.* 484; S. *OC* 248–249.
[17] E. *Hec.* 544–545.
[18] S. *Ant.* 269–270.

In *Oedipus Coloneus*, too, the importance of touch is often underlined. When he needs Antigone's guidance, Oedipus asks her πρόσθιγέ νύν μου, and she answers ψαύω καὶ δή (173). The presence of Ismene must be confirmed by touch—πρόσψαυσον, ὦ παῖ—and this she does: θιγγάνω δυοῖν ὁμοῦ (329). When his daughters have been restored to him, touch once again provides confirmation of the presence of his loved ones. Oedipus asks them to embrace him (1104–1105) and at 1110 he clasps them in his arms.

Touch can also represent a threat. When Creon says that he is going to abduct him, Oedipus cries out:

> ὦ φθέγμ' ἀναιδές, ἦ σὺ γὰρ ψαύσεις ἐμοῦ; (*OC* 863)
>
> O shameless voice, are you really going to touch me?

The danger is concentrated in Creon's voice. Oedipus cannot see his movements; he can only wait whether or not he will feel his hostile touch. However, in the next 23 lines there is no indication that Creon actually takes hold of him. If he does, then it must be at the moment when the chorus call for help (884–886), after which the arrival of Theseus puts an end to the menacing situation.

When expressing his gratitude after the reunion with his daughters Oedipus says to Theseus:

> καί μοι χέρ', ὦναξ, δεξιὰν ὄρεξον, ὡς
> ψαύσω φιλήσω τ', εἰ θέμις, τὸ σὸν κάρα. (*OC* 1130–1131)
>
> Reach out your hand, my lord, that I may touch it and, if it is right to do so, kiss your head.

On the surface, these lines do not seem related to Oedipus' blindness, but we must be aware of their implication. Oedipus cannot spontaneously grasp Theseus' hand or head. He has to wait until the other guides his hand by touching *him*. However, before Theseus does or can do what he is asked to do, Oedipus curbs his impulse: stained as he is, he should not want Theseus to touch him.[19] And Theseus does not do so, nor does he respond verbally. Is he reluctant, despite his magnanimity, or does he think it more tactful to respect Oedipus' feelings? The staging is important here, as Kamerbeek saw: '1135 and 1137 lead us to suppose that Theseus has taken a step in his direction, but refrains on hearing Oedipus' passionate dismissal of his

[19] *OC* 1132–1138.

own first impulse'. It would be indeed quite possible to stage the scene this way, but since Oedipus cannot see whether Theseus intends to approach him, I do not think 1135 and 1137 tell us anything about the king's movements.

Twice in this tragedy Oedipus protests that he is morally innocent, but that innocence does not remove the stain which he feels still clings to him. However, at the end of the play his life as an outcast is over and the roles are reversed. Oedipus is no longer dependent on the favours and the guidance of others. Now it is he who confers an important favour upon Athens and its king and it is he who, guided by the god, shows the others the way. This reversal is stressed by his wish *not* to be touched. He will lead the way ἄθικτος ἡγητῆρος (1520) and to his daughters he says: χωρεῖτε, καὶ μὴ ψαύετ' (1544). At the end of his last speech he bids farewell to the light:

> ὦ φῶς ἀφεγγές, πρόσθε πού ποτ' ἦσθ' ἐμόν,
> νῦν δ' ἔσχατόν σου τοὐμὸν ἅπτεται δέμας. (*OC* 1549–1550)
>
> O lightless light, you once were mine, but now my body touches you for the last time.

Jebb's translation 'my body feels you' is correct of course, but perhaps it does not do justice to Sophocles' imaginative choice of the verb ἅπτεσθαι.

What happens next is related by a messenger. After the final call of the god Oedipus asks Theseus to take care of his daughters (1631–1635). It is the counterpart of his plea to Creon in *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1510.[20] But this time Oedipus is master of the situation and certain that his wish will be fulfilled. There is no need for a confirming touch; he asks the king to give the pledge of his handshake to his daughters. Then he sends them away, after touching them ἀμαυραῖς χερσῖν, with 'blind hands' (*OC* 1639). His hands are blind, because his eyes cannot direct them. Nevertheless he touches the girls and does not ask to be touched by them. Soon afterwards it is all over.

[20] I do not mean to say that all spectators at the Dionysia registered this, since many of them may not have known the *OT* and even those who were old enough to have seen the performance some thirty years before may have forgotten this scene. But I am fairly sure that Sophocles himself cast his mind back to it.

SOPHOCLES' SATYR-PLAYS AND THE LANGUAGE OF ROMANCE

Mark Griffith

1. *Introduction*

Satyr-plays are usually regarded as occupying a middle ground between tragedy and comedy, and as constituting a mixture of the two that provided light relief after the emotional rigors of the preceding tragedies. But of course the term 'comic' encompasses a wide variety of formal and generic categories, from the ritualistic invective, obscenity, and grotesque costumes of *iambos* and Old Comedy to the romance themes and 'happy endings' of the *Odyssey*, Euripides' *Orestes*, and *Daphnis and Chloe*, and it seems to me that modern scholarly preoccupation with the broader and cruder elements of satyr-drama (and with possible parodies of particular tragedies) has tended to result in a neglect of what we might term the 'romantic' aspects of this dramatic genre, in terms both of its level of lexical decorum and of its representation of erotic attraction and relationships.[1]

Roughly one quarter of Sophocles' plays (some 25–30 out of the 120 or so known titles) were presumably not tragedies but satyr-dramas. Apart from the lengthy but damaged papyrus of *Ichneutae*, we have only tantalizingly small bits and pieces from any of them, and only

[1] In this paper I shall purposely use the terms 'romance, romantic' to refer to two different but overlapping spheres of meaning: (i) works of fiction that include themes of travel, adventure, exotic location, and often erotic encounters too, culminating in a happy ending (see e.g. Frye 1957: esp. 51–52, 306, 319; 1976); (ii) erotic engagement, courtship, sexual passion, and falling in love (as in the contemporary English usage, 'a romantic evening', 'how romantic!'), as distinct from 'low' and crudely anatomical or violent depictions of sexual conquest and activity on the one hand, and non-erotic representations of marriage and other intimate relations on the other. As will become clear in what follows, the overlap between (i) and (ii) seems to have been characteristic of Sophoclean satyr-plays. By 'happy ending', I mean primarily the (re)uniting of male and female lead characters (usually in marriage), and the prospect of familial and social harmony and prosperity to follow. Thus *hypothesis* 2 to Euripides' *Orestes* uses the term 'comic' to describe the outcome of that play (κωμικωτέραν ἔχει τὴν καταστροφήν).

about a dozen titles have been identified with any degree of certainty.[2] At least as many more of the plays that are normally listed as tragedies must therefore in fact have been satyric; and suggestions have varied wildly as to which these might be, concerning both plays whose titles alone are known and others for which some fragments survive in ancient quotation or papyrus remains.[3] This variation is in itself quite telling, for it brings home to us how little difference there often is between the dialogue of tragedy and that of satyr-drama.

If an ancient commentator does not happen to specify that the Sophoclean passage he is quoting comes from a satyr-play, we tend to assume it comes from a tragedy. But sometimes there is no way of telling, one way or the other. Even from the exiguous remains of the known satyr-plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles, one could quote several continuous passages of iambic trimeters whose language and metrical character conform perfectly to the norms of tragedy (e.g. A. *Fr.* 46a.4–20 (*Dicty.*), *Fr.* 281a (*Dikê*-play), S. *Fr.* 314.221–232 (*Ichn.*)—to say nothing of the dialogue scenes of Euripides' *Cyclops* or the famous atheism-fragment from Euripides' or Critias' *Sisyphus* (*Fr.* 19 KPS). For while the language, meter, and stage-deportment of the satyrs themselves (and of their disreputable father, Papposilenus) are discernibly, and sometimes conspicuously, sub-tragic, the serious characters appear to conduct themselves linguistically and behaviorally for the most part very much as they do in tragedies—a distinction that is confirmed by the costuming and visual self-presentation of the actors, to judge from the Pronomos vase and the other surviving representations of stage performances and rehearsals.[4]

Ancient and modern critics alike, in assigning satyr-drama to some kind of 'middle' level between high tragedy and low comedy,[5] and

[2] Lloyd-Jones (1996) identifies thirteen titles; Krumeich, Pechstein & Seidensticker (1999) (KPS) eighteen; *alii alia*. See below, notes 22, 44.

[3] In what follows, quotations and references to Sophoclean fragments will be based primarily on Radt (1977); but reference will also be made to the editions of Lloyd-Jones (1996) and KPS.

[4] For discussion of the visual evidence, see esp. Brommer (1959); KPS 41–73 (R. Krumeich); Griffith (2002), with further references.

[5] The account of Horace in *AP* 220–239, and other references to 'tragedy at play' (e.g. Demetrius *On Style* 169), certainly encourage us to think in terms of an intermediate status for satyr-drama between the two more familiar dramatic forms; and thus e.g. KPS; Voelke (2001); Lopez-Eire (2003). But more often it is the comic connections that are emphasized in modern criticism, as e.g. Voelke (2003); see W. Allan (2003: 309): 'The satyr-play [. . .] has more in common with the comic tradition than with the tragic' (referring also to Zagagi 1999); contrast Seaford (1984);

thus regarding satyr-drama as essentially half-comic, have tended to interpret all signs of 'high' language or serious themes in satyr-drama as necessarily burlesque or parody of tragedy.[6] Yet in most formal respects satyr-plays belong quite squarely with tragedy, and share very few of the characteristics of comedy. Furthermore, the notion of a 'middle' style (which the ancients sometimes applied to this form, as to e.g. pastoral) is in itself quite ambiguous: for by the standards of Classical criticism, the 'middle type' or 'character' of style is usually thought of, not as a mixture of high and the truly low (i.e. the vulgar and colloquial), but as a sub-genre, or gradation, within the 'high'.[7]

The present article has two main goals: first, to establish more precisely what place on the high/low spectrum is occupied by the language of Sophocles' satyr-plays, and second, to explore the language that is used in these plays to describe erotic and romantic relations (desire, passionate love, courtship, and sexual activity). In combination, these two avenues of investigation will reveal that Sophoclean satyr-drama seems to have presented a high incidence of relatively 'serious' and romantically-tinged erotic language and behavior; and my article will conclude with some brief suggestions as to the significance of this fact for the general character and dramatic impact of these plays.

2. *Elevation of language*

A number of recent studies have focused on the non-tragic elements of satyric diction, sifting through the fragments to assess the use of diminutives, colloquialisms, vulgarisms, obscenities, and paratragic expressions in comparison with the practice of tragedy and comedy.[8] The results have been rather inconclusive (and sometimes circular): on

Griffith (2002, 2005); and Demetrius *On Style* 163. A further kind of 'middling' status for satyrs in the Athenian imagination has come more into vogue over the last twenty years or so, as they are viewed in structuralist terms as cultural 'mediators' between god and animal (e.g. Lissarrague 1990; Voelke 2001).

[6] So esp. Sutton (1980), who emphasizes the function of the satyric genre as an on-going inversion of tragic norms.

[7] Thus 'grand' (*megaloprepês*), 'middle' (*mesos*) or 'flowery' (*anthêros*) or 'smooth' (*glaphuros*), and 'thin' (*ischnos)* are all 'types' (*charactêres*) of serious, formal prose style, quite separate from 'low' mime or conversation. On the characteristics of the 'smooth' and 'charming' style, see esp. Demetrius *On Style* 128–178; further Wehrli (1946); Lausberg (1990); etc.

[8] See esp. KPS 15–16; Lopez Eire (2003); Redondo (2003).

the one hand there is no disputing the general point that satyr-drama admits a higher rate of colloquial and mildly vulgar language than tragedy while eschewing the grossness and exaggerations of comedy; but on the whole no clear and consistent distinctions appear to have been established between the word-choice, syntax, and style of satyric dialogue and those of tragedy. That is to say, while it is easy enough to pick out particular passages (mainly those spoken or sung by the satyrs themselves, or by their scurrilous father/leader Papposilenus) that refer to animals, food, drinking, babies, body parts and functions (urinating, farting, masturbating), music, and dancing in ways that would not be encountered in tragedy, or that employ exclamations and stage antics of a sub-tragic type, these expressions and gestures are for the most part distinctly less 'low' and disruptive than their equivalents in Aristophanes;[9] and the language of the non-satyric characters, which comprises quite a high proportion of the dialogue of every play, appears to have adhered quite closely—like the metrical features of their iambic trimeters—in almost all respects to the level of tragedy, and to have contained very few indicators of colloquial, let alone comic, style.[10]

One simple and objective index of the level of elevation (*hupsos, semnotês, megaloprepeia*: 'grandeur, magniloquence') of a given passage of Greek poetry is the frequency of compound adjectives.[11] The Greek critics from Aristophanes and Aristotle onwards recognized that this element of word choice was one of the most conspicuous kinds of 'adornment' (*kosmos*) through which ordinary, simple language might be transformed into more elaborate and poetic expression;[12] and it is not surprising to find that the rate of compound adjectives per line consistently reflects in numerical terms the well-

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[9] On the mildness of satyr-drama's language for sexual activity in particular, as compared with that of Comedy, see Henderson (1975); Griffith (2005). The costuming of the satyr-chorus likewise was much less exaggerated and gross than that of Comedy, cf. Griffith (2002: 217–224). On exclamations and interjections, see Stevens (1945; 1976); Labiano Ilundain (2000).

[10] Seaford (1984: 47–48). On the metrical characteristics of satyric trimeters (especially their scrupulous observance of Porson's Bridge), see Griffith (2005).

[11] See Griffith (1977: 148–150) (based in part on Clay 1958; 1960).

[12] The contest of Aeschylus and Euripides in Aristophanes' *Frogs* makes much of this feature; and see Aristotle *Poetics* 21.1457a31–1459a16, esp. 1459a10 τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν διπλᾶ μάλιστα ἁρμόττει τοῖς διθυράμβοις ('In the case of nouns [and adjectives], compounds are especially suitable for dithyrambs'); also Demetrius *On Style* 164.

known distinction between the loftier style of Aeschylus and the more mundane diction of Euripides.[13] And although common-sense would perhaps suggest that all kinds of long words might contribute equally to 'high' style, closer inspection soon reveals that polysyllabic verb-forms (both simple and compound) are in fact quite common in all levels of Greek expression, including comedy and prose,[14] whereas compound nouns and adverbs, and above all adjectives, turn out to be a far more reliable index of elevated style.[15]

I have assembled complete data on the compound nouns, adverbs, and adjectives found in the surviving satyric plays and fragments. But my analysis here, which employs comparative figures for the surviving tragedies and satyric fragments of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and also two sample plays of Aristophanes (*Acharnians*, *Clouds*), will focus only on the compound adjectives, since it is these that are the most consistently informative.[16] The results of this analysis are contained in Table 1.

Table 1: Comparative rates of compound adjectives per 1000 lines

Aeschylus' tragedies	(highest)	316 (*Supp.*)
	(lowest)	248 (*Eu.*)
		247 (*Pr.*)
Aeschylus' satyr-fragments		216
Sophocles' tragedies	(highest)	200 (*Ant.*)
	(lowest)	126 (*Ph.*)
Sophocles' satyr-fragments		175
Euripides' tragedies	(highest)	173 (*Ph.*)
	(lowest)	104 (*Heracl.*)
Euripides' *Cyclops*		130
Aristophanes		c. 66

It is immediately apparent from Table 1 that for each of the tragedians the rate of compound adjectives in his satyr-plays is similar to

[13] See Griffith (1977: 149–150).

[14] In the first 125 lines of Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, we may note seven polysyllabic, but quite prosaic, perfect passive participles: μεμιλτωμένον, παρεσκευασμένος, ἐσκηνημένοι, κατακείμενοι, κατακείμενος, ἐξυρημένε, ἐσκευασμένος.

[15] See Griffith (1977: 149–153).

[16] The complete lists of compound adjectives are reproduced in the Appendix. Lists of the rest of the (non-adjectival) compound words are available from me at *markg@berkeley.edu*.

that in his tragedies,[17] and that the rate of compound adjectives for all three tragedians remains consistently higher than that for Aristophanes. In the remains of Aeschylus' satyr-plays (amounting to approximately 320 verses complete enough to be somewhat intelligible), there are 70 compound adjectives,[18] giving a rate of ca. 216 per 1000 lines. This falls slightly below the rate for Aeschylus' tragedies, but is still significantly higher than any of the plays of Sophocles or Euripides. In Euripides' *Cyclops*, we find 90 compound adjectives in 704 lines, a rate of ca. 130 per 1000 lines, squarely within the range of Euripides' tragedies.[19] By contrast, the first 400 lines of Aristophanes' *Acharnians* yield just 29 compound adjectives (a rate of ca. 74 per 1000 lines), while *Clouds* 1–200 yield only 11 (55 per 1000). Furthermore, a significant proportion of the Aristophanic compound adjectives are quite prosaic and/or 'low' (e.g., (*Ach.*) μεσημβρινοί, ἀθάνατος, καταπύγονας, χαυνόπρωκτα, φιλαθήναιος, κακοδαίμων, Μαραθωνομάχαι, πεντέτεις, τριακοντούτιδες, (*Clouds*) ἄδικον, ἀμαθής, τρισμακάριος), while others are absurdly inflated and/or paratragic (e.g., *Ach.* 3 ψαμμακοσιογάργαρα, 119 θερμόβουλον, 181 ἀτεράμονες).

Turning to Sophocles' satyr-plays: in *Ichneutae* (*Fr.* 314), we have approximately 350 lines that survive intact enough to yield usable material.[20] In these 350 lines, we find between 54 and 60 compound adjectives, i.e. a rate approaching 175 compound adjectives per 1000 lines of verse.[21] In the other indubitably or probably satyric Sophoclean

[17] It could be argued that the rate of compound adjectives in satyr-plays may have been artificially elevated by the accidents of transmission, since many of the fragments are quoted by grammarians such as Hesychius, Pollux, etc. precisely for the rare words that they contain. But the papyrus fragments of Aeschylus and Sophocles, which survive only by chance, maintain a similar rate of polysyllabic words in general, and of compound adjectives in particular; so it does not appear that this argument is cogent.

[18] Occasionally, a word is incomplete or corrupt, but seems nonetheless almost certainly to be a compound adjective or noun: e.g. (*Dicty.*) ποικιλονωτ-, νεβροφον-; (*Isthm.*) ἐπιτροπ-, τριδουλ-, etc.

[19] Some of these 90 in *Cyclops* are quite humdrum (e.g. ἄδικος, εὐσεβές); but most are quite 'tragic' and non-parodic, as a glance at the Appendix will confirm.

[20] In cases of damaged or defective texts, I have defined a 'usable' line as one containing at least six secure syllables and two or three clearly identifiable words. In deciding which of several possible readings to follow, I have generally compromised between KPS and Radt (1977).

[21] Of course, there might be a few more compound adjectives lurking in the missing parts of those 350 mutilated lines; so if anything these figures are on the low side overall. I am also making no distinction between lyric and dialogue, or between longer and shorter verse units, treating all of them simply as 'lines' which makes the measurements all the more crude. But given the state of the evidence, we really have no choice.

fragments (perhaps 17 plays in all),[22] where the accidents and uncertainties of transmission are often even more problematic—though the quotations from Stobaeus, Plutarch, etc. do at least usually reach us as more or less whole lines—the rate is similar. In total, they amount to ca. 185 'lines',[23] in which approximately 40 compound adjectives occur (many of them occurring in short lyric lines), yielding a rate of ca. 215 per 1000 lines. The grand total of compound adjectives per lines in Sophocles' satyric fragments is thus at least 94 (54 + 40) in ca. 535 lines, ca. 175 per 1000. This rate falls squarely within the rate for Sophocles' extant tragedies, which range from 200 (highest) to 126 (lowest) per 1000 lines.

As we have already noted, this criterion (frequency of compound adjectives) does seem to distinguish effectively and consistently between the different levels of elevation among the tragedians and comedians. Within each tragedian's work, the figures are consistent; and Aristophanes' plays yield figures of a completely different order from those of any of the tragedians. By this criterion, at least, the language of satyr-play (and specifically of Sophoclean satyr-plays) is not really 'in the middle', between that of tragedy and comedy, but almost identical to that of tragedy.

Other markers of tragic elevation and/or distinctively Sophoclean diction yield less conclusive results when applied to his satyr-plays; but none points to any sharp deviation. Thus, in accordance with the high frequency of polysyllabic adjectives, Sophocles' satyr-plays also contain several examples of three-word trimeters—at least four in 535 lines (a higher rate than any of Sophocles' tragedies, in fact): *Ichn. Fr.* 314.122, 173; *Fr.* 329; *Fr.* 537.2—and perhaps two more, if *Fr.* 473 and *Fr.* 666 are satyric (as several scholars believe).[24] And it may be noted that Sophocles' predilection for nouns suffixed with -σις and -μα appears to be equally strong in his satyr-plays.[25]

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[22] These seventeen are: *Achilleôs Erastai, Amphiaraus, Amycus, Dionysiscus, Helenês Gamos, Heracliscus, Heracles, Inachus, Cedalion, Cerberus, Crisis, Momus, Oeneus, Pandora, Salmoneus, Syndeipni*, and *Hybris*. See above, note 1; and the discussions of Lloyd-Jones (1996); KPS.

[23] Here too the decision as to what should or should not count as a 'line' is often somewhat arbitrary (esp. in the case of the mutilated *Inachus*); see above, note 21.

[24] Sophocles' highest rate is four per play (*Aj.*), his lowest is one (*Tr.*); Aeschylus ranges from three (*Pers.*) to thirteen (*Th.*); see further Stanford (1940); Griffith (1977: 91–92). On the basis of such small (statistically insignificant) figures, one would not want to claim that Sophocles regularly employed more three-word trimeters in his satyr-plays than in his tragedies; but, for what it is worth, we may take this as a small piece of evidence that he did not use significantly fewer.

[25] These nouns are studied by Long (1968: 34ff.); Griffith (1977: 152). In Sophocles'

3. *Sentence length*

A separate index of style is the number of words per sentence. I have surveyed all the surviving passages of Sophocles' satyr-plays that are at least three lines long, do not contain a change of speaker, and are well enough preserved for us to tell whether or not they contain major punctuation, simply counting the total number of words (of any kind) that occur between one major punctuation mark (full stop, colon, or question mark) and the next; and I have compared the results with the figures that have previously been compiled for the three tragedians.[26] I have done the same for Aristophanes' *Acharnians*.

The one slight but consistent difference that was previously observed among the three major tragedians was Sophocles' smaller number of short sentences (1–10 words long) and generally higher proportion of long sentences (esp. those of 36 words or longer), as compared with both Aeschylus and Euripides. Thus in the case of Aeschylus' undisputed tragedies, 46% of the sentences (476 out of 1019) are between 1 and 10 words long; similarly for the six selected plays of Euripides the figure is 45% (772 out of 1645);[27] but for the four tragedies of Sophocles that were examined (*Ajax*, *OT*, *Antigone*, and *Trachiniae*) the figure is only 38% (348 out of 923).

For the satyric fragments of Sophocles, a slight but probably significant difference is the higher rate of short sentences (i.e. 1–10 words long): these comprise 44 out of the total of 79 eligible sentences, i.e. almost 56%, a higher rate even than Aeschylus and Euripides' tragedies and significantly higher than Sophocles' tragedies, approaching the rate of Aristophanes (61%). And strikingly, a high proportion of these sentences consist of only 1–5 words (25 in all = 32%; for

satyr-plays, there are eleven occurrences of -σις nouns altogether (*Fr.* 171.1 βρῶσις; *Fr.* 181.2 βρῶσιν; *Fr.* 314.81 σύλησιν; *Fr.* 314.164 ἐλευθέρωσιν; *Fr.* 314.174 βάσιν; *Fr.* 314.223 μετάστασις; (*Fr.* 314.265 πύστις); *Fr.* 314.372 ξενέστασις; and *Fr.* 1130.15 μέτρησις, ὄρχησις, λάλησις. As for -μα nouns (plentiful in all three tragedians), I count no fewer than 31 in Sophocles' *Ichneutae* alone; and there are two in *Fr.* 149, and another in *Fr.* 941.

[26] The figures for the non-satyric plays of the three tragedians are taken from Griffith (1977: 214–217). It should be noted that in that earlier study I included only passages of eight or more lines (rather than three) from the same speaker—an unrealistic criterion when studying the fragmentary satyr-plays. This may perhaps create a significant source of difference; but I see no alternative.

[27] The figures for *Rhesus* are 77 out of 170 (45%).

Sophocles' tragedies the rate is only 12%)—presumably a positive index of greater directness of expression, simplicity of style, and avoidance of complex syntactical subordination. This is confirmed at the other end of the spectrum, where we note the scarcity in Sophocles' satyr-plays of very long sentences (those containing 36 words or more): I find only two such passages, *Ichn. Fr.* 314.151–160 (55 words, preceded by a 33-word sentence in 145–150) and *Fab. Incert.* (maybe *Oeneus*) *Fr.* 1130.9–16 (36 words). And an interesting feature of these long sentences in the satyr-plays is their relatively simple syntactic structure with extended anaphora and parataxis (esp. *Fr.* 1130), in contrast to the syntactically more elaborate strings of subordinate clauses preferred in Sophoclean tragic rhesis.[28]

In sum: by most of the available stylistic indices, the language of Sophocles' satyr-plays stands very close to—indeed is often indistinguishable from—that of his tragedies, while deviating sharply from the practice of Comedy. This is especially the case for the diction and meter of the dialogue scenes. And while his satyr-plays do deviate significantly from his tragedies in their preference for short sentences, the discrepancy is relatively small, and suggests a preference for simplicity and avoidance of syntactical complexity that is as characteristic of a smooth 'middle' style of expression as it is of comic style. We may conclude that in terms of stylistic register and elevation, satyr-play appears for the most part to inhabit the same world as tragedy.

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[28] There are two further sentences in the satyr-fragments that extend beyond 25 words, both in *Ichn.* (*Fr.* 314.145–151, 223–228). These likewise are syntactically simple, the first especially so, a string of participles, nouns and adjectives in apposition to subject of the main clause ('Why are you so scared, you dummies, frightened of everything, always working away at spineless stuff . . ., just bodies and tongues and phalluses . . .?'), though the second is a little more complex and closer to elevated tragic style. In Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, the overall rate of long sentences (over thirty words) is similar (6%) to that of Sophocles; but it is notable that most of the long sentences come in the parabasis (626–718), where the style takes on a distinctive rhetorical flavor of its own, in some respects more elevated and political than normal comic dialogue: so 646–649, 34 words; 668–675, 33; 676–682, 35; 713–716, 33; 706–712, 48. (The other long sentences in the play are: 17–22, 38 words; 211–238, 31; 247–252, 31; 544–551, 40; 599–606, 46; 979–984 and 995–999, 38.)

4. *Sophocles' language of sex and love*

As we have noted, scholars have looked long and hard—perhaps too hard—at the 'comic' features of satyric diction,[29] focusing on expressions concerning food and drink (though satyr-plays emphasize especially wine-consumption and sympotic behavior, whereas Comedy tends to focus more intently on eating);[30] interactions with, and descriptions of, animals and rustic activities (herding, fishing, hunting, etc.); physical labor; diminutives and other colloquial expressions;[31] exclamations and interjections of excitement, chasing, wondering, and discovery,[32] along with many repetitions and insistent anaphoras.[33] Less often noted by scholars are the frequent references to other contexts of luxury, leisure, and high-living in addition to the symposium, especially weddings and betrothal ceremonies;[34] and in general the search for the comic seems to have blinded critics to some of the more sophisticated and romantic elements in satyric—and especially Sophoclean—descriptions of human interactions.

References to (lower) bodily processes seem in fact to be much less common in satyr-play than in Old Comedy,[35] and the actual language employed is much less coarse.[36] Indeed, even when reference is made in satyr-drama to undignified noises, postures, and loss

[29] See above, notes 8 and 9. In what follows, I shall not try to maintain a consistent distinction between the language of the heroic characters and that of the satyrs and Papposilenus, since the fragmentary state of the surviving Sophoclean evidence simply does not make this possible. So I will refer in general to 'satyric style', even though it was clearly not entirely homogeneous.

[30] Sympotic language in Sophocles' satyr-plays is actually not as extensive as it is in Aeschylus or in E. *Cyclops*—perhaps merely a matter of chance. But see below, p. 63 (on *Fr.* 537).

[31] Stevens (1931; 1976); Seaford (1984: 47).

[32] Some of these exclamations are peculiar to satyr-drama, e.g. *Ichn. Fr.* 314.131 ὓ ὓ ὓ ὓ, 176 ὗ ὗ ὗ, ψ ψ ἆ ἆ.

[33] E.g. S. *Ichn. Fr.* 314.100 θεὸς θεὸς θεὸς θεὸς, 107 ἰδοῦ ἰδοῦ; cf. 177–178 ὑπέκλαγες ὑπέκριγες ὑπό μ' ἴδες. On the stylistics and tone of such anaphora, see below, pp. 62–63, 68. On Aristophanic interjections, see Labiano Ilundain (2000).

[34] See below, pp. 62–63.

[35] See also Lopez Eire (2003); O'Kell (2003), with further references.

[36] At S. *Ichn. Fr.* 314.147 the satyrs are reproached as being ὀνθία 'manure' ('you lumps of dung!')—certainly not a compliment, and not an elevated word; but ὄνθος is found twice in Hom. *Iliad* 23 (775, 777), and the word occurs also in Aeschylus' tragedies (*Fr.* 275, regarding the death of Odysseus; likewise κόπρος is not uncommon in high poetry). The satyr-plays appear in fact to refrain from using the lower registers of terms of shitting, farting, pissing, etc. (χεζ-, ἀποπερδ-, πιεζ, etc.), in contrast to the practice of Aristophanes and Old Comedy (and before that, Hipponax and

of bodily self-control, the expressions seem to maintain a tone similar to that, e.g., of the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*, where the baby farts, sneezes, and whistles loudly (280, 295–297), or of Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers*, where the Nurse describes the baby Orestes' peeing and puking (748–762) in affectionate and matter-of-fact terms. Sophocles' satyr-plays rarely use low or obscene terms in their references to human anatomy and sexual activity.[37] Typical is S. *Dionysiscus Fr.* 171.1–3 with its much-discussed reference to φαλακρόν.[38] We never encounter in Sophocles (or Aeschylus or Euripides either) any of the lower terms such as πέος, ψωλή, πρῶκτος, πυγή, κύσθος, χοῖρος, etc.). Instead we find e.g. *Ichn. Fr.* 314.150–151 σώματα . . . μόνον,/ καὶ γλῶσσα καὶ φαλῆτες ('just bodies, tongues, phalluses!').[39]

Of course, the fact that we do find such frequent mention of the penis in a state of erection is significant and distinctive. In Sophocles not only are φαλακρόν and φαλῆτες prominently mentioned, but we are given also detailed descriptions of 'stretching it out' and manipulating it (*Ichn. Fr.* 314.368–370 παύου τὸ λεῖον φαλακρὸν ἡδονῆι πιτνάς,

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iambos): so e.g. the opening scene of Ar. *Frogs*, and Henderson (1975: 187–203 and passim). The lowest word we find of this kind in Sophocles is the hapax ἐνουρήθρα ('chamberpot'); and even in this case we note that ἐνουρέω is itself not an uncommon prose expression (Herodotus, Aristotle, etc.). At *Ichn. Fr.* 314.168 Lloyd-Jones interprets ψοφήσετε as 'you'll fart' or 'shit' (??) (sc. in terror); but the text here is too uncertain for any reliable conclusions to be drawn. At *Fr.* 1130.11 (probably from S. *Oeneus*, in a scene in which the satyrs are presenting themselves as suitors for the hand of Deianira), we find among a list of their alleged athletic skills (mostly quite conventionally admirable), the phrase ὄρχεων ἀποστροφαί 'twisting of testicles' (sc. in the *pankration*). Here again ὄρχεις is the standard prose (scientific-medical) term for 'testicles', e.g. in Herodotus and the Hippocratic Corpus—it is not slang, and is not disruptive of the rest of the formal speech.

[37] In Lloyd-Jones' edition (1996) of *Fr.* 483 (from S. *Pandora*) we read τρίψει (γέμοντα) μαλθακῆς ὑπ' ὠλένης. This restoration and interpretation as masturbation are far from secure.

[38] Is this baby (Dionysus) accepting food, or drink (*brôsin*)? and is he reaching up to stroke someone's nose and bald head, or his penis and its glans? Editors take different views, as they do on the similar *Ichn. Fr.* 314.366–372. When is the 'shiny, bald head' (φαλακρόν) *just* a bald head, when is it supposed also to connote, or denote, the shining tip of an erect phallus? (See now O'Kell 2003: 291–295). But even if in *Fr.* 171 the latter is meant, we should note that (as in the similar scene in A. *Dictyulci*, where the baby Perseus is described as being 'fond of the *posthê*' (ὡς ποσθοφίλης ὁ νεοσσός) and as reaching out to touch the phalluses of the nearby satyrs) the terminology is friendly and mild (πόσθη, φαλακρόν cf. φαλῆς, φάλλος) not coarse or vulgar; cf. Henderson (1975); Griffith (2005). Greek has plenty of coarse and vulgar terms to choose from, to refer to the penis, anus, vagina, etc., and to various kinds of sexual activity, as the text of Aristophanes exemplifies (and Henderson (1975) discusses in detail); but satyr-drama does not employ the cruder terms at all.

[39] See further Seaford (1984: on E. *Cyc.* 180).

'Stop stretching out that smooth knob in pleasure!'); and from the satyric *Momos* (*Fr.* 423) we encounter the word ἀποσκόλυπτε ('draw back the foreskin'). The linguistic and behavioral register in such contexts seems to be playful and affectionate, but not obscene, and it seems to be a certain childishness in the satyrs' character that is thus emphasized. In this respect, the excitable but perennially immature and ineffectual chorus occupies a special place on the Athenian erotic spectrum.[40] As quasi-adolescents or boys, exploring and fantasizing about their sexuality, always watching, hoping, and making advances, but still for the most part merely 'playing' with themselves, these satyrs are contrasted with the more mature and well-directed human (and Olympian) participants in the romances and marriages that take place before their eyes, on the same stage and before the same audience.

As we noted above, Sophocles' satyrs—and other leading characters in his satyr-plays—are often found in contexts of luxury, leisure, and high-living, especially at the symposium or participating in betrothal or wedding ceremonies. The plots of at least three—probably—satyric plays of Sophocles (*Helenês Gamos, Krisis* [i.e., the *Judgment of Paris*], and *Oeneus*, which dealt with the suitors for the hand of Deianira; cf. *Fr.* 1130), all involve language and situations of stylish living and social pretension reminiscent of Herodotus' account of the marriage of Megacles' daughter.

Thus in *Fr.* 1130 (which is certainly satyric, and probably from *Oeneus*) the satyrs present themselves as suitors. The syntactically simple list of attributes, all nominatives and genitives, with six-fold anaphora (ἔστι μὲν . . ., ἔνεισι δὲ . . ., ἔνεστι δὲ . . ., ἔστιν . . ., ἔστι . . ., ἔστι . . .), is especially striking, with its suggestion of limitless abundance of talent and epideictic exuberance, culminating in the three -σις abstracts (15–16 ἔστιν οὐρανοῦ/μέτρησις, ἔστ' ὄρχησις, ἔστι τῶν κάτω/λάλησις . . ., 'There's measuring of the heavens, there's dancing, there's talking about the things below'), specifying the satyr-suitors' sophisticated intellectual accomplishments. Elsewhere (*Fr.* 361, from the *Krisis*), Aphrodite's gorgeous adornments, and her overwhelming effect on those who saw her, are described (πάντα συνεταράχθη), in language that contains no visible hint of parody or

[40] So S. *Ichn. Fr.* 314.366 ἀλλ' αἰὲν εἶ σὺ παίς. See further Griffith (2005), with particular reference to Aeschylus' *Dictyulci*.

incongruity. Possibly (probably?) satyric too is *Fr.* 398 (*Manteis*), a description of a dinner-setting, again with anaphora used to emphasize the abundance of luxurious foods and furniture (ἦν οἰὸς μαλλός . . ., ἦν δ' ἀπ' ἀμπέλου/σπονδή τε καὶ ῥὰξ εὖ τεθησαυρισμένη,/ἐνῆν δὲ παγκάρπεια συμμιγὴς . . ., 'There was a sheep's fleece, there was libation from the vine and grapes well-treasured, there was an all-abundant mixture of fruits . . .'). Likewise the (probably Sophoclean) Adesp. *Fr.* 656 (*P.Oxy.* 2804), although it is a papyrological mess,[41] certainly includes references to expensive perfume (βακκάρις), 'Lydia', 'Sardis' and other details of luxurious life-style, as well as perhaps to 'intercourse' (ξυνεῖναι), and someone's 'prime-youthfulness' (ἄκρηβον).

Fr. 537 (*Salmoneus*) contains an extended description of sympotic behavior: τάδ' ἐστὶ κνισμὸς καὶ φιλημάτων ψόφος·/τῶι καλλικοσσαβοῦντι νικητήρια/τίθημι καὶ βαλόντι χάλκειον κάρα, 'Here are the itch and sounds of kisses: I offer prizes to the best *kottabos*-player and to the one who hits the bronze target!' The mention of *kottabos*-playing lends an upper-class tone to the proceedings, while the 'itch, sting' of desire and 'sounds of love-making' may indicate musical as well as amorous conduct.[42] Perhaps we should consider too in this context Sophocles' *Tyro* (*Fr.* 659), in which the young woman laments the cropping of her lovely hair and the consequent loss of her sexual attractiveness, as well as *Fr.* 769 (Incert.), with its reference to effeminate clothing.

These references to luxury, to sympotic behavior, and to weddings, all create contexts from which the language of sexuality and of the physical and emotional manifestations of desire (*erôtika, aphrodisia*) is never far away. Sophocles' fragmentary plays do indeed contain several descriptions of the bitter-sweet and positively exciting symptoms of 'falling/being in love'; and a remarkably high proportion—possibly all—of these appear to come from satyr-dramas.

In the dialogue scenes of the seven surviving tragedies there are no such 'romantic' passages. As for the lost tragedies, these are of course difficult to evaluate in these terms, since in so many cases we know almost nothing of their contents, even of their cast of characters. But in surveying those surviving fragments that are either definitely tragic or of uncertain genre, I notice only a handful of plays in which a love affair and/or marriage, or even sexual desire, seems to have

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[41] Apart from Radt's edition, see Carden (1974: 244–250); KPS 393: both agree that the fragment is probably satyric, and probably Sophoclean.

[42] For the multiple associations of κνισμός, see KPS 384.

played a significant part in the plot.[43] The most probable candidates seem to be: *Colchides, Nausicaa, Oenomaus, Procris, Troilus, Tyro*, and *Phaedra*—i.e. seven plays. Of these, *Procris* and *Phaedra* clearly involved erotic conflicts that were not of the straightforwardly 'romantic' and positive kind that I have outlined. Of the remaining five plays, I think it likely—as have several scholars before me—that at least three or four were satyr-dramas (i.e. *Nausicaa, Oenomaus, Tyro*; perhaps *Colchides* too).[44]

Sophocles' satyr-dramas appear to have been full of erotic language and love-scenes. The prime example is the *Lovers of Achilleus* (*Achilleôs Erastai*). In one fragment (*Fr.* 157) we encounter the phrase ὀμμάτων ἄπο/λόγχας ἵησιν ('s/he darts spears from his/her eyes'), in which probably it is 'he'—i.e. the young Achilleus—who thus wounds with his glances. This play, along with two or three others of Sophocles, clearly introduced both homosexual and heterosexual desire as the focus of serious attention from the main characters. Several grammarians, in discussing the term παιδικά, cite *Fr.* 153 and give us the immediate context: . . . ἐπιδόντων γάρ τι τῶν Σατύρων εἰς τὴν γυναικείαν ἐπιθυμίαν, φησὶν ὁ Φοῖνιξ "παπαῖ, τὰ παιδίχ', ὡς ὁρᾷις, ἀπώλεσας" ('After the satyrs have given in a bit to their desire for women, Phoenix says, "Hey, you can see you've lost your boy-friend!"'). The satyrs apparently have just transferred their affections from a male to a female object; i.e. presumably they have dropped out of the competition for the affections of the lovely young Achilleus, and are now (as usual) pursuing women and/or nymphs—though who exactly is being addressed by Phoenix, as having 'lost' his *paidika* is far from clear. In any case, the play seems to have concerned itself with the different trajectories and dynamics of young male homosexual and heterosexual desire, a characteristically elite and leisured preoccupation at Athens.[45]

[43] In an unpublished paper on Aristotle's *Poetics* and the origins of the Greek novel, delivered during the early 1980s, John J. Winkler argued that a good number of fifth-century tragedies (now lost) may have followed a trajectory of 'happy-ending' closer to the model of E. *IT* than to the disastrous closure of S. *OT* (whence Aristotle's discussion in chapters 13 and 14 of the *Poetics*). But Winkler does not explore the likely erotic component of such 'romantic' tragedies. I am grateful to Francis Dunn for making a typescript of this lecture available to me.

[44] Other possibilities for romantic plots or scenes in lost tragedies might be *Aichmalotides, Alcmeon, Amphitryon, Andromeda, Dolopes, Hermione, Euryalus, Thyestes* (cf. *Fr.* 256?), *Iphigeneia, Lemniai*, and *Tympanistai* (i.e. another eleven possibles]; but almost none of these is definitely known to have contained any such scene or description, and several in any case may have been satyric.

[45] An incidental reference to *paidika* occurs also in *Fr.* 345 (*Colchides*, a play deal-

Apart from these brief but suggestive references to homoerotic romantic relations, we find three longer passages that describe the effects and feelings of love in more detail.[46] The first comes once again from *The Lovers of Achilleus*:

> τὸ γὰρ νόσημα τοῦτ' ἐφίμερον κακόν·
> ἔχοιμ' ἂν αὐτὸ μὴ κακῶς ἀπεικάσαι.
> ὅταν πάγου φανέντος αἰθρίου χεροῖν
> κρύσταλλον ἁρπάσωσι παῖδες εὐπαγῆ,
> τὰ πρῶτ' ἔχουσιν ἡδονὰς ποταινίους·
> τέλος δ' ὁ θυμὸς οὔθ' ὅπως ἀφῆι θέλει,
> οὔτ' ἐν χεροῖν τὸ κτῆμα σύμφορον μένειν.
> οὕτω δὲ τοὺς ἐρῶντας αὑτὸς ἵμερος
> δρᾶν καὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾶν πολλάκις προσίεται. (S. *Fr.* 149)

> This disease is a desirable evil. / Here's a comparison—not bad, I think: / when ice gleams in the open air, / children grab. / Ice-crystal in the hands is / at first a pleasure quite novel. / But there comes a point—/ you can't put the melting ice down, / you can't keep holding it. / Desire is like that. / Pulling the lover to act and not to act, / again and again, pulling. (trans. A. Carson, slightly adapted)

This description of the bitter-sweet properties of Love deserves more detailed discussion than is possible here. Fortunately the reader can consult the extended analysis by Anne Carson,[47] who devotes more space to this passage than to any other poetic text from ancient Greece, so exemplary and suggestive does she find it of Classical Greek sensibilities concerning desire and its effects, delights, dangers, pains, and

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ing with Jason and Medea), as we are told of Zeus' passion for Ganymedes' thighs (μηροῖς ὑπαίθων τὴν Διὸς τυραννίδα), in a line cited by Athenaeus together with the famous passage from Aeschylus' tragedy *Myrmidons* (*Fr.* 135 σέβας δὲ μηρῶν ἁγνὸν οὐκ ἐπηιδέσω,/ὦ δυσχάριστε τῶν πυκνῶν φιλημάτων). There is another reference to *paidika* from an unknown play (*Fr.* 841 (Incert.) ὅτωι δ' ἔρωτος δῆγμα παιδικὸν προσῆι). We do not know if the play is satyric or tragic. Still from the clearly homoerotic angle, *Fr.* 448 of Sophocles' *Niobe* also mentions a homoerotic relationship, as motivating one of the sons (τῶν Νιοβιδῶν βαλλομένων καὶ θνῃσκόντων, ἀνακαλεῖταί τις τὸν ἐραστήν): this too is a play that, as several scholars have proposed, could well be satyric, with the gods so active on-stage, and a straightforwardly moralistic plot of divine punishment of the misguided.

[46] Further short passages of this type include: *Fr.* 537 (*Salmoneus*), discussed earlier, which occurs in the context of a symposium (. . . κνισμὸς καὶ φιλημάτων ψόφος . . ., etc.); but beyond the conventional 'sting' of love, we can say little more about the context or direction of this scene; also *Nausicaa*, though unfortunately nothing survives of the scenes between Nausicaa and Odysseus (a topic also treated in Old and Middle Comedy).

[47] Carson (1986: 111–116). In the first line, she reads ἐφήμερον with the MSS, not ἐφίμερον as most editors do.

attractions. Her discussion of the ice-simile is characteristically vivid and precise:

> We hang upon the physical fate of the melting ice; it is, in a way, the protagonist of the simile and we are watching it perish. At the same time, we care for the hands of the children. Ice is cold, and the longer you hold it the colder your hands get. But this care reminds us of another. The longer you hold it, the more it melts [. . .] As a conventional lover, you relish the sensation of melting, in your bittersweet way. <But> as an observer of ice, your feelings about melting are different, more complex [. . .][48]

We do not know who spoke the lines, nor to whom they refer (Phoenix or Heracles in love with Achilleus? Achilleus with Patroclus? or vice-versa? Achilleus with a woman? The satyrs with Achilleus, or now a woman? The possibilities are almost endless . . .). But the crucial point for the present purpose is simply that this passage, singled out as it is for being one of the most complex and engaging of all Classical Greek descriptions of 'love the bittersweet', occurs in a satyr-play.

A second extended passage of erotic language comes from S. *Oenomaus*: and in this case the romance is definitely heterosexual. The passage is very corrupt; and some of the restorations are less than certain. But the gist is clear, as Hippodamia describes the inflammatory effects of the meeting of Pelops' gaze with her own, in boldly figurative language:

> τοίαν Πέλοψ ἴυγγα θηρατηρίαν
> ἔρωτος, ἀστραπήν τιν' ὀμμάτων, ἔχει·
> ᾗι θάλπεται μὲν αὐτός, ἐξοπτᾶι δ' ἐμέ,
> ἴσον μετρῶν ὀφθαλμόν, ὥστε τέκτονος
> παρὰ στάθμην ἰόντος ὀρθοῦται κανών. (S. *Fr.* 474, Radt's text)
>
> Such a magic hunting-charm of Love, / a kind of lightning-bolt of the eyes, Pelops has received. / By this he himself is heated-up, and it (he?) is roasting me too, / measuring his eye (gaze) equally, just like a builder's ruler / that is lined up straight along its level.

Many scholars have concluded that this play was probably satyric, with its ogrish villain, gruesome skulls, athletic competition, and winning of the bride.[49] In any case, there is no doubt that Sophocles' play

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[48] Carson (1986: 114).

[49] As we have seen, satyrs are often found in contexts of athletic competition and courtship contexts. We may note that this story was later the subject of New Comedies by Antiphanes and Eubulus.

provided a serious and engaging treatment of a romantic encounter, in language that belongs to the same register as that of the mainstream erotic poets and novelists of Greek tradition.

Our third surviving continuous passage of romantic language is found in *Fr.* 941 (Incert.—possibly, but not certainly, satyric), describing the power (and names) of Cypris.

ὦ παῖδες, ἥ τοι Κύπρις οὐ Κύπρις μόνον,
ἀλλ' ἔστι πολλῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπώνυμος.
ἔστιν μὲν Ἅιδης, ἔστι δ' ἄφθιτος βίος,
ἔστιν δὲ λύσσα μανιάς, ἔστι δ' ἵμερος
ἄκρατος, ἔστ' οἰμωγμάς, ἐν κείνηι τὸ πᾶν
σπουδαῖον, ἡσυχαῖον, ἐς βίαν ἄγον
. . .
εἴ μοι θέμις—θέμις δέ—τἀληθῆ λέγειν,
Διὸς τυραννεῖ πλευμόνων ἄνευ δορός,
ἄνευ σιδήρου· πάντα τοι συντέμνεται
Κύπρις τὰ θνητῶν καὶ θεῶν βουλεύματα. (Incert. *Fr.* 941.1–6, 14–17)

Children, the Cyprian goddess is not only 'Cyprian', / But she is called by many names: / She is Hades; she is Eternal Life; / She is Raging Madness; she is Unmixed Desire; / She is Wailing. In her resides everything serious, / Everything peaceful, everything that leads to violence / . . . / If it is allowed for me—and it *is* allowed—to state the truth, / She rules without spear, without steel, over the heart of Zeus. Indeed, Cypris short-circuits all the plans of mortals and of gods.

Although this passage is less striking than the previous two, the anaphora of ἔστι in 1–6 recalls *Oeneus Fr.* 1130 (quoted above), in which we observed the simplicity of satyric sentence structure and noted that this may have been a mannerism of the 'middle style' of epideictic and descriptive writing in general.

In all these examples, we are engaged with the language and sexual dynamics of 'romance': 'boy meets girl' (or 'boy meets boy'), 'they fall in love', etc. (or 'satyrs meet boy/girl, but s/he is saving her/himself for someone better'). Although, as we have noted, it is impossible to determine whether some of these passages are tragic or satyric (i.e., *Oenomaus Fr.* 474, *Fr.* 841 Incert., *Colchides, Niobe*), all the others—i.e. the clear majority of the surviving Sophoclean passages dealing with love and romance—indisputably are. And the language of all these 'romantic' passages is quite straight and serious; there is nothing comic, parodic, or burlesque in any of them (although of course there may have been an element of incongruity present if the satyrs spoke the lines or were the subject of the description, or being

referred to as potential lovers or suitors). The language itself seems quite appropriate to the expression of the bitter-sweet excitement of young love, and to the serious treatment of such romantic encounters—in a vein comparable to that of e.g. Anacreon, or later the bucolic lovers of Theocritus and the Greek novel (esp. Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*).

Indeed, these two authors probably offer some of our best evidence for the Hellenistic *Nachleben* of satyric mentality and style, and it is striking that Theocritus in particular, in his poems of rustic romance and adolescent infatuation, makes use of similar techniques of anaphora and repetition to the ones we have noted in Sophocles' satyr-plays, with a comparable blending of high and low-er (but not 'low') elements:

> ἔντι δάφναι τηνεί, ἔντι ῥαδιναὶ κυπάρισσοι,
> ἔστι μέλας κισσός, ἔστ' ἄμπελος ἁ γλυκύκαρπος,
> ἔστι ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ . . . (Theoc. 11.47–49)
>
> There are laurels there, there are delicate cypresses, / There is dark ivy, there is sweet-fruited vine, / There is cold water . . .

K.J. Dover comments that such forms of repetition and anaphora were characteristic of popular and traditional songs, lullabies, wedding-songs, forms which were (he says) 'eschewed by Classical literature [. . .]'.[50] I suggest that the Classical Sophocles did not entirely 'eschew' such figures of speech, but used them in his satyr-plays; and that in this respect, as in others that we have observed, his language of romance belonged to the smooth 'Middle Style' that ancient theorists thought suitable for such topics.

5. *Conclusion*

It may be significant that the biographical tradition gives us a highly erotic Sophocles[51] (as distinct from the drunken, soldiering Aeschylus,

[50] Dover (1971: xlvi–viii). For further examples, see e.g. Theoc. 1.71–72, 74–75; 11.22–23, and 24.40 ἔστι . . . ἔστι . . .; ps.-Theoc. 8.11–12. Demetrius (*On Style* 140–141) remarks that the *charis*-providing figures of *anadiplôsis* and *anaphora* are especially frequent in Sappho; and he also remarks (132) on the intrinsic *charis* of such subject-matter (*pragmata*) as νυμφαῖοι κῆποι, ὑμέναιοι, ἔρωτες, ὅλη ἡ Σαπφοῦς ποίησις—exactly the same subjects as form the content for satyr-drama.

[51] The evidence (four pages' worth) for Sophoclean '*amatoria*' is collected in Radt (1977).

and the reclusive, bookish, impious Euripides). As a boy, Sophocles is said to have performed a gorgeous naked dance in a choral celebration after the Battle of Salamis (T 28), and as a young playwright he scored a hit playing the role of the nubile Nausicaa as she danced and played ball with her friends, in his (possibly satyric) play of that name. In his mature years, Sophocles was well-known as an *erastês* who flirted frequently, though not always successfully, with young male waiters and other cute *paidika*; and late in life (as Plato and others record) he acknowledged that his sex life in general had been stressful and unrelenting.[52] Of course, little or nothing of this biographical tradition need actually be true (for we know how unreliable these *Lives of the Poets* tend to be); but we may surmise that the idea of Sophocles as a man intensely engaged in both homosexual and heterosexual pursuits (like his alleged Oedipal strife with his sons) found support in—and/or was originally suggested by—his writings, as with most of these poetic *Lives*. That is to say, Sophocles was thought of as a famous lover, because so many of his plays presented famous lovers and love-affairs.[53]

It appears that about half of the satyr-plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles whose plots can be reconstructed even in outline with any degree of confidence, were love-stories ('romances') that ended up with a male hero, human or divine, marrying a new bride (often after rescuing her from attempted capture and violation by another, or by the satyrs, or both). Love stories, of course, comprise the chief plot element of the majority of the dramas that the world has ever known. In Athens, the New Comedy of the fourth century BCE and later (as in Rome) certainly offered an unending spectacle of youthful romance. But in the fifth century, Old Comic sex and marriage were represented very differently. 'Love' or 'romance' would not be the word to describe the sexual appetite of an Aristophanic hero (even a husband, like Cinesias in *Lysistrata*): 'desire', 'horniness', or 'lust' (even 'sadism') might be closer to the mark, and the language of desire, courtship, sexual pursuit and intercourse in Aristophanes is generally rough and crude in the extreme.[54]

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[52] Plato *R.* 328b, Soph. T 80a.

[53] Interestingly, Plato's language about Sophocles' erotic tribulations (T 80a) describes Love as λυττῶντά τινα δεσπότην ('a kind of raging slave-owner'), a phrase that recalls S. *Fr.* 941 (1–4 Κύπρις . . . λύσσα μανίας, 15 τυραννεῖ, above p. 67).

[54] There is nothing like e.g. Ar. *Ach.* 271–279 in the surviving remains of satyr-drama.

Our surviving tragedies allow little room for sexual desire of a positive and successful kind: only occasionally for conjugal love (Alcestis-Admetus; Helen-Menelaus) and various last-minute betrothals (such as Electra to Pylades). After Euripides' break-through love-drama *Andromeda* of 415 (?) BCE things may have changed.[55] But for most of the fifth century, it appears to have been primarily the satyr-plays that provided the most engaging and fertile field of romance for Athenian theater-goers—not necessarily as burlesque, nor as parody, but as an imaginary world in which a couple could meet, fall in love, and end up happily married. And Sophocles' satyric language was equal to the needs of such romantic occasions.

APPENDIX

Compound adjectives in satyr-plays, tragedies, and Old Comedy

Aeschylus

Dicty. Fr. 46a–c: ἐνάλιε, ἀμπελοσκάφοι, ἐγχώριος, μαρειλύτων; *Fr.* 47a–c: πρόξενον, προπράκτορα, αἰχμάλωτος, μιλτόρεπτον, ποικιλονω-, ποσθοφίλης, ὑστρίχων, παιδοτρόφους, εὐμενής, νεβροφον-, ἀνόσους, ἄναυδος, -ντροπος, ὕφαλος; *Isthm. Fr.* 78a: εὐσεβῆ, πρόφρων, καλλίγραπτον, σεισίχθονος, ἄναυδον, ἐπιτροπ-, ἄναλκις; *Fr.* 78c: ἔνορκον, τρίδουλ-, πολυπ-, διστοίχων, νεόκτιτα, ἐμμελέστατον; *Prom. Pyrk. Fr.* 204b: εὐμενής, ἀκάματον, ἑστίουχον, φερέσβιος, σπευσίδωρος, νυκτιπλαγκτ-, βαθυξυλ-; *Fr.* 204c?: τηλέγνωτον; *Fr.* 205: ὠμολίνου; *Fr.* 288?: πυραύστου; *Fr.* 307: ἄναυδος; *Dikê-play Fr.* 281a: ἔνδικον, εὐδερκές, δύσαρκτον, ὁδοιπόρων; *Glaucus Pontius Fr.* 25e: ἄγραυλος, ἔπιχωρι-, ἄφυλλον, ὑψηλο-; *Fr.* 26: ἀνθρωποειδὲς; *Fr.* 29: ἀειζώου; *Kerykes Fr.* 108: σεμνόστομον; *Fr.* 110: πυρσοκόρσου; *Circê Fr.* 113a: μανόσπορος; *Fr.* 114: αὐτόφορβος; *Leon Fr.* 123: ὁδοιπόρων; *Proteus Fr.* 210: δύστηνον, μέσακτα; *Fr.* 213: ἄεπτοι; *Fr.* Incert. 330: λεοτόχορτον, νεαίρετον; *Sisyphus Fr.* 225: θεοφόρων . . . λεοντοβάμων . . . χαλκήλατος; *Fr.* 226: σταθμοῦχος; *Fr.* 227: ὑπερφυής; *Fr.* 228: πολυξένωι; *Fr.* 230: αἱμόρρυτοι [φλέβες]; *Trophoi Fr.* 246d: πεδοίκου.

Total: 70 in ca. 320 lines, i.e. rate of ca. 215 per 1000 lines

[55] See Gibert (2000); Griffith (2002).

Sophocles

Ichn. Fr. 314.10 [δύσ]λοφον, 14 [βου]στάθμου, 16 ἐφημέρων (?), 19 παντελές, 21 ἐμμανής, 36 συμμαχ-, 41 νυμφογεννή[του], 48 προσφιλής, 51 χρυσοστεφές, 69 ὑπόνομα (?), 70 διανύτων, 78 ἀρίζηλα, 83 κατήκοος, 84 προσφιλής, 85 παωτεκής, 96 διπλοῦς, 97 ὕποσμος, 108 ἐπίσημον, 116 ἐναργῆ, 118 παλινστραφῆ, 123 [βοη]λάτην (?), 146 ἄνευρα, 149 ἄνευρα, ἀκόμιστα, ἀνελεύθερα, 157 ὀρειτρόφων, 162 χρυσλφαντον, 173 κυνορτικόν, 174 τριζυγής, 203 ἀληθ[ές], 218 πεδορτον, 221 ὑλώδη, 222 ἔνθηρον, 225 ὕποινος, 226 εὐπαλῆ, 228 ἐγγόνοις, 233 ἀναιτί—(?), 243 βαθύζωνε, 245 ἄξενος, 255 ὀρθοψάλακτον, 270 βαθυζώνου, (285 ἄφραστα ?), 290 ἔμμεστον, 300 ἄναυδος, 301 προμήκης, ἐπικυρτος, 304 βπαχυσκελές, 305 προσφερές, 308 προσφερές, 310 σύγγονος, 316 ἀρτίγομφα, 327 ξύμφωνον, 329 [χερ]οψάλακτος, 342 ἀληθῆ, 343 ἀληθῆ, 363 [ἄκ]αρπον (?), 372 ἀπόψηκτον, 375 ῥινοκόλλητον, 381 παμπόνη-, 383 ἀληθές.

Total: 54 (60?) in ca. 350 entire-enough lines, i.e. ca. 155 (175?) per 1000 lines

Other satyr-plays (certain or probable): *Amphiaraus Fr.* 114 ἄγραυλος; *Fr.* 117 ἀλεξαίθριον; *Achilleôs Erastai Fr.* 149 ἐφίμερον, εὐπαγῆ, ποταινίους, σύμφορον; *Fr.* 152 διχόστομον, δίπτυχοι; *Fr.* 156 ἀρρῶξιν; *Dionysiscus Fr.* 172 ἄλυπον; *Helenês Gamos Fr.* 181 ἀχρεῖος; *Inachus Fr.* 269a 2 θεοστυγῆ, 43 λινεργ-, 46 ἄφθογγος, 50 ἄπιστα, 52 ἀξυνετ-, 53 πολυφαρμ-, 56 αἰολωπόν; *Fr.* 269c 16 ποπυιδρίδας, 19 ἀιδοκυνέας, ἄβροτον, 31 πορπαφόρος; *Fr.* 274 πάνδοκος; *Fr.* 278 εὐδαίμονες, ἀφθίτου; *Fr.* 284 ἀντίπλαστον; *Fr.* 288 κυαμόβολον; *Fr.* 289 παλινσκίωι; *Fr.* 292 ἀελλόθριξ; *Fr.* 294 ἄναντα; *Fr.* 295 ἀστολοκρατές, ἀναυδον; *Cedalion Fr.* 329 ἀλλοτριοφάγοι; *Fr.* 332 αὐτοκτίστους; *Cophi Fr.* 363 ἰσόπριος; *Oeneus Fr.* 1130 2 αἰχμαλ-, 8 ὅμαυλοι, 13 παντάγνωστα, 16 ἄκαρπος; *Syndeipni Fr.* 565 κάκοσμον; *Hybris Fr.* 670.2

Total: 40 in ca.185 entire-enough lines, i.e. ca. 215 per 1000 'lines'

Total for Sophoclean satyr-plays: 54 + 40 = 94 in ca. 535 lines, i.e. ca. 175 per 1000 lines

Euripides

Cyc. 3 ἐμμανής, 5 γηγενῆ, 6 ἐνδέξιος, 15 ἀμφῆρες, 19 ἀπηλιώτης, 21 μονῶπες, 22 ἀνδροκτόνοι, 26 ἀνοσίου, 30 δυσσεβεῖ, 31 ἀνοσίων, 44

ὑπήνεμος, 53 μηλοβότα, 54 ἀγροβάτα, 59 ἁμερόκοιτοι, 64 θυρσοφόροι, 66 ὑδροχύτοις, 72 λευκόποσιν, 79 μονοδέρκται, 82 πετρηρεφῆ, 89 ταλαίπωροι, 91 ἄξενον, 93 ἀνδροβρῶτα, 124 ἄχορον, 125 φιλόξενοι, 127 ἀνθρωποκτόνωι, 206 νεόγονα, 215 εὐτρεπής, 226 συμμιγῆ, 235 τριπῆχε, 241 ἀληθές, 245 κρεανόμωι, 247 ὀρεσκόου, 289 δυσσεβῆ, 292 ἄθραυστος, 294 ὑπάργυρος, 296 δύσφρονα, 298 πυριστάκτωι, 302 βουπόροισι, 305 δοριπετῆ, 306 ἀνάνδρους, ἄπαιδας, 310 εὐσεβές, 318 ἐναλίας, 342 ἄμεμπτος, 344 διαφόρητον, 348 ἀνοσίου, 349 ἀλίμενον, 360 δασυμάλλωι, 365 ἀποβώμιος, 371 ἐφεστίους, 378 ἀνοσιωτάτους, 380 εὐτραφέστατον, 386 χαμαιπετῆ, 388 δεκάμφορον, 394 παλιούρου, 396 θεοστυγεῖ, 399 χαλκήλατον, 416 ἔκπλεως, ἀναισχύντου, 429 ἄμεικτον, 432 ἀσθενής, 436 προσφερῆ, 438 ἀνόσιον, 442 πανουργοῦ, 462 φαεσφόρωι, 493 ἀπαίδευτον, 501 μυρόχριστον, 526 εὐπετής, 560 ἄδικος, 574 ἄδιψον, 578 ἄκρατος 590 εὐγενῆ, 592 ἀναιδοῦς, 596 ἀδάμαντος, 598 ἀπάλαμνον, εὔτρεπῆ, 602 ἄκρατος, θεοστυγεῖ, 610 ξενοδαιτυμόνος, 611 φωσφόρους, 616 ἄσπετον, 621 φιλοκισσοφόρον, 631 διάπυρος, 642 σύμμαχοι, 647 αὐτόματον, 658 ξενοδαίτης, 666 μηλονόμος, 680 ἐπήλυγα, 689 παγκάκιστε, 693 ἀνοσίου,

Total: 90 in 709 lines, i.e. 130 per 1000 lines

Aristophanes

Ach. 1–400: 3 ψαμμακοσιογάργαρα, 40 μεσημβρινοί, 47, 53 ἀθάνατος, 74 ἄκρατον, 79 καταπύγονας, 83 πανσελήνωι, 88 τριπλάσιον, 95 ναυφρακτον, 104 χαυνόπρωκτε, 105 κακοδαίμων, 119 θερμόβουλον, 142 φιλαναθήναιος, 163 σωσίπολις, 181 ἀτεράμονες, Μαραθωνομάχαι, σφενδάμνινοι, 188 πεντέτεις, 193 τριακοντουτιδες, ἐπίκωπος, 242, 260 κανηφόρος, 252 τριακοντούτιδας, 254 θυμβροφάγον, 264 ξυγκωμε, νυκτοπεριπλάνητε, 265 παιδεραστά, 288 ἀναίσχυντος, 315 ταξικάρδιον, 390 σκοτοδασυπυκνότριχα, 400 τρισμακάριε

(ca. three—φόρος nouns or adjectives?: 216 σπονδοφόρος, 242, 260 κανηφόρος)

Total: 29 (32?) in 400 lines, i.e. ca. 75 per 1000 lines

Nu. 1–200: 2 ἀπέραντον, 44 ἀκόρητος, 76 ὑπερφυᾶ, 103 ἀνυποδήτους, 104 κακοδαίμων, 115 ἀδικώτερα, 116 ἄδικον, 125 ἄνιππον 129 ἐπιλήσμων, 135 ἀμαθής, 166 τρισμακάριος.

Total: 11 in 200 lines, i.e. 55 per 1000 lines

Total for Aristophanes: 40 in 600 lines, i.e. ca. 66 per 1000 lines.

WHERE NARRATOLOGY MEETS STYLISTICS: THE SEVEN VERSIONS OF AJAX' MADNESS

Irene de Jong

Introduction

A characteristic feature of Sophocles' dramatic technique is the repeated presentation of the same event by different characters. Examples that spring to mind here are Helenus' oracle concerning the sack of Troy in the *Philoctetes*, Heracles' sack of Oechalia in the *Trachiniae*, or the murder of Laius in the *Oedipus Tyrannus*. In the course of the plays pieces of information are gradually released by characters, who each have their own interpretation and put their own accents. In the end the spectators may have a complete picture of what happened, but more often than not, the playwright seems more interested in the effects of suspense, puzzlement, or characterization which this device allows him.[1]

In this paper I will discuss an extreme example of repeated presentation: the story of Ajax' mad attack on the cattle,[2] which is recounted no less than seven times in the *Ajax*:

	speaker	addressee	lines
prologue	Athena	Odysseus	1–13 + 38–70 + 118–133
	Odysseus	Athena	18–33 + 38–70 + 118–133
	Ajax (insane)	Athena (+Odysseus)	91–117

[1] Repeated presentation is not the exclusive domain of Sophocles (though he is particularly fond of it); cf. e.g. the fall of Troy in Aeschylus *Agamemnon*, on which see Andersen (1997: 107–132).

[2] I am aware of the fact that the exact nature and length of Ajax' madness is a matter of controversy: does it start with Athena's intervention or much earlier; does it end that same night or does it last so as to include his suicide. For discussions, see Vandvik (1942); Biggs (1966); Musurillo (1967); Simpson (1969); Holt (1980); Winnington-Ingram (1980: 11–56); and Padel (1995: 68). I concur with Holt (1980), who argues that Ajax' madness is brief (it starts when Athena directs his anger at the cattle instead of the Greek generals) and ends soon after his return to the tent, and that all later references to his 'illness' and 'madness' are either due to ignorance of the speaker or are metaphorical.

(*cont.*)

	speaker	addressee	lines
parodos	chorus	each other	141–147 + 172–191
first epeisodion	Tecmessa	chorus	214–220 + 234–244 + 284–304
	Ajax (sane)	chorus + Tecmessa	366–367 + 372–376 + 401–409 + 447–453
fourth epeisodion	Menelaus	Teucer	1052–1061

These seven versions derive from different characters or, in the case of Ajax, from one character speaking at different moments and in different situations: once during his madness and once after his return to sanity.

In narratological terms what we are dealing with here are different focalizations of the same event. Of course, Sophoclean commentators have noticed these different versions, pointing out characteristics of the individual perspectives and occasionally drawing up comparisons between the various perspectives. A general analysis of 'Sophocles' multi-perspectival presentation of Ajax' was made by Charles Segal (1989–1990), who discusses not only his nightly attack but all his deeds of both past and present.

The subject of the repeated presentation of Ajax' madness cannot therefore be said to be unexplored, but I think there is room for more discussion. In view of the topic of this volume I propose to take a closer look at the verbal level of the repeated presentation. As is only to be expected, the differences in focalization are accompanied, indeed highlighted by variation in the wording. But the repetition of words can be equally significant. Finally, even the same words may have different meanings, when voiced by different characters.[3] As Pat Easterling once put it: 'detailed study of his [Sophocles'] practice in both repetition and variation ought to put us in a stronger position to assess the quality of his style' (1973: 34). Combining narratology and stylistics I hope to strengthen our assessment of the quality of both his style and his narrative, and ultimately of his dramatic art.

Before starting my analysis I want to add one methodological point. It has become fashionable recently to apply narratology to

[3] For repetition in Sophocles, see, e.g., Kirkwood (1958: 225–246); Easterling (1973; 1999); and Vernant (1981).

Greek drama. There are the studies by Goward (1999) and Markantonatos (2002) and the general discussion by John Gould (2001). In a sense, I am myself to blame for this fashion, since I wholeheartedly used narratology in my 1991 monograph on the Euripidean messenger-speech. However, in that study I was analyzing narrative *parts* which are embedded in a dramatic context. It is to my mind neither right to consider plays *as a whole* as narratives, in view of the absence of a primary narrator, nor necessary to analyse them with the help of narratology, in view of the existence of excellent drama-theories.[4] The insights of narratology should be applied only to the narrative parts of Greek drama, when characters or chorus recount events of the past, as happens in the case of Ajax' fit of madness, to which I now return.

Athena

The first to speak about Ajax' madness is Athena. Though her main function is to inform Odysseus and hence the spectators about Ajax' actions and state of mind, she initially suppresses her omniscience and asks Odysseus what he is doing near Ajax' tent (lines 12–13). Of course, she is perfectly aware 'why he has taken this trouble' of investigating Ajax' whereabouts, but she wants to make him speak out first.[5] We see the goddess here employing the technique of the 'suggestive question' in the same way as in the first Book of the *Odyssey*, when, confronting young Telemachus in the guise of Mentes, she asks the boy what is going on in the house of Odysseus; she knows exactly what the situation is, but making the youth formulate it himself, she

[4] E.g. Pfister (1988). I discuss the topic of narratology and drama in more detail in De Jong (2004: 6–7).

[5] Unless otherwise indicated, I will refer to the principal commentaries (Campbell, Garvie, Jebb, Kamerbeek, and Stanford) by name only, it being understood that the comment is found *ad loc.* Cf. Jebb: 'Athena already knows his motive (36); but this touch of divine irony is dramatically useful by giving the cue for his [Odysseus] statement'; Kamerbeek: 'it should not of course be argued that Athena has no need to hear from Od. that which she knows herself already. It is Od. who has to speak in the order of the proceedings, and this happens in quite a natural way'; Stanford: 'This is Sophocles' device for extracting some preliminary information which the spectators need to know: but it is not a violation of dramatic verisimilitude because [. . .] intelligent people often do ask questions without needing the information: they are interested in the manner not in the matter of the response'.

forces him to face it. Again as in the case of the *Odyssey*, Athena's question is far from neutral; just as she there described the situation in the palace in strongly negative terms, she here suggests that Ajax is Odysseus' enemy (ἐχθρῶν, 2) and introducing the imagery of the hunt (5–6, 8) casts him in the role of prey.

That Athena actually knows very well what Ajax has done, transpires from at least one detail in her introductory remarks, her use of the (rare) epithet ξιφοκτόνους, for Ajax' 'sword-killing' hands (10). According to Stanford, 'Sophocles probably made the phrase vague to give a quick, transient impression, soon to be clarified by the appearance of Ajax on the stage', while Garvie suggests that 'the epithet helps to establish at the beginning his status as a warrior'.[6] In my view it is unlikely that Athena, who paints a very negative picture of Ajax, would stress his [Ajax'] status as a warrior. Rather than a 'vague phrase', I consider this word a very specific hint that she in fact knows perfectly well what Ajax has done. Indeed, at the end of her speech she calls herself 'someone who knows' (12), and in 34–35 Odysseus will eagerly take Athena's bait and ask for her guidance.

Odysseus

Cued by Athena's question Odysseus gives the first version of Ajax' madness, which has the form of an epic regression:[7]

D	18b–20	I am tracking hostile (δυσμενεῖ) Ajax, the shieldbearer (σακεσφόρῳ),
C	21–24	who this night seems to have done an inconceivable deed.
B	25–27	For we just discovered that all the herds and overseers have been killed,
C'	28–29a	and everyone blamed him. Furthermore, an eyewitness,
A	29b–30	who saw him leaping over (πηδῶντα) the plain alone (μόνον) with freshly-sprinkled (νεορράντῳ) sword,
D'	31–33	reported this to me and so I am tracking him.

[6] Stanford and Garvie rightly stress that this is the first mention of the sword which is to play such a crucial role in the play; see the contribution of Buxton in this volume.

[7] An epic regression means that a speaker starts at the present, then goes back in time step by step, and then forward again; see De Jong (2001: xiv).

We see that Odysseus' version, though the first in the plot, is not really the first of the story,[8] the very first version being that by the anonymous eyewitness, at the heart of the epic regression (A: 29b–30). Once more we hear of Ajax' sword, already hinted at by Athena, and its epithet νεόρραντος carries full significance, since it makes clear why Ajax was immediately brought into connection with the recent massacre.[9] Garvie calls the detail that Ajax was alone, μόνος, 'not very significant in itself'. In my view, however, it is important, in that it makes him solely responsible for the massacre. At the same time this word is a prime example of what Easterling (1973) calls 'charging', when a theme is constantly repeated and reworked in the course of a play: Ajax is a man who fights alone, i.e., who continues fighting when others have fled (cf. 1273–1279) or who volunteers for duels, and who will die alone (cf. 657, where he announces that he will go to an 'untrodden place'). Moreover, in his lonely stubbornness he is a typical Sophoclean hero.[10] A last detail in the eyewitness' version is the verb πηδάω. Only Jebb discusses it, suggesting that the verb expresses Ajax' 'wild gestures of triumph'. For this interpretation there are no parallels, the verb being associated with the feet rather than the hands. In my view, the verb suggests Ajax' mad running; the verb is used twice by Euripides in connection with the ecstatic running of Dionysus (*Ion* 717, *Ba.* 307).[11]

When we turn from the eyewitness to Odysseus, we may note that he is greatly shocked by what has happened, as transpires from πρᾶγος ἄσκοπον, 'inconceivable deed' (21),[12] the doubling ἐφθαρμένας . . .

[8] For the distinction plot vs. story, see Pfister (1988: 196–198).

[9] The epithet, which seems a neologism of Sophocles, recurs, in exactly the same metrical position in 828, in the mouth of Ajax about to commit suicide. There it functions in two ways: it is both a 'grim reminder' (Garvie) of the blood he has already shed and proleptically announces his own blood. Kamerbeek speaks of a 'Fernverbindung'.

[10] Cf. 467, 1276, 1283, and see Knox (1964: 32).

[11] The root will recur twice in the *Ajax* (and nowhere else in the extant Sophoclean plays): 833 (Ajax announces a swift leap on the sword) and 1279 (Hector leaping over the Greek trenches onto their ships). We may be dealing with charging, the spectators being reminded of Ajax' mad leaping at the beginning of the play; see Segal (1989–1990: 396).

[12] In principle, ἄσκοπος can mean (i) 'obscure, unintelligible'; (ii) 'inconceivable'; (iii) 'reckless'; and (iv) 'aimless'. Of these, (iv) (considered by Stanford and Garvie: Ajax has missed his target) seems to me impossible, because at this stage Odysseus does not know Ajax' target yet; (iii) is not in tune with the general neutrality of Odysseus' stance; (i) (considered by Stanford and Garvie) is possible, but (ii) (Jebb, Campbell, considered by Garvie) is preferable: the deed is such as no one would have expected beforehand (cf. esp. *El.* 1315 and *Ph.* 1111).

κατηναρισμένας in 25–26,[13] and his mention of the death of the overseers of the flocks (27), a fact which will only recur in the chorus' version (232).[14] But, despite his shock, he refrains from blackening Ajax. In the first place, where all the other Greeks immediately accuse Ajax, he himself expresses doubt (cf. 23b, 24) and wants to investigate the matter first. Thus, when he continues the imagery of the hunt (19, 20, 32), the association is with a detective rather than with the bloodthirsty hound to which Athena had earlier compared him (8). It is in this light also that we must see Odysseus' use of the epithet σακέσφορος in line 19. This epithet alludes to Ajax' traditional attribute in the *Iliad*;[15] making Odysseus use it here, Sophocles signals that this character still looks at Ajax as a hero and thereby prepares for the consistent compassion and respect which he will show for Ajax until the very end of the play. Odysseus' use of δυσμενεῖ in 18 (repeated in 122) is therefore no confirmation of Athena's ἐχθρῶν in 2, as Garvie suggests. Rather, as Blundell (1989: 63) remarks, the two words are not interchangeable here: whereas Athena's ἐχθρός suggests a mutual enmity between Ajax and Odysseus, Odysseus' δυσμενής indicates that the enmity is one-sided, and only comes from Ajax.[16] Indeed, the whole play will confirm this, showing us an Ajax who remains embittered against Odysseus and the Atrides until the end.

There is one last detail in Odysseus' version which merits our attention: ἐκ χειρός (27). As all commentators note, this detail is relevant in that it makes clear that the animals did not die by a wild beast but by a human being. At the same time, as Garvie notes, Ajax' murderous hand will be stressed time and again in the various versions of his madness (cf. 10, 40, 43, 50, 57, 115, 219, 230, 310, 372, 451, 453). I suggest we are dealing with an example of charging, since later on in the play the hand recurs not only in the con-

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[13] Garvie comments that the two verbs are 'virtually synonymous', but the first may be used of both animals and men, while the second strictly speaking only applies to men, and seems inserted (apart to give expression to Odysseus' shock) in connection with the overseers.

[14] Garvie notes that 'little will be made of this later in the play (but cf. 232)', but I think that both its presence in (sensitive) Odysseus' and the (frightened) chorus' versions, and its absence in Ajax' own versions is in itself significant. Thus Knox (1961: 7) writes: 'whom [herdsmen] Ajax characteristically never even mentions'.

[15] For a full discussion, see the contribution of Davidson in this volume.

[16] I note that in 78 Odysseus does call Ajax ἐχθρός, but at that stage he has become more critical towards Ajax. The theme of friends and enemies is of course central to the play, see discussion in Blundell (1989: 60–105).

text of Ajax' martial feats (439, 616, 772), but also in that of his acceptance of the fateful sword of Hector (661) with which he will kill himself.

Athena

Being asked for guidance by Odysseus, Athena now gives a full and omniscient report, first in the form of a stichomythia (38–50), then of a continuous narrative (51–70): Ajax, angry because of Achilles' armour, set out and arrived at the Atrides' tent, was deluded by her, killed cattle, thinking it were the Greek generals, and is at present torturing the remaining cattle inside his tent. She purposefully stops at this point, so as to leave the dramatic climax, Ajax' maltreatment of 'Odysseus', to be voiced by the deluded hero himself.

As in her introductory words, Athena is not giving a neutral presentation but one biased against Ajax.[17] A clear example is line 47 (νύκτωρ ἐφ' ὑμᾶς δόλιος ὁρμᾶται μόνος), of which Kamerbeek notes that 'Athena represents the design of Ajax as hateful as she can'. The hatefulness resides in her thrice repeated stress on his secretiveness: there is the explicit δόλιος, but even the neutral νύκτωρ 'by night', which repeats Odysseus' νυκτός of line 21, and μόνος, which recalls line 30, in this setting acquire a negative undertone of stealth and deceit, in short of unheroicness.[18]

A second example of Athena's coloured focalization is her use of the epic sounding epithets πολύκερων (φόνον) in 55 and εὔκερων (ἄγραν) in 64: according to Stanford, the epithets are merely used for elegance, while Kamerbeek and Garvie suggest that they emphasize Ajax' madness, because he should have noted the horns. But I side with Jebb and take them as ironical: instead of on 'well-greaved' Trojans, Ajax is made to spend his heroic energy on 'well-horned' cattle.

A third example is Athena's choice of αἰκίζεται in 65 to refer to Ajax' torturing of the Greek generals: this word not merely suggests

[17] Cf. Knox (1961: 5–6); Grossmann (1968: 79); Lesky (1972: 181); Podlecki (1980: 53–55); Evans (1991: 71). Differently Linforth (1954: 4, 9), who detects no anger at all either in her actions or in her subsequent report, and Kirkwood (1958: 101–102), who calls her impersonal and dispassionate.

[18] Kamerbeek notes: 'The picture of Ajax going forth at night against his enemies, by stealth and alone, brooding on vengeance and planning destruction, stands in contrast with the madman striding the plain of l. 30'.

physical maltreatment but also dishonouring.[19] Indeed, perhaps the spectators will have heard in it an allusion to the contemporary legal term of αἰκία, 'assault',[20] and see Athena slip into her role of prosecutor, which she soon will exercize in all force, when cross-examining Ajax about his deed.

Why is Athena giving such a biased report? It is clear from her actions that she is angry at Ajax and wants to punish him. She not merely strikes him with madness, which could still be seen as a means of rescuing the Greek generals, amongst whom her favorite Odysseus, but she actively exhorts him in his madness, eager to throw him into her 'evil hunting-nets' (59–60). But this is not the end of it. In 66–67 she instructs Odysseus to divulge the information she is presently giving him to the other Greeks. In other words, she is intent on exposing Ajax' humiliating madness as fully as possible.[21] In this way she will create the maximum of damage to the hero's reputation and hence self-esteem. Athena's biased report therefore forms part of her punishment of the hero. Why she would want to punish this hero is for the moment left unspecified.[22]

Though the passage 38–70 mainly presents Athena's version, there are two points where Odysseus' focalization comes to the fore: in 40 he still (cf. 21) considers Ajax' deed something which can hardly be understood or imagined, but in 46, when he has been informed

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[19] The verb is discussed only by Stanford: 'Here as in 111 and 300 the middle seems to mean: "brutally assault". Jebb's translation "torment" suggests rather too much deliberation from a berserk madman like Ajax. And the emphasis is, I think, on the indignity rather than on the pain, as befits heroes.' Of his three remarks, I only sympathize with the third one. His explanation of the middle is *ad hoc* and unfounded (for a better one, see R.J. Allan 2003: 113, note 199: 'emotionally motivated actions. Subject benefits from the activity in that the subject tries to exercize power over the object through the activity'). That Ajax, though berserk, acts very deliberately will become clear in 91–117.

[20] Cf. e.g. Pl. *R.* 425d, and cf. Griffith (1983: *ad* 93).

[21] We now, in retrospect, look with different eyes at Athena's words in 36–37: at first sight they seemed to stress her protectiveness towards her favorite; but she now appears to have her own agenda, viz. to use Odysseus as an instrument in the downfall of Ajax.

[22] The spectators will have been puzzled, in that, in so far as we know, pre-Sophoclean versions of the Ajax' story do not speak of anger/punishment on the side of Athena; see the overview in Kamerbeek (1–8, esp. his remark on p. 6 that the scholia call Ajax' *hubris* against the gods in S. *Aj.* 762–777a *prosthêkê tou poiêtou*). We hear of Athena influencing the vote on Achilles' armour in favour of Odysseus (*Od.* 11.547, *Ilias Parva* argument and fr. 2), but this suggests favoritism towards Odysseus rather than enmity towards Ajax.

that Ajax had worse things in mind, wanting not merely to kill animals but men, he starts thinking about it in more negative terms, speaking of τόλμαις and φρενῶν θράσει.[23] It remains to be seen whether he comes to accept Athena's view altogether.

Ajax (insane)

Athena does not confine her humiliation of Ajax to the indirectness of a narrative report. She actually brings him on stage and makes him show his madness directly to both Odysseus and the spectators (91–117). The hero's version of his own madness combines all three forms of narration, as distinguished by Genette (1980: 215–233): ulterior narration, when he admits that he has killed the Greeks and the Atrides; simultaneous narration, when he talks of Odysseus at that moment sitting inside as his prisoner; and prior narration, when he announces how he will torture and kill him. His report repeats all the points of Athena's earlier one, thereby confirming it, while at the same time expanding it on one point, the torturing of the Greek generals (referred to in general terms by Athena in 65, it is now described in full detail in 105–110).

On the micro level of the verbal presentation there are some interesting observations to be made. In the first place, there is one near-repetition: Athena had spoken of Ajax 'binding' the cattle (62 δεσμοῖσι συνδήσας, 65 συνδέτους),[24] while Ajax speaks of the ram which he takes to be Odysseus as his δεσμώτης, 'prisoner' (105); from his point of view this word gives expression to the humiliating treatment he—thinks he—is giving Odysseus, but for the spectators it only accentuates his delusion that he is dealing with men instead of cattle.[25]

In the second place, there are two exact repetitions, the repeated words having different meanings. The first is παρέστης in line 92: Ajax thanks Athena for 'standing next to him', i.e., 'helping him' during his nightly attack. Athena herself had referred to this 'help' very differently in lines 59–60 ('I urged on the man who was already moving around in frenzied illness, threw him into evil hunting-nets'),

[23] For negative instances of τόλμη (Ellendt-Genthe: *audacia*) cf. *OT* 125, 533; *OC* 1030; *Ant.* 371; *Tr.* 582; of θράσος (Ellendt-Genthe: *audacia temeraria*) cf. *El.* 626.

[24] And cf. Tecmessa in 240 δήσας, 296 συνδέτους, 299 δεσμίους.

[25] Admittedly, Tecmessa, too, uses δεσμῶτιν . . . ποίμναν in 234.

and Ajax' use of παρίσταοθαι and of course of σύμμαχον in 117 (picking up Athena's own use of the term in 90)[26] are instances of bitter dramatic irony, as all commentators note. But I would also suggest a link with line 48, where Odysseus asked Athena: καὶ παρέστη κἀπὶ τέρμ' ἀφίκετο [sc. Ajax]; There Kamerbeek notes that 'to stand near' is also used of hostile approaches in Homer.[27] Recalling these hostile or ominous overtones, the spectators may interpret Ajax' use of παρίστασθαι in 92 as doubly ironical: Athena not only is not helping him, she is actually attacking him.

The second repetition concerns ἄγρας, 'prey', in 93. The same word had been employed by Athena in 64 (ὡς ἄνδρας, οὐχ ὡς εὔκερων ἄγραν ἔχων) in its literal sense,[28] while Ajax here uses it metaphorically to refer to—what he thinks are—human captives. The repetition brings home the dramatic irony of his use of this word: unwittingly, he is using no metaphor at all but speaking literally (Garvie).

It is clear that in this scene Athena, making Ajax admit his own crimes, indeed boast of them, is further 'throwing him into evil hunting-nets', to use her own words of line 60. She is cross-examining him, with Odysseus being present as a silent—and for Ajax invisible—witness. She pretends to be on Ajax' side, calling herself his 'ally' (90) and feigning delight in his treatment of the Greeks (notably in 95: 'Did you dye your sword thoroughly in the army of the Argives?' and 97 'Did you really wield your hand in fighting against the sons of Atreus?', where ἦ καί express an eager question and where the negatively charged verb χραίνεσθαι, 'defile', which she

[26] At this stage the spectators already know that Athena is not Ajax' ally but his enemy. Only later will the full impact of the word σύμμαχος become clear to them: Athena is punishing Ajax precisely because in the past he rejected all divine support and specifically refused Athena to become his ally (760–780). As so often, the punishment mirrors the offence: Athena forces him to become her ally in a ludicrous battle (against cattle), which will bring him shame and lead to his death. This later passage contains many verbal repetitions of the present one: 774–775 πέλας ἵστω ~ 92 παρέστης; 766 ὑψικόμπως and 770 ἐκόμπει ~ 96 κόμπος. When speaking about dramatic irony in 117, therefore, as all commentators do, whe should in fact speak of dramatic irony *in retrospect*, since at this point the spectators do not know about Ajax' clash with Athena in the past, a detail which to all appearances did not form part of the traditional core of the Ajax' story, see note 22.

[27] Cf. *Il.* 16.853 = 24.132; *Od.* 9.52; 16.280; 24.28. In all these cases it is 'bad fate' (death) which stands near a hero. Of course, παρίστασθαι is also, indeed most often, used positively, in the sense of helping, in Homer, e.g. *Il.* 10.278–279, *Od.* 3.223.

[28] And again by Tecmessa in 297.

used in 43 vis-à-vis Odysseus, has been replaced by the descriptive ᾔχμασας). Even when she briefly seems to forget her role, twice calling Ajax' victim Odysseus τὸν δύστηνον (109 and 111) and using the negatively charged verb αἰκίζομαι (111; cf. 65, discussed above), this is only a trap: it provokes Ajax into stating his intention to kill Odysseus all the more emphatically. This brief moment of feigned discord between goddess and hero does bring up one important point of difference between their versions of Ajax' madness: whereas Athena speaks of dishonourable torturing, he considers it the paying of a justified penalty (τείσει . . . δίκην, 113).

After Ajax has left the stage again, there follows a brief evaluation by Athena and Odysseus, which points up the difference in their perspectives on Ajax' act. Athena now reveals that she is punishing Ajax because of things he said and did in the past (the full particulars will be set out in 760–780). Although she invites Odysseus to share her point of view ('Do you see the greatness of the strength of the gods?', 118), he does not do so: 'I see that all we who live are nothing more than phantoms or shadows' (125–126; the repetition ὁρᾷς . . . ὁρῶ underscores the difference).[29] Whereas Athena had referred to the insanity with which she struck Ajax as δυσφόρους γνώμας, 'misleading imaginations'/'imaginations which are hard to bear up against' (51–52),[30] Odysseus refers to it as Ajax being ἄτῃ συγκατέζευκται κακῇ, 'yoked to an evil delusion' (123). Instead of, like Athena, relishing in the downfall of an opponent (cf. 79: οὔκουν γέλως ἥδιστος εἰς ἐχθροὺς γελᾶν), Odysseus pities Ajax (121–123). Again his rejection of the goddess' perspective is underscored by verbal repetition: whereas Athena had just before deceivingly called Ajax' supposed victim Odysseus (τὸν) δύστηνον, Odysseus now uses the same expression of Ajax, who is a real victim, with real compassion (122). As all commentators note, the one who does—in this respect—share Athena's perspective is Ajax himself, who in 105–106 had gloated over his 'fallen opponent' Odysseus (ἥδιστος . . . δεσμώτης ἔσω θακεῖ) and, as will appear from 303, laughed while abusing him.

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[29] Segal (1989–1990: 397–398).

[30] Kamerbeek defends the active meaning 'misleading'; Garvie also considers 'grievous' (because of the consequences his madness wil have for Ajax), but this hardly suits the revengeful goddess; Jebb opts for 'hard to bear up against', Campbell for a combination: 'The natural meaning "grievous", "intolerable", is slightly modified by the association of "hard to resist" or "bear up against", Ajax could not withstand the fatal illusion'.

The chorus

The chorus' version of Ajax' madness is a hearsay report (cf. 137–138, 142, 148–151, 186, 187–191). All scholars agree that the rumour they are referring to is in fact the report which Athena instructed Odysseus to give in 67. At first sight, this seems to be confirmed by the chorus itself, which in 148–150 speaks of 'the whispering words that Odysseus fabricates and insinuates into everybody's ears'. There is a problem, however: why is the chorus guessing as to which god made Ajax kill the cattle (172–181), why does it make no mention at all of the fact that while killing the cattle Ajax thought he was killing Greek generals, when it was exactly on these points that Odysseus had been fully informed by Athena in the preceding scene?[31] One solution would be to assume that the chorus is not referring to any report of Odysseus at all, but is basing itself on the vague rumors which ever since daybreak and the finding of the slaughtered cattle (and the report of the eyewitness) must have started to spread. Knowing of the enmity between Ajax and Odysseus it simply—but as the spectators know unjustifiedly—ascribes that rumor to him.[32] Another solution would be that Sophocles is here sacrificing strict logic to dramatic expediency: he needs a chorus which is only dimly informed about what has happened and still hopes that it is not true. Moreover, its lack of knowledge concerning these points (Athena's role[33] and Ajax' delusion) means that it will not be able to inform Tecmessa, who thereby can come up with her own—puzzled—interpretation.

The kernel of the chorus' version of Ajax' mad attack is formed by lines 141–147. Hardly surprisingly, much stress is laid on the fact that the cattle killed by Ajax consisted of booty which was as yet undivided and hence belonged to the whole army (144–146, cf. again in 175). Mentioned in passing by Odysseus (26), this detail was already stressed by Athena too (54), in her zeal to blacken Ajax: it

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[31] Commentators have not noted this problem, but have instead been troubled by the question as to whether enough time has elapsed between Odysseus' exit and the chorus' arrival to allow them to have met Odysseus and heard his information.

[32] Note that at 188 (and again at 225) they ascribe the rumours to both Odysseus and the Atrides, which again pleads against their actually having heard Odysseus' report.

[33] As all commentators note, their speculations, though wrong, are logical and interesting in themselves; in particular, their idea that Ajax may not have acknowledged the wargod Ares' help comes close to the actual situation (cf. 768–770 and 774–777).

makes Ajax' crime one directed not only at the generals but at the whole army. The chorus stresses it because it realizes that it will turn the entire army against Ajax and itself; indeed, fear is its main reaction—together with incredulity and shame—to Ajax' deed (cf. 229–232 and 245–256).

Two variations in the chorus' version call for our attention. Instead of the πεδία, 'plain', in Odysseus' version (30), the chorus speaks of a ἱππομανῆ λειμῶνα, 'meadow which abounds in horses'/'where horses run wild' (143–144). All commentators discuss the meaning of the adjective (see Jebb in his appendix), some are puzzled as to why horses are mentioned when it is cattle that Ajax kills, but my question is rather why we find such a precise indication of the scene of the crime at all. Unless we assume that the epithet is simply chosen because of its root μαν-, which evokes Ajax' mad behaviour (cf. 81 μεμηνότα, 216 μανίᾳ, 726 μανέντος, 957 μαινομένοις), I would suggest that this is an instance of what Roland Barthes (1982) has called 'the reality effect', the inclusion of apparently superfluous descriptive details, so as to increase the authenticity and hence reliability of a story.[34] By the time the chorus hears the rumour about Ajax, it has already been augmented with all kind of authenticating detail (cf. 226 'the news is increased by mighty rumour'). At the same time, the chorus in 'quoting' the rumour seems to edit its actual wording, speaking as they do about Ajax' αἴθωνι σιδήρῳ in 147, instead of the 'freshly-sprinkled sword' of line 30. 'Flashing sword or iron' is, as all commentators note, a Homeric expression, and the intertextual reference suggests the chorus' unfaltering respect for and loyalty to Ajax.[35] In

[34] A close parallel is *Trachiniae* 188: a messenger reports to Deanira how Lichas is informing the inhabitants of Trachis about Heracles' victory and imminent return 'in the meadow where the oxen are pastured in summer' (ἐν βουθερεῖ λειμῶνι). The detail must increase the reliability of his report. The one other occurrence of λειμών in Sophocles, *Aj.* 655, is an instance of significant repetition: for his suicide Ajax returns to the place of the crime which led to it. Sophocles' choice of <u>ἱππο</u>μανῆ as authenticating detail may have been made in connection with βοτῆρας <u>ἱππο</u>νώμας in 232, as Kamerbeek's laconic 'cf.' seems to suggest.

[35] The parodos as a whole contains many Homeric echoes; see Davidson (1975) and cf. Garvie: 'The many epic words reinforce the impression of Ajax as a Homeric hero'. Αἴθων will recur twice (222, 1088), both times in connection with 'fiery', 'hot-tempered' Ajax. Again, intertextuality may play a part here, since in Homer the epithet is often used of animals, notably of a lion attacking cattle in a simile devoted to Ajax (*Il.* 11.548–557); cf. Stanford *ad* 221. For Garner (1990: 55–58), this Homeric simile even is Sophocles' main inspiration for making mad Ajax turn against cattle; here it should be noted, however, that Ajax' attack on cattle is found in the *Little Iliad*, argument and fr. 2.1, which therefore is more likely Sophocles' model.

231, when they have just heard Tecmessa confirm the rumour, they will use a very different epithet for Ajax' sword: now it is 'black' (κελαινοῖς ξίφεσιν). The blackness in the first place refers to the dark metal (Hesiod speaks of 'dark iron') and perhaps to the drops of dark blood on it; but I think we can follow Stanford, who suggests that 'the epithet refers to the despairing, dark mood of the chorus'.

There is one last—repeated—detail in the chorus' version, to which I would like to draw attention. At 184 they speak about Ajax 'falling upon the flocks' (ἐν ποίμναις πίτνων). The same verb had been used by Odysseus (42) and Athena (55, 58), and will be used by Tecmessa (300) and Ajax himself (375). Now πίπτω is perhaps not the most obvious choice to express the idea of an attack, and Sophocles seems to have chosen it here with an eye on charging: later on in the play Ajax will 'fall on' his sword (cf. 828 and 1033).[36]

Tecmessa

The longest version of Ajax' madness is that by Tecmessa. As has been remarked by all commentators, her version takes the form of a messenger's report; the chorus actually speaks of ἀγγελίαν in 224. As is usual in messenger-scenes, we first have a dialogue between Tecmessa and the chorus (201–283) and then a continuous rhesis (284–330). The structure of her version, which is told in several instalments, is as follows:

214–220	summary
234–244	penultimate phase of Ajax' madness, his killing and torturing of animals inside the tent
285–294	first phase, Ajax preparing for departure and leaving the tent
295	middle phase, killing of cattle outside the tent (*skipped*)
296–300	penultimate phase, his torturing inside the tent
301–304	final phase, his mysterious conversation just outside the tent

Her version repeats and supplements, but also not repeats the earlier versions. I start with one marked case of non-repetition, Ajax'

[36] Cf. Garvie *ad* 1033: 'He who "fell on" the animals (184, 300) has now fallen himself'. An intermediate position is taken by πεσών in 325: after his mad attack Ajax falls down exhaustedly amongst the cattle he has killed.

actions outside the tent which, as Tecmessa explicitly says at 295, she is not able to recount.[37] Tecmessa's omission is both internally motivated (staying inside the tent, she can not know what happens outside in the fields) and understandable from the point of view of the playwright, who refrains from presenting what by now has been told three times. Tecmessa does repeat Ajax' torturing of the cattle inside the tent, and in doing so we may note how she sometimes echoes the language of Athena's and Ajax' (insane) versions (τὸν δ' ὀρθὸν ἄνω κίονι δήσας, 239–240 ≈ δεθεὶς πρὸς κίον', 108; δεσμίους, 299 ≈ συνδέτους, 65; κἀρράχιζε, 299 ≈ κύκλῳ ῥαχίζων, 56; ᾐκίζεθ', 300 ≈ αἰκίζεται, 65) and sometimes expands on it (the simple μάστιγι of 110 becomes μέγαν ἱπποδέτην ῥυτῆρα . . . λιγυρᾷ μάστιγι διπλῇ, 241–242), confirming that Ajax has done what in 105–117 he threatened to do. She also repeats, from a very different perspective, Ajax' encounter with Athena just outside the tent, which the spectators had watched at 91–117. She supplements the earlier versions by reporting on the first phase of Ajax' attack, his preparations inside the tent.

In all of this the main interest for the spectators is in Tecmessa's restricted understanding of what was going on: she has no clear idea of the nature of Ajax' delusion (his taking cattle for men) and does not know about Athena's role. The nearest she will come to an understanding is when she says at 300 that Ajax tortured 'the rest *as if* they were men, though attacking the flocks'. But just as Odysseus is enlightened by Athena in the prologue, it will need Ajax himself to inform Tecmessa (and the chorus) about his delusion and Athena's role.

A first manifestation of Tecmessa's restricted understanding is her use of σφαγία and χρηστήρια at lines 219–220: 'such is the sight that you could see inside the hut, *victims* slaughtered by his hand, bathed in blood, *sacrifices of* that man'. Commentators interpret χρηστήρια in connection with Ajax, either as ominous sacrifices which announce his suicide or as sacrifices to the demon of madness. In my view we have to interpret these words in connection with Tecmessa. Indeed, whereas the others speak of Ajax 'killing' the animals (ἐναρίζω, κείρω, κτείνω, ὄλλυμι), she uses verbs like σφάζω, αὐχενίζω, and ῥαχίζω, which all refer to the slaughtering of sacrificial victims (235, 298, 299).[38] Also, at 237–239 she reports how Ajax 'cut off the head and

[37] It is in general characteristic of Sophoclean messenger-speeches (as opposed to Euripidean ones) to contain gaps; see Barrett (2002: 190–222).

[38] The others never use these verbs, except for Athena who uses ῥαχίζω at 56.

the tip of the tongue of a ram, and threw them down'; this act may have suggested to her the ritual of cutting out the tongue of sacrificial animals (and then burning it).[39] Taking these cues together, my suggestion is that Tecmessa, not knowing the exact nature of Ajax' delusion, his taking cattle for men, tries to make sense of his behaviour, interpreting it in terms of a sacrifice, albeit a corrupted sacrifice.

Tecmessa's restricted understanding is particularly manifest at the beginning of her long, continuous report, which is told according to her experiencing rather than her narrating focalization.[40] Ajax set out 'at dead of night when the evening lamps no longer burned'; in earlier reports, too, it had been indicated that Ajax' expedition took place at night (21, 47, 141, 180, 209). I recall in particular Athena's version (47), where 'by night', in combination with 'treacherously' and 'alone', acquired the negative connotation of unheroic secrecy. From Tecmessa's point of view, however, this detail is expressive of her puzzlement: why would Ajax set out with his sword in the middle of the night?[41] Her bewilderment is further revealed in her qualification of Ajax' mission as κενάς, 'empty'. According to Garvie, 'it is mainly with hindsight that Tecmessa describes it as empty' and he translates 'a futile mission'. I do not find this convincing; should Tecmessa really have spoken from hindsight, she would sooner have called the mission 'disastrous' or 'terrible'; also, even at this point, when reporting to the chorus, she does not know what Ajax' real mission was (to kill the Greek generals). Rather, I side with the other commentators[42] and take 'empty' to mean 'without apparent cause

[39] Cf., e.g., *Od.* 3.332 and 341 and Garvie *ad* 239, who speaks of a 'corrupted sacrifice' (which he, however, connects with Ajax' rather than Tecmessa's perspective). The scholia—highly implausibly—suggest that Ajax cuts out the tongue (of Nestor), because he gave false testimony in the contest over Achilles' armour. This may—or may not—have been Ajax' motive, but it can never be Tecmessa's association with the action.

[40] Cf. her own words in 316 in connection with the earlier report she gave Ajax and which will have been substantially the same as she now gives the chorus: ἔλεξα πᾶν ὅσονπερ ἐξηπιστάμην, 'I told him all that he had done, as far as I knew/understood it'. To make a messenger suppress his *ex eventu*-knowledge is common narratological practice in Sophoclean and Euripidean messenger-speeches, see De Jong (1991: 30–56).

[41] Tecmessa's use of νύκτερος at 217 has a different ring. Here the word brings home the tragic nature of Ajax' fate: the famous hero, who, as all commentators point out, in *Il.* 17.645–647 so passionately prays to Zeus to be allowed to fight—and, if needs be, die—in broad daylight, is made to act in the middle of the night, i.e. in darkness and obscurity. Cf. Stanford (275–276) and Padel (1995: 68).

[42] Garvie takes this interpretation into consideration, too.

or object'. It prepares for her subsequent question to Ajax what he is doing, setting out unsummoned, neither called by messengers nor having heard trumpets (288–291). Her surprise is also reflected in her use of historic presents at 288: 'πιπλήσσω καὶ λέγω.[43] In this context the word μόνος (294) acquires yet another significance: whereas earlier speakers had used it to incriminate Ajax, who alone is guilty of the massacre and stealthily went about his murderous plans, in Tecmessa's version it—again—expresses puzzlement; why would he rush out 'alone', when 'the whole army is sleeping'?[44]

Tecmessa's restricted understanding comes to the fore again at the end of her report, when she tells about Ajax' conversation with a shadow (301–304). Whereas the chorus spontaneously think of a divine cause of Ajax' mad behaviour (cf. 172–181, 182–185), Tecmessa nowhere detects a divine hand.[45] For her Athena is a mere shadow,[46] a figment of Ajax' mad brain. Line 304: ὅσην κατ' αὐτῶν ὕβριν ἐκτείσαιτ' ἰών, '(he laughed) at how much *hubris* he had avenged on them in his foray', is intriguing: whereas earlier she had reported (her own and) Ajax' words in direct speech (293), she here turns to indirect speech.[47] This means that she is one step removed from a direct, 'mimetic' rendering of his words, and indeed her indirect quotation does not correspond to any one line used by Ajax vis-à-vis Athena. The one element which does correspond is ἐκτείσαιτ', which recalls τείσει (113). But the charged word ὕβριν had not been used by Ajax. It must be Tecmessa's rendering of line 98, where Ajax said 'these men will not dishonour Ajax anymore'. Stanford and Garvie suggest that the sentence might be ambiguous, its other meaning

[43] For historic presents in Sophocles, see the paper by Rijksbaron in this volume.

[44] In Tecmessa's formulation Ajax' nightly attack becomes a tragic instance of the 'lonely vigil' *topos* ('all others are asleep, but only X is awake') for which see Leeman's classic article (1985). In her summary, where she does use *ex eventu* knowledge, Tecmessa realizes the consequence of Ajax' setting out alone: 'for to look upon one's self-made sufferings, *when no one else has helped to inflict them*, intensifies great pain' (260–262).

[45] The one exception seems to be 243–244: 'uttering terrible words of abuse, which a god, no man, must have taught him', but this seems more a general expression (Ajax spoke in an uncharacteristic manner) and hardly suggests that she is thinking of a specific divine intervention at that very moment.

[46] The word σκιᾷ is another instance of significant repetition: for Tecmessa, Athena is no more than a shadow, whereas earlier Odysseus had called (all) mortals mere shadows (126), and in 1257 Teucer will call dead Ajax a shadow.

[47] Bers (1997: 50–51) suggests that Tecmessa here (and at 312 and 317) does not quote Ajax, because his words are 'unsuitable for direct representation'.

being: '(he laughed) at all the *hubris* he had gone and inflicted on them by way of vengeance'. Since Tecmessa would not easily accuse Ajax of *hubris*, this should be an alternative meaning which *only the spectators* could attribute to the words.[48]

The remainder of Tecmessa's report recounts Ajax regaining his senses and realizing what he has done, thus preparing for his entering the stage, and in 307 gives a first hint of the hero's focalization of his deed: καὶ πλῆρες ἄτης ὡς διοπτεύει στέγος, 'when he saw the house full of ruin'. This small detail is characteristic of Tecmessa's perspective in general. Though hardly understanding why Ajax did what he did, she very well grasps the consequences which his deed will have for him: 'the terrible, great, fierce' and 'famous' Ajax has been humiliated and this is something he is not going to take lightly. If the chorus' version was coloured by fear for themselves, Tecmessa's version is very much tuned to—the suffering of—the hero himself.[49]

Ajax (sane)

Having regained his senses, Ajax does not express regret at his nightly attack, only at the fact that he missed his real target, the Greek generals,[50] and instead unleashed his fury on—unfearing/harmless—animals. His use of epic epithets in connection with the animals at 374–375 (ἑλίκεσσι . . . κλυτοῖς) recalls Athena in 55 and 64; but whereas the goddess was gloatingly ironic, he is bitterly ironic (Garvie).[51] He now clearly sees that he was hit by a fit of madness (λυσσώδη νόσον, 452),[52] sent to him by Athena, whom he now no longer refers

[48] Not surprisingly, Menelaus will in 1088 speak of Ajax' attack in terms of *hubris*. Ajax himself, when sane, will look back on his mad attack as an act of *hubris* committed against himself (367).

[49] Cf. Segal (1989–1990: 399): 'Her narrative is marked by the recognition of Ajax' emotional and physical suffering'. It is only later that Tecmessa will urge her own perspective as against Ajax', when discussing his plan to kill himself (485–524).

[50] The one thing that remains constant in Ajax' vision is his idea that the Greek generals were wrong in not awarding him Achilles' arms and that hence he was justified in avenging himself on them; cf. his reference to them as τοὺς ἀλάστορας at 373, 'men who deserve to be pursued by an avenger'.

[51] Differently, Kamerbeek: 'the epithets are not meant by Ajax as ironical, but they nevertheless illustrate the situation ironically', and Stanford: 'the elevated style perhaps emphasizes (by contrast) the sordidness of Ajax' butchery of mere cattle'.

[52] Cf. the use of νοσ—by Athena at 66; the chorus at 185, 338; and Tecmessa at 207, 269, 271, 274, 280. Ajax speaks of λύσσα rather than using the root μα(ι)ν-,

to chummily as his ally but as a fearsome goddess (she is 'mighty' (402), 'Gorgon-eyed'[53] and 'unconquerable'[54] (450)). He realizes that the tables have been turned against him: it is no longer he who tortures his enemies (65, 111), but he is being tortured himself (403); instead of laughing at his enemies (303), he will now be laughed at by them (367, 454).[55] In short, 'the hunt' he was so proud of at 93 is now (dis)qualified as a 'foolish' one (407) and the blood he has caused to flow now appears to him as ἐρεμνόν, 'dark' (376), with a connotation of 'gloomy' and 'horrendous', while earlier it was purple (φοινιχθείς, 110).[56]

There is one detail in Ajax' version to which I would like to draw special attention: 'and when I was already stretching my hand against them [Agamemnon and Menelaus], Athena ἔσφηλεν, tripped me up, by inflicting on me the disease of madness'. To this we may compare Athena's version at 49–52: 'Indeed, he was already at the gates of the two generals. (Od.) How then did he stay his hand when it was so eager for bloodshed? (Ath.) I kept him from his incurable joy, by casting misleading imaginations on his eyes'. Jebb and LSJ take ἔσφηλεν as 'foil', 'frustrate'; Kamerbeek, following Ellendt-Genthe, takes it even more abstractly as 'bring to perplexity and disaster'.[57] In my view, however, Garvie is right in taking it literally as 'trip up'. He does not further discuss the word in his commentary, but I would suggest that Ajax is here using a wrestling metaphor:[58] σφάλλω is the technical term for tripping up someone in wrestling. The metaphor gives perfect expression to Ajax' perspective: he feels

as others do (see section on the chorus' version). It may be that he chooses this word because it originally describes martial rage (cf. *Il.* 13.53); however, in Euripides (e.g. *Ba.* 981 and *HF* 922–1015) it is used as a general word for frenzy, without any martial associations.

[53] Rather than 'disparaging' (Stanford), the epithet is 'sinister' (Garvie).

[54] Athena will be pleased to hear that Ajax calls her ἀδάματος, in view of her words at 118: 'Do you see, Odysseus, the greatness of the strength of the gods?

[55] Cf. Stanford, who (on 367 and 401–403) speaks of the 'biter is bitten'; Garvie (*ad* 403) 'the alternation of Ajax' fortunes is marked by the repetition of the verb of 65, 111, 300'.

[56] The usual epithet of dark blood is μέλας, while in Homer ἔρεμνός is used of night, storm, earth, or the aegis. The same combination appears at Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 1390, with reference to the blood of murdered Agamemnon. Cf. Campbell: 'with reference to the gloom of night and other circumstances of horror which surrounded the act'. For Kamerbeek, however, the word here 'simply = "black"'.

[57] This sentiment will be expressed by Ajax some lines further: εἰ δέ τις θεῶν βλάπτοι (455–456).

[58] Cf. e.g. *Il.* 23.719: οὔτ' Ὀδυσεὺς δύνατο σφῆλαι οὔδει τε πελάσσαι.

Athena has cheated him, defeating him by means of a trick. That tricks were used in wrestling can be illustrated, very fittingly, from the wrestling match between Ajax and Odysseus in *Iliad* 23: 'Odysseus did not forget guile (δόλου) and caught Ajax with a stroke behind the hollow of the keen, unnerved the tendons and threw him on his back' (725–727). It seems typical of the Ajax as portrayed by Sophocles in his *Ajax* that this hero neither looks back with horror on his own murderous behaviour nor connects Athena's intervention with any previous behaviour of his (such as we will hear about in 760–780), but only feels cheated again (first he was robbed of Achilles' armour, now of his rightful revenge).

Menelaus

Menelaus is the last to look back at Ajax' nightly action. His brief version forms part of a speech in which he defends his decision not to let Ajax be buried: having hoped that he would be an ally and friend of the Greeks, they found Ajax a worse enemy than the Trojans, because he 'plotting murder against the whole army, marched against it by night' (1055–1056). Blundell (1989: 91) calls his summary 'a blunt but accurate statement of a reasonable grievance', and other commentators, though noting that 'the whole army' is an exaggeration, add that Ajax *had* been embittered against all the Greeks (cf. 844) and *had* turned against the common herds (53–54, 146), and, one may add, *had* agreed with Athena that he had 'dyed his sword in the entire Argive army' (95–96).[59] In my view, however, the sting of Menelaus' version is in ἐπεστράτευσεν, 'march against'. This verb, implying an orderly military attack against an enemy, is a far cry from the 'mad leaping' of the anonymous eyewitness' version in line 51. Using it, Menelaus casts Ajax in the role of official enemy of the Greeks, a position which makes his non-burial acceptable. Other details in his version strengthen this point of view: his νύκτωρ (1056) has the same negative connotation of stealth which it had in Athena's version (947); he unambiguously calls Ajax' deed *hubris* (1061, see the discussion in the section on Tecmessa); and suppressing all references to madness he makes Ajax' action a fully conscious one.[60]

[59] Cf. also 408–458, where Ajax fears the anger of the entire army.
[60] Speaking of 'one of the gods'/'a god' (1057, 1060) suggests that he is unaware of Athena's role.

Conclusion

With Menelaus I have come full circle with my analysis of the seven versions of Ajax' madness. I hope to have demonstrated Sophocles' superior handling of the instrument of verbal repetition and variation. He is not only a brilliant dramatist but also a brilliant narrative artist. The infinite possibilities of the device of focalization, which literary historians all too hastily tend to consider a modern invention, are exploited by him to the full. The different versions in the first place shed different lights on Ajax: mortal victim of divine forces (in the eyes of Odysseus); overbearing mortal who deserves to be punished (Athena); hero, who is the victim of false slander (chorus); hero who has ruined his own glory (Tecmessa), justified but cheated avenger (Ajax himself), and enemy of the Greeks (Menelaus). But they also characterize the speakers themselves, who are scrupulous and sympathetic (Odysseus), vindictive and gloating (Athena), loyal but self-centered (chorus), loyal and Ajax-centered (Tecmessa), heroic but short-sighted (Ajax), and hostile (Menelaus).

Athena's appearance on stage has often been seen as an exception to Sophocles' usual way of involving the gods, viz. as invisible and inscrutable powers behind the scenes.[61] My analysis has shown, however, that her divine focalization, though omniscient and coming early in the play, is not the dominant one.[62] The person who comes closest to Athena's focalization is, strikingly enough, Ajax himself: (exactly as she had foreseen) he looks at his fit of madness in terms of a humilation which makes him the laughing stock of his peers and which therefore can only be cured by his death. But it is apparently the humanistic perspective of Odysseus, expressed early and adhered to consistently until the end of the play, which Sophocles wanted his spectators to adopt.[63]

[61] Cf., e.g., Buxton (1984: 16): 'The purposes of the Sophoclean gods are usually enigmatic, the only exceptions being Athena in *Ajax* and Heracles at the end of *Philoctetes*'.

[62] Cf. Budelmann (2000: 185): 'The further the play moves on, the more difficult it becomes to take the prologue as the basis for an interpretation'. Cf. also Easterling (1993: 81–86), who argues that we should see Athena in this prologue primarily as a kind of *didaskalos*, stimulating the spectators' awareness of the play as play.

[63] Cf. Easterling (1993: 82): 'His [Odysseus'] words in 121ff. can be seen as a guide to the audience as spectators, not just of this scene, but of tragedy in general'.

SOPHOCLES ON FIRE: ΤΟ ΠΥΡ IN *PHILOCTETES*

Rush Rehm

Facing Neoptolemus' apparent betrayal, Philoctetes turns on the young man with a surprising invective:

> ὦ πῦρ σὺ καὶ πᾶν δεῖμα καὶ πανουργίας
> δεινῆς τέχνημ' ἔχθιστον, οἷά μ' εἰργάσω,
> οἷ' ἠπάτηκας· οὐδ' ἐπαισχύνῃ μ' ὁρῶν
> τὸν προστρόπαιον, τὸν ἱκέτην, ὦ σχέτλιε; (S. *Ph.* 927–930).[1]

> You fire, you utter terror, you hateful craftsman [masterpiece] / of subtle villainy—how you worked me, / how you deceived me! Aren't you ashamed to look at me / a suppliant who turned to you, you wretch?

Philoctetes is full of vocatives—over 130, by rough count—but as far as I can ascertain, this is the only use of τὸ πῦρ as a vocative (or, better, a 'vocatival invective') in all of ancient Greek literature. Beginning with this unprecedented occurrence, I will consider the wider implications of fire in *Philoctetes*, focussing on the way that Sophoclean language ignites dramatic action, character development, and critical response.

Professor Kamerbeek—the anniversary of whose editions of Sophocles we honor in this volume—notes in his commentary on the play that Philoctetes' vehement indignation befits a typical Sophoclean 'passionate man'—a fiery invective from a heroic-tempered protagonist. Following Jebb and others, Kamerbeek also points out that, in epic, τὸ πῦρ connotes a ruthlessly destructive force.[2] Philoctetes' use of the word, then, suggests that Neoptolemus represents such a devastating power.

Regarding fire as applied to epic characters, one immediately thinks of Neoptolemus' father, Achilles, whose association with images of fire provides the basis of Whitman's seventh chapter ('Fire and Other Elements') in *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (1958). Whitman finds some two hundred occurrences of the image in the *Iliad*: armor glistens like fire; warriors dart like flames; Zeus flashes his lightning;

[1] Quotations refer to the Loeb edition of Sophocles, Lloyd-Jones (1994–1996).
[2] Kamerbeek (1980: on *Ph.* 927–928).

fires of sacrifice and feasting burn, as do the funeral pyres of the plague victims, the battle dead, Patroclus, and finally Hector, whose funeral rites close the poem. The burning of the Greek ships and subsequent death of Patroclus causes Achilles to appear and frighten the Trojans. Athena crowns his head with a golden cloud from which light blazes to the heavens like the beacon fires of a city under siege (*Il.* 18.203–214). When Achilles battles the river Xanthus in Book 21, he is joined by Hephaestus, fire fighting water, the god who earlier forged Achilles' immortal armor at Thetis' bequest. As Whitman demonstrates in impressive detail, the manifold flames of the *Iliad* gather around the greatest Greek hero.[3]

Achilles on fire, Neoptolemus as fire—the adage 'like father, like son' might seem appropriate. However, when Philoctetes cries out ὦ πῦρ σύ at the young man, Neoptolemus resembles an *anti*-Achilles, someone not to be trusted, the sort of man Achilles himself assails in *Iliad* Book 9. Prefacing his response to Odysseus' speech on Agamemnon's behalf, Achilles asserts: 'I hate that man like death itself, who says one thing out loud, but keeps another hidden in his heart' (*Il.* 9.312–313). A similar duplicity characterizes Achilles' *son* in Sophocles' play.

Philoctetes' fiery vocative suggests that Neoptolemus 'burns' with a different flame from that of his Homeric father. He more closely resembles his commander and mentor, Odysseus, a man whom Philoctetes recalls with loathing:

> ἔξοιδα γάρ νιν παντὸς ἂν λόγου κακοῦ
> γλώσσῃ θιγόντα καὶ πανουργίας, ἀφ' ἧς
> μηδὲν δίκαιον ἐς τέλος μέλλοι ποεῖν. (*Ph.* 407–409)
>
> Well I know how he would lend his tongue / to any wicked cause, to any and all villainy if that / would bring to pass some unjust result.

The word for villainy—πανουργία—recurs in our primary passage, where, in addition to 'fire', Philoctetes calls Neoptolemus πᾶν δεῖμα καὶ πανουργίας/δεινῆς τέχνημ' ἔχθιστον ('utter terror, a hateful craftsman of every sort of evil'), one who should feel ashamed at his deception, οὐδ' ἐπαισχύνῃ. Philoctetes' question—'aren't you ashamed?'—uncannily

[3] Whitman (1958: 128–153); see also Nagy (1979: 321–323). Graz (1965) uses a structural linguistic approach to the meaning of fire in Homeric epic; his conclusion (1965: 344–350) emphasizes the profane nature of fire imagery in the *Iliad* and its relationship to *la menace de ruine* that hangs over the Greek ships and the city of Troy.

echoes Neoptolemus' own sentiment earlier in the play, when he goes against his nature and agrees to Odysseus' plan to deceive Philoctetes: ἴτω· ποήσω, πᾶσαν αἰσχύνην ἀφείς ('Let it come! I will do it, casting off all shame', *Ph.* 120).

Commenting on 927–928, Kamerbeek points out the relevance of a passage in Aristophanes' *Knights*:

Χο. ἦν ἄρα πυρός γ' ἕτερα θερμότερα,
καὶ λόγοι τῶν λόγων
ἐν πόλει τῶν ἀναι-
δῶν ἀναιδέστεροι· (*Eq.* 382–385)

There are things, then, hotter than fire,/[as there are] speeches more shameless even/than the shameless speeches/of those who rule the city.

For Kamerbeek the relevance arises 'because there θερμός (πῦρ) is associated with ἀναιδής'. But the *Knights* passage also suggests—at least as a point of comparison—the link between fire and language, πῦρ and λόγος. In Sophocles' play, Neoptolemus manifests the shameful πανουργία of Odysseus, which Philoctetes assails as πανουργίας/δεινῆς τέχνημ' ἔχθιστον. Viewing these passages together, Philoctetes suggests that manipulative speech, used to gain advantage and power, constitutes a shameful τέχνη of deception. We will return to the interweaving of fire, τέχνη, and manipulative speech below.

Reflecting Jebb's interest in the topography of Greece and how it relates to tragic texts, his commentary links Philoctetes' ὦ πῦρ σύ to the play's setting: 'The image [of fire] is one which Lemnos itself might well suggest (cf. 800 n.)'.[4] At that point in the play, Philoctetes cries out in pain from his wound and begs Neoptolemus to 'take me up and burn me with this fire invoked as Lemnian' (*Ph.* 799–801). Most scholars think that Philoctetes refers to the Mosychlos volcano,[5] which made the phrase τὸ Λήμνιον πῦρ proverbial for a particularly fierce fire, as at *Lysistrata* 296–301:

ὡς δεινόν, ὦναξ Ἡράκλεις,
  προσπεσόν μ' ἐκ τῆς χύτρας
ὥσπερ κύων λυττῶσα τὠφθαλμὼ δάκνει·
κἄστιν γε Λήμνιον τὸ πῦρ
  τοῦτο πάσῃ μηχανῇ·
οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποθ' ὧδ' ὀδὰξ ἔβρυκε τὰς λήμας ἐμοῦ. (*Lys.* 296–301)

[4] Jebb (1898: on *Ph.* 927).
[5] See Jebb (1898: on *Ph.* 800). Torretti (1997: on *Ph.* 800) points out the lack of

> How terribly, Lord Heracles, this smoke / jumped from the bucket and attacked me! / It bit both my eyes like a rabid bitch! / And as for this fire, it's Lemnian / in every possible way; otherwise / it wouldn't have bitten into my bloodshot eyes that way!

In Aristophanes' play (produced in 411, two years before *Philoctetes*), the chorus of Old Men have brought fire to burn the women out of the Acropolis, seized as part of Lysistrata's plan to end the war. The men are hoist on their own petard when the flames bite back, burning their already sensitive eyes 'like Lemnian fire'.[6]

When Philoctetes invokes the fires of Lemnos, however, they do not represent a source of pain, but rather respite from it. Philoctetes compares Neoptolemus' help in hurling him into the volcano to the assistance he himself provided Heracles, when he ignited the hero's pyre on Mt Oeta. At the time, Heracles was—at least metaphorically[7]—burning alive in the cloak poisoned by the Centaur Nessus' blood, just as Philoctetes suffers from his feverish infection when he begs Neoptolemus for help. Philoctetes hands his bow to his new friend—the very gift he received from Heracles for lighting his funeral pyre—and falls unconscious. He awakens a hundred lines later to find himself betrayed, his bow in enemy hands, and the promise of homecoming dashed. Jebb is right: Philoctetes' cry ὦ πῦρ σύ does reach out spatially to Lemnos. But it also extends temporally and mythically back to the funeral pyre of Heracles, and to the gift of his bow, control over which constitutes the key dramatic action of the play.

As we know from *Iliad* Book 1, Lemnos is also the island of Hephaestus, the place where the god lands after Zeus hurls him from Olympus for insubordination (*Il.* 1.590–595).[8] Not long after he

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evidence for Lemnian volcanic activity. Burkert (1970: 5) notes the discrepancy between the volcano's activity in literature and the geological fact that 'there never was a volcano on Lemnos at any time since this planet was inhabited by *homo sapiens*'. Cf. Kamerbeek (1980: on *Ph.* 799–80); and Webster (1970: on *Ph.* 799f.). According to Kirk (1985: on *Il.* 1.592–594), 'Lemnos was Hephaestus' main cult-centre in the Greek world, because of its natural gas rather than as an active volcano—but also because it was close to the Asiatic region from which the idea of a divine smith was drawn'.

[6] Burkert (1970)—followed by Bowie (1993: 186–188 and 191–192)—connects the phrase to the New Fire festival of Lemnia, which he analyzes in detail.

[7] Heracles describes his pain to Hyllus in Sophocles' *Trachiniae*: ἔθαλψέ μ' ἄτης σπασμὸς ἀρτίως ὅδ' αὖ ('again a spasm of torture has burned me', 1082).

[8] Burkert (1970: 3). The incident in question may be the one to which Zeus refers at *Il.* 15.18–24. The entry by March (1998) on Hephaestus (following Kirk 1995: on *Il.* 1.592–594) concludes by quoting Milton's version of the god's descent in *Paradise Lost*:

calls Neoptolemus ὦ πῦρ, Philoctetes links his island directly to the god of fire. He asks Lemnos to keep Neoptolemus from abducting him to Troy:

ὦ Λημνία χθὼν καὶ τὸ παγκρατὲς σέλας
Ἡφαιστότευκτον, ταῦτα δῆτ᾽ ἀνασχετά,
εἴ μ᾽ οὗτος ἐκ τῶν σῶν ἀπάξεται βίᾳ; (*Ph.* 986–988)

Oh Lemnian earth and your all-conquering flame,/wrought by Hephaestus, can this be endured,/that he will take me away from you by force?

Reflecting the island's proximity to Troy and its Hephaestean pedigree, Lemnos marks the second station of the beacon relay described by Clytemnestra in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*:

Χο. καὶ τίς τόδ᾽ ἐξίκοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀγγέλων τάχος;
Κλ. Ἥφαιστος, Ἴδης λαμπρὸν ἐκπέμπων σέλας·
φρυκτὸς δὲ φρυκτὸν δεῦρ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἀγγάρου πυρός
ἔπεμπεν· Ἴδη μὲν πρὸς Ἑρμαῖον λέπας
Λήμνου· μέγαν δὲ πανὸν ἐκ νήσου τρίτον
Ἀθῷον αἶπος Ζηνὸς ἐξεδέξατο· (*A.* 280–285)

Using the god metonymically for his chief attribute, Clytemnestra describes how Hephaestus discharges 'a bright flame from Ida, / beacon after beacon sent here, a relay / of fire. From Ida to the rock of Hermes / on Lemnos, and there a huge torch kindled on the island / reaches its third station, the peak of Zeus at Athos . . .' Bidding farewell to Lemnos at the end of the play, Philoctetes also mentions its 'Hermaean mount'.

οὗ πολλάκι δὴ τοὐμὸν ἐτέγχθη
κρᾶτ᾽ ἐνδόμυχον πληγῇσι νότου,
πολλὰ δέ φωνῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας
Ἑρμαῖον ὄρος παρέπεμψεν ἐμοὶ
στόνον ἀντίτυπον χειμαζομένῳ· (*Ph.* 1456–1460)

where often my head was drenched inside my cave by the battering of the wind, and often the mountain of Hermes brought back to me a groan answering my voice as the storm assailed me!

. . . . from Morn
To Noon he fell, from Noon to dewy Eve,
A Summers day; and with the setting Sun
Dropt from the Zenith like a falling Star.
On Lemnos th' Aegaean Ile . . . (*PL* 1.742–746)

During his long years of hardship, Philoctetes heard his own cries of anguish echoed back from the mountain. In Clytemnestra's speech, however, the crag of Hermes sends nothing back, but rather accepts the beacon of Troy onto Greek soil, a beacon that eventually reaches the house of Atreus. It signals both the Argive victory and the fact that the conflagration at Troy has not yet burnt itself out.

To summarize briefly, Philoctetes' surprising invective shoots out an array of sparks that scatter over, and draw together, Neoptolemus, Achilles, and his opposite Odysseus (with his fire-like τέχνη of shamefully deceptive speech); the Mosychlos volcano, Lemnian fire and Mt Oeta, and the bow that links the two; and the god of fire himself, Hephaestus, with his special ties to Neoptolemus' father, the island of Lemnos, and the beacon flares that signal the fall of Troy.

But Philoctetes' cry ὦ πῦρ also invokes a basic natural phenomenon, and we should consider for a moment the elemental nature of fire as it figures in early Greek thought, particularly Heraclitus. At one point, the scholarly consensus placed Heraclitus firmly in the tradition of Ionian monistic materialist cosmogonists. Where Thales posited water (τὸ ὕδωρ) and Anaximenes air (ἡ ἀήρ) as the primal ontological stuff (ἡ ἀρχή), Heraclitus substituted fire (τὸ πῦρ) as the basic cosmic building block. Later, the argument went, Pythagorean-influenced Empedocles offered a pluralist version, in which everything arose from *four* primal elements—earth, air, water, and fire—in various combinations.[9]

In his magisterial *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (1979), however, Charles Kahn claims that Heraclitus does not fit this scheme. His argument there may help us understand Sophocles' use of fire in *Philoctetes*. Let us take a quick look at fragment 37:

> κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα. (Kahn 37; DK 30)

Roughly translated, the fragment reads: 'The ordering, the same for all, no god nor man has made, but it ever was and is and will be: fire ever living, kindled in measures and in measures going out'. Kahn points to Jacob Bronowski's discussion of fire in his popular history of science, *The Ascent of Man* (1974):

[9] Kahn (1979: 9–23 and 132–153).

> There is a special mystery and fascination about man's relation to fire, the only one of the four Greek elements that no animal inhabits (not even the salamander) [. . .]. [There is an] air of magic that boils out of fire, the alchemical feeling that substances can be changed in unpredictable ways. This is the numinous quality that seems to make fire a source of life and a living thing [. . .]. [F]ire is not a material, any more than life is material. Fire is a process of transformation and change, by which material elements are rejoined into new combinations.[10]

In Kahn's view, fire as process fits Heraclitus' meaning better than a strictly material sense, in which fire is primal matter. He finds support in the fact that the Greeks frequently used fire to receive human bodies after death:

> [I]n representing life and creativity, it [fire] also represents death and destruction. As an altar flame consuming the sacrifice, it represents the gods. As fire for cooking and for warmth in winter, it sustains human life. As instrument of the arts, the stolen gift of Prometheus, it points to the divine element in human activity, the techniques and industry that separate us from the animals. Fire has many qualities. But it is the most unlikely choice for a starting point in a literal account of the development of the world in material terms, since it is not itself a kind of matter, not a body at all, but a process of transition from one state to another, a symbol of life and death at once, the very element of paradox.[11]

Rather than tracing Heraclitan influences on Sophocles (a dubious undertaking),[12] we would do better to take up Kahn's general point about the ubiquitous presence, and importance, of fire in the Greek world. For instance—fire for cooking and warmth. In the opening scene of our play, Neoptolemus discovers Philoctetes' cave and relates its meager contents to Odysseus:

Οδ. οὐδ' ἔνδον οἰκοποιός ἐστί τις τροφή;
Νε. στιπτή γε φυλλὰς ὡς ἐναυλίζοντί τῳ.
Οδ. τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ἐρῆμα, κοὐδέν ἐσθ' ὑπόστεγον;

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[10] Bronowski (1974: 123 and 142).

[11] Kahn (1979: 138). For the importance of fire in Greek religion, see Furley (1981) and Burkert (1985: 60–64).

[12] Kahn (1979: 134) notes that Heraclitus' attribution of divinity to κόσμος itself—'it ever was and is and will be'—is echoed in Euripides' *Fr.* 910 (Nauck; DK 59 A 30): 'the ageless order of undying nature'. Such resonance supports the ancient testimonia that Euripides was a student of Ionian science (ἡ ἱστορία); see Haigh (1896: 206–207 and 270–273), with sources. We might stretch the case to Sophocles by noting how 'Euripidean' his *Philoctetes* seems. The twists and turns of the plot, the strange Merchant's speech, the surprising appearance of Heracles as *deus* at the end indicate how open Sophocles was to Euripidean influence near the end of his career.

Νε. αὐτόξυλόν γ᾽ ἔκπωμα, φλαυρουργοῦ τινος
τεχνήματ᾽ ἀνδρός, καὶ πυρεῖ᾽ ὁμοῦ τάδε.
Οδ. κείνου τὸ θησαύρισμα σημαίνεις τόδε.
Νε. ἰοὺ ἰού· καὶ ταῦτά γ᾽ ἄλλα θάλπεται
ῥάκη, βαρείας του νοσηλείας πλέα. (*Ph.* 32–39)

Odysseus: And are there none of the things that make a home in there?
Neoptolemus: Yes, a bed of leaves pressed down, as though for someone who camps there.
Odysseus: But is the rest bare, and is there nothing there beneath the roof?
Neoptolemus: Yes, a cup made from a single piece of wood, the work of a poor craftsmen, and with it stones for making fire.
Odysseus: The treasures that you are describing must be his.
Neoptolemus: Ah, ah! Here is something else, rags drying in the sun, stained with matter from some grievous sore!

He describes a bed of leaves, a rough wooden cup, 'handiwork' (τεχνήματα) of a poor craftsman, material 'for making a fire' (πυρεῖα . . . τάδε), and some wound-infested rags drying in the sun. This description anticipates Philoctetes' own account of his primitive existence, shooting birds for food with his bow, gathering firewood, and crawling back to his cave:

εἶτα πῦρ ἂν οὐ παρῆν,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐν πέτροισι πέτρον ἐκτρίβων μόλις
ἔφην᾽ ἄφαντον φῶς, ὃ καὶ σῴζει μ᾽ ἀεί.
οἰκουμένη γὰρ οὖν στέγη πυρὸς μέτα
πάντ᾽ ἐκπορίζει πλὴν τὸ μὴ νοσεῖν ἐμέ. (*Ph.* 295–299)

But then there would be no fire, / so by striking stone against stone, at last / I would release the hidden spark, and that saves me. / Yes, a roof overhead and the presence of fire / gives me all I need, except for an end to my disease.

These two passages capture the simplicity of Philoctetes' life—cave for shelter, bow for food, fire for cooking, warmth, and existence. His primitive technology is signaled by his fire making and by his handmade wooden cup, which Neoptolemus calls the τεχνήματα of a poor craftsman. We are meant, I think, to contrast Philoctetes' handiwork with Neoptolemus' raging πῦρ and crafty τέχνημ᾽ ἔχθιστον assailed by Philoctetes in our opening passage (*Ph.* 927–930). The purpose of Neoptolemus' fire and associated τέχνη is not primitive survival but sophisticated destruction, accomplished by villainous deception, the instrumental use not of fallen wood and gathered stones, but of a vulnerable human being.

The isolated, primitive nature of Philoctetes' existence on Lemnos supports Peter Rose's reading of the play. In *Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth* (1992), Rose draws on the anthropology of the Sophists, who argue that human society developed from an isolated pre-social state, in which mere survival was the goal, to a form of social contract within which humans could develop in mutually agreed upon ways, pointing ultimately to the rise of the *polis*.[13] From the fragments of Democritus, Protagoras, Hippias, Antiphon, Prodicus, and Gorgias, we can piece together the argument that this social environment allowed persuasion to substitute for brute force, until communal values—non-aggression, cooperation, pity, like-mindedness, the idea of a common good—became accepted currency.[14]

Rose's anthropological perspective helps account for the play's desert-island setting, its emphasis on primitive technology, and Sophocles' innovative inclusion of the young Neoptolemus, whose normative education the play dramatizes. Lemnos and the marooned Philoctetes accommodate the pre-social stage. The growing solidarity between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes points to an emerging 'social compact', dependent on pity (τὸ οἰκτείρειν), affection (ἡ φιλία), and persuasion (ἡ πειθώ) as opposed to force (ἡ βία). Finally, the manipulative Odysseus personifies Sophistic 'degeneration' in late fifth-century Athens, dominated by self-interest and an instrumentalist view of others[15]—the very perversion that Philoctetes accuses Neoptolemus of in our opening passage.

This anthropology of progress, or progress perverted, recalls the primary Greek myth of human survival, amelioration, and development: Prometheus' theft of fire from the gods on behalf of mankind. As we know from *Prometheus Bound*, stolen fire offers an array of τέχναι, from basic heat and light to an understanding of architecture, meteorology, numbers, writing, medicine, sailing, prophecy, and so on, a myth that moves from human survival to human progress. As Griffith observes in his commentary on the play, 'we are given a description of human progress from primitive ignorance, savagery, and chaos to relative affluence and sophistication. The basis for that progress is

[13] Rose (1992: 273–278). See also Havelock's review of the fragments of early Greek 'anthropologists' (1957: 104–124).

[14] Rose (1992: 275–277) and Guthrie (1969: 135–147), both with sources.

[15] Rose (1992: 282–319). For Odysseus' instrumentalism, see O'Higgins (1991) and Blundell (1989: 184–190); Bowra (1944: 286) concludes that Odysseus resembles those men 'produced and corrupted by war'.

technology, of which the source and symbol is fire.'[16] Applying this symbol to Neoptolemus, we might propose that Philoctetes' invective opens the possibility for a Heraclitan-like transformation of the young man into a representative of Promethean progress. Instead of an Odysseus-like τέχνημ' ἔχθιστον, Neoptolemus might come to represent a more hopeful vision of anthropological and technological advance. Indeed, later in the play we see Neoptolemus stand up to Odysseus, return the bow to Philoctetes, and promise to free him from his primitive existence by bringing him out of Lemnos and back to human society.

At the outset, I referred to Kamerbeek's note, linking Philoctetes' ὦ πῦρ to its speaker, a fiery epithet from a fiery hero. This makes sense. But what also drives the invective is the character of *Neoptolemus*, not a ruthlessly destructive force like his father, nor simply a deceptive flame like Odysseus. Rather, Neoptolemus is fire as a state of transformation, a young man who changes over the course of the play, losing and finding his true nature, until he restores his hard-earned fellow-feeling with Philoctetes and offers him a Promethean future of salvation and progress.

However, Sophocles does not leave us there. Heracles—bound to Philoctetes by fire, as noted earlier—makes a surprising appearance at the end and redirects the play's trajectory to Troy. He offers Philoctetes a cure for his wound and glory at the fall of the city, but on the following condition:

> ἃ δ' ἂν λάβῃς σὺ σκῦλα τοῦδε τοῦ στρατοῦ,
> τόξων ἐμῶν μνημεῖα πρὸς πυρὰν ἐμὴν
> κόμιζε. (*Ph.* 1431–1433)
>
> the booty you get from this expedition,/you bring to my pyre as a memorial offering/for my bow

The funereal fire at Mt Oeta, earlier linked to Lemnos, now points toward the sack of Troy and the fires of the conquered city. And Heracles utters one further condition, in the form of a warning:

> τοῦτο δ' ἐννοεῖθ', ὅταν
> πορθῆτε γαῖαν, εὐσεβεῖν τὰ πρὸς θεούς·
> ὡς τἄλλα πάντα δεύτερ' ἡγεῖται πατὴρ

[16] Griffith (1983: on *Pr.* 450–506). For a discussion of fire and civilization on a broader scale, see Goudsblom (1992); Pyne (2001) provides an environmental history that focuses on human 'colonization' and cultivation of fire.

> Ζεύς. οὐ γὰρ ηὑσέβεια συνθνῄσκει βροτοῖς·
> κἂν ζῶσι κἂν θάνωσιν, οὐκ ἀπόλλυται. (*Ph.* 1440–1444)
>
> Keep this in mind, when / you lay waste the land of Troy: show reverence for the gods, / for everything else father Zeus considers / secondary. Reverence does not die away with mortals; whether they live or die, it is never destroyed.

From what we know of the aftermath, Philoctetes does indeed show reverence to the gods when he lays waste to Troy. But Neoptolemus is another story. He slaughters Priam at the altar of Zeus Ἑρκεῖος in pointed contrast to his father's treatment of the suppliant king in *Iliad* 24. In most extant accounts, Neoptolemus also slays Hector's young son Astyanax, either pushing him from the ramparts or smashing his head against the altar where Priam takes refuge. After the city's sack, Neoptolemus sacrifices Polyxena, the virgin daughter of Priam and Hecuba, at the grave of his father, a doublet for the unholy sacrifice at Aulis that launched the Greek ships for Troy. This 'newcomer to war'—as the name 'Neoptolemus' suggests—proves a quick study, turning into a pitiless, bloodthirsty butcher.[17]

Returning to our primary passage, Philoctetes' outburst ὦ πῦρ σύ resonates across the play, the mythic tradition, the Greek world at large. It points to—but also beyond—the destructiveness of a natural force, the image of a warrior like Achilles, the island of Lemnos with its geological fire, the funeral pyre of a hero like Heracles, a primal element in Ionian cosmogony, a symbol of ceaseless transformation encompassing Heraclitan opposites. The word also represents the basis of human progress for the Greeks, fire as a symbol of craft, skill, intelligence applied to the world, τέχνη. And it evokes the fires at Troy, the source of heroic glory via the destruction of a great city.

But ὦ πῦρ σύ remains a vocative, a direct address (made to a person or a thing, with or without ὦ), and also an invective, an insult aimed at the addressee. But that person—Neoptolemus—also goes by another name in the literary tradition, 'Pyrrhus', 'fire-like'. According to the *Cypria*, the name derives from the color of Neoptolemus' hair, 'fiery red'.[18] However, a militaristic explanation seems at least as

[17] Davies (1989: 71–73) summarizes evidence from the epic cycle on Neoptolemus' brutality at Troy. For pictorial representations of his actions, see Rehm (2002: 354 notes 163 and 164).

[18] *Cypria Fr.* 16, where we also learn that Pyrrhus received the name Neoptolemus from Phoenix, because his father Achilles was young when he began to fight the

likely, given that Pyrrhus lent his name to the so-called 'Pyrrhic dances', a form of military exercise/exhibition/war dance in which Greek males competed for prizes.[19] Perhaps, then, the name arose from Neoptolemus' fire-like devastation at Troy, like 'The rugged Pyrrhus' of Hamlet:

> he whose sable arms,
> Black as his purpose, did the night resemble
> When he lay couchèd in th'ominous horse,
> Hath now this dread and black complexion smeared
> With heraldry more dismal; head to foot
> Now is he total gules [a heraldic term for red], horridly tricked
> with blood of fathers, mothers, daughters, sons,
> Baked and impasted with the parching streets,
> That lend a tyrannous and damnèd light
> To their lord's murder. Roasted in wrath and fire,
> And thus o'er sizèd with coagulate gore,
> With eyes like carbuncles, the hellish Pyrrhus
> Old grandsire Priam seeks. (*Hamlet* 2.2.413–425)

Shakespeare's Pyrrhus earns his name not from his hair color, but from the coagulate gore and burning flame of his blood lust.

But the fire that Philoctetes associates with Neoptolemus does not constitute an etymological given, 'name as fate', nor does it illuminate a predestined path of future barbarism. As we have seen, fire takes many shapes in the Greek world and for many different ends. It can bring light in the darkness, like Prometheus' gift to mortals,

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war (on the model of Telemachus, whose name indicates that his father Odysseus was far away fighting a battle). See Davies (1989: 44–45). Nonetheless, in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, the name 'Neoptolemus' strongly suggests a 'son-directed' etymology, emphasizing how 'new to battle' this young warrior really is.

[19] For the mythological connection between Achilles, Pyrrhus, and fire, see Delcourt (1965). For Pyrrhus and the war dance ἡ πυρρίχη, see Nagy (1979: 122 and 331–332), based on Archilochus *Fr.* 304W and Eustathius 1697.1–6 *ad Odyssey* 11.505; also Latte (1913: 27–63); Winkler (1990: 55–56); and Delavaud-Roux (1993: 72–106), who concentrates on the movements as illustrated on Attic vases, drawing on Poursat (1968). Borthwick (1969: 385–390) emphasizes the popularity of pyrrhic dances in Athens, performed at the Panathenaia and dedicated to Athena Tritogeneia, as war goddess and protector of the city. In *Andromache* (1131–1140), Euripides puns on Neoptolemus' 'pyrrhic' name, when the young man 'dances pyrrhically' (πυρρίχας, *Andr.* 1135) while trying to escape the weapons of the Delphians, who eventually slay him. Drawing together scattered sources, Borthwick (1967) connects the Pyrrhic dance with Neoptolemus' leap from the Trojan horse, bringing us back to the young man's brutal role in the sack of Troy. Pyrrhic war dances remained popular in Rome, albeit with decadent elaborations (Suetonius *Iulius* 39 and *Nero* 52).

or the gift that Neoptolemus seems to offer to the marooned Philoctetes, the promise of rescue, homecoming, civilization. Or it can dazzle and beguile you into thinking it's your friend, that you can trust it, until it turns on you in your sleep, like Neoptolemus turns on Philoctetes. Or it can come at you directly, the dark fire of annihilation, one that reduces a great city to ash. Directed at a dramatic character, this invectival vocative is really a call to action. The fire that burns in Philoctetes' ὦ πῦρ σύ is ultimately about what kind of fire Neoptolemus chooses to be.

We live in a world in which our fiery choices seem to expand exponentially, with worse and worse consequences. After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the U.S. responded in kind, initially targeting Afghanistan and the Taliban, a version of the mujahadeen that the U.S. had begun arming in 1978. At that point, none of those responsible in the Carter administration thought that, by 'luring' the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan (quelling Muslim unrest that might spread across the border), they would set off a chain-reaction that eventually would bring the havoc 'home' to the United States. Instead of reflecting on the sources of the fire that came out of the blue on 9/11, the U.S. government's response has been to harness more fire and unleash it where and how it chooses. The 'war on terrorism' continues to have horrific consequences, not only in Iraq, but also in the West Bank and Gaza, Colombia, Chechnya, Western China and Tibet, Aceh and West Papua, and on the international community at large.

Of course, whatever fire the theater ignites cannot hold a candle to military firepower—the unspeakable ways that destructive flame comes out of the earth or down from the sky in these days of civilized barbarity. Nonetheless, those of us drawn to the theater, ancient and modern, would like to believe that artistic fire can help reduce the man-made conflagrations that plague us. If the reading of Philoctetes' ὦ πῦρ σύ that I offer here has merit, then the fires of Sophocles' play have much to offer us.

PART TWO

SYNTAX

SOPHOCLES' VOICE. ACTIVE, MIDDLE, AND PASSIVE IN THE PLAYS OF SOPHOCLES[1]

Rutger Allan

Sophocles enjoys the reputation of being a poet who fully exploits the expressive possibilities of the Greek language. As Stanford puts it,

> Sophocles is one of the subtlest and most skilful of Greek writers in placing his words and phrases in his sentences so as to produce fresh nuances of meaning and implication from combinations of simple words. Indeed some of the hardest problems of interpretation of his plays result from syntactical subtleties, such as the meaning of a preposition, the force of an adverb, the intention of a *Middle* form or a *Genitive case*, and so on (1963: 267).

In passing, Stanford notes that one of the aspects of Greek grammar which frequently gives rise to questions of interpretation is the middle voice. The middle voice owes its elusive nature to a remarkably wide variety of uses and the often highly subtle semantic nuances it can convey. Sophocles in particular appears to be conscious of the refined expressive force of the middle voice. Lloyd-Jones and Wilson recognize this feature of Sophocles' language when motivating their preference for reading middle ἐξεπράξατ' instead of active ἐξέπραξεν at *Ajax* 45:

> Elsewhere Sophocles uses the active of this verb in this sense, and at Hdt. 7.158.2 τὸν φόνον ἐκπρήξασθαι means 'to avenge a murder'; but we retain the middle, not out of reverence for L, but because Sophocles, whose use of that voice is so subtle (see Campbell, i. 52–53) may well have meant the middle to be reflexive with the sense 'achieved for himself', i.e. 'succeeded in his enterprise' (Lloyd-Jones & Wilson 1990: 10).

In this paper, Sophocles' employment of the middle voice will be inspected more closely. A number of passages in his tragedies will

[1] I would like to dedicate this paper to the memory of Professor Ruijgh. I consider it a great privilege to have been a student of such a brilliant scholar and inspiring teacher. I am grateful for his comments—meticulous and perceptive as ever—on an earlier version of this paper.

be discussed for which the precise appreciation of the semantic value of the middle and passive voices is of major importance. Given this subject matter, the structure of this contribution will necessarily be of a somewhat episodic character.

The discussion will be centered around two main themes. First, a number of cases will be considered in which the middle appears to convey a special nuance in contrast with the *active* voice. Next, those cases will be examined in which the formal or semantic relation of the middle voice to the *passive* voice is at issue.

Sophocles' sensitivity to the niceties of the middle voice is especially apparent in his use of the middle verb ὁράομαι/εἰδόμην. Consider, for example, *Trachiniae* 306:

(1) οὕτως ἐγὼ δέδοικα τάσδ' ὁρωμένη (*Tr.* 306)

Such is my fear as I look upon them[2]

Deianira, on seeing the captive women, fears that her own offspring might some day suffer the same fate. The middle ὁρωμένη appears to express that Deianira is emotionally overcome by the sight of the captive women. Campbell already seems to acknowledge this special value of ὁράομαι, which he calls 'ethical' or 'pathetic' (Campbell 1907: 52–53). In his extensive study of the use of ὁράομαι in Homer, Bechert (1964) comes to a similar conclusion. According to Bechert, the middle is used

> [. . .], wenn das Objekt und seine Rückwirkung auf das Subjekt hervorgehoben wird: bei übermächtigen, besonders göttlichen Objekten; lebhaft vergegenwärtigend zur Bezeichnung des starken Eindrucks, den das Objekt auf das Subjekt macht (Bechert 1964: 426).[3]

This special use of the middle form also occurs in Aeschylus (e.g. *Pers.* 179, *Pr.* 92) and Euripides (e.g. *Andr.* 133, *Hel.* 122).[4] In prose, it is only found in Herodotus.[5]

[2] The translations in this paper are taken, sometimes in adjusted form, from Lloyd-Jones' Loeb edition (1998).

[3] Remarkably, in Latacz *et al.* (2000) it is noted at *Iliad* 1.56: 'ὁρᾶτο: metrisch bedingtes Medium'. But in this passage Hera is clearly moved by the sight of the dying Greeks (cf. also κήδετο).

[4] Possibly, non-passive ὁράομαι still existed in the Attic of the first half of the fifth century. Otherwise, its use in tragedy might be explained as an epicism. In Attic prose, the middle only survives in a number of compound verbs, e.g. περιοράομαι, προοράομαι, ὑφοράομαι. In these verbs the subject is clearly involved psychologically in a special way. A relic of the middle verb is also found in the fixed expression ἰδού 'look!'.

[5] In Herodotus, present ὁράομαι always has a passive meaning 'I am being seen',

Most commentaries on Sophocles do not attempt to account for these middle forms. Jebb, for example, inaccurately remarks (at *OC* 244) that the middle of ὁράω *only* occurs in poetry, without going into its meaning. Moorhouse (1982: 179), in turn, counts the middle of ὁράω as one of the middle forms 'whose use shows little or no difference from that of the corresponding actives'. However, an emotional overtone—typically that of wonder or distress—can be observed in each Sophoclean case of ὁράομαι, as is shown in the following examples:

(2) εἴ του φίλων βλέψειεν οἰκετῶν δέμας,
ἔκλαιεν ἡ δύστηνος εἰσορωμένη (*Tr.* 908–909)

. . . every time she caught sight of the shape of any of her dear attendants, she wept, hapless one, as she looked upon them . . .

Here the nurse tells how Deianira burst into tears every time she saw one of her attendants. The presence of the seemingly redundant εἰσορωμένη is not only motivated by the aspectual contrast with βλέψειεν (ingressive aorist)—'look upon' vs. 'catch sight of' (see Easterling *ad loc.*)—, but also by the implication of the middle voice, that is, the fact that Deianira *is stricken by grief* (cf. ἔκλαιεν ἡ δύστηνος) when looking at the attendants.

(3) ἀρχαῖα τὰ Λαβδακιδᾶν οἴκων ὁρῶμαι
πήματα φθιτῶν ἐπὶ πήμασι πίπτοντ' (*Ant.* 594–595)

From ancient times I see the troubles of the dead of the Labdacid house falling upon one another . . .

The chorus are witness to the calamities of the Labdacidae, and express their emotional involvement. In the remaining cases of ὁράομαι we can likewise observe the character's feelings of wonder or grief evoked by the sight of certain persons, objects, or scenes. These cases are: *Aj.* 351: (Ajax to the chorus of Salaminian sailors:) 'see (ἴδεσθε) what kind of wave, sent up by a deadly surge, circles rapidly around me'; *El.* 892: Chrysothemis is astonished when she sees (κατειδόμην) that somebody has tended Agamemnon's tomb and left a lock of hair; *El.* 977: Electra says she and Chrysothemis should be looked at with admiration (ἴδεσθε) since they saved their father's house; *El.* 1059:

whereas εἰδόμην has retained its original meaning 'I saw something impressive', against passive aorist ὤφθην 'I was seen'.

the chorus marvel at (εἰσορώμενοι) the wise birds above who take care of those that give them life and pleasure; *OC* 244: Antigone beseeches the elders of Colonus to pity her father, and says that she looks upon (προσορωμένα) their eyes with eyes that are not blind; *OT* 1217: the chorus wish they had never set eyes (εἰδόμαν) on Oedipus; *Ph.* 351: Neoptolemus says he has never seen (εἰδόμην) his father; *Ph.* 1113 Philoctetes wishes to see (ἰδοίμαν) the person who beguiled him; *Tr.* 151: Deianira: someone who was experienced himself could see (εἰσίδοιτο) what evils she is burdened with; *Tr.* 1003: Heracles exclaims he would marvel at (ἰδοίμαν) the one who would put an end to his suffering.[6]

In many cases, however, it is more difficult to assess the exact semantic value of the middle inflection. A number of verbs which are usually active have middle variants in Sophocles. Metrical factors may explain, at least partly, the occurrence of these middle forms given that they are practically restricted to poetry.[7] Sophoclean examples are: ηὕδατ' (*Aj.* 772, cf. also *Ph.* 130, 852), αἰτήσομαι (*Aj.* 825, cf. also *El.* 453, etc.), ὑπερπονουμένῳ (*Aj.* 1310, cf. also *OT* 685 v.l. προπονουμένῳ), νοσεῖται (*El.* 1070), γοᾶτο (*OT* 1249, cf. also *Tr.* 51, 937), νοούμενος (*OT* 1487), κηκιομέναν (*Ph.* 697), ποθουμένᾳ (*Tr.* 103), ἐκλαυσάμην (*Tr.* 153, cf. also *OT* 1467), συγκατοικτιουμένη (*Tr.* 535), σχολάζεται (*Fr.* 314.275), θαμίζεται (*Fr.* 503.3), ῥυπωμένου (*Fr.* 858.2), ποππύζεται (*Fr.* 878).[8] The obvious metrical convenience of these forms does not exclude, however, that there may also be a semantic factor at work. Thus Kamerbeek ascribes an intensifying force to some of these middle forms.[9] He is probably right in assuming that the middle inflection does have a special semantic value. Elsewhere I have argued that the middle inflection of this type of verbs emphasises the facet of the subject's physical or psychological *affectedness* which is already inherent in the lexical meaning of the verb stem.[10] The following is an example of this type:

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[6] This line (θαῦμ' ἂν πόρρωθεν ἰδοίμαν) might be an echo of the Homeric formula θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι.

[7] See Kühner-Gerth (I: 102); Chantraine (1927); Schwyzer-Debrunner (II: 232–233); Sideras (1971: 238); R.J. Allan (2003: 207).

[8] A number of these verbs are also mentioned by Moorhouse (1982: 178–179). According to him, these middle verbs show little or no difference with the corresponding active. Note, incidentally, that Sophocles uses the actives ἅζω (*OC* 134), αἰκίζω and σέβω, instead of the more usual middle forms.

[9] E.g. *ad Tr.* 103, 1216.

[10] In R.J. Allan (2003: 205–210) this type of middle verbs is discussed in more

(4) <u>αἰτοῦ</u> δὲ προσπίτνουσα γῆθεν εὐμενῆ
ἡμῖν ἀρωγὸν αὐτὸν εἰς ἐχθροὺς μολεῖν (*El.* 453–454)

Fall down and pray that he himself may come in kindness from below the earth to help us against our enemies . . .

The middle form may emphasise the ardency with which Chrysothemis should pray. Note that the active form αἴτει would also have been metrically possible.[11] Another example is:

(5) πάθη μὲν οὖν δὴ πόλλ' ἔγωγ' <u>ἐκλαυσάμην</u>· (*Tr.* 153)

Well, the sufferings I have wept over are many.

Deianira expresses how many suffering she has endured; the middle stresses the intensity of her lament accordingly.[12] In the following passage, the remarkable middle form νοσεῖται appears.

(6) ὅτι σφὶν ἤδη τὰ μὲν ἐκ δόμων <u>νοσεῖται</u> (*El.* 1070)

[Tell them] that their house is beset with sickness (cf. Lloyd-Jones & Wilson 1990: 63)

The middle form is only found in the *Parisinus gr.* 2794. Most MSS have active νοσεῖ. Lloyd-Jones and Wilson—who print the middle form—are probably right in ascribing a special sense to this middle verb: 'a middle used to express the effect of the action on the subject, so that its sense is near to the passive, and it means "is beset with sickness"' (Lloyd-Jones & Wilson 1990: 63).[13]

Middle verbs of the type I discussed above should be distinguished from the middles which have an indirect reflexive meaning. To be

detail. The term 'affectedness' is used here in a technical sense, referring to the physical or psychological effect on the subject.

[11] A similar case can be found at *OC* 488.

[12] It is worth noticing that the perfect of κλαίω is always of the middle form κέκλαυμαι (likewise δακρύω, perfect δεδάκρυμαι). The values of the middle and the perfect overlap. The middle inflection expresses the idea that the subject is affected as a result of the event; the perfect denotes that the subject is in a certain state as a result of the affecting event. The middle form κλαίομαι may have been created after the model of emotive speech act verbs such as ὀδύρομαι and ὀλοφύρομαι (see R.J. Allan 2003: 105, 107). The middles γοᾶτο and συγκατοικτιουμένη, mentioned above, can be explained in a similar way.

[13] Note that in the Hippocratic corpus, as C.J. Ruijgh pointed out to me, two remarkable examples of the passive of νοσέω occur: (i) τὰ νοσεόμενα 'the body parts affected by disease' (Hp. *Loc. Hom.* 7 [278 Littré]), based on the active type νοσεῖ τὴν κεφαλήν 's/he is ill with respect to his/her head'; (ii) τὰς τεσσαράκοντα ἡμέρας τὰς νοσεομένας 'the 40 days during which one is ill', based on the active type νοσεῖ τεσσαράκοντα ἡμέρας.

sure, the indirect reflexive nuance is often quite difficult to appreciate. Consequently, in many cases commentaries tend to remark that the meaning of the middle is unclear or that the middle is used with the same meaning as the active. In the following, I will deal with a number of middles 'whose use', according to Moorhouse, 'shows little or no difference from that of the corresponding actives' (1982: 179). These verb forms are πρόσνειμαι, τιμωρουμένης, and ἐκλύεται. The first example is:

(7) πρόσνειμαι δέ μοι
χάριν βραχεῖαν πρὸς μακροῖς ἄλλοις διδούς (*Tr.* 1216–1217)

But grant me in addition a small favour, over and above great things!

Heracles asks Hyllus to grant him a favour—to marry Iole—, which is also in the interest of Hyllus himself. The middle πρόσνειμαι, therefore, may well be explained as having an indirect reflexive meaning.[14] Next, let us consider the following example:

(8) ἐμοῦ δὲ πατρὶ πάντα τιμωρουμένης (*El.* 349)

. . . when I do all to avenge my father . . .

Kells (*ad loc.*) notes that the middle τιμωρουμένης has the same sense as the active. However, the middle voice may well convey a distinct meaning. Electra obviously has a personal interest in the act of vengeance. Due to their close relatedness, Electra's act of vengeance on the murderer of her father not only avenges *her father* but also *herself*.[15]

The last indirect reflexive case I would like to discuss concerns the middle verb ἐκλύομαι:

(9) ὃς εἰς ἀγῶνα τῷδε συμπεσὼν μάχης
ἐκλύεταί με. (*Tr.* 20–21)

[Heracles] who contended with him in battle and released me.

[14] Similarly, in the case of the simple verb νέμομαι the subject always benefits from the action since the dividing subject also ends up with a share of the object divided. The use of the middle form in πρόσνειμαι χάριν may also have been triggered by the existence of the *medium tantum* χαρίζομαι.

[15] Similar cases are S. *El.* 399, E. *El.* 1095, and E. *Or.* 1117. The construction of the middle τιμωρέομαι with a dative complement may well be a contamination of the two more common constructions: (i) the active verb with a dative complement ('avenge s.o.'), and (ii) the middle verb with an accusative complement ('avenge oneself on s.o.').

There are no cases attested of active ἐκλύω meaning 'release (a person)'. Jebb (*ad loc.*) notes 'ἐκλύεται, here simply = ἐκλύει', and rejects the possibility that it would mean 'deliver for himself' (similarly, Easterling *ad loc.*). However, I can think of no objection to interpreting the verb as an indirect reflexive middle. Heracles obviously gains an advantage by releasing Deianira since she will be his bride. Next, consider the following example:

(10) τί δῆτ' ἐγὼ οὐχὶ τοῦδε τοῦ φόβου σ', ἄναξ,
ἐπείπερ εὔνους ἦλθον, <u>ἐξελυσάμην</u>; (*OT* 1002–1003)

Why, since I have come in friendship, have I not released you from this fear, my lord?

Kamerbeek (*ad loc.*) rejects the idea that the middle has any special value, since the compound ἐκλύω always appears in the middle voice (similarly Jebb at *Tr.* 21). This may be true, but it does not exclude the possibility that the middle endings of ἐκλύομαι still show a discernable semantic nuance.[16] In general, a person releasing someone will gain a certain benefit, if only of a moral kind. To be sure, in *OT* 1003 the interest of the messenger in releasing Oedipus from his fear is not immediately clear. Yet, in the following lines, Oedipus and the messenger explicitly speak about a suitable reward for the messenger's service, cf. line 1004 καὶ μὴν χάριν γ' ἂν ἀξίαν λάβοις and line 1006 εὖ πράξαιμι. It appears, in other words, that the middle voice of ἐκλύομαι does have a semantic contribution which can be distinguished from that of the active voice. Let us now turn to the last instance of ἐκλύομαι:

(11) ἐγὼ δ', ἐπειδὴ δόξα τῇδ' ἐπεστράφη,
αὐτός τ' ἔδησα καὶ παρὼν ἐκλύσομαι. (*Ant.* 1111–1112)

Since my decision has been thus reversed, I who imprisoned her shall myself be present to release her.

In 1113–1114, Creon explains his motive for releasing Antigone: he fears it is best to end one's life in obedience to the established laws. Creon's interest in releasing Antigone exists thus on a rather abstract, moral level. Given this element of self-interest in Creon's behaviour, we may ascribe an indirect reflexive meaning to the middle ἐκλύσομαι.[17]

[16] In R.J. Allan (2003: 49–52) I argue against the view that middle verbs which do not have a contrasting active do not have a special middle meaning.

[17] The only remaining case of middle ἐκλύομαι with an indirect reflexive meaning

The above cases show that one may often wonder as to the nuance which the middle voice conveys in contrast to the active voice. The next part of this paper will address issues which relate to the contrast between the middle voice and the passive voice, both from a morphological and from a semantic point of view. In some cases we may doubt whether a particular form has a passive meaning or rather an agentive reflexive-like meaning.[18] An example is the following:

(12) κἀγὼ 'θελοντὴς τῷδ' ὑπεζύγην πόνῳ. (*Aj.* 24)

And I, as a volunteer, have been burdened with this toil. (my trans.)

This type of yoke-metaphor, in which suffering a hardship is seen as bearing a yoke, is quite common.[19] Ὑπεζύγην is often considered to express a reflexive-like meaning. For instance, Jebb renders it as 'I took it upon me', and Kamerbeek (preserving the metaphor) in Dutch as 'zich voor iets inspannen'.[20] Interpreting the verb in this way suggests that Jebb and Kamerbeek had those middle-passive verbs in mind which can designate volitional, reflexive-like actions, such as στέλλομαι (ἐστάλην) 'set out' (e.g. *Aj.* 328), στρέφομαι (ἐστράφην) 'turn around (intr.)' (e.g. *Aj.* 1117).[21] This interpretation of ὑπεζύγην, however, is not very plausible. Middle verbs with passive aorists which involve a *volitional* meaning belong solely to the class of (body) motion verbs, such as στέλλομαι and στρέφομαι above.[22] Furthermore, there are no other examples of the passive aorist ἐζύγην with such a reflexive-like meaning. The other examples of the passive aorist form involving this yoke-metaphor (see note 19) should all be interpreted as passives. It is, therefore, much more attractive to interpret

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in Sophocles is *Aj.* 531 (Tecmessa sent Eurysaces away to protect him from Ajax).

[18] Cases in Sophocles with regard to which there is controversy as to their passive or agentive meaning are: *Aj.* 352: κυκλεῖται (see e.g. commentaries Jebb, Kamerbeek); *Aj.* 549: ἐξομοιοῦσθαι (Jebb, Kamerbeek, Stanford); *Aj.* 615: ηὕρηται (Jebb, Kamerbeek, Stanford); *Ant.* 550: ὠφελουμένη (Kamerbeek); *Ant.* 677: κοσμουμένοις (Jebb, Kamerbeek, Griffith); *Ant.* 1268: ἀπελύθης (Jebb, Kamerbeek, Griffith); *El.* 54: ἡρμένοι (Jebb, Kamerbeek, Kells); *El.* 1070: νοσεῖται (Campbell, Moorhouse, Lloyd-Jones); *OT* 73: ξυμμετρούμενον (Jebb, Kamerbeek); *OT* 1214: τεκνούμενον (Lloyd-Jones & Wilson); *Tr.* 72: ἐξαφεῖται (Jebb, Kamerbeek); *Fr.* 941.16: συντέμνεται (Pearson).

[19] E.g., A. *A.* 842 (ζευχθείς); *Ch.* 795 (ζυγέντ'); S. *Ph.* 1025 (ζυγείς); E. *Andr.* 98 (συνεζύγην).

[20] Cf. also the translation 'I undertook' of the new Loeb-edition.

[21] Cf. ἵσταμαι with its archaic aorist ἐστάθην 'I stood up/stood still', e.g. *Aj.* 1171.

[22] For a discussion of this type of middle verb, see R.J. Allan (2003: 76–81).

ὑπεζύγην also as passive: 'I have been yoked'. By using a passive, Odysseus implies in a subtle manner that he had been encumbered—though volunteering ('θελοντής)—with this rather unpleasant task (i.e. to track down Ajax) *by the other Greeks*, thus partly shirking his own responsibility.

Another verb regularly giving rise to ambiguity is ἀπαλλάττομαι, which can be either passive 'be freed from' (e.g. *Ant.* 400, *OC* 786), or intransitive middle 'depart' (e.g. *Ant.* 422, *El.* 1338). In both cases the aorist form is ἀπηλλάγην/-χθην.[23] An elusive example of this verb is:

(13) οὔκουν ἐρεῖς ποτ', εἶτ' ἀπαλλαχθεὶς ἄπει (*Ant.* 244)

Will you not speak out, and then leave after having been discharged? (my trans.)

Creon is speaking to the guard, who clearly hesitates in recounting what has happened, fearing Creon's anger upon hearing the news. Griffith (*ad loc.*) translates the line as 'So won't you finally speak out, and then take off and leave?' (cf. also the new Loeb edition: 'and then take yourself away'). He adds 'ἀπαλλαχθείς may also imply "rid yourself of fear"'. If we interpret ἀπαλλαχθείς as having the intransitive meaning 'depart, take off', we are left with a somewhat tautological expression ἀπαλλαχθεὶς ἄπει 'having left, you will go away'. In my view, this interpretation, though not impossible, is not the most elegant one. A more attractive solution is to view ἀπαλλαχθείς as a passive which belongs to the verb ἀπαλλάττω used in the legal sense 'discharge, acquit'.[24] A clear example of this special meaning of ἀπαλλάττω is found in Demosthenes:[25]

(14) ἂν μὲν ἀπογνῶτε τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην, ἅπαντές εἰσιν ἀπηλλαγμένοι καὶ δίκην οὐδεὶς οὐδεμίαν μὴ δῷ. (D. 22.39)

If you dismiss this impeachment, they have been all acquitted and not a single one will pay the penalty.

[23] The form ἀπηλλάγην appears to be the common Attic form, since it is strongly preferred in Attic prose; in Ionic prose, ἀπηλλάχθην predominates. In the future stem, there is a morphological and semantic distinction between the middle and the passive: ἀπαλλάξομαι means 'I will depart', ἀπαλλαγήσομαι/-χθήσομαι means 'I will be freed (from)' (e.g. *El.* 1002). See also R.J. Allan (2003: 201–202). Incidentally, it is remarkable that Plato uses the form in -χθη- only twice, both times in the *Seventh Letter* (335a5, 346b1)—that is to say, if Plato wrote it—, whereas elsewhere he uses the common Attic form in -γη- 28 times.

[24] On ἀπαλλαγή as a legal term, see Harrison (1971: 115–129).

[25] Cf. also Ar. *Pl.* 271; Pl. *Lg.* 721d; D. 34.22; 37.1

That ἀπαλλαχθείς at *Ant.* 244 should be interpreted in this specific legal sense is suggested by the previous words of the guard. In 228 he says—speaking to himself—that he might be punished (δώσεις δίκην), and in 239 he pleads not guilty in advance. The scholium on *Ant.* 244 οὐ γὰρ ἀπειλεῖ κελεύων εἰπεῖν ἀλλά φησιν ὅτι δηλώσας τὸ πρᾶγμα ἄπιθι ἀθῷος also seems to imply that the guard may leave ἀθῷος after having exonerated himself by explaining the matter.[26]

In a number of Sophoclean cases it is not the meaning of the middle or passive verb that is problematic, but rather its morphological form. An interesting case in point is found in the first stasimon of the *Antigone*:

(15) καὶ φθέγμα καὶ ἀνεμόεν
φρόνημα καὶ ἀστυνόμους
ὀργὰς ἐδιδάξατο καὶ δυσαύλων
πάγων ὑπαίθρεια καὶ
δύσομβρα φεύγειν βέλη
παντοπόρος· (*Ant.* 355–360)

And he [Man] taught himself speech and wind-swift thought and the temper that rules cities, and how to escape the exposure of the inhospitable hills and the sharp arrows of the rain, all-resourceful.

Most scholars explain ἐδιδάξατο as 'he taught himself' (cf. Campbell 1907: 52; Jebb, Kamerbeek, Griffith *ad loc.*).[27] This view is probably right, but it is not unproblematic from a grammatical point of view. Elsewhere, the sigmatic middle aorist ἐδιδαξάμην always has an indirect reflexive meaning 'teach for one's own benefit'.[28] Furthermore,

[26] Ellendt-Genthe appears to have acknowledged that there is more to be said about ἀπαλλαχθείς, interpreting it as 'quasi *onere, quod fers, deposito*'.

[27] Griffith (*ad loc.*) mentions *Aj.* 1376 ἀγγέλλομαι . . . εἶναι φίλος as a parallel case which also involves a rare reflexive middle. In my view, however, ἀγγέλλομαι should not be taken as a reflexive middle. Rather, it should be interpreted as 'promise' (cf. Ellendt-Genthe: 'ultro profiteor'). The middle voice implies that the subject is bound by his promise as a consequence of the speech act. This particular use of the middle voice can be compared to that of ὑπισχνέομαι, ὑφίσταμαι (see R.J. Allan 2003: 107). The middle ἐδιδάξατο certainly does not mean 'they taught one another', as is mentioned as an alternative interpretation by Griffith. First, ἐδιδάξατο is singular. Second, reciprocal middles are virtually always *media tantum*, and they always designate actions which normally involve two participants acting on one another, such as verbs of contending (ἀγωνίζομαι, μάχομαι, etc.). See also R.J. Allan (2003: 84–88).

[28] Under certain contextual circumstances, ἐδιδαξάμην may be interpreted as 'have s.o. teach s.o.', i.e. as a so-called 'causative middle'. However, it should be stressed that it is not the middle voice which expresses this causative meaning, as is claimed remarkably often. Active verbs, no less than middle verbs, can have a

middle verbs with a direct reflexive meaning ('to V oneself') typically designate grooming activities such as ἀλείφομαι 'I anoint myself' or λοῦμαι 'I bathe'. Direct reflexive verbs all designate physical actions that are *normally* performed with respect to oneself. If, on the other hand, the action at issue is rarely performed with respect to oneself, then a reflexive pronoun must be added (see R.J. Allan 2003: 90–92). Thus, with a verb such as ῥίπτω 'throw'—which denotes an action which one does not normally perform with respect to oneself—, reflexivity is expressed by means of an active form and a reflexive pronoun, e.g., ῥίπτει αὑτὸν εἰς τὴν θάλατταν 'He throws himself in the sea' (D. 32.6). Since teaching is an activity that is not normally performed on oneself, the idea 'to teach oneself' should be expressed by an active form and a reflexive pronoun, i.e., ἐδίδαξα ἐμαυτόν.[29] Furthermore, teaching is not a physical activity like ἀλείφομαι and λοῦμαι. In other words, ἐδιδάξατο remains a thorny case. A possible explanation may be to assume that it has been created after the example of the semantically related verb γυμνάζομαι 'train oneself' (aorist ἐγυμνασάμην). Γυμνάζομαι is a perfectly normal direct reflexive middle verb, since it denotes a physical activity which the subject normally performs on his/herself.

Morphological issues regarding middle and passive forms are also involved in two other cases in Sophocles. At *Ant.* 24 we find the remarkable form χρησθείς, and at *OC* 636 (in the MSS) σεβασθείς or σεβισθείς. The OCT runs as follows:

(16) Ἐτεοκλέα μέν, ὡς λέγουσι, †σὺν δίκῃ
χρησθεὶς δικαίᾳ† καὶ νόμῳ, κατὰ χθονὸς
ἔκρυψε τοῖς ἔνερθεν ἔντιμον νεκροῖς (*Ant.* 23–26)

Eteocles, they say, in accordance with justice and with custom he has hidden beneath the earth, honoured among the dead below.

causative interpretation (e.g. Pl. *Men.* 94b). This has already been clearly stated by Kühner-Gerth (I: 108): 'Im Medium an sich liegt der Kausativbegriff ebensowenig wie im Aktiv'. The middle voice of verbs which are interpreted causatively expresses—as often in the case of transitive middles—that the subject benefits as a result of the action. Thus, the subject of ἐδιδαξάμην typically is a father having his son educated, e.g. Pl. *Men.* 93d (see also R.J. Allan 2003: 115–116). There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that ἀπάγεσθε in *Ph.* 1029 is causative, and ἄγετε is not (cf. Webster *ad loc.*). Both may or, more likely, may not be interpreted as causative. The verb ἀπάγεσθε specifies ἄγετε in two respects: 'why are you taking me (i) *away* (ii) *for your own benefit*?'.

[29] E.g., Φήμιος ἑαυτὸν ἐδίδαξεν (Apollonius Dyscolus *Pron.* 55B, 6 [p. 44 Schneider]).

σὺν δίκης χρήσει G.H. Müller:[30] σὺν δίκης κρίσει Nauck (δικαίᾳ κρίσει χρησάμενος sch.)

(17) ἁγὼ σέβας θεὶς οὔποτ᾽ ἐκβαλῶ χάριν
τὴν τοῦδε, χώρᾳ δ᾽ ἔμπολιν κατοικιῶ (*OC* 636–637)

Because I have respect for these things I shall never spurn his grace, but shall settle him in the country as a dweller in the city.

σέβας θεὶς Mekler: σὲ βιασθεὶς K: σεβισθεὶς Lra: σεβασθεὶς zt

In both cases scholars have thought that the passive aorist forms χρησθείς and σεβασθείς/σεβισθείς in the MSS are not sound. The forms have been suspected of being late Greek, and therefore corrupt. In my opinion, however, there are reasons to believe that the transmitted passive aorist forms are sound in both cases. The form χρησθείς is considered problematic because elsewhere in classical Greek χρησθῆναι has passive meaning ('be used'). According to our grammar textbooks Sophocles should have written the regular middle form χρησάμενος (cf. scholium). The 'active' meaning of χρησθῆναι first appears—if sound—in Polybius (συγ-χρησθῆναι 2.32). However, that χρησθείς departs from the Attic norm is no conclusive argument to condemn it. Already in classical Greek, passive aorist forms start to appear where one would not expect them. For example, Sophocles himself uses δέρχθη (*Aj.* 425) 'he saw' instead of the regular form ἔδρακε;[31] ἀρεσθείη (*Ant.* 500) 'it may please' instead of ἀρέσειε; and βρυχηθείς (*OT* 1265) 'having roared' instead of βρυχησάμενος. There are more instances of such novel passive aorist forms in other classical authors, for example, ἀπελογήθην (Antiphon), ἐπιλεχθείς (A. *A.* 1498), ἐπιλογισθέντες (Hdt. 7.177), ἠμείφθην (Pindar, Xenophon), ὀλοφυρθείς (Th. 6.78.3), ὑποδεχθείς (E. *Heracl.* 757). In each case a passive aorist appears instead of a regular sigmatic middle form.[32] This means that we cannot exclude that Sophocles wrote χρησθείς. Assuming he did, there are two alternative ways in which the phrase may be interpreted, according to Kamerbeek (*ad loc.*). Either σύν is to be construed *in tmesi* with χρησθείς, and δίκῃ δικαίᾳ and νόμῳ are the dative complement of συγχρησθείς, or, alternatively,

[30] This reading, however, had already been proposed by Jebb.

[31] Cf. also δερχθέντες in *Fr.* 837. This form is already found in A. *Pr.* 93 and 547. Pindarus has forms with a stem δρακ-η- (*P.* 2.20, *N.* 7.3).

[32] The gradual expansion of the passive aorist form in the classical age and its semantic basis is discussed in more detail in R.J. Allan (2003: 157–177).

a dative Ἐτεοκλεῖ should be understood as the dative complement of χρησθείς (in the sense 'treat'). The combination δίκῃ δικαίᾳ, however, remains peculiar. According to Kamerbeek, it may be an ancient expression (cf. ὡς λέγουσι).

Why σεβισθείς (or σεβασθείς) has not always met with scholarly approval[33] is difficult to understand. Indeed, although the active verb σεβίζω is more frequent, the middle σεβίζομαι is well-attested (A. *Supp.* 815, 922; *Ch.* 912). There must have been a verb σεβάζομαι as well, witness Homeric σεβάσσατο. Furthermore, there is a rule in classical Greek that middle verbs designating psychological processes have passive aorist forms, for example, ἥδομαι-ἥσθην, φοβέομαι-ἐφοβήθην. A very close parallel is the form ἐσέφθην (from σέβομαι) found also in Sophocles, *Fr.* 164.[34] In other words, σεβασθείς and σεβισθείς can be accepted as completely regular Attic forms.[35] The Homeric form σεβάσσατο cannot be considered a counter-argument. In Homer, the ubiquitous sigmatic middles which denote mental processes (e.g. ἀασάμην, ἐχολώσατο, σεβάσσατο) are to be considered archaisms, preserved in the epic language as convenient metrical alternatives (see R.J. Allan 2003: 148–153).

The last issue I would like to consider relates to the voice distinctions found in the verbal paradigm of φαίνω. These distinctions are relevant to a number of passages in Sophocles.

(18) ἀκτὶς ἀελίου, τὸ κάλ-
λιστον ἑπταπύλῳ φανὲν
Θήβᾳ τῶν προτέρεω φάος,
ἐφάνθης ποτ', ὦ χρυσέας
ἁμέρας βλέφαρον (*Ant.* 100–104)

Beam of the sun, the fairest light of all lights which have appeared before for seven-gated Thebes, finally you have been shone forth, eye of golden day . . .

The aorist ἐφάνθης (l. 103) is usually viewed as an equivalent of φανέν (l. 101), that is, as intransitive 'you appeared'. This view, however, is not as self-evident as it might seem. In fact, there are no

[33] Σεβισθείς has been accepted by Schneidewin, Nauck & Radermacher, Jebb, Campbell, Pearson's OCT, and Dain.

[34] Hesychius explains it thus: ἐσέφθην· ἐσεβάσθην, ἡσύχασα, ᾐσχύνθην. Σοφοκλῆς Δαιδάλῳ. Plato uses the form σεφθεῖσα (Pl. *Phdr.* 254b).

[35] In *AP* 7.122 we find ἐσεβάσθη with the same meaning: Αἰαῖ, Πυθαγόρης τί τόσον κυάμους ἐσεβάσθη;

parallel examples in our Greek texts which might corroborate this special interpretation of ἐφάνθης. In classical Greek ἐφάνθην is always used with a passive meaning 'I have been revealed', whereas ἐφάνην means 'I appeared'. We should, therefore, regard ἐφάνθης as a passive, i.e. 'Beam of the sun, . . . finally you *have been shone forth*'. As the agent of the passive verb, the sun—perhaps conceived of as a personified being—may be understood.[36]

A subtle distinction can also be found in the future stem of φαίνω. Here we find two contrasting forms: the middle future φανοῦμαι and the passive future form φανήσομαι. It has often been assumed that there is no semantic distinction between these two future forms. Elsewhere I have argued, reviving a neglected theory of Blass (1892), that the two future forms differ with respect to verbal *aspect* (R.J. Allan 2003: 178–198). The form φανοῦμαι has a 'presentic' (imperfective) meaning, comparable to imperfect ἐφαινόμην, whereas φανήσομαι has an 'aoristic' (perfective) meaning, comparable to aorist ἐφάνην. The verb φαίνομαι can be construed with an infinitive (involving a subjective view: 'seem'), as well as with a participle (objective view: 'turn out (to be)').[37] This results in the following possible combinations:

(1) 'presentic' φανοῦμαι	[+ infinitive] 'seem' (stative)
	[+ participle] 'turn out repeatedly (to be)' (generic/iterative)
(2) 'aoristic' φανήσομαι	[+ participle] 'turn out (to be)' (ingressive).[38]

Compare the following examples from Plato:

(19) ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἀπαγορεύει καὶ ἀπαγορεύων ὑπὲρ πάσης τῆς πόλεως ἀεὶ φαίνεται καὶ φανεῖται (Pl. *Lg.* 871a)

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[36] The active counterpart of this passive clause can be found at *Ph.* 297: [Philoctetes] ἔφην' ἄφαντον φῶς. The two cases are similar in that *light* (φῶς or ἀκτίς) is construed as the patient of φαίνω. The other Sophoclean examples of ἐφάνθην are: *OT* 1485: ὃς ὑμίν . . . / πατὴρ ἐφάνθην ἔνθεν αὐτὸς ἠρόθην 'who has been disclosed to be your father by her from whom he himself was got'; *OT* 525: τοὔπος δ' ἐφάνθη 'the word has been revealed'; *Tr.* 743: τὸ γὰρ / φανθὲν τίς ἂν δύναιτ' <ἂν> ἀγένητον ποεῖν; 'What has been disclosed, who can cause it never to have happened?'.

[37] See Smyth & Messing (1956: 476); Rijksbaron (2002: 121).

[38] I am not aware of examples of φανήσομαι construed with an infinitive, although there are some instances of ἐφάνη + infinitive. The rareness of this construction is probably due to the incompatibility of the 'aoristic' semantics of φανήσομαι with the stative semantics of the infinitive construction ('seem'). For frequency figures of the various constructions I refer to R.J. Allan (2003: 187).

For the law itself makes the proclamation, and it is always found out to make a proclamation on behalf of the state, and it will always be.

(20) Σω. Τοῦτων γὰρ δή, ὦ ἄριστε, φήσομεν, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν ὃ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανήσεται; . . .
Γλ. οὐκ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ καλά πως αὐτὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φανῆναι (Pl. *R.* 479a)

Socrates: "My dear fellow", we'll say, "of all the many beautiful things, is there one that will not also be found to be ugly? . . ."
Glaucon: There isn't one, for it is necessary that they are found to be beautiful in a way and also ugly in a way.

In example (19), φαίνεται and φανεῖται are construed with a participle (ἀπαγορεύων), conveying an objective meaning ('turn out, found out (to be)'). Φανεῖται clearly has an iterative/generic meaning (cf. the adverb ἀεί). Note that it is coordinated with the generic present φαίνεται. In (20), we are dealing again with the objective meaning. There is ellipsis of the participle (ὄν). In this example, φανήσεται does not refer to a generic or iterative event, like φανεῖται in (19). Instead, it refers to a single moment in which, upon closer inspection of the matter, the beautiful things will indeed turn out to be ugly. It has, in other words, an ingressive meaning. Note, further, that the aorist form φανῆναι in Glaucon's answer corresponds with the future φανήσεται in Socrates' question.

This aspectual difference can also be appreciated in Sophocles. For example,

(21) ἐν τοῖς γὰρ οἰκείοισιν ὅστις ἔστ᾽ ἀνὴρ
χρηστός, φανεῖται κἀν πόλει δίκαιος ὤν (*Ant.* 661–662)

For, whoever is a righteous man in family matters will turn out to be just in the city also.

The participle construction (ὤν) expresses the objective meaning 'turn out, be found'. The form φανεῖται has a generic meaning: 'he will *always* turn out to be just in the city also'. The indefinite subject-clause ὅστις ἔστ᾽ ἀνὴρ χρηστός, accordingly, involves a generic referent. Now consider the following example:

(22) τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον, ὃν πάλαι
ζητεῖς ἀπειλῶν κἀνακηρύσσων φόνον
τὸν Λαΐειον, οὗτός ἐστιν ἐνθάδε,
ξένος λόγῳ μέτοικος· εἶτα δ᾽ ἐγγενὴς
φανήσεται Θηβαῖος (*OT* 449–453)

> That man you have long been looking for, with threats and proclamations about the murder of Laius, that man is here, in pretence an alien immigrant. But later he shall turn out to be a native Theban . . .

Although the participle is omitted, it is clear that φανήσεται has the objective meaning 'turn out, be found', thereby contrasting with λόγῳ 'in pretence'. The form φανήσεται conveys an 'aoristic' or, to be more specific, an ingressive meaning: Oedipus' true identity will *become* clear. Let me end with a very similar example, once again from *Oedipus Tyrannus*:

(23) φανήσεται δὲ παισὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ ξυνὼν
ἀδελφὸς αὑτὸς καὶ πατὴρ (*OT* 457–458)

And he shall turn out to be to his children whom he lives with both a brother and a father . . .

Although it is unclear whether or not ξυνών is construed with φανήσεται (see Kamerbeek *ad loc.*), φανήσεται no doubt has the objective meaning ('turn out to be'). It has, furthermore, an 'aoristic', ingressive meaning.

From the cases discussed above we may conclude that Sophocles exploits, indeed, the expressive possibilities of voice distinctions optimally. In most cases, the poet was free to use one particular voice form in preference to another. In other words, voice marking is used purposefully to produce a special semantic effect. We should, therefore, shy away from conclusions of the type found so often in commentaries such as 'this middle is used with the same meaning as the active'. As a matter of principle, a difference in meaning between two types of expression should always be presumed, even if the exact semantic nuance may not be clear to us immediately. In fact, by disregarding this presumption we do not give the stylistic qualities of the author in question their due.[39]

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[39] From a theoretical point of view, having two linguistic forms with one identical meaning contravenes two major motivations in language communication. It is neither *iconically* motivated, since there is no iconic one-to-one relationship between form and meaning, nor is it *economically* motivated, since a speaker would have to learn two forms instead of one. For the importance of these two motivations for language structure, I refer to Croft (2003: 101–117).

ON FALSE HISTORIC PRESENTS IN SOPHOCLES (AND EURIPIDES)

Albert Rijksbaron

Many messenger speeches in our current Sophocles and Euripides texts contain forms that may be interpreted either as a historic present or as an—augmentless—imperfect, depending on the accent. Examples are κυρεῖ/κύρει, κυνεῖ/κύνει, φοιτᾷ/φοίτα. In such cases our texts most often have the 'present' accentuation, with or without support of the manuscripts. Since I am about to transform several of such historic presents into imperfects, I should perhaps first provide some linguistic background to my argument, both with respect to the historic present and to the augmentless imperfect. I will start by briefly setting forth what is in my view the function of the historic present. I will then mention a number of semantic and syntactic features of uncontroversial historic presents both in drama and in two historical works, Herodotus' *Histories* and Xenophon's *Anabasis*, the idea being that these features may guide us in determining whether a given tragic candidate for this function qualifies as a historic present or not. This will be followed by some remarks on augmentless past tenses in Sophocles and Euripides. Finally, I will discuss a number of dubious historic presents in the two dramatists.

1. *The function of the historic present*

The preferred habitat of the historic present is, of course, the narrative, i.e. a report of past events, which are predominantly narrated in imperfects and aorist indicatives;[1] there is, in fact, no narrative without these two tenses. The aorist presents the main events of the story, i.e. the events that warrant that the narrative moves on, while the imperfects

[1] Occasionally, the historic present occurs in what may be called mixed narrative-argumentative passages; an example is μισθοῦται in πῶς οὖν ταῦτ᾽ ἐποίησεν; μισθοῦται τουτονί (D. 18.148).

provide the background to these events. At varying intervals the flow of these past tenses may be interrupted by the occurrence of a present indicative form, traditionally called the historic present, sometimes also narrative present. An important function of these presents is to present events that the narrator considers crucial or decisive for the development of the plot.[2] An oft-cited example of this use is ἐπορᾷ in Hdt. 1.10.2:

(1) ὡς δὲ κατὰ νώτου ἐγένετο ἰούσης τῆς γυναικὸς ἐς τὴν κοίτην, ὑπεκδὺς ἐχώρεε ἔξω. καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἐπορᾷ μιν ἐξιόντα . . . (Hdt. 1.10.2)

And when she turned her back upon him, going to her bed, he crouched and slipped from the room. And the woman saw him as he went out . . .

where the fact that Candaules' wife sees Gyges leave the bedroom completely overthrows the course of events as planned by Candaules. Needless to say, it is not just the perception verb ἐπορᾷ that is marked here as crucial by the present tense but this verb plus the dependent state of affairs (ἐξιόντα). I realize that in assigning this 'decisive' function to the historic present I run a risk of falling victim to circular reasoning, there being no other indications of 'decisiveness' than the historic present. Below, I will try to neutralize this risk by pointing to a number of features of the historic present that can satisfactorily be accounted for if expressing 'decisiveness' is considered the basic function of the historic present and that otherwise remain unexplained.

There is, not surprisingly, much controversy about the question as to what is and is not a decisive event. Thus, Irene de Jong (1991: 40) observes *à propos Med.* 1141:

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[2] This view is already found in Kühner-Gerth (I: 132): 'Oft neben Aoristen oder Imperfekten zur Hervorhebung einzelner besonders bemerkenswerter und für die Folge wichtiger Momente'. Cf. further Eriksson (1943: 9; 'Hauptpunkte'), Schwyzer-Debrunner (II: 271; 'entscheidende und neue Momente'), also Kells (1973: on *El.* 35; '. . . reporting a critical act or occurrence'), Sicking & Stork (1997: 147–156).—Ultimately, and at a more theoretical level, the 'decisive' function of the historic present can be accounted for along the lines sketched by Benveniste in his article 'Le langage et l'expérience humaine' (Benveniste 1974). By interrupting the flow of past tenses the present tense creates the illusion that the event concerned does not belong to the past, but is 'un moment neuf, non encore vécu', in the words of Benveniste (1974: 74). Being presented as new and 'having not yet been gone through', the event has, in a context of events 'that have been gone through', another information status than these other events. By suddenly confronting the reader with 'un moment non encore vécu', the narrator wants him to know that this is not an ordinary, but an extraordinary event of the past, an event that may be expected to have more far-reaching effects than the surrounding events.

(2) κυνεῖ δ' ὁ μέν τις χεῖρ', ὁ δὲ ξανθὸν κάρα
παίδων· (E. *Med.* 1141)

And someone kissed the hands and another the blond heads of the children. (trans. here and below Kovacs)

'[. . .] in the case of *Med.* 1141 (servants kiss—κυνεῖ—the hands and heads of Medea's children) it would be difficult to maintain that this is a decisive event'. I could not agree more. Fortunately, Irene de Jong's uneasy feelings can, in this case at least, be dissipated quite easily. In fact, this quotation brings us straightaway to the heart of the matter. For it so happens that κυνεῖ is a conjecture of Brunck's, the reading of the MSS being the imperfect, κύνει. At the end of my paper I will come back to this case.

While in drama, too, the 'decisive' function is an important one, the narrative situation there differs from that in historical texts, in as much as the messengers and other narrators report about events of which they themselves have been a witness; to quote Irene de Jong once more (1991: 8): '[. . .] being an eyewitness is the messenger's very theatrical *raison d'être*'. The historic present is the means *par excellence* to give expression to his eyewitness status: the narrator speaks as if he is again on the spot and is experiencing a 'moment non encore vécu'. This, in turn, may lend a certain vividness to his report. However, 'vividness' is to my mind not a central notion in connection with the historic present.[3] To show its doubtful status it suffices perhaps to replace 'decisive' in the above quotation from *Narrative in Drama* with 'vivid'. The resulting statement is devoid of meaning.[4]

2. *Some syntactic and semantic features of the historic present*

The use of the historic present is far more restricted than that of imperfect and aorist, as appears from the following list of features.

[3] Supporters of the 'vividness' theory sometimes appeal to [Long.] *Subl.* 25, where it is said that 'when you introduce the past things as happening and being present, οὐ διήγησιν ἔτι τὸν λόγον ἀλλ' ἐναγώνιον πρᾶγμα ποιήσεις'. *Pace* LSJ and others I do not think that ἐναγώνιος here means 'energetic, vivid', but rather, as elsewhere, 'argumentative, suited for forensic oratory'. In fact, the example from Demosthenes' *De corona* mentioned in note 1 probably belongs to this category.

[4] I have discussed the problems connected with the notion 'vivid' elsewhere, see Rijksbaron (2002b: 257 and 261f.). See also Sicking & Stork (1997: 131–134).

I. The fact that it is (almost) confined to narrative discourse has already been mentioned.

II. A consequence of I is that the historic present does not occur in exclamations or questions,[5] but only in declarative sentences. The—remarkable—exception that proves the rule (for Sophocles and Euripides) is Creon's question

(3) Φυ. ταύτην γ' ἰδὼν θάπτουσαν ὃν σὺ τὸν νεκρὸν
ἀπεῖπας. ἆρ' ἔνδηλα καὶ σαφῆ λέγω;
Κρ. καὶ πῶς ὁρᾶται κἀπίληπτος ἡρέθη;
Φυ. τοιοῦτον ἦν τὸ πρᾶγμ'· ὅπως γὰρ ἥκομεν, . . . (*Ant.* 404–407)

Phy. I saw her burying the corpse that thou hadst forbidden to bury. Is that plain and clear?
Cr. And how was she seen? how taken in the act?
Phy. It befell on this wise. When we had come to the place . . . (trans. here and below Jebb)

which comes just before the full report of the Guard, who had already given away, as messengers always do, the main event (l. 404). With πῶς ὁρᾶται, Creon asks the Guard to elaborate upon that 'seeing'. The use of the historic present leaves no doubt that for Creon a crucial event is involved, and that he asks the messenger to transfer him mentally to the *flagrant délit.*

III. A further consequence of I is that the historic present does not occur in the second person, but only in the third and first persons.

IV. Not all verbs have historic presents. They are, in fact, confined to telic, or terminative, and momentaneous verbs (so-called 'accomplishments' and 'achievements', respectively), and do not occur, then, with durative-stative verbs. This means that forms like ἐστί, κεῖται, μένει, ἔχει, νομίζει, εὕδει are never used as a historic present.[6] As we

[5] With the exception of rhetorical questions, i.e. questions that are pragmatically equivalent to a statement, e.g. τίς οὐ σίδηρον προσφέρει, τίς οὐ πέτρον; E. *Andr.* 1153.

[6] 'Nicht von Zustände', Schwyzer-Debrunner (II: 271); 'des verbes comme εἰμί, κεῖμαι n'apparaissent jamais au présent historique', Ruipérez (1982: 182). Moorhouse (1982: 185) claims that a number of historic presents in the report of Orestes' 'death' in *Electra* have 'imperfective' meaning, but this is unlikely. (βίᾳ) φέρουσιν at 725 is said 'de rectore auferendo' (Ellendt-Gendte); ἀνοκωχεύει (732) = 'suspend sa marche un moment' (Mazon); διώκει (738) = 'se lance' (Mazon); ἑλίσσεται (746) must be connected with the preceding σύν = 'he was rolled up in a ball' (Kells).

will see presently, this has important consequences for our material. The activity involved is normally displayed by a human being,[7] but occasionally by natural phenomena, as at X. *An.* 4.1.15 εἰς δὲ τὴν ὑστεραίαν γίγνεται χειμὼν πολύς.[8]

V. Historic presents are rare in the passive voice; there are four examples in Sophocles: *Ant.* 406 and 423 ὁρᾶται, already mentioned above, *OT* 812 (ὁ πρέσβυς) ἐκκυλίνδεται, *El.* 746 (Orestes) σὺν δ' ἑλίσσεται τμητοῖς ἱμᾶσι, and two in Euripides: *Alc.* 184 (δέμνιον) δεύεται (unless this has middle meaning, see also note 27) and *Hipp.* 1237 αὐτὸς δ' ὁ τλήμων . . . / . . . ἕλκεται δεθείς.

VI. Historic presents are rare in subordinate clauses. An example from Sophocles is

(4) ὁ δ' <u>ὡς ὁρᾷ</u> σφε, στυγνὸν οἰμώξας ἔσω
χωρεῖ πρὸς αὐτὸν . . . (*Ant.* 1226–1227; messenger speaking)

But when Creon saw him, with a dreadful groan he came inside towards him . . .

VII. Historic presents cannot be combined with the negative, except under special conditions, as in:

(5) ὁ δ' οὖν Τισσαφέρνης ὡς μεῖον ἔχων ἀπηλλάγη, πάλιν μὲν <u>οὐκ ἀναστρέφει</u>, εἰς δὲ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἀφικόμενος τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐκεῖ συντυγχάνει βασιλεῖ (X. *An.* 1.10.8)

At any rate, after Tissaphernes had thus come off with the worst of it, he did not wheel round again, but went on to the camp of the Greeks and there fell in with the King

which is, in the narrative parts of Books 1 and 2 of the *Anabasis*, one of the three instances of οὐ + historic present, alongside 44 cases of οὐ with imperfect or aorist. The negated historic present οὐκ ἀναστρέφει is only acceptable, I think, because it is balanced by a positive statement (συντυγχάνει).[9] In Sophocles and Euripides there

[7] Explicitly or implicitly, the latter at e.g. X. *HG* 3.2.31 τούτων δὲ συγχωρηθέντων εἰρήνη τε γίγνεται καὶ συμμαχία Ἠλείων πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους.

[8] In Euripides, there is just one example of a non-human subject of a historic present, *Hipp.* 1212 χωρεῖ, subject a gulf, in Sophocles none (for *Tr.* 767 see below, ex. (14)).

[9] The other two instances are 1.10.1 οἱ μὲν μετὰ Ἀριαίου οὐκέτι ἵστανται, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσι, and 2.6.3 ἐνταῦθα οὐκέτι πείθεται, ἀλλ' ᾤχετο πλέων εἰς Ἑλλήσποντον. Observe that here, too, the negated historic present is balanced by a positive statement.

are no such exceptions: οὐ never modifies a historic present; cf. also Moorhouse (1982: 184).

VIII. As appears from the following table, the sentences in which historic presents appear are normally introduced by δέ or καί

	Herodotus 1.1–70	Sophocles	Euripides
δέ	23	24	84
καί	3	19	18
τε	–	1	1
ἀλλά	–	2	2
asyndeton	9	7	5
γάρ	–	5	2

One of the striking features of this survey is the total absence of γάρ from Herodotus, and its small numbers in Sophocles and Euripides. The marginal position of γάρ in connection with the historic present also appears from the fact that of the 241 instances of γάρ in the first four Books of Xenophon's *Anabasis* just one is combined with a historic present. This involves, moreover, a special use of γάρ. The example runs:

(6) ὁποῖόν τι μὲν δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὄναρ ἰδεῖν ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβάντων μετὰ τὸ ὄναρ. γίγνεται γὰρ τάδε. εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ . . . (X. *An.* 3.1.13)

Now what it really means to have such a dream one may learn from the events which followed the dream—and this is what happened. Immediately after . . .

In this example γάρ introduces an embedded narrative, explaining what the συμβάντα mentioned in the preceding sentence consisted of.[10] This function of γάρ has recently been discussed by Sicking and Van Ophuijsen (1993: 20–21) and De Jong (1997).[11] In Sophocles

[10] Our passage is exceptional in that the narrative is introduced in two stages, so to speak. It might also have started straightaway with εὐθὺς γὰρ ἐπειδή . . ., but as it is, it is announced by the historic present + γάρ, whereby the importance of the events following the dream is heavily emphasized. And with good reason, for Xenophon is speaking here about a dream he had himself, a dream that eventually led to his appointment as the commander-in-chief of the Greeks.

[11] Kroon (1995: 148ff.) observes, on a similar use of Latin *nam* introducing narratives: '[. . .] a general or summarizing statement [. . .] is followed by a particular instance (not seldom in the form of an extensive *narratio*) which clarifies or fills in the detail of the general statement'.

and Euripides, too, if the historic present occurs in a γάρ-clause, this is *only* in γάρ-clauses introducing an embedded narrative of the type exemplified by (6). A clear case in point is:

(7) ἡγόμην δ᾽ ἀνὴρ
ἀστῶν μέγιστος τῶν ἐκεῖ, πρίν μοι τύχη
τοιάδ᾽ ἐπέστη, . . ./. . .
ἀνὴρ γὰρ ἐν δείπνοις μ᾽ ὑπερπλησθεὶς μέθῃ
καλεῖ παρ᾽ οἴνῳ πλαστὸς ὡς εἴην πατρί. (*OT* 775–780; Oedipus speaking)[12]

and I was held the first of all the folk in that town, until the following chance befell me. At a banquet a man full of wine cast it at me in his cups that I was not the true son of my sire.

Here, the sentence introduced by γάρ explains the nature of τύχη τοιάδε; καλεῖ marks the event as decisive. I should add that in such sentences the past tenses are also, and indeed more frequently, found.[13] For an example from drama with a pluperfect see below, example (18).

In regular explanatory γάρ-clauses, on the other hand, γάρ is *never* found with the historic present. In such clauses (that is, in narrative) only the imperfect and—far less often—aorist occur; three examples with an imperfect are:

(8) πολλὰ τῶν ὑποζυγίων ἀπώλετο ὑπὸ λιμοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἦν χόρτος (X. *An.* 1.5.5)

. . . many of the baggage animals died of hunger, for there was no fodder . . .

(9) καὶ οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι ἐξέφυγον· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τὸ ὄρος· (X. *An.* 7.4.6)

Now most of the villagers made their escape, for the mountain was close at hand

(10) κοὐδεὶς ἐτόλμα τἀνδρὸς ἀντίον μολεῖν.
ἐσπᾶτο γὰρ πέδονδε καὶ μετάρσιος (S. *Tr.* 785–786)

and no one dared to to come before the man. For the pain dragged him to earth, or made him leap into the air

[12] The other examples in S. are: *Aj.* 764, *Ant.* 1001, *El.* 35. The examples from Euripides are *Ph.* 1410 and 1458; *IT* 1395 does not belong here, see below, note 27.

[13] Cf. e.g. ἐπικατερρίπτουν at X. *An.* 4.7.13, where the embedded narrative is formally announced by δεινὸν . . . θέαμα: ἐνταῦθα δὴ δεινὸν ἦν θέαμα. αἱ γὰρ γυναῖκες ῥίπτουσαι τὰ παιδία εἶτα ἑαυτὰς ἐπικατερρίπτουν, καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες ὡσαύτως. In Sophocles and Euripides, too, this is common, cf. e.g. *OT* 1268ff., *Ba.* 760.

In fact, the basic function of γάρ is to provide this type of background information.[14] The two uses can in principle be distinguished by the following rule-of-thumb: regular γάρ presupposes an implicit question like 'how was this possible?' (cf. (9)) or 'what was the cause/reason of this?' (cf. (8) and (10)), while narrative γάρ presupposes rather a question like 'what did *x* consist of ?' (cf. (6) and (7)).

The importance of the distinction between these two uses of γάρ will become clear below.

3. *Some conclusions*

The features mentioned at IV through VIII should, of course, be accounted for, and this can be done in a satisfactory way if signalling 'decisive events' is taken as the basic function of the historic present:

– (IV. non-occurrence of stative historic presents) the semantics of stative verbs are inherently at odds with the notion 'decisive event'; verbs like 'be', 'think', 'have', 'sleep' are rather used to provide background information
– (V. near-absence of historic presents in the passive voice) decisive events are typically caused by actively operating persons, not by persons undergoing an action
– (VI. rareness in subordinate clauses) since subordinate clauses typically provide information that is on a lower hierarchical level than that provided by independent sentences, one may expect decisive events to occur at the highest level
– (VII. near-absence of negated historic presents) non-events may be expected to qualify less easily as decisive events than real events[15]
– (VIII. near-absence of historic presents with γάρ) decisive events may be expected to avoid collocation with a particle whose main function is to introduce background information.

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[14] In what is called, in the pragmatic model known as 'the Geneva model', a 'subsidiary discourse act', to be distinguished from 'central acts', like, in our examples, πολλὰ τῶν ὑποζυγίων ἀπώλετο ὑπὸ λιμοῦ· and οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι ἐξέφυγον, respectively. Cf. for these distinctions Kroon (1995: 65–66).

[15] The special information status of negative statements may be illustrated from the following example from Givón (1984: 323): (a. Context)—'What's new?' (b. AFF(IRMATIVE)-reply)—'Oh, my wife is pregnant'; (c. NEG-reply)—'Oh, my wife is not pregnant'. Sentence (c.) is 'distinctly odd', as Givón puts it.

Of these semantic features, it is especially the features mentioned at IV and VIII that can help us determine whether κυρει and the other forms under discussion should be interpreted as historic presents or as imperfects.

4. *The unaugmented imperfect (and aorist)*

Having given an idea of my theoretical framework concerning the historic present, I now turn to the unaugmented imperfect, or to be more precise, the imperfect without the syllabic augment, for the absence of the temporal augment plays no role in my corpus.[16]

The existence in Greek drama of unaugmented past tenses was for a long time denied by scholars, but is nowadays more or less grudgingly acknowledged. Rather more than less—for generally speaking the situation is still thus, that if an editor sees a way to get rid of an unaugmented past tense he will not hesitate to do so. This may involve rather innocent measures like adding a coronis in cases where aphaeresis is believed to be involved, as in (11), where most editors follow Brunck in reading ’θώυξεν

(11) παίσας κάρα ’θώυξεν (S. *Aj.* 308)
he struck his head and uttered a loud sound

θώυξεν codd.: ’θώυξεν Brunck

but also slightly less innocent measures like changing the accent, or the verb ending, in the cases I am going to discuss below.

The most extensive modern treatments are, in chronological order: Lautensach (1899: 165–174; ‘Fehlen des syllabischen Augments’), Page’s note in his commentary from 1938 on *Medea* 1141 (strangely enough, Page does not mention Lautensach), and Bergson (1953: 121–128; ‘The omitted augment in the messengers’ speeches of Greek tragedy’). Of these, Bergson’s article is of no use for my purpose, for his objective is to show that the omission of the augment is not an epicism, but a matter of metrical convenience. He does not question the reliability of the lists of instances used by Lautensach and

[16] Although verbs beginning with a long vowel or diphthong pose similar problems of accentuation. An example is E. *IT* 1395 ὠθεῖ Kirchhoff: ὤθει L, see also notes 18 and 27.

Page. In fact, he mentions forms like κυρει only in passing on p. 124. So I can confine myself to Page and Lautensach.

Page writes: 'The exx. in messengers' speeches are: A. *Pers.* 313 πέσον, 376 τροποῦτο, 416 παίοντο, 458 κυκλοῦντο, 506 πῖπτον S. *El.* 715 φορεῖτο, 716 φείδοντο: *OT.* 1249 γοᾶτο: *Tr.* 904 βρυχᾶτο, 915 φρούρουν: *OC* 1606 κτύπησε, 1607 ῥίγησαν, 1624 θώυξεν: E. *Ba.* 767 νίψαντο, 1066 κυκλοῦτο, 1084 σίγησε, 1134 γυμνοῦτο.' Lautensach has the same list, plus A. *Ch.* 738 θέτο and E. *Fr.* 495.36 δῦνον. These lists, however, present a fundamental problem, for they are based upon what may be called a modern vulgate (incidentally, Lautensach does not mention which text he used), where a number of unaugmented imperfects either have been removed *per coniecturam* or remain hidden in the apparatus criticus. In fact, Page himself (still on *Med.* 1141) mentions a number of such cases, which he calls 'dubious or corrupt exx.', viz. S. *Ph.* 371; E. *Med.* 1141 (+1207); *Hec.* 580 and 1153; *Ion* 1205, and admits that in the case of *Ph.* 371 [κυρει—AR], E. *Med.* 1141 [κυνει] and 1207 [κυνει] 'it remains doubtful whether the verbs should be accented as imperfects or as "historic presents."' The last three will reappear in my own, corrected, list below. A more comprehensive list should contain at least the following possible instances,[17] where the imperfect has some, overwhelming or even exclusive manuscript support.[18] For Sophocles these are:

[17] I confine myself to forms where a change of accent or verb ending changes the interpretation. Forms like λέγον (E. *Hec.* 580) and θάκουν (*Hec.* 1153) are therefore not included. Incidentally, once the idea has been given up that unaugmented past tenses should be removed as much as possible from our texts, both λέγον and θάκουν, that are virtually always corrected, are perfectly acceptable forms.

[18] And this is not all, for it is worth noticing that cases like S. *Ant.* 407 ἥκομεν, 432 ἱέμεσθα and 433 θηρώμεθ'; E. *Andr.* 1159 κομίζομεν; *IT* 330 χειρούμεθα, 334 κομίζομεν, that all occur in messenger (-like) speeches and in principle may be taken (without any change of accent) either as (unaugmented) imperfects or as present tense forms are virtually never mentioned as possible instances of imperfects, wrongly, I think. An exception is Kamerbeek, who discusses the problem involved in his extensive note on S. *Ant.* 432 (the problem is largely ignored by Jebb, and wholly by Campbell and Griffith). But I will not pursue this issue further here; the whole subject of unaugmented forms in drama deserves a fresh study *à la* Lautensach.—As for 'manuscript support' a word of caution is perhaps in order here. While our classical texts go back, in one form or another, to their respective authors, this is not so with the accents, for these are due to the editorial activity of Byzantine scholars and copists. Cf. Schwyzer (1959: I.373): 'Systematisch ist die Akzentuation erst seit dem 9. und 10. Jahrhundert durchgeführt'; cf. also Reynolds & Wilson (1991: 4). So if all MSS read, say, κύρει, this means that the Byzantine copists agreed upon this accentuation. Perhaps these copists occasionally continued the editorial practice of scholars from antiquity, but in any case the accents cannot go

5. *A list of historic presents in Sophocles that may actually be imperfects; text and apparatus Lloyd-Jones & Wilson, with additions*

(12) πύλας δ', ὅπως εἰσῆλθ', ἐπιρράξασ' ἔσω,
<u>καλεῖ</u> τὸν ἤδη Λάϊον πάλαι νεκρόν,
μνήμην παλαιῶν σπερμάτων ἔχουσ', . . .
γοᾶτο δ' εὐνάς, . . . (*OT* 1245–1248; messenger speaking)

once within the chamber, she dashed the doors together at her back; then called on the name of Laius, long since a corpse, mindful of that son . . ., and she bewailed the wedlock . . .

1245 καλεῖ Ambros. G 56 sup., coni. Erfurdt [etiam Pearson, Jebb, Dawe (apud quem nihil in app. invenitur), Ellendt-Genthe ('recte sic Erf.: libri male κάλει')]: κάλει codd. [Brunck ('κάλει), Wolf-Bellermann, Campbell, Kuiper, Dain-Mazon, Kamerbeek]

(13) βοῶν γὰρ εἰσέπαισεν Οἰδίπους, ὑφ' οὗ
οὐκ ἦν τὸ κείνης ἐκθεάσασθαι κακόν,
ἀλλ' εἰς ἐκεῖνον περιπολοῦντ' ἐλεύσσομεν·
<u>φοιτᾷ γὰρ</u> ἡμᾶς ἔγχος ἐξαιτῶν πορεῖν (*OT* 1252–1255; messenger speaking)

For crying out loud Oedipus burst in, and suffered us not to watch her woe unto the end; on him, as he rushed around, our eyes were set. To and fro he went, asking us to give him a sword . . . And, in his frenzy, a power above man was his guide

1255 φοιτᾷ **Lrpat** [etiam Brunck, Campbell, Jebb, Kuiper, Pearson, Dawe, Ellendt-Genthe, Kamerbeek, Moorhouse]: φοίτα **p**, coni. Blaydes [Roussel, Dain-Mazon]

(14) ὅπως δὲ σεμνῶν ὀργίων ἐδαίετο
φλὸξ αἱματηρὰ κἀπὸ πιείρας δρυός
ἱδρὼς ἀνῄει χρωτὶ καὶ <u>προσπτύσσεται</u>
πλευραῖσιν ἀρτίκολλος, ὥστε τέκτονος,
χιτὼν . . . (*Tr.* 765–769; Hyllus speaking)

But when the blood-fed flame began to blaze from the holy offerings and from the resinous pine, a sweat broke forth upon his flesh and the tunic clung to his sides . . . close-glued, as if by a craftsman's hand

back further than to the time of Alexandrinian scholarship. All this entails that the accents in our MSS have less authority than the words in these MSS. They should not be ignored, of course, but ultimately the putting of accents on ambiguous forms is a matter of interpretation.

767 προσπτύσσεται Musgrave [etiam Ellendt-Genthe ('libri προσπτύσσετο contra tragicorum usum') Jebb, Pearson, Dawe]: -ετο codd. [Hermann, Campbell, Dain-Mazon, Kamerbeek]

(15) ἐπεὶ δ' ἀπεῖπε, . . .
τότ' ἐκ προσέδρου λιγνύος διάστροφον
ὀφθαλμὸν ἄρας εἶδέ μ' ἐν πολλῷ στρατῷ
δακρυρροοῦντα, καί με προσβλέψας καλεῖ·
"ὦ παῖ, πρόσελθε, . . ." (*Tr.* 789, 794–797; Hyllus speaking)

But when he gave over . . . then, from out of the shrouding altar-smoke, he lifted up his wildly-rolling eyes, and saw me in the in the great crowd, weeping. He turned his gaze on me, and called me: "O son, draw near . . .". That command sufficed . . .

796 καλεῖ H. Stephanus: κάλει codd.

(16) κἀγὼ 'κδακρύσας εὐθὺς ἐξανίσταμαι
ὀργῇ βαρείᾳ, καὶ καταλγήσας λέγω·
"ὦ σχέτλι',/. . ."
ὁ δ' εἶπ' Ὀδυσσεύς, πλησίον γὰρ ὢν κυρεῖ· (*Ph.* 368–371; Neoptolemus speaking)

The tears came into my eyes,—I sprang up in passionate anger,—and said in my bitterness: "Wretch . . .". Then said Odysseus, for he chanced to be near

371 κυρεῖ Porson [etiam Ellendt-Genthe, Jebb, Pearson, Dain-Mazon, Webster, Dawe, Kamerbeek, Ussher]: κύρει codd. [Campbell: ἦν κυρῶν Brunck, Hermann]

(17) ἦν μὲν σιωπή, φθέγμα δ' ἐξαίφνης τινὸς
θώϋξεν αὐτόν, ὥστε πάντας ὀρθίας
στῆσαι φόβῳ δείσαντας ἐξαίφνης τρίχας.
καλεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν πολλὰ πολλαχῇ θεός·
"ὦ οὗτος οὗτος, Οἰδίπους, . . ."
ὁ δ' ὡς ἐπῄσθετ' ἐκ θεοῦ καλούμενος,
αὐδᾷ . . . (*OC* 1624–1630; messenger speaking)

There was a stillness; and suddenly a voice of someone cried aloud to him, so that the hair of all stood up on their heads for sudden fear, and they were afraid. For the god called him with many callings and manifold: "You there, Oedipus, . . .". But when he perceived that he was called of the god, he craved that . . .

1626 καλεῖ] κάλει **t** (= Triclinius)

5.1. *Discussion*

All in all this gives us a maximum of six new instances of unaugmented imperfects from Sophocles. I will argue that of these instances at least four should indeed be analysed in this way: (12), (13), (14), and (16).

Example (12), *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1245
Campbell, who reads κάλει, apparently felt a need to defend his choice, for he writes: 'The imperfect κάλει without augment [. . .] is retained from the MSS, and agrees with ἵετο and γοᾶτο better than καλεῖ [. . .] For καλεῖ, which may be thought more vivid, cf. O.C. 1630 [= 1655 AR].' I will turn to the latter example shortly. The commentators who prefer καλεῖ do so without Campbell's scruples. Possibly they considered it, in fact, more vivid, but I will not fall into the trap of speculating about the arguments they may have had. But what about decisiveness here? This interpretation should, I think, be rejected, unless one is prepared to accept that calling upon the dead Laius may be a decisive event in Jocasta's life just before her own death.[19] I have little doubt that the manuscripts' κάλει should be retained, along the lines set out by Campbell, and that it has iterative meaning, just like γοᾶτο.[20] In fact, it adds to the pathos of the scene if Jocasta is described as shouting Laius' name repeatedly.

(13), *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1255
With some hesitation I prefer the imperfect, not because of γάρ, for this could be considered a case of γάρ introducing an embedded narrative, which in that case would indicate what Oedipus' περιπολεῖν consisted of, but because of the semantics of φοιτᾶν, which has frequentative meaning and is therefore an atelic verb. If the historic present expresses 'decisiveness', as I argued above, φοιτᾷ would express a frequentative decisive event, which is almost a contradiction in terms. Be that as it may, I have found no parallels for such a use of the present tense of a frequentative verb.

(14), *Trachiniae* 767
Here, we are not dealing with a change of accent, but of verb ending. With the majority of the editors I fail to see why προσπτύσσετο

[19] If καλεῖ is considered 'vivid' I am of course defenceless.
[20] But unlike ἵετο, which has rather immediative meaning.

should be changed to προσπτύσσεται. As appears from the note which accompanies his correction ('[προσπτύσσετο] offensioni est ob augmenti absentiam'), Musgrave has found fault with the imperfect simply because of the omitted augment, but this is hardly a sufficient reason. The imperfect should, then, be retained, and is in line with the other imperfects here: ἐδαίετο in 765 and ἀνῄει in 767.

(15), *Trachiniae* 796
The fact that the 'calling' is followed by direct speech may favour the historic present reading. A parallel is *Ant.* 1227, and probably *OC* 1626, although in the latter case there is a variant κάλει (see ex. (17)). In fact, speeches occurring in messenger speeches are frequently introduced by verbs of saying in the historic present, e.g. λέγει, βοᾷ, αὐδᾷ, ἀιτεῖ, ἀντιφωνεῖ[21] and notably ἐννέπει (of which, however, no imperfect or aorist exists). Sometimes a decisive event is involved, but more generally the combination of historic present and quoted speech may add to the persuasiveness of the messenger's report: the messenger speaks not only as an eyewitness but also as an 'earwitness'. There are no instances where the imperfect of καλέω or the other verbs mentioned above is followed by direct speech, although with still other verbs this is not uncommon, cf. E. *Hel.* 1584 ηὔχετο, *Heracl.* 825 παρήγγελλε. On balance, Stephanus' conjecture is to be preferred.

(16), *Philoctetes* 371
I will discuss this example, mentioned by Page among his 'dubious or corrupt exx.', in more detail, because on a small scale it gives us a fascinating insight into the way our profession works, or perhaps I should say, sometimes works.

Let me say for starters that Porson's (if it is really Porson's, see below) κυρεῖ is definitely impossible, for the following reasons: (i) the sentence contains regular explanatory or 'background' γάρ; in this use γάρ does not combine with the historic present, see above on examples (8)–(10); (ii) with κυρεῖ we get a stative historic present, viz. κυρεῖ ὤν—a use for which there are no parallels, cf. item IV above, p. 130.

[21] *Aj.* 773; ἀντιφωνεῖ **Lrpat**: ἀντεφώνει **p**.

Now interestingly and reassuringly, but also slightly depressingly, Gottfried Hermann followed already roughly the same line of reasoning, for he rejects, in his edition of the *Philoctetes* of 1824 (1833²), the present tense with the following remark: 'Nam praesentis in narrando usus quum ab alacritate quadam loquentis repetendus sit, convenit primariis partibus narrationis, non etiam iis, quae obiter et explicandi caussa inseruntur. Itaque nec Latine dicas, tum dicit Vlysses, praesens est enim, nec, si alia lingua utare: ut hoc non iniuria etiam a Graeca lingua alienum putari oporteat.'[22] With this remark, except for the deplorable use of 'alacritas', Hermann hits the nail on the head. For as I argued in connection with γάρ, the historic present does, indeed, not befit 'quae obiter et explicandi caussa inseruntur'. As for the second half of Hermann's remark, if κυρεῖ ὤν is replaced by ἐστι, it is immediately clear that the resulting sentence is, in fact, impossible: ὁ δ' εἶπ' Ὀδυσσεύς, πλησίον γάρ ἐστιν.[23]

Jebb, however, was not impressed: 'Hermann objected to the historic present as unsuitable to a parenthetic remark; but without cause'. To support this note Jebb refers to his own note on *Ant.* 253 ('historic pres. combined with past tense; cf. Lys. Or. 1 § 6 [. . .]'), and to E. *Hec.* 963. But all three passages are very different from *Ph.* 371. The *Antigone* passage runs:

(18) ὅπως δ' ὁ πρῶτος ἡμὶν ἡμεποροσκόπος
δείκνυσι, πᾶσι θαῦμα δυσχερὲς παρῆν·
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἠφάνιστο . . . (S. *Ant.* 253–255)

And when the first day-watchman showed it to us, sore wonder fell on all. The dead man was veiled from us . . .

And that in Lysias:

(19) ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι παιδίον γίγνεται, ἐπίστευον ἤδη . . . (Lys. 1.6)

But when a child was born to me, thenceforward I began to trust her . . .

[22] 'As the use of the present in narrating must derive from a certain liveliness of the speaker, it befits the main parts of the narrative rather than those passages that are inserted obliquely and for the sake of explaining. Thus, you would not say in Latin "[. . .]" nor in other languages. So we may safely assume that Greek, too, did not know this use.'

[23] Before Hermann, Brunck had already observed: 'Sane res ipsa manifesto tempus imperfectum postulat: verum Attici poëtae rarissime augmentum omittunt, nec erat hic licentiae locus'. Unfortunately Brunck does not tell us why in this case the 'licentia' does not apply. Anyhow, he replaced ὢν κύρει by ἦν κυρῶν, which was adopted, alas, by Hermann. Apparently, Hermann shared Brunck's view of the augment here.

There are simply no parentheses here, only temporal clauses.

As for the *Hecuba*, this is not convincing either, if only because there is a variant τύγχανον:

(20) σὺ δ’, εἴ τι μέμφῃ τῆς ἐμῆς ἀπουσίας,
σχές· <u>τυγχάνω</u> γὰρ ἐν μέσοις Θρῄκης ὅροις
ἀπών, ὅτ’ ἦλθες δεῦρ’· ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀφικόμην,
. . . / ἐς ταὐτὸν ἤδε συμπίτνει δμωὶς σέθεν (E. *Hec.* 962–965)

As for you, if you find fault with my absence, check the thought. It happens that I was away in the inland regions of Thrace when you arrived here

963 τυγχάνω Ω̣ξZcZm et $G^{S}T^{ZC}$: τύγχανον vel ’τ- GPPaZ et $B^{3}R^{\gamma\rho}$: ἐτύγχανον $FVaT^{Z}$ et $B^{3}R^{S}Sa^{S}$

But even if the present tense is correct, this sentence is not a parenthesis either. Nor are we dealing with a narrative or a historic present. If correct, τυγχάνω . . . ἀπών should be taken as an instance of the use discussed by Kühner-Gerth (I: 200 Anm. 9): ‘So von vergangenen Handlungen [the present participle] auch nach präsentischem Hauptverbum’. Kovacs correctly translates ‘It happens that I was away [. . .]’. This is the same use of the participle which we find in e.g.

(21) φαίνομαι οὖν τρισκαιδεκέτης ὢν ὅτε ὁ πατὴρ ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἀπέθνῃσκε. (Lys. 10.4)

It is clear, therefore, that I was thirteen when my father was put to death by the Thirty.

So much for Jebb’s rejoinder to Hermann’s objections. I should also add that one dearly misses a positive appraisal on Jebb’s part of the present tense form. What is its effect? What do we gain by reading the present? Why is it better than the reading of the MSS? As for the other commentators, Campbell—who is virtually the only one who resisted Porson’s (and Elmsley’s, see below) authority, for he prints the imperfect—notes, in his *Paralipomena Sophoclea* (1907): ‘The historic present would not be amiss, but there hardly seems sufficient cause for departing from the traditional text’. While the first part of this statement is not correct, the second is, of course, entirely to the point. Again, others were not impressed. Webster (1970) writes: ‘the present has to be explained as a historic or vivid present; the MSS κύρει is the imperfect without augment; this is rare in tragedy and usually the word begins the line, but it cannot be ruled out here.’

Not only Jebb, Kamerbeek, too, I am afraid, had an off-day when he wrote his note. While he accepts κυρεῖ and takes it as a historic present, he adds: 'If we follow the mss in reading κύρει, the form without augment may be defended on the ground that it occurs in a narrative comparable to a messenger's story, where such an epicism is not rare'. So far so good. But he then goes on with: 'Besides he could have used κύρει (present), for he has ἔκυρον (imperfect) *O.C.* 1159'. Unfortunately this is metrically impossible, for κύρω (a very rare by-form of κυρέω) has a long -υ-. Perhaps he was misled by Ellendt-Genthe, who did not have their day either, for they print κῠ́ρω. Ussher (1990) has no note at all.

Finally, a few words about the origin of κυρεῖ—we have not yet reached the end of the off-days. In all apparatuses this form is ascribed to Porson. But where did Porson propose this reading? The first part of Hermann's note sends us to Porson's note on E. *Med.* 1141, for Hermann writes: 'Porson ad Med. 1138 [= 1141] κυρεῖ quem sequitur Elmsleius ad Med. 1110'. Naturally, from this remark we must infer that κυρεῖ was a conjecture by Porson. Porson himself, however, believed that κυρεῖ was the reading of the *manuscripts*, for he writes[24] at *Med.* 1138 (= 1141)]: 'Hic et 1204. [= 1207] κύνει habent Lasc. Ald.[25] solenni errore, quem correxit Brunckius [viz. into κυνεῖ, in his edition of the *Medea* of 1793, see above example (2)—AR]; quocirca magis eum miror in locis similibus tantas turbas interdum ciere. Sophocl. Philoctet. 371. πλησίον γὰρ ὢν κυρεῖ [*sic*—AR] sine ulla causa in πλησίον γὰρ ἦν κυρῶν mutavit.'[26] In other words, Porson here castigates Brunck for rejecting a present tense form of the MSS, while elsewhere he introduced such present tense forms himself in our texts.

As for Elmsley, mentioned in Hermann's note, he writes (1818, on *Medea* 1110 = 1141): 'Hic et v. 1176 [= 1210] κυνεῖ reposuit Brunckius', followed by a quotation of Porson's words 'quocirca [. . .]' etc. Elmsley then makes things worse, for he rephrases Porson's words as follows: 'Apud Sophoclem scilicet Phil. 371 πλησίον γὰρ ὢν κύρει

[24] Ed. of 1812, originally published in 1801, and also in those of 1821 and 1825.

[25] The edition of Lascaris (1494) and the Aldina (1503).

[26] 'Here and at 1204 Lasc. Ald. have κύνει, by a common error, which Brunck has corrected; I am therefore amazed that in similar cases he sometimes makes such a fuss.' Brunck had published his Sophocles edition in 1786.

[*sic*] in πλησίον γὰρ ἦν κυρῶν mutare maluit (viz. Brunck), quam praesens κυρεῖ [*sic*] praeteriti imperfecti sensu admittere'. This is of course quite a mess, and apart from everything else one wonders whether Elmsley really believed that the present could have the meaning of an imperfect.

All in all, it looks as if everybody believed that Porson proposed the conjecture κυρεῖ for *Ph.* 371, while Porson himself thought that κυρεῖ was in the manuscripts. How should this comedy of errors be represented in an accurate apparatus? Perhaps as follows: 'κυρεῖ Porsono attribuunt edd.; is autem falso hanc formam pro lectione libr. habuit'. In the last resort we must conclude that κυρεῖ is a ghost-form, since nobody actually proposed to read it.

5.2. *Discussion, continued*

(17), *Oedipus Coloneus* 1626
For καλεῖ and κάλει (which may well be a conjecture, of course) followed by direct speech see above, on *Tr.* 796, example (15). What about the effect here of γάρ and πολλὰ πολλαχῇ? As for γάρ, this is, I think, an instance of γάρ introducing an embedded narrative, for it explains what the φθέγμα mentioned in line 1623 consisted of. On this count, then, both καλεῖ and κάλει are possible. As for πολλὰ πολλαχῇ, in his note Jebb slightly varies on his translation, for he writes: 'with repeated and manifold calling'; Lloyd-Jones, too, has an iterative translation: 'For the god called him often and from many places'. In any event, if this is the meaning of these two adverbs, this strongly suggests that indeed a repeated event is meant, which would plead in favour of the imperfect. On the other hand, the fact that καλει is followed by direct speech and takes up ἐξαίφνης θώϋξεν suggests rather that there is no repetition involved. All in all, I believe that the latter is correct. Πολλά should then be taken as a manner adverb, and πολλαχῇ as a locative adverb: 'loudly and by many ways' (i.e. 'from many sides').

6. *Historic presents in Euripides that may be imperfects*

For reasons of space I confine myself to discussing *Med.* 1141, which got already a brief mention above (ex. (2)), and *Ba.* 728:[27]

(22) . . . δι' ὤτων δ' εὐθὺς ἦν πολὺς λόγος
σὲ καὶ πόσιν σὸν νεῖκος ἐσπεῖσθαι τὸ πρίν.
κυνεῖ δ' ὁ μέν τις χεῖρ', ὁ δὲ ξανθὸν κάρα
παίδων· (E. *Med.* 1139–1142; messenger speaking)

For our ears buzzed with the loud report that you and your husband had brought your former quarrel to and end. And someone kissed the hands and another the blond heads of the children.

1141 κυνεῖ Brunck: κύνει codd. ('fortasse recte. Cf. v. 1207'—Murray, Page)

(23) αἳ δὲ τὴν τεταγμένην
ὥραν ἐκίνουν θύρσον ἐς βακχεύματα,
/. . . πᾶν δὲ συνεβάκχευ' ὄρος 726
καὶ θῆρες, οὐδὲν δ' ἦν ἀκίνητον δρόμῳ.
κυρεῖ δ' Ἀγαύη πλησίον θρῴσκουσά μου·
κἀγὼ 'ξεπήδησ' ὡς συναρπάσαι θέλων (E. *Ba.* 723–729; messenger speaking)

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[27] Other cases in Euripides where edd. prefer a historic present to an imperfect are:

(i) *Alc.* 183–184 κυνεῖ and δεύεται (κυνεῖ BOV: κύνει LP; δεύεται BOV et gB; δεύετο P: aut -αι in -ο aut -ο in -αι mutavit L^{1c});

(ii) *Med.* 1207 κυνεῖ (κυνεῖ V et $^{i}\Sigma^{b}$: κύνει ΩLP);

(iii) *IT* 1395 ὠθεῖ (ὠθεῖ Kirchhoff: ὤθει L).

I add a few remarks. *Med.* 1207 is like 1141, and there is no reason to treat it differently, so the imperfect should be preferred. At *IT* 1395 Kirchhoff's conjecture should be rejected, for it occurs in a regular 'background' γάρ-clause, where the historic present is impossible, see above p. 133; ὤθει is simultaneous with the preceding imperfect ἠπείγετο: the blowing of the wind and the speed of the ship coincide. Cf. also Platnauer *ad loc.* 'I see little reason to suspect the imperf.'. As for *Alc.* 183–184, δεύετο is generally rejected for metrical reasons, cf. e.g Dale *ad loc.*: 'Since δεύετο here is prosodically impossible we can justifiably remove δάκρυσε 176 and κύνει 183'. 'Impossible' is perhaps just a bit too strong, for there are some cases where muta cum liquida in initial position makes position, cf. especially Barrett on E. *Hipp.* 760. Moreover, the situation here is similar to that of the unaugmented imperfects: some instances may be hidden in the apparatus, or have been removed *per coniecturam*. To the possible examples at least one should be added, *IA* 1579 ἵνᾱ πλήξειεν ἄν. Also, the alternative forms κυνεῖ and δεύεται at *Alc.* are not without problems either, at least if marking decisive events is considered the basic function of the historic present (the proponents of 'vividness' will of course haven no qualms). That δεύετο may be the correct reading finds some support in line 185 ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλῶν δακρύων εἶχεν κόρον: this clause seems more appropriate after an imperfect than after a historic present. For κυνεῖ see also below on *Med.* 1141.

And the women at the appointed time of day began to wave their thyrsoi and to worship Dionysus . . . the whole mountain with its beasts was as possessed as they were, and everything was set in rapid motion. Agave's leaping happened to bring her near me, and I left my hiding-place and jumped up to seize her

728 κυρεῖ P^2: κύρει LP

6.1. *Discussion*

Example (22), *Medea* 1141
To explain his text, that, as far as I could see, has been adopted by all subsequent editors, Brunck provides just the following remark:[28] 'κυνεῖ hic et v. 1207 praesens, non imperfectum. Sic in narrationibus variari tempora sciunt, qui paullo attentius Tragicos legerunt.'[29] To be sure, in the second sentence Brunck ingeniously combines an appeal to *variatio* as a critical concept with an *argumentum ex auctoritate*, but if this is all that can be put forward against the reading of the manuscripts, that reading should perhaps not be given up too easily, the less so because κυνεῖ introduces a very inappropriate historic present (see above on ex. (2)). In fact, κύνει makes perfect sense, and has iterative meaning: it is not simply 'they kissed', but 'they covered with kisses', simultaneously with ἦν πολὺς λόγος.

Example (23), *Bacchae* 728
This example much resembles *Ph.* 371, discussed above, example (16), since it combines a form of κυρέω with a present participle and the same locative adverb, πλησίον. As in the example from *Med.* (ex. (22)), all editors seem to prefer the present indicative accentuation, κυρεῖ, which is due to the corrector of P. In Kovacs' translation, κυρεῖ δ' Ἀγαύη πλησίον θρῴσκουσά μου expresses the idea that Agaue, while jumping, ended up in the immediate vicinity of the messenger. Likewise the translations of Roux ('Agavé passe à ma portée, bondissante') and Grégoire ('or voici qu' Agavé bondit à ma portée'), and probably also Kirk ('Agaue chances to jump close by me'). Compare also the translations of Willink and Kovacs in another case of πλησίον θρῴσκειν, viz. at *Or.* 257: αὗται γὰρ αὗται πλησίον θρῴσκουσί

[28] In the Leipzig edition of 1794.
[29] 'That the tenses show such variation in narratives is well-known to people who have read the tragedians just a bit more attentively.'

μου: '[. . .] here they come galopping near me' (Willink), 'Here they come leaping toward me!' (Kovacs). But I do not think these translations are correct, since they all treat θρῴσκω as some verb of 'moving toward'. In reality, 'bring' or 'come' is not part of the meaning of the present θρῴσκειν.[30] Both at *Ba.* 728 and *Or.* 257 the meaning is rather 'jump to and fro', 'move, jump around'. In other words, θρῴσκω does not have telic, but durative-stative meaning (cf. also φοιτᾶν above, example (13)). Just as in the case of S. *Ph.* 371, the historic present would clash with a durative-stative meaning,[31] so the imperfect must be preferred: 'she happened to be jumping near me'. Κύρει . . . θρῴσκουσα continues the imperfects ἐκίνουν . . . συνεβάκχευ' . . . οὐδὲν ἦν ἀκίνητον, which seems unobjectionable.

7. *General conclusions*

The results of the above discussion are summarized in the following table, where the text of the OCT editions of Sophocles and Euripides should be taken as representative of most modern editions:[32]

	manuscripts	OCT	this article
S. *OT* 780 (ex. (7))	καλεῖ	καλεῖ	καλεῖ
OT 1245 (ex. (12))	κάλει	καλεῖ	κάλει
OT 1255 (ex. (13))	φοιτᾷ majority of the MSS; φοίτα minority	φοιτᾷ	φοίτα
Tr. 767 (ex. (14))	προσπτύσσετο	προσπτύσσεται	προσπτύσσετο
Tr. 796 (ex. (15))	καλεῖ	καλεῖ	καλεῖ
Ph. 371 (ex. (16))	κύρει	κυρεῖ	κύρει
OC 1626 (ex. (17))	καλεῖ	καλεῖ	καλεῖ
E. *Med.* 1141 (ex. (22))	κύνει	κυνεῖ	κύνει
Med. 1207 (note 27, ex. (ii))	κύνει	κυνεῖ	κύνει
IT 1395 (note 27, ex. (iii))	ὤθει	ὠθεῖ	ὤθει
Ba. 728 (ex. (23))	κύρει	κυρεῖ	κύρει

[30] Θρῴσκω may have this meaning all right, but only in the aorist, see LSJ *s.v.* (who wrongly classify *Or.* 257 and *Ba.* 728 under the heading 'leap upon, attack').

[31] There is one other instance of κυρεῖ in a Euripidean messenger-speech, viz. at *El.* 777 κυρεῖ . . . βεβώς. Since here, too, there is a clash between the stative value of this phrase and the historic present I am tempted to read κύρει.

[32] Observe, however, that Dain-Mazon, in their Budé-edition, read an imperfect at *OT* 1245, 1255 and *Tr.* 767.

What other conclusions can be drawn from the above observations? First, that a linguistic framework may be of some help in interpreting the elusive verb forms of our Greek texts. Second, that the number of historic presents in Sophocles and Euripides goes slightly down while that of imperfects goes slightly up. Third, that the phenomenon of unaugmented past tenses is more widespread than is generally assumed, and should no longer be considered some kind of aberration. Fourth, that an apparatus criticus should be as detailed as possible. Fifth, that consulting our predecessors of at least the last two centuries is indispensable to form a balanced opinion, although, sixth, one should always reckon with one or more, or even collective, off-days. Seventh, that the consultation of these predecessors should perhaps start with Gottfried Hermann.

APPENDIX: HISTORIC AND ACTUAL PRESENTS

There comes a moment, of course, when the messenger has to put an end to his report. This is in general indicated by a reference to the actual situation, which in turn may be followed by a concluding evaluation; actuality and evaluation may also coincide. Not unexpectedly, the reference to the actuality is expressed by present tense forms. But how can we be certain that these presents are not historic presents? Let us look *paullo attentius* at example (a) and at some translations of line 1240 and especially of κεῖται:

(a) ἐς δ᾽ ὑγρὸν
ἀγκῶν᾽ ἔτ᾽ ἔμφρων παρθένῳ προσπτύσσεται
καὶ φυσιῶν ὀξεῖαν ἐκβάλλει ῥοὴν
λευκῇ παρειᾷ φοινίου σταλάγματος.
κεῖται δὲ νεκρὸς περὶ νεκρῷ, . . . (S. *Ant.* 1236–1240; messenger speaking)

Lloyd-Jones: 'Still living, he clasped the maiden in the bend of his feeble arm, and shooting forth a sharp jet of blood, he stained her white cheek. He lay, a corpse holding a corpse [. . .]'
Jebb: 'he lies'
Dain-Mazon: 'Il est là [. . .]'.

Observe that Lloyd-Jones translates κεῖται with a past tense, and we must therefore assume that he takes κεῖται as another instance of a historic present, after προσπτύσσεται and ἐκβάλλει. But this is impossible, if only because, as I noticed earlier, stative κεῖμαι does not

qualify for this use. Also, with this translation there is properly speaking no formal transition to the actual situation. That Lloyd-Jones' choice of a past tense is not an incident appears from example (b), and from the similar example (c):

(b) τοιόνδε κεῖται προπετές (*Tr.* 701)
Lloyd-Jones: 'So there it lay' (sc. the piece of wool)
Contrast Jebb: 'In such a state it lies as it fell' and Dain-Mazon: 'Il est là [. . .]'

(c) καί νιν πυρᾷ κέαντες εὐθὺς ἐν βραχεῖ
χαλκῷ μέγιστον σῶμα δειλαίας σποδοῦ
φέρουσιν ἄνδρες Φωκέων τεταγμένοι,
ὅπως πατρῴας τύμβον ἐκλάχῃ (-οι cett.) χθονός.
τοιαῦτά σοι ταῦτ' ἐστίν, (*El.* 757–761)

Lloyd-Jones: 'at once carried [. . .] his mighty form, so that he should be accorded burial [. . .]'
Contrast again Jebb: 'are bringing him' and Dain-Mazon: 'les Phocidiens ont été délégués pour vous l'apporter'

Why Lloyd-Jones in all three cases has chosen to translate in this way is quite a riddle. Even more puzzling is that he translates ἐστίν at *El.* 761 (ex. (c)) with a past tense: 'Such was this event', instead of 'Such is the situation'. Observe that these choices are not simply a matter of stylistic preference; in (c), for instance, the translation with 'carried' brings about a radical change in the dramatic situation, for the use of this past tense implies that the ashes of 'Orestes' *are* already on the soil of his fathers, i.e. Mycenae (cf. l. 760), which they are not.[33] Jebb, Mazon and others correctly take κεῖται etc. as actual presents.[34]

[33] The chosen 'Phocians' (i.e. Orestes and Pylades) only arrive at the palace at l. 1098; at 1113 we learn that they bring the remains of 'Orestes', φέροντες αὐτοῦ σμικρὰ λαίψαν' ἐν βραχεῖ/τεύχει, where φέροντες of course echoes φέρουσιν at 759.

[34] For similar actual presents in Euripides see e.g. κεῖνται at *Med.* 1220 and κομίζομεν at *Andr.* 1159.

THE USE OF THE DEMONSTRATIVES ὅδε, οὗτος AND (ἐ)κεῖνος IN SOPHOCLES

C.J. Ruijgh†

1. In his otherwise valuable *Syntax of Sophocles* Moorhouse (1982: 153) claims that in Sophocles' plays the pattern of the tripartite system of the demonstratives is not always maintained. Thus reference is made to Ajax, who is absent from the stage, by (ἐ)κεῖνος, ὅδε and οὗτος (*Aj.* 1–80), 'all without any sense of distinction'. In my opinion, however, referential identity of different expressions does not imply neutralization of the semantic values of the expressions in question: βασιλεύς 'king' has not the same semantic value as the personal name Δαρεῖος, though both nouns may refer to the same person.

In this connection Moorhouse (155) does not agree with the opinion of Kühner-Gerth that in some passages ὅδε refers to what is especially prominent in the speaker's mind. Kühner-Gerth's observation is as follows (I: 644):

> So kann ferner ὅδε von Gegenständen gebraucht werden, die sich räumlich auf die zweite oder dritte Person beziehen und daher dem Bereiche des Redenden ferner stehen, die aber der Redende in lebhafter Auffassungsweise in seine unmittelbare Sphäre herüberzieht und als seine eigene Person berührend anschaut. [. . .]. Auch können beide Pronomen: ὅδε und οὗτος auf einen und denselben Gegenstand hindeuten, ὅδε denselben *emphatisch vergegenwärtigend*, οὗτος auf denselben bloss hinweisend. [my italics]

Kühner-Gerth's opinion is corroborated by phenomena observed in living languages. I quote Lyons (1977: 677):

> In conclusion, we would draw attention to what we will call *emphatic* deixis and its role in anaphoric reference. It frequently happens that 'this' is selected rather than 'that', 'here' rather than 'there', and 'now' rather than 'then', when the speaker is *personally involved* with the entity, situation or place to which he is referring or is identifying himself with the attitude or viewpoint of the addressee. The conditions which determine this emphatic use of the marked member of these deictically opposed demonstratives and adverbs are difficult to specify with any degree of precision. But there is no doubt that the speaker's *subjective*

> *involvement* and his appeal to shared experience are relevant factors in the selection of those demonstratives and adverbs which, in their normal deictic use, indicate proximity. [my italics]

In this connection one may also think of the English idiomatic use of *this* instead of *a certain* in sentences like *Then I met this girl*, without previous mention of the girl in question: telling a story, the speaker relives the scene in question, so that he has the girl before his mind's eye, a girl who is going to play an important role in the continuation of the story.

In sum, I am convinced that Kühner-Gerth are right, and I will argue that Sophocles uses the pronouns ὅδε, οὗτος, and ἐκεῖνος in the way indicated by Kühner-Gerth.

2. Let us consider the following sentence:

> (Oedipus to Jocasta, relating his encounter with Laius:)
> στείχων δ' ἱκνοῦμαι τούσδε τοὺς χώρους, ἐν οἷς
> σὺ τὸν τύραννον τοῦτον ὄλλυσθαι λέγεις. (*OT* 798–799)
>
> On my way I came to *this* region, in which according to you that king perished.

Kamerbeek explains the use of τούσδε as follows: 'the locality is before his mind's eye'.[1] He adds that the same use is found in τριπλῆς/ ὅτ' ἦ κελεύθου τῆσδ' ὁδοιπορῶν πέλας, 'When I was on my way near this three-forked road' (800–801). The use of τούσδε in fact suggests that Oedipus relives with anxiety the scene he describes, fearing that he might turn out to be Laius' murderer. Instead of emphatic τούσδε, Oedipus might have used the neutral anaphoric pronoun τούτους, as he did in the expression ὁ χῶρος οὗτος (732), or even κείνους with the connotation 'that region faraway'. Though τούτους and κείνους were metrically impossible in 798, the selection of τούσδε with its emphatic force is entirely adequate in the context: a great poet like Sophocles always makes a virtue of metrical need.

This interpretation of τούσδε is corroborated by the use of the historical present ἱκνοῦμαι, which suggests the 'vivid' report of crucial events by an eye-witness. After ἱκνοῦμαι, Oedipus uses four other historical presents: παίω (807), ὁρᾷ (807), ἐκκυλίνδεται (812), κτείνω

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[1] He was preceded by Campbell (1879): 'The cross-road is vividly present to his imagination; hence the pronoun ὅδε is used'.

(813), as against only one occurrence of the aorist (809 καθίκετο).[2]

As for the relative clause, most scholars seem to consider ἐν οἷς . . . restrictive, i.e. as part of a correlative construction. In my opinion, it should rather be interpreted as non-restrictive, i.e. as an apposition to τούσδε τοὺς χώρους: 'to this region, the place where that king was killed according to you'. (See also section 3.) In fact, Jocasta must have understood that τούσδε τοὺς χώρους refers to the place indicated by herself with ἐν τριπλαῖς ἁμαξιτοῖς (716) and . . . σχιστὴ . . . ὁδός. . . (733–734) and by Oedipus with ἐν τριπλαῖς ἁμαξιτοῖς (730) and ὁ χῶρος οὗτος (732).

The enjambment, finally, gives emphasis to the content of the next verse, i.e. to Laius' death. The position of the clause is characteristic of Sophocles. Compare the εἶδος Σοφόκλειον (elision at verse boundary) in the clauses starting with ὅμως δ' (785) and γένος δ' (791).

In the preceding part of the dialogue between Jocasta and Oedipus (698–797), Oedipus uses emphatic anaphoric ὅδε five times (729, 732, 735, 754, 755) and neutral anaphoric οὗτος only three times (732, 786, 794), whereas Jocasta uses neutral οὗτος five times (728, 731, 737, 739, 766) and ὅδε only twice (710, 764).[3] The high frequency of emphatic ὅδε in Oedipus' words reflects his anxiety: Jocasta's description of the circumstances of Laius' death conjures up in his mind the scene at the σχιστὴ ὁδός; the mentioning of the cross-road makes him infer that he might be Laius' murderer.

The conclusion is obvious: Kamerbeek's commentary on τούσδε τοὺς χώρους in *OT* 798 is entirely justified.

3. Moorhouse (155), however, does not accept Kamerbeek's interpretation of τούσδε at *OT* 798, arguing that 'here τούσδε is antecedent to οἷς', which implies that we are dealing with the correlative construction τούσδε . . . ἐν οἷς. In fact, however, the normal demonstrative of the correlative construction is οὗτος. Kühner-Gerth (I: 647) mention this rule and add: 'Nur selten, wenigstens in Prosa, die *stärkeren* Demonstrative ὅδε, τοιόσδε u.s.w., und zwar immer so, dass der Gegenstand als eben in den Gesichtskreis tretend *lebhaft vergegenwärtigt* wird' [my italics]. This implies that in the correlative construction

[2] In οὐ μὴν ἴσην γ' ἔτεισεν 'But he did not get merely an even penalty' (810), the negation excludes the use of the historic present (Moorhouse 184; Rijksbaron, this volume, p. 131).

[3] Oedipus uses deictic ὅδε at 700, Jocasta at 736 and 762.

the use of ὅδε instead of οὗτος has the same extra force as it has elsewhere (cf. section 1).[4]

In its use as an anaphoric pronoun, οὗτος usually refers back to what has just been mentioned (retrospective reference), whereas ὅδε usually refers forward to what is going to be mentioned (prospective reference).[5] Thus, expressions like ἔλεγε τάδε/τοιάδε refer to the following direct speech, whereas expressions like ταῦτα/τοιαῦτα εἶπε refer to the preceding speech. Kühner-Gerth (I: 646–647) add that οὗτος is often also used prospectively, for instance in τοῦτο ὅτι and οὕτως ὥστε. This is in accordance with the correlative construction, where the order τοῦτο . . . ὅ (prospective τοῦτο) coexists with ὅ . . . τοῦτο (retrospective τοῦτο). One might perhaps conclude that prospective οὗτος is used when it refers to what is going to be mentioned in the continuation of the same sentence, whereas the stronger prospective ὅδε 'the following' is used when it refers to what is going to be mentioned in the next sentence or sentences. Thus, τοῦτο may refer forwards to an infinitive: τοῦτο σοὶ ἐφίεμαι,/τοιάνδ' ἀεί μοι σύμμαχον παρεστάναι, 'I bid you this, to stand always at my side as such an ally as you are to-day' (*Aj.* 116–117).[6]

Having mentioned the prospective use of οὗτος, Kühner-Gerth (I: 646–647) continue: 'Ungleich seltener, wenigstens in der attischen Prosa, werden ὅδε, τοιόσδε, τοσόσδε, ὧδε auf schon erwähntes bezogen, indem der Redende sich dasselbe vergegenwärtigt oder etwas Gegenwärtiges gleichsam vor Augen stellt [. . .]'. This concerns the emphatic use of retrospective ὅδε mentioned above (section 1) and illustrated by *OT* 798 (section 2). The restriction 'at least in Attic prose' suggests that the use in question is more frequent in Attic tragedy.

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[4] This extra force led Ellendt-Genthe (506) to state about ὅδε 'esse omnium demonstrativorum quasi fortissimum'.

[5] With the ancient Greek grammarians and Lyons (1977: 659), I use 'anaphoric' as a generic term. Some modern linguists restrict 'anaphoric' to retrospective reference and use the neologism 'cataphoric' for prospective reference.—In their anaphoric use the demonstratives are the strong counterparts of the weak third person pronouns (schematically, τοῦτον: postpositive αὐτόν = ἐμέ: enclitic με).

[6] Of course, the distinction between 'next sentence' and 'continuation of the same sentence' is not always clear-cut. In spoken language it depends on the intonation pattern. In a written text, it may be expressed by different punctuation marks: colon vs. comma. Thus, I would put a colon rather than a comma before ἐκεῖ in οὐκ ἔστι σοι ταῦτ', ἀλλά σοι τάδ' ἔστ'· ἐκεῖ/χώρας ἀλάστωρ οὑμὸς ἐνναίων ἀεί, 'Your destiny is not that, but it is this: there (i.e. in Thebes) (will be) my curse upon the country, everlasting' (*OC* 787–788). Here, retrospective ταῦτ' contrasts with prospective τάδ'.

Whereas Moorhouse does not accept the semantic distinction between anaphoric ὅδε and anaphoric οὗτος, he does recognize that anaphoric (ἐ)κεῖνος has its full demonstrative force (Moorhouse 158), for instance in the correlative construction: νῦν ἐκεῖν' ἔξεστί σοι/ παρόντι λεύσσειν, ὧν πρόθυμος ἦσθ' ἀεί, 'now you can see before your eyes those places which you always desired' (*El.* 2–3; the *paedagogus* to Orestes). The expression ἐκεῖνα 'those places far away' is presented from Orestes' point of view during the past.

4. Moorhouse's opinion on the absence of differences in meaning between ὅδε and οὗτος in many contexts, is founded on his description of the basic meanings of the three demonstratives:

> In general we find the familiar distinction between ὅδε and οὗτος on the one hand, making a closer reference, and (ἐ)κεῖνος on the other, making a remoter; and further, ὅδε is more close than οὗτος. In other words, there is a tripartite system, corresponding to the division of person in the personal pronouns and the verb between 'I', 'thou', and 'he'. (153)

The description given in the first sentence agrees with that of Kühner-Gerth (I: 641).[7] The description given in the second sentence goes back to Brugmann (1904), who introduced the terms *Ich-Deixis, Du-Deixis* and *Jener-Deixis* for the basic semantic values of, respectively, ὅδε 'this one here with me', οὗτος 'that one there near you', and (ἐ)κεῖνος 'that one over there'. These are useful terms. The *Ich*-deictic meaning of ὅδε is obvious when the speaker refers to himself with ὅδε instead of ἐγώ, for instance in τῆσδέ γε ζώσης ἔτι, 'at least while I am still alive' (*Tr.* 305). Ajax refers to himself with expressions like ὅδε (ὁ) ἀνήρ: *Aj.* 422, 446, 822. In this use ὅδε cannot be replaced with οὗτος. The *Du*-deictic meaning of οὗτος, on the other hand, is obvious in vocative expressions like οὗτος σύ 'you there' (*OT* 532,

[7] The idea of ὅδε being more close than οὗτος implies a distinction that was not yet made by the ancient grammarians. According to Apollonius Dyscolus, both οὗτος and ὅδε express 'closeness' as against ἐκεῖνος expressing 'remoteness' (*Pron.* 21.11, 57.10–12 Schneider; *Synt.* 136.13 Uhlig). Apollonius' failure to recognize the semantic distinction between ὅδε and οὗτος is due to the fact that in the spoken Greek of his time, ὅδε no longer existed, its function having been adopted by οὗτος. In the *New Testament*, for instance, ὅδε is almost absent. For the ancient grammarians ὅδε was a Classical Greek synonym of οὗτος. Thus spoken post-Classical Greek had a bipartite system of demonstratives: unmarked οὗτος vs. marked ἐκεῖνος. Modern Greek has replaced it by a tripartite system again: (ἐ)τούτος, αὐτός, (ἐ)κείνος, corresponding more or less with Classical Greek ὅδε, οὗτος, ἐκεῖνος.

1121), οὗτος (*Aj.* 71, 1047), ὦ οὗτος (*Aj.* 89, *OC* 1627).[8] In this use οὗτος cannot be replaced with ὅδε. In a comparable way, ὅδε and οὗτος are sometimes replaceable with ἐμός and σός, respectively, for instance τῆσδε χειρός, 'this hand of mine' (*OT* 811).

From such uses it appears that the basic meaning of οὗτος is rather 'that one there near you' than 'this one relatively close to me'. Moorhouse should have said 'In fact, however, . . .' instead of 'In other words, . . .' at the beginning of his second sentence. This has consequences for the interpretation of οὗτος. In his monologue Ajax first refers to his sword with τόδ' ἔγχος 'this weapon of mine' (*Aj.* 658), then with τοῦτ' (661). Moorhouse (156) believes that τοῦτο is deictic here, but 'that object near you' is impossible, since Ajax' words are not addressed to a second person. Therefore τοῦτο can only be interpreted as the neutral anaphoric pronoun.

The tripartite system is also found in the pronominal adverbs of place and manner: ἐνθάδε, δεῦρο, ἐνθένδε, τῇδε and ὧδε correspond with ὅδε; ἔνταῦθα, ἐντεῦθεν, ταύτῃ and οὕτω(ς) with οὗτος; ἐκεῖ, ἐκεῖσε, ἐκεῖθεν, ἐκείνῃ and ἐκείνως with ἐκεῖνος. A reduced system without *Jener*-deictic term is found in the pronominal adjectives and some adverbs of time: τοιόσδε, τοσόσδε, τηλικόσδε and τηνικάδε correspond with ὅδε; τοιοῦτος, τοσοῦτος, τηλικοῦτος and τηνικαῦτα with οὗτος.[9]

Brugmann also introduced the term *Der-Deixis*, viz. for the pronoun ὁ/τό-, which in Homer's language is the usual anaphoric pronoun. It may be described as a demonstrative, but it is not found in strictly deictic use, apart from the relic τῇ, 'there!'. The corresponding pronominal adjectives and adverbs are ἔνθα, ἔνθεν, τῇ, ὥς; τώς, τοῖος, τόσος, τηλίκος, τῆμος = τηνίκα, with τόφρα = τέως and τότε. In Classical Greek, ὁ/τό- was replaced with anaphoric οὗτος, apart from certain constructions. Thus οὗτος adopted *Der*-deictic value next to its basic *Du*-deictic value.

5. The prototypical strictly deictic use of the demonstratives, i.e. the use which may be accompanied by a pointing gesture and/or eye-

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[8] See also Lloyd in this volume. Since σύ functions both as nominative and as vocative, the nominative form οὗτος could adopt the vocative function. Compare the discussion in A.D. *Pron.* 21.10–28 S.

[9] Another *Du*-deictic form, viz. τημοῦτος (τημοῦτος : τῆμος = τοῦτο : τό), a poetic equivalent of τηνικαῦτα, occurs in Hesiod (*Op.* 576), whereas *Ich*-deictic τημόσδε is found in Hellenistic poetry, e.g. Theoc. 10.49, Call. *Jov.* 21, A.R. 2.957.

gaze, must have been much more frequent in everyday conversation than it is in literary texts. Especially strictly deictic ἐκεῖνος is infrequent. The rare examples always seem to have the deictic particle -ί, and are confined to comedy: οὑτοσὶ πέρδιξ. # ἐκεινοσὶ δὲ νὴ Δί' ἀτταγᾶς, 'That (bird) before your eyes is a partridge.' # 'But that one over there, yea by Zeus, is a francolin' (Ar. *Av.* 297).[10]

In some contexts, the use of οὗτος implies a lower degree of closeness than ὅδε. This is the case when Ino speaking to Odysseus uses the expressions εἵματα ταῦτα 'those clothes (on your body)' and τόδε κρήδεμνον 'this veil (in my hands)' (*Od.* 5.343, 346). However, this difference is not essential to the semantic values of οὗτος versus ὅδε. Thus, Diomedes speaking to Nestor uses the expressions τούτω 'those (horses) of yours' and τώδε 'these (horses) of mine' (*Il.* 8.109), though he stands before Nestor's horses.[11] In numerous situations ὅδε and οὗτος are used to refer to objects that are, as appears from the context, as close to the speaker as to the addressee. A case in point is *Od.* 13.345–351. Here, Athena first says to Odysseus Φόρκυνος μὲν ὅδ' ἐστὶ λιμὴν . . ./ἥδε δ' ἐπὶ κρατὸς λιμένος . . . ἐλαίη, 'This here is Phorcys' harbour . . ., this here, on the harbour's head, is the olive-tree', after which she continues with τοῦτο δέ τοι σπέος . . ., ἔνθα σὺ πολλὰς/ἔρδεσκες Νύμφῃσι . . . ἑκατόμβας·/τοῦτο δὲ Νήριτόν ἐστιν ὄρος . . ., 'There you have before your eyes the cave . . ., where you used to offer to the Nymphs great sacrifices; there you have Mount Neriton . . .'. Rather than expressing a difference of distance, the switch from *Ich*-deictic ὅδε to *Du*-deictic οὗτος should be connected with the presence of the second person pronoun τοι in the sentence and the personal relation of the addressee with the cave.[12] Such uses of οὗτος instead of ὅδε might be described as 'addressee-oriented' deictic reference.

In this way the switch from ὅδε to οὗτος at the beginning of Sophocles' *Electra* may be accounted for. Standing in front of the palace at Mycenae the *paedagogus* says to Orestes: τὸ γὰρ παλαιὸν Ἄργος οὑπόθεις τόδε,/ . . . /αὕτη δ', Ὀρέστα, . . . /ἀγορὰ Λύκειος, 'For ancient Argos, which you were longing for all the time, is here before

[10] Demonstratives strengthened by the deictic particle -ί are not found in tragedy, apparently being incompatible with its elevated style.

[11] I do not agree with Kühner-Gerth here (I: 644), who think that τούτω has the connotation of inferior quality.

[12] I disagree with Kühner-Gerth (I: 641), who suppose that τοῦτο is used because the places in question are less close to the speaker.

our eyes . . .; there before your eyes, Orestes, is the Lycean *Agora* . . .' (*El.* 4–7).[13] The switch to addressee-oriented deixis can be connected with the insertion of the vocative 'Ορέστα. Then the speaker switches back again to ὅδε, τόδε (7, 10).

The semantic distinction between ὅδε and οὗτος is very clear in the τειχοσκοπία-scene in the *Iliad.* Pointing to a Greek leader, Priam asks Helen to tell him the identity of the man concerned: τόνδ' ἄνδρα 'this man before my eyes', ὅς τις ὅδ' ἐστὶν . . . 'who this man is' (*Il.* 3.166–167). Helen answers: οὗτος γ' . . . Ἀγαμέμνων, 'That man before your eyes is Agamemnon' (178), with the addressee-oriented demonstrative. In the same way Priam in his second question uses τόνδε . . . ὅς τις ὅδ' ἐστί (192) and Helen answers οὗτος δ' αὖ Ὀδυσσεύς (200). In his third question Priam again uses ὅδ' (226) and Helen answers οὗτος δ' Αἴας ἐστι . . . (229). Interestingly, in this passage οὗτος could also be interpreted as an anaphoric pronoun: 'that man you just mentioned, that man you have in mind'. This 'deictic-anaphoric' use of οὗτος is, so to speak, the link between the strictly deictic and the strictly anaphoric use of the pronoun. An example from Sophocles is found at *OT* 1120. Oedipus asks the Corinthian messenger: ἦ τόνδε φράζεις . . ., 'Do you mean this man on my side?'. The messenger answers: τοῦτον, ὅνπερ εἰσορᾷς, '(Yes,) that man on your side, the very man you are looking at'.[14] Here τοῦτον might be interpreted not only as a retrospective anaphoric pronoun but also as prospective, if τοῦτον ὅνπερ . . . is considered a correlative construction.

To express a new arrival on the stage the use of ὅδε is normal: ἀλλ' ὅδε γὰρ δὴ βασιλεὺς χώρας . . . χωρεῖ, 'But look! Here before our eyes comes the king of the land . . .' (*Ant.* 155–158). Exceptionally, however, οὗτος occurs, as at *El.* 1431. But here the context is different. Aegisthus' appearance has already been announced by the chorus (1428–1429). According to the text presented by Jebb and Lloyd-Jones & Wilson[15] Orestes asks: εἰσορᾶτε ποῦ/τὸν ἄνδρ', 'Where do you see the man?' (1430–1431). Electra answers with: . . . οὗτος ἐκ προαστίου/χωρεῖ . . ., 'There before your eyes he is coming from the suburb . . .' (1431–1432). Since she is answering Orestes' question Electra uses the addressee-oriented demonstrative οὗτος ('your man'), although an anaphoric interpretation cannot be excluded.

[13] For a more detailed analysis, see the contribution of Dunn in this volume.

[14] Moorhouse (154) observes: 'τόνδε deictic, τοῦτον less close, associated with the second person'. This observation is correct, except for 'less close'.

[15] A different text is given by Pearson, Dain (cf. Kamerbeek *ad loc.*) and Dawe.

6. It seems that the use of ὅδε referring to what is present in the situation-of-utterance is more usual than that of addressee-oriented οὗτος: the speaker is at the zero-point of the spatiotemporal coordinates of the deictic context (Lyons 1977: 638). Thus ὅδε may refer deictically to the present time, i.e. the time span which contains the moment of utterance and includes the recent past and the near future (cf. English *these days*). So one finds τῇδε θἠμέρᾳ 'on this (the present) day' (*Aj.* 1362; cf. 753, 756, 778), and also νυκτὸς . . . τῆσδε 'this night, i.e. last night' (*Aj.* 21; cf. 209).[16]

The temporal use of ὅδε is also found in the case of actions and emotions belonging to the present time and playing a major role in the actual situation. Thus Athena speaking to Odysseus refers with σπουδὴν . . . τήνδ' 'the present zeal' (*Aj.* 13) to this hero's search she is watching at this very moment (καὶ νῦν . . . ὁρῶ . . . κυνηγετοῦντα). She could have used the neutral anaphoric pronoun ταύτην, but τήνδ' gives more emphasis. The same interpretation is plausible for τήνδ' . . . αἰτίαν 'the present accusation' (28), τήνδ' . . . βάσιν 'these steps (of last night)' (42), τὸ βούλευμ' . . . τόδ' 'this design' (44), τολμαῖς ταῖσδε 'these bold plans' (46), τοῦδ' . . . πόνου 'this work' (61), τήνδε . . . νόσον 'the present madness' (66), etc.

Temporal (ἐ)κεῖνος refers to the remote past, or, less often, to the remote future. Thus Electra refers with κείνα . . . ἁμέρα 'that day long ago' (*El.* 201) to the day that her father was murdered. The expression ἐκείνην τὴν τελευταίαν . . ./ἡμέραν 'that final day' (*OT* 1528–1529) refers to the unknown day of the future death of human beings.

7. As I observed above (section 5), the strictly deictic use of (ἐ)κεῖνος is exceptional in literary texts. It is, in fact, mainly used to refer to something outside the situation of utterance. In this use the basic semantic feature 'over there' is converted into 'elsewhere, in another place' (local) and/or 'a considerable time ago' (temporal). Thus in drama it refers to what is not present on the stage. So Ajax refers to his father (πατήρ, *Aj.* 434) with κείνου 'that man far away' (437). Since the dead are in the underworld, they are usually referred to with (ἐ)κεῖνος, at least in interactive discourse. Thus Oedipus refers to Laius with ἐκεῖνον (*OT* 139), though he also uses τὸν τύραννον τοῦτον (*OT* 799: cf. section 2). Sophocles exploits this specific use of

[16] Kühner-Gerth (I: 641) wrongly state that ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ has the same meaning as τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ. In fact, the demonstrative of ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ functions only as an anaphoric pronoun, at least in Classical Greek.

(ἐ)κεῖνος in *Ant.* 566–567: After Ismene's rhetorical question 'How can I live alone without this girl on my side (τῆσδ' ἄτερ)?', Creon reacts saying ἀλλ' ἥδε μέντοι μὴ λέγ'· οὐ γὰρ ἔστ' ἔτι, 'But stop using the word ἥδε, for she is no more'.[17] Henceforth, instead of ἥδε, Ismene should use ἐκείνη.

Interestingly, in a number of instances a speaker uses ὅδε as well as οὗτος to refer to the same person, and the same happens with the combination of ὅδε and (ἐ)κεῖνος. Of ὅδε and οὗτος I first give an example from Herodotus, where metrical factors play no role: 1.115.2–3. Speaking to King Astyages and Artembares, the father of the boy beaten at his command, young Cyrus says: 'The boys of the village, one of them being this boy here (τῶν καὶ ὅδε ἦν), made me king in their play. . . . The other boys did what I told them to do, but that boy on your side was disobedient (οὗτος δὲ ἀνηκούστεε)'. The switch to οὗτος suggests the idea of 'your boy', 'that boy defended by you (against me)'. An anaphoric interpretation of οὗτος is not impossible, though in that case ὁ δέ would be more usual than οὗτος δέ.

As for ὅδε combined with (ἐ)κεῖνος, an example of this use may be found at *Ant.* 384: ἥδ' ἔστ' ἔκείνη τοὔργον ἡ 'ξειργασμένη, 'Here she is, that person guilty of the deed'. The pronoun ἐκείνη refers to the person guilty of covering Polynices' body with dust some time ago. Since no-one saw Antigone covering the body, the guilty person had to be traced. The pronoun ἐκείνη corresponds to the time when Antigone was not yet arrested. The pronoun ἥδ' refers to the present person: the identity of the wrongdoer, unknown in the past, is revealed at the moment of utterance. Another example of this type of 'present revelation' is ὅδ' ἐκεῖνος ἐγώ 'Here I am, that person whom you are tracing' (*OC* 138): Oedipus reveals himself as the man traced by the chorus, who did not yet know his identity. It is on this use that the colloquial expression τόδ' ἐκεῖνο 'here we have it' or τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο 'there you have it' is based. The expression is seldom found in tragedy, but often in comedy and in Plato's dialogues. Here τόδε or τοῦτο indicates the present manifestation of something that was predicted, suspected, sought or implied in the past (Kühner-Gerth I: 650).[18]

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[17] The nominative ἥδε—after Ismene's τῆσδε—represents the lexeme in question. Compare the use of the nominative as unmarked case for the lemmata in the lexicon.

[18] In such cases Moorhouse (153), following Bain (1913), is inclined to see the

Another example is *El.* 977–983. Speaking to Chrysothemis, Electra predicts that everybody will praise the two sisters, if they save their father's house by avenging murder. Everybody will say: ἴδεσθε τώδε τὼ κασιγνήτω, φίλοι, . . ., 'Behold these two sisters, my friends, who saved their father's house, . . .'. Having mentioned the deeds of the two sisters, the hypothetical speaker continues with τούτω φιλεῖν χρή, τώδε χρὴ πάντας σέβειν·/τώδ' ἐν θ' ἑορταῖς . . ./τιμᾶν ἅπαντας . . . χρεών, 'Those two women (just mentioned) one should love, these women all should revere, these women all should honour at festivals'. While τώδε is strictly deictic, τούτω, coming after the relative clause about their heroic deeds, is most likely anaphoric, although an addressee-oriented nuance may be present ('those women just mentioned and before your eyes, not just before mine (τώδε)').

Ph. 841 (Neoptolemus to the chorus): τοῦδε γὰρ ὁ στέφανος, τοῦτον θεὸς εἶπε κομίζειν, 'For it is to this man here that the crown belongs, it is he that the god told us to bring'. In this passage, Neoptolemus three times uses ὅδε referring to Philoctetes, who is sleeping on the stage (839, 840, 841). Then he switches to τοῦτον, which may be interpreted both as an addressee-oriented demonstrative ('the man before your eyes') and as a simple anaphoric pronoun ('he'; see section 5). The sentence introduced by τοῦτον might be replaced with a relative clause introduced by ὅν, but τοῦτον is stronger than ὅν.

Ph. 1434–1437 (Heracles, after speaking to Philoctetes, addresses Neoptolemus): οὔτε γὰρ σὺ τοῦδ' ἄπερ σθένεις/ἑλεῖν τὸ Τροίας πεδίον οὔθ' οὗτος σέθεν·/ἀλλ' ὡς λέοντε συννόμω φυλάσσετον/οὗτος σὲ καὶ σὺ τόνδ' 'For you cannot take the Trojan plain without this man here nor he without you; but like a couple of lions, guard you both each other, that man on your side you and you this man here'. At first Heracles refers to Philoctetes, who was the addressee in 1418–1433, with ὅδε 'this man before my eyes'. Then he chooses Neoptolemus' perspective, by switching to the addressee-oriented pronoun οὗτος 'that man on your side'. Having again used οὗτος, Heracles switches back to ὅδε: Heracles' next words are again spoken to Philoctetes.

influence of metre and *variatio*. But as I argued also above (section 2), it is wrong to suppose that a poet like Sophocles used less adequate expressions for metrical reasons.

‘YOU COULD HAVE THOUGHT’: PAST POTENTIALS IN SOPHOCLES?

Gerry Wakker

1. *Introduction*

(1) καίτοι πόθεν κλέος γ᾽ ἂν εὐκλεέστερον
κατέσχον ἢ τὸν αὐτάδελφον ἐν τάφῳ
τιθεῖσα; (S. *Ant.* 502–504)

and yet <I am right for> whence could I have won a nobler glory than by burying my brother?[1]

This sentence is often presented as an example of a past potential.[2] It may, however, be asked whether this is the most likely interpretation and on the basis of which criteria one can decide that this sentence is to be interpreted as a past potential rather than as a counterfactual. This question must be seen in a wider perspective.

It is widely held that Greek uses the secondary indicative plus ἄν to give expression not only to counterfactual utterances (English translation: ‘would’), but also to past potentials (i.e. possibilities in the past) of the type ‘you could have come’, ‘you could have thought’, etc. Sometimes, however, the existence of the past potential in Ancient Greek is doubted[3] or even denied.[4]

In my paper I want to reinvestigate this issue, and focus, more specifically, on the so-called past potentials in Sophocles. Grammars and commentaries mention (at least) twelve examples of past potentials in Sophocles.[5] I will closely examine these passages in connection

[1] Generally speaking, when no explicit reference is made to the source of my translations, the translations are mine. The text edition used is the edition in the Oxford Classical Texts Series of Lloyd-Jones & Wilson (1990a) unless otherwise stated.

[2] The example is explicitly interpreted as a past potential by Kühner-Gerth (I: 212); Schwyzer-Debrunner (II: 347); Moorhouse (1982: 215); and Kamerbeek *ad loc.* Jebb’s translation (‘whence could I have won’) suggests that he too interprets it as a past potential.

[3] Cf. Wakker (1994: 156–163); Rijksbaron *et al.* (2000: 88).

[4] Cf. Duhoux (2000: 202–203).

[5] *Aj.* 119–120, 430; *Ant.* 390, 502–504; *El.* 756, 1281; *OT* 523–524; *OC* 964–965; *Ph.* 572, 869, 1278; *Tr.* 707–708. Some of these examples are taken as past potential by all commentators and grammars, others only by some of them.

with the more general discussion about the existence of the past potential. In section 2 I will first focus on the difference between past counterfactuals and past potentials in general; in section 3 I will study the Sophoclean examples within this wider framework; in section 4, finally, I will present my conclusions.

2. *Past counterfactuals and past potentials*

2a. *State of research concerning Ancient Greek*

It is commonly argued[6] that in post-Homeric Greek the secondary indicative + ἄν may be used to express a past possibility, where ἄν indicates 'under some circumstances', e.g. ἐποίησεν ἄν 'he could have done'. This expression is said to have one of the following three nuances, depending on the context:[7]

(i) purely potential, expressing what might have happened (without implying either that it did or did not);
(ii) counterfactual, expressing what might have happened, but did not. McKay (1981) characterizes this type as an 'excluded potential';
(iii) iterative, expressing what might have happened and if it did, happened more than once.[8]

The third interpretation is found in past descriptive contexts only, i.e. in contexts in which a description of customs and habits belonging to the past is presented. It is, therefore, rather easy to see when this interpretation holds. However, it seems difficult (if not impossible) to define in which (past) contexts the first and in which the second interpretation applies (see for this question in English also section 2b). All that is usually said is that the first interpretation applies

[6] Gildersleeve (1900–1911: 170); Goodwin (1889: 81–86); Humbert (1960: 112–113, 224); Kühner-Gerth (I: 212–214; II: 477–478); McKay (1981: 42); Moorhouse (1982: 215–216); Schwyzer-Debrunner (II: 346–348); Stahl (1907: 354–355).

[7] Cf. esp. Moorhouse (1982: 215–216); and also McKay (1981).

[8] Iterativity means "that a series of events or processes is represented as a tendency, the sort of thing that could happen as much as what actually did happen" (McKay 1981: 41). This implies that at any past moment the State of Affairs in question does not necessarily obtain, but possibly obtains, since it has repeatedly obtained, and will repeatedly obtain. This last part of the implication is in fact a prediction, belonging to the 'possible world'. In this way the past-iterative use of the secondary indicative + ἄν may be connected with the past potential: at some past moment one could expect that the SoA in question would once again obtain (iterative interpretation) vs. would obtain (potential interpretation).

mainly in fixed expressions such as ἔγνω τις ἄν ('one could/might have realized') or εἶδες ἄν ('you could/might have seen'). These expressions contain 'many a person' or 'you' (in the sense of 'one') as subject and have a verb meaning 'observe, think, say'. Of most of these examples one could, however, maintain perfectly well that they are counterfactuals. One may wonder whether the interpretation as a past potential is not, incorrectly, influenced by the translation 'could', which seems due rather to the lack of an explicit (counterfactual) *if*-clause than to an inherent potential value of the main clause.

(2) δεινὰς δ' ἂν εἶδες πυρρίχας (E. *Andr.* 1135)

you could/would have seen strange contortions

(3) ἐπέγνως δ' ἄν (X. *Cyr.* 8.1.33)

you could/would have witnessed

(4) ἔνθα δὴ ἔγνω ἄν τις ὅσου ἄξιον εἴη . . . (X. *Cyr.* 7.1.38)

there anyone would have learned how much it is worth that . . .

These examples are all of the same type 'I tell you that you (or: one) certainly would have thought/seen *x*', and they all evoke the same implication: 'if you had yourself been present at that moment and at that place'. While, in principle, the 'you' in these examples may be interpreted as the interlocutor (a counterfactual interpretation is then the only possibility, if—as is usually the case—the interlocutor is known not to have been present), it may perfectly well be interpreted, in a vaguer sense, as referring to the reader/spectators; thus, it may in some cases be said to be practically equivalent to 'one' (τις).[9] Of course, the you/one, being the reader/spectators,[10] is known not to have been present when the SoA in question occurred, but the effect of such expressions is to turn him temporarily into an eyewitness, thus involving him more directly into the story and suggesting him how to react emotionally to what is told.[11]

[9] Of course, in (2), being part of the messenger-speech in which the messenger tells Peleus the events leading to the death of his grandson Neoptolemus, the messenger does not (or at least not directly) address the spectators, whereas the second person in (3), occurring in a narrative passage, does directly address the reader.

[10] In τις-passages the link τις-reader/spectator is only indirect, the τις being an anonymous spectator (eyewitness), who comments upon the actual situation of the scene in the story and with whom the reader/spectator is invited to identify and to share his feelings, cf. Ruijgh (1992: 81).

[11] Cf. De Jong (1987: 54–60; 1991: 105). An example of the combination of a

Often, as I said above, examples like (2)–(4) are interpreted as past potentials. However, in most of the situations in question it is self-evident that the you/one was *not* present. A counterfactual interpretation seems, consequently, quite natural. Even, then, in those cases where at first sight an interpretation of the expression as a past potential may seem obvious and in which most commentaries and grammars suggest this interpretation, it is not as simple as that. An alternative interpretation is possible.

Before turning to the Sophoclean examples let us, by way of comparison, briefly turn to English, a language with a system of modal expressions that is at least as complicated as in Greek and in which a past potential seems to exist (be it as a marginal phenomenon). Perhaps this comparison can teach us something about the contexts in which a past potential may be used.

2b. *A comparison with the English past potential*[12]

Let us first look at some English examples. In the grammar of Quirk *et al.* (1985: 233) we find the following sentences:

(5) They might have become champions.
(6) We could have borrowed the money.

Such sentences have a past hypothetical meaning, and may thus be considered 'past potentials', expressing that at some time in the past the possibility existed that they would become champions (5) or that we would borrow the money (6).[13] It is not explicitly indicated whether this possibility was or was not realized. The question as to the realization of the possibility simply does not arise. Semantically, then, a past potential expresses the existence in the past of a real possibility. Pragmatically, however, in most contexts it is suggested that this possibility has not been realized.[14] It is precisely the latter sugges-

potential main clause and a counterfactual *if*-clause is found at E. *Supp.* 764 φαίης ἄν, εἰ παρῆσθ᾽ ὅτ᾽ . . . ('You might have said so, if you had been present when . . .'), for which see Wakker (1994: 164–165).

[12] See also Wakker (1994: 156–163).

[13] My paraphrase is based on Van Pottelbergh (1939: 25). Quirk *et al.* (1985: 233) give a slightly different paraphrase; (5) is said to be equivalent to 'it is possible that they would have become champions', (6) to 'it would have been possible for us to borrow the money'. Quirk *et al.* seem to have already incorporated the usually implied counterfactual interpretation into their paraphrase.

[14] Cf. Quirk *et al.* (1985: 233) concerning (2): 'usually with the implication '. . . but we didn't'.

tion (which is not an aspect of meaning but an invited inference)[15] which brings a past potential close to a counterfactual, and perhaps not surprisingly so. Normally speaking, past SoA's are *qualitate qua* observable,[16] hence facts (or non-facts, if negated). Thus, unless it is explicitly indicated that the speaker is not acquainted with the past course of events, stating that there was in the past a possibility is, from a pragmatic point of view, more likely to imply that the possibility has not been realized than that it has been realized, for in the latter case one would preferably not say 'it was possible for *p* to occur/happen', but rather '*p* occurred/happened'.

Mutatis mutandis the same holds when a conditional clause is added:

(7) If United could have won that game, they might have become league champions. (Quirk *et al.* 1985: 232)

Quirk *et al.* rightly observe that (7) usually has a counterfactual interpretation, and implies that United did not win the game. That such examples are usually interpreted in a counterfactual way may be explained as follows. The realization of a past SoA is made dependent on a *past* conditional, which is most likely interpreted as implying that the condition has not been realized. Indeed, as noted above, past SoAs are usually *qualitate qua* facts. Facts cannot be the subject of a hypothesis. Thus, unless it is explicitly indicated that the speaker is not acquainted with or has his doubts about the past course of events,[17] a hypothesis concerning the past is interpreted as a hypothesis concerning a SoA of which one knows that it has not been realized (counterfactual). In other words, the fact that a past condition is used is normally interpreted as implying that it is a counterfactual condition, for otherwise it would not have been mentioned as a condition: rather, a temporal ('when United had won that game') or causal clause ('since United had won that game') would have been used.[18]

Example (7) may only be interpreted as a past potential if it is clearly indicated that the speaker does not know whether or not the SoA in the *if*-clause (and hence also that mentioned in the main clause) has been realized, e.g.:

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[15] I.e. an inference that the addressee is as it were invited to infer from contextual and/or situational information. See Geiss & Zwicky (1971).

[16] Cf. Lyons (1977: 444–445).

[17] As in so called neutral conditions with an indeterminate reading, such as 'I don't know anything about that game, but *if United won that game*, they might have become league champions'.

[18] Cf. Goodwin (1889: 83–84); Van Pottelbergh (1939: 24–25).

(8) I don't know anything about that game. But if United could have won it, they might have become league champions/they would perhaps have become league champions.[19]

Such contexts, however, seem rare and rather marked.

All in all, then, we may draw two conclusions:

(i) semantically speaking, in English the category 'past potential' does exist, both in independent clauses and, be it as a marginal phenomenon, in conditional periods;
(ii) pragmatically speaking, the difference between a past counterfactual and a past potential is slight, because usually the contexts suggest that the SoA involved has not been realized. An unequivocal past potential interpretation seems likely only if the speaker appears not to be acquainted with the past course of events.

If we look now at the grammars of Ancient Greek, we find that the same expression (secondary indicative with ἄν) is said to be used for both past potential and past counterfactual, and that it will therefore be very hard to prove the existence or non-existence of an unequivocal past potential. Let us now, with the above observations in mind, study in detail the Sophoclean examples of past potentials in their contexts, to see whether arguments can be found in favour of the interpretation as past potentials or against it.

3. *The Sophoclean examples*

In total I have studied 81 examples in Sophoclean tragedies where a secondary indicative is combined with ἄν, and three examples[20] of an infinitive with ἄν in which we can plausibly interpret the infinitive as a representative in indirect discourse of a secondary indicative in direct discourse. Most of these examples can be interpreted in a straightforward way.[21] This holds for all cases presented in sections 3.1–3.2.2.

[19] It is perhaps more natural in such a situation to use a neutral condition with an indeterminate reading, as illustrated in note 17.

[20] *El.* 312–313, 756; *OT* 1227–1228.

[21] I have included in my examples τῆς σῆς δ' οὐκ ἐρῶ τιμῆς λαχεῖν,/οὐδ' ἂν σύ, σώφρων γ' οὖσα. Νῦν δ' ἐξὸν πατρὸς/πάντων ἀρίστου παῖδα κεκλῆσθαι, καλοῦ/τῆς

3.1. *Iterative ἄν + secondary indicative*

All six examples[22] occur in a past descriptive context, i.e. in a context in which customs or habits belonging to the past are described, such as in (9):

(9) . . . Θερσίτης τις ἦν,
ὃς οὐκ ἂν εἵλετ' εἰσάπαξ εἰπεῖν, ὅπου
μηδεὶς ἐῴη· (*Ph.* 442–444)

There was one Thersites, who never chose to speak once, where no one would allow him to speak

The context is clearly descriptive, Thersites being characterized by his usual habits. The iterative optative ἐῴη helps to interpret ἂν εἵλετ' as an expression of iterativity.[23] The aorist εἵλετ' is used to mark the making of the choice; an imperfect would express the sentiment of preference, see Jebb *ad loc.*

An example of an imperfect with iterative ἂν may be seen in:

(10) εἴ τ' ἔδει τι καὶ ποτὸν λαβεῖν,
. . .,/ξύλον τι θραῦσαι, ταῦτ' ἂν ἐξέρπων τάλας
ἐμηχανώμην (*Ph.* 292–295)

and if water had to be fetched, or if a bit of fire-wood had to be broken, I would creep forth, poor wretch, and manage it

In this passage Philoctetes tells about his daily struggle for life after he had been left alone.

μητρός (*El.* 364–367, 'I do not long for your privilege, nor would you, if you were wise. But as it is, whereas it is possible to be called daughter of the noblest father among all, be called the child of your mother'). This example is exceptional in that the verb is omitted and one may wonder with Jebb whether an optative ἐρῴης or an imperfect ἤρας is to be understood. Given the following νῦν δ' and the totally opposite way of acting of the sisters I prefer a counterfactual interpretation (a potential would leave open the possibility that Chrysothemis would indeed change her way of acting, which does not seem likely).

[22] *Aj.* 1144–1145; *Ph.* 290–292, 294–295, 295, 443, 701–702.

[23] Kamerbeek (*ad loc.*) considers the iterative interpretation preferable but thinks a past potential interpretation would also be possible. I do not see, however, how the ὅπου-clause must be interpreted if ἂν εἵλετ' would be a past potential and would refer to only one possible occasion in the past.

3.2. *Past counterfactual*

From a rhetorical-argumentative point of view two main types of counterfactuals may be distinguished, dependent on the kind of implication evoked by the counterfactual period.[24]

3.2.1. *Contrast with a factual SoA*

Roughly, one can say that if the SoA of an *if*-clause is in contrast with a factual SoA,[25] it is minimally the *if*-clause that gets a counterfactual reading. From a semantic point of view, the counterfactuality of the main clause follows only if the protasis expresses a necessary condition, as in 'if the moon had entered the earth's shadow, she would have been eclipsed' (example from Goodwin 1889: 149). In ordinary language usage, however, denial of the apodosis usually follows as an invited inference, as in 'If I had said this, he would have been persuaded' (cf. Goodwin 1889: 149). This 'generally implies not merely that *I did not say this*, but also that *he was not persuaded*'.[26] This may be explained by the Gricean maxim of quantity 'be as informative as required', according to which conditional *if*-clauses are usually interpreted as necessary conditions for the realization of the SoA's designated by the main clause.

3.2.1.1. Subtype a

One subgroup of such contrastive counterfactuals in Sophocles (27 examples)[27] appears to resume—in a counterfactual way—a factual situation that is implied or explicitly given in the preceding context. The reasoning may be schematized as follows: 'if *p* had been, *q* would have been'; not-*p* is presupposed, hence it is implied: not-*q*, cf. (11), where the whole reasoning is made explicit, the following νῦν δέ-clause sketching the real situation.

(11) (Oedipus' reaction to Jocasta's advice that he need not be afraid of a marriage with his mother:)

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[24] Cf. Wakker (1994: 150–154).

[25] The factual SoA may precede or follow the conditional period, or it may be implicitly referred to.

[26] Cf. Karttunen (1971: 566–569).

[27] *Aj.* 82, 534, 1229–1230; *Ant.* 755, 905–907, 909–910; *El.* 312–313, 439–441, 556–557, 1021–1022, 1319–1321 (twice), 1507; *OT* 318, 348–349, 402–403, 432, 434, 591, 691–692, 984–985, 1354–1355, 1357–1359, 1371–1372; *Ph.* 412–413, 1218–1220; *Tr.* 896–897.

καλῶς ἅπαντα ταῦτ' ἂν ἐξείρητό σοι,
εἰ μὴ 'κύρει ζῶσ' ἡ τεκοῦσα· νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ
ζῇ πᾶσ' ἀνάγκη, κεἰ καλῶς λέγεις, ὀκνεῖν. (*OT* 984–986)[28]

All that would have been said well by you, if my mother was not alive. But as it is, since she is alive, I must necessarily be afraid, even if you speak well.

Often the reasoning is not wholly spelled out, as in (12).

(12) (the last words of Oedipus' angry rhesis to Tiresias:)
εἰ δὲ μὴ 'δόκεις γέρων
εἶναι, παθὼν ἔγνως ἂν οἷά περ φρονεῖς. (*OT* 402–403)

If you did not seem to be an old man, you would have learned by suffering how bold you are.

Here, of course, though by 'δόκεις it is not presented as such, it is a well-known and observable fact that Tiresias is indeed a γέρων. The conditional clause may also be replaced by, for instance, a participle (*Aj.* 82, 1229–1230; *OT* 1354–1355, 1371–1372; *Ph.* 412–413), an adjective (*El.* 1319–1320), γάρ 'for else' (*El.* 1507; *OT* 318) or a wish (*El.* 1021–1022).

3.2.1.2. Subtype b

Another subgroup of contrastive counterfactuals[29] does not react to a factual situation in the preceding context, but rather to one that follows[30] (often introduced by νῦν δέ 'but in reality' and the like, or it is left implicit); this factual situation may contrast with either the SoA of the *if*-clause, of the main clause, or with the SoA's of both clauses. Sometimes the *if*-clause is replaced by a participle (*El.* 365;

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[28] Cf. *Aj.* 1229–1230, where the factual situation is presented in the ὅτε-clause that follows in 1231.

[29] There are 23 examples: *Aj.* 45, 442–444, 447–449, 1057–1060; *Ant.* 466–469; *El.* 365, 373–375, 394, 604–605, 992–994, 1331–1333; *OC* 270–273, 904–906, 924–927, 951–952, 1365–1366; *OT* 117, 261–262, 1386–1387, 1438–1439, 1511–1512; *Ph.* 947–948; *Tr.* 86–87.

[30] It is not always clear whether an example belongs to subtype a or b. The decision depends on the question whether the information in the *if*-clause is implied in the preceding context or not. This cannot always be proven. There are, then, borderline cases. Thus I have assigned (11) to subtype a, since it has been taken for granted in the preceding context that Oedipus' mother is still alive, but *El.* 1331–1333 to subtype b, since it has not been said or implied before that the paedagogus was watching at the door.

OT 117; *Ph.* 947–948). Two examples may suffice to illustrate this group. In (13) οὐδὲν εἰδὼς contrasts with φρονῶν in the *if*-clause:

(13) . . . καίτοι πῶς ἐγὼ κακὸς φύσιν,
ὅστις παθὼν μὲν ἀντέδρων, ὥστ᾽ εἰ φρονῶν
ἔπρασσον, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὧδ᾽ ἐγιγνόμην κακός;
νῦν δ᾽ οὐδὲν εἰδὼς ἱκόμην ἵν᾽ ἱκόμην. (*OC* 270–273)

And yet how evil I was in nature, I who was but requiting a wrong, so that if I had been acting with knowledge, even then I could not be accounted wicked. But, as it was, all unknowing I went whither I went.

In example (14) it is the main SoA *q* which is explicitly contrasted with a factual situation: ὥσπερ οὐχὶ σῴζεται. Here we are invited to conclude that *p*, the SoA of the *if*-clause, is not true either.

(14) καὶ πρίν γε φωνεῖν, ὦ γυναῖκες, εἰ φρενῶν
ἐτύγχαν᾽ αὕτη μὴ κακῶν, ἐσῴζετ᾽ ἂν
τὴν εὐλάβειαν, ὥσπερ οὐχὶ σῴζεται. (*El.* 992–994)

Women, before she spoke, if she hadn't had evil thoughts, she would have remembered caution, as she does not.

As we have seen, in some of the examples above the conditional clause has been replaced by other, less explicit expressions or has been left implicit, if it could be easily understood on the basis of the context.

3.2.1.3. Subtype c

A special subcategory is formed by counterfactual expressions of wishing, etc., 'I would wish/like' (usually with imperfect and ἄν), 'I would have wished/liked' (usually with aorist and ἄν), where a general condition 'if it were/had been possible' can be supplied, cf. with imperfect:

(15) (Neoptolemus: 'Must I repeat the same words twice and thrice?')
Odysseus: ἀρχὴν κλύειν ἂν οὐδ᾽ ἅπαξ ἐβουλόμην. (*Ph.* 1239)[31]

I would wish not to hear them at all.

An example with an aorist is (16):

(16) οἴμοι, δύ᾽ αὖ τώδ᾽ ἄνδρ᾽ ἔλεξας, οἶν ἐγὼ
ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν ἠθέλησ᾽ ὀλωλότοιν κλύειν. (*Ph.* 426–427)[32]

[31] Cf. *Aj.* 88.
[32] Cf. *Aj.* 411; *OT* 1348; *Tr.* 734.

Ah me, again you have named two men here [sc. Ajax and Antilochus], of whose death I would least have wished to hear.

3.2.2. *A special argumentative type of counterfactual*

The second main type of counterfactuals[33] resumes, just like subtype a above (see section 3.2.1.1), a proposition *p*, but this type serves to establish the truth of *p*, rather than that of *q* (cf. also ex. (14) above). We are dealing with a special argumentative type: I/people say *p*. If not *p*, *q*. *Q* is evidently not true, so *p* is true. I give two telling examples, one with a fully developed conditional period, the other with an implicit condition:

(17) πῶς οὖν ὁ λῃστής, εἴ τι μὴ ξὺν ἀργύρῳ
ἐπράσσετ' ἐνθένδ', ἐς τόδ' ἂν τόλμης ἔβη; (*OT* 124–125)

How then the robber would have come to such a recklessness, if some intrigue, aided by money, had not been working from here?

Oedipus wants to argue that some intrigue must have been working from Thebes (*p*). The rhetorical question implies that the robber would not have been so reckless without this intrigue. The implicit argumentation here is as follows: <I argue: there must have been working some intrigue, aided by money, from Thebes (*p*)>. If not (if not *p*), he would not have been so reckless (*q*). <He was reckless (not *q*), so there was some intrigue, aided by money, from here (*p*)>.

(18) (Oedipus: I hope that Creon will come with good news. Priest: I think he does.)
οὐ γὰρ ἂν κάρα
πολυστεφὴς ὧδ' εἷρπε παγκάρπου δάφνης. (*OT* 82–83)

for otherwise—i.e. if he had not had good news—he would not come crowned thus thickly with laurel covered with berries.

3.3. *Past potential?*

Let us now study the twelve examples which at least one commentary or grammar interprets as a past potential and see whether there are arguments to defend or to reject this interpretation. I would like to claim that in most of these cases a counterfactual interpretation is the most obvious choice. These examples can easily be assigned to one of the counterfactual subtypes presented above.

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[33] There are ten examples: *Aj.* 950; *OC* 98–99, 125–127, 146–148; *OT* 82–83, 124–125, 220–221, 572–573, 1456–1457; *Ph.* 1037–1039.

3.3.1. *Expressions of a wish*
First, there are four examples which are rather similar to subtype c (see section 3.2.1.3) above, cf.:

(19) ἀλλ' ἤθελον μὲν ἄν σε πεισθῆναι λόγοις/ἐμοῖσιν. (*Ph.* 1278–1279)

but I would wish that you were persuaded by my words.

It is not wholly clear how this example is interpreted by Jebb. His translation is 'I could have wished', which suggests that he takes it as a past potential, but in his commentary he refers to *Ph.* 1239 (= (15)), where he translates 'I should have wished'. Kamerbeek *ad loc.* (following Goodwin 1889: sections 246, 426) takes this example, without any further explanation, as a past potential ('I could have wished'), but in my view it rather resembles (15)–(16) and is, therefore, a counterfactual, the conditional ('if it were possible') having been left implicit, as may also be inferred from the next words: εἰ δὲ μή τι πρὸς καιρὸν λέγων κυρῶ, πέπαυμαι ('but if I speak not at the right moment, I have done') and by Philoctetes' answer: πάντα γὰρ φράσεις μάτην ('right, for you will speak all in vain').

Although having a different verb, (20) may also be discussed in this connection:

(20) σχολῇ ποθ' ἥξειν δεῦρ' ἂν ἐξηύχουν ἐγώ. (*Ant.* 390)

I could/would have vowed that I should not soon be here again.

This example also resembles the examples (15)–(16). Here, too, a rather general condition may be easily understood (εἰ ἠρώτα τις), as Jebb *ad loc.* rightly suggests.[34] Kamerbeek *ad loc.* is not explicit about the interpretation he prefers. He offers two ways of interpretation: either to take ἄν with ἐξηύχουν as a past potential (without further arguments) or to take ἥξειν ἄν together. The other examples adduced by him of a future infinitive with ἄν are dubious, however, and I would therefore prefer to take ἂν ἐξηύχουν together (also on the basis of the word order) as a counterfactual, as in the examples in section 3.2.1.3. For two other examples considered by Kamerbeek as past potentials the same seems to hold true. Both *El.* 1281 (οὐδ' ἄν

[34] In fact the man had already asserted that he would not return (329), but, of course, the circumstances having changed, he can have another perspective now. It is not necessary to see this as a contradiction, as Kamerbeek *ad loc.* thinks. Cf. also Brown *ad loc.*

ἤλπισ' 'I would not have expected') and *Ph.* 869 (οὐ . . . ἂν ἐξηύχυσ' ἐγώ' 'I would not have boasted') are similar to (16) and may, therefore, be considered counterfactuals.

3.3.2. *Rhetorical questions*

Next there is a group of rhetorical questions (four examples), to which (1) belongs, which may now be reconsidered:

(1) καίτοι πόθεν κλέος γ' ἂν εὐκλεέστερον
κατέσχον ἢ τὸν αὐτάδελφον ἐν τάφῳ
τιθεῖσα; (S. *Ant.* 502–504)

and yet <I am right for> whence would I have won a nobler glory than by burying my brother?

Kühner-Gerth (I: 212) remark that the nuance of possibility results from the fact that the SoA is presented as having been realized under certain circumstances (ἄν), and that in the context involved the actual occurrence of these circumstances is left out of consideration. I wonder, however, if this (rather clumsy) interpretation is needed. I prefer a counterfactual interpretation belonging to subtype a (cf. section 3.2.1.1), the *if*-clause being suggested by the participle ('than by burying my brother' being more or less equivalent to 'if I had not buried my brother'). The question is best interpreted as a rhetorical question. Antigone means to say that she would *nowhere* (i.e. not by doing anything else) have won a more honourable glory. It would be rhetorically less effective if by the use of a past potential she would leave open the possibility that she could have won a more honourable glory somewhere else. A comparable argumentation holds for the rhetorical question in (21).

(21) τούτου τίς ἂν σοι τἀνδρὸς ἢ προνούστερος
ἢ δρᾶν ἀμείνων ηὑρέθη τὰ καίρια; (*Aj.* 118–119)[35]

Who would have been found more prudent or better in acting in season than that man?

Of course, Athena does not want to leave open the possibility that such a man could have been found. A counterfactual interpretation, explicitly excluding this possibility, seems rhetorically more effective.

Compare also:

[35] This example is considered a past potential by Jebb *ad loc.* and by Moorhouse (1982: 215–216).

(22) αἰαῖ· τίς ἄν ποτ' ᾤεθ' ὧδ' ἐπώνυμον
τοὐμὸν ξυνοίσειν ὄνομα τοῖς ἐμοῖς κακοῖς; (*Aj.* 430–431)[36]

Ah, who would ever have thought that my name would agree so meetly with my troubles?

Once again, a rhetorical question is used to express a strongly assertive 'no one would have thought'. A general condition such as 'if he was asked', 'if he was here', can be supplied. A past potential, leaving open the possibility that someone could have had that opinion, seems rhetorically less effective.

(23) πόθεν γὰρ ἄν ποτ', ἀντὶ τοῦ θνῄσκων ὁ θὴρ
ἐμοὶ παρέσχ' εὔνοιαν, ἧς ἔθνῃσχ' ὕπερ;
οὐκ ἔστιν· (*Tr.* 707–709)[37]

From what motive and in gratitude for what the beast in his death-throes would have shown sympathy for me, on account of whom he was dying? That is impossible.

In this case (in contrast to his comments on (1), (21)–(22)) Jebb *ad loc.* suggests it is a counterfactual, rightly so, in my opinion; just as in those three cases, this example may be interpreted as a counterfactual rhetorical question, which is equivalent to a strong assertion: the beast never showed any sympathy.

3.3.3. *Miscellaneous cases*

The following example may be compared with (2)–(4) and is possibly counterfactual:

(24) . . . ὥστε μηδένα
γνῶναι φίλων ἰδόντ' ἂν ἄθλιον δέμας. (*El.* 755–756)
so that no friend who saw it would have known the hapless corpse.

(24) is part of the false story of Orestes' death in the Delphian horse-races that the paedagogus tells to Clytaemnestra. A counterfactual interpretation seems plausible (at least for the spectators) since the friends are known not to have been present at the accident, the accident not having taken place at all; ἰδόντ' may be taken as equivalent to εἰ εἶδεν.

[36] This example is considered a past potential by Gildersleeve (1900–1911: 430); Jebb *ad loc.*; Kamerbeek *ad loc.*; Kühner-Gerth (I: 213); and Moorhouse (1982: 215–216).

[37] This example is mentioned by Stahl (1907: 354) as an example of a past potential.

Another passage, (25), may be interpreted in the same way and may be taken as a representative of the counterfactual subtype a (cf. section 3.2.1.1):

(25) . . . μᾶλλον δ', εἰ παροῦσα πλησία
ἔλευσσες οἷ' ἔδρασε, κάρτ' ἂν ᾤκτισας. (*Tr.* 896–897)

and if you had seen as an eyewitness what she did, verily your pity would have been much deeper.

The nurse, as eyewitness, is addressing the (leader of the) chorus here, who is known not to have been present at the events leading to Deianira's death.

Finally, there are three examples where both text and interpretation pose difficulties ((26)–(28)):

(26) ἀλλ' ἦλθε μὲν δὴ τοῦτο τοὔνειδος τάχ' ἂν [δ'][38]
ὀργῇ βιασθὲν μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ φρενῶν. (*OT* 523–524)

but verily this reproach has come perhaps under the pressure of anger rather than from the purpose of the heart.

Some scholars[39] mention the possibility of taking ἦλθε and τάχ' ἄν together as a past potential 'but this reproach might perhaps have come under the pressure of anger'. This interpretation, however, is problematic because the reproach has actually been made, hence the truth of ἦλθε τοὔνειδος is presupposed. Others[40] argue that ἄν belongs to βιασθέν, the combination having a potential value ('this reproach that may have come under the pressure of anger'). Although this is a possible interpretation,[41] I wonder whether it is not easier to regard τάχ' ἄν (which is often used together in combination with a potential optative) as a fixed expression, equivalent to τάχα alone 'perhaps'. Once τάχ' ἄν was seen as a fixed expression it could also be used with other verb forms than the potential optative, even forms where ἄν is not normally found.[42]

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[38] *P.Oxy.* 2180, coni. M Schmidt: om. codd. In the interpretation suggested by me the insertion of δέ is not needed. I therefore propose to follow the manuscripts.
[39] Goodwin (1889: 82); Jebb *ad loc.*, Kamerbeek *ad loc.*
[40] Kühner-Gerth (I: 213); Moorhouse (1982: 215–216).
[41] For more examples of ἄν with a participle with potential value, see Kühner-Gerth (I: 242–243).
[42] Cf. τάχ' ἄν on its own right in an answer (after a question with δεῖ), Pl. *Sph.* 255c11.

This might also be the solution for the next example:

(27) . . . θεοῖς γὰρ ἦν οὕτω φίλον,
τάχ’ ἄν τι μηνίουσιν ἐς γένος πάλαι (*OC* 964–965)

for thus was it to the liking of the gods, perhaps because they bear anger against my family from time of old

The text of my final example is much disputed:

(28) πρὸς ποῖον αὖ τόνδ’ αὐτὸς Οὐδυσσεὺς ἔπλει; (*Ph.* 572)

Who now was this other person to whom Odysseus himself was sailing?

αὖ Dobree; ἄν codd.; οὖν Dissen

Scholars suggest three possible solutions (mentioned all three by Jebb, who chooses the third one, and by Kamerbeek *ad loc.*, who cannot choose). In my opinion, the third one is the most simple and the least problematic.

(i) Goodwin (1889: 82) and Moorhouse (1982: 215–216) retain ἄν. Moorhouse, following Schneidewin, observes ‘Neoptolemus is sceptical about the story, hence he does not state ἔπλει as a fact’: ‘Who was this man to whom Odysseus himself might have been sailing?’ However, there is no sign of skepticism on Neoptolemus’ part here (as there was in 345). On the contrary, he knows that the ‘merchant’ is seen by his accomplice Odysseus, and he is supposed to back up the latter’s false story, which is aimed at deceiving Philoctetes (cf. Odysseus’ instruction in 130–131: ‘He, of course, child, will tell a crafty tale: accept what is serviceable at the moment in his story’).

(ii) ἄν should be linked with ποῖον τόνδε sc. ὄντα = ποῖος ὅδε ἄν εἴη (following a suggestion by Campbell). Although this seems possible (cf. Kühner-Gerth I: 213–214), it is a rather difficult interpretation (ἄν being connected with a missing participle).

(iii) αὖ is read (instead of ἄν); αὖ occurs more often in questions expressing a nuance of impatience (cf. LSJ *s.v.*) (cf. *Ant.* 7 and cf. Jebb *ad loc.*): ‘Who was this other person to whom Odysseus himself was sailing?’

4. *Conclusions*

Twelve possible instances in Sophocles of the so-called past potential have been studied and contrasted with counterfactuals. My conclusion is that none of these examples need be taken as a past potential. Most examples appear to be normal counterfactuals, others have other possibilities of interpretation. What all these dubious examples have in common is the fact that they have no explicit *if*-clauses. Perhaps the fact that in such cases modern languages generally tend to translate the main verb with 'could' has furthered, without any other compelling reason, the interpretation as a past potential. All in all, if one generalizes the above observations (see also section 2) one may ask whether from a synchronic point of view, it is necessary to assume that apart from expressing a counterfactual (or, in descriptive contexts, an iterative) value, the secondary indicative + ἄν may also have a potential value. To be sure, from a diachronic point of view, the existence of a separate category of 'past potential' is useful to explain the origin of both counterfactual and past-iterative interpretations[43] of the secondary indicative with ἄν, but from a synchronic point of view, all instances of the secondary indicative with ἄν (apart from those in past descriptions) can in principle be explained as counterfactuals. There seem to be no (or hardly any) examples[44] that must be explained as past potentials.

[43] There seem to be transitional cases between the various interpretations: a past-iterative ἄν in a clearly descriptive passage may sometimes also be interpreted as a past potential or counterfactual. Two examples to illustrate this: X. *HG* 3.4.18 ἐπερρώσθη δ᾽ ἄν τις ἐκεῖνο ἰδών ('one recovered strength when seeing that'—iterative, or: 'one might/could have recovered strength having seen that'—potential, or: 'one would have recovered strength'—counterfactual); Ar. *Ra.* 1022 ὁ θεασάμενος πᾶς ἄν τις ἀνὴρ ἠράσθη δάιος εἶναι ('every man who had seen that desired/might have desired/would have desired to be a fighting man'). Cf. McKay (1981: 42); Stahl (1907: 354–355).

[44] Even in a complicated case like Lys. 1.27, in which at first sight a potential interpretation seems most likely, a counterfactual interpretation is not excluded either for πῶς γὰρ ἄν (sc. κατέφυγε) or for ᾧ τοὺς εἰσελθόντας ἂν ἠμύνατο. The reasoning is as follows: Eratosthenes had no weapons. If he had had arms, he would have defended himself against the people who came in, and he would perhaps afterwards have taken refuge to the hearth. Also Pl. *Ap.* 18c6, presented as a past potential by Burnet *ad loc.*, can be interpreted in a different way; I would categorize it as an idiomatic expression such as 'you might have said', cf. (2)–(4) above: ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε ('speaking to you at that age in which you would/could have most believed it'). I suppose that by ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ a general supposition is triggered of the type 'one might have believed', but

My conclusion is, therefore, that there are no compelling reasons to assume the existence of a past potential in Sophocles (nor, probably, in classical Greek in general).[45]

that the general 'one' has been replaced by 'you' (sc. the members of the jury), because of the insertion of προς ὑμᾶς just before. As argued above in the discussion of examples (2)–(4), it is not clear whether such idiomatic expressions are past potentials or counterfactuals. Alternatively, it can it be interpreted in an iterative way, as Ruijgh suggested to me (personal communication). In any case, a past potential interpretation is not the only solution.

[45] My thanks are due, first, to the editors of this book and to Stéphanie Bakker and Stefan Radt for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper, and, second, to Monique Swennenhuis, who swiftly and expertly corrected my English.

PART THREE

PRAGMATICS

TROPE AND SETTING IN SOPHOCLES' *ELECTRA*

Francis Dunn

Since contributors to this volume will undoubtedly explore the theme of 'Sophocles and the Greek Language' from their individual perspectives, I would like first to reflect on my own view of the playwright's language. In general terms, the critic's task is to move from an appreciation of Sophocles' language to an explanation of its effectiveness. In my experience, an important part of this task involves reading the ancient playwright's language at its most literal level in order to take apart its tropes; only then can the critic hope to demonstrate what makes it distinctive or suggestive. For example, it does not help one much in explaining the opening line of *Antigone* to note that Ἰσμήνης κάρα, literally 'head of Ismene', means the same as Ἰσμήνη; rather, the particular task of the critic here is to remark on the fact that Antigone does *not* call her sister 'Ismene' and to explain why she uses this phrase instead. In commenting on this line, Griffith (1999) describes the expression as 'elevated (and untranslatable) tragic periphrasis'; this amounts to saying that Ἰσμήνης κάρα means the same as Ἰσμήνη in more elevated language, without telling us why elevated language is required here. Jebb is a bit more helpful, informing us that 'the periphrasis (as with κεφαλή) usu. implies respect, affection, or both', although he neglects to tell us just how the periphrasis achieves this effect. However, by being attentive to the very strangeness of this expression, and to the difference between its literal and figurative meanings, one will actually be better prepared as a critic to explain it.

So far I have outlined the critic's task in empirical terms, namely to show how one aspect of language (the figurative) is constituted by its opposite (the literal), but this same task can be understood in theoretical terms as a constructive counterpart to deconstruction. One of the most sensitive readers of rhetorical tropes is former Yale deconstructionist Paul de Man, who dismantles these by calling into question the gap between their literal and figurative meanings. For example, in *Allegories of Reading* (1979: 11–12) he considers W.B. Yeats' poem, 'Among School Children', which concludes with the famous

rhetorical question, 'O body swayed to music, O brightening glance/ How can we know the dancer from the dance?' As a trope, the rhetorical question takes the place of (and is presumably identical to) a negative statement: what the poet means to say is, 'No, it is impossible to tell the dancer from the dance'—or that one cannot separate form from content, or the physical beings of the poem's young school children from their glowing inner natures. De Man insists, however, that, instead of simply accepting this 'obvious' meaning of the rhetorical question, one acknowledges its literal meaning as a real question that asks with some urgency, 'How does one go about distinguishing the dancer from the dance, or a spirit from its embodiment?' For the deconstructionist, then, the literal and figurative meanings are completely inseparable—only by posing the literal question can the poem ask the rhetorical one.

My constructive counterpart to this deconstructive reading of tropes is to ask how literal meanings generate figurative ones. For example, in the case of *Antigone*, merely observing that Ἰσμήνης κάρα is an 'elevated' periphrasis allows one either to accept uncritically the mystifications of rhetorical language (to use the deconstructionist's terms) or to stop short of explaining the trope (to use mine). After all, a trope is by definition an elevated use of language; what we would like to know is *why* Antigone uses this particular figure and not some other—a patronymic, for example, such as παῖ Οἰδίπου. Even Jebb's explanation, which seems to me correct, would carry more weight if he showed *how* the periphrasis 'head of Ismene' implies respect and/or affection. By being attentive to the strangeness of the phrase, which substitutes a single, tangible part of the person for the whole, one may infer that this particular periphrasis implies a gesture of immediacy: instead of just addressing her sister by name, Antigone in her appeal for solidarity would rather touch Ismene's head or kiss her face.

In this paper I shall consider how the opening lines of Sophocles' *Electra* set the scene. The description of the dramatic setting in these lines is unusually long and detailed and raises a seemingly simple question: Why are so many landmarks involved? The attempt to answer this will require unravelling the figurative language that describes the setting. I shall argue, first of all, that the literal language of the prologue describes a setting more complex than critics have previously recognized; second, that this complexity can itself be understood as a large-scale trope whereby multiple landmarks constitute a single scene

for the drama; and third that, because these landmarks bring with them competing values and divergent expectations, this setting leaves the audience without a coherent framework by which to judge the action that follows.

Typically, Sophocles sketches the opening scene with the deftest of strokes. In *Ajax*, Athena speaks to Odysseus, situating him 'by the naval huts of Ajax' in the Greek camp at Troy (ἐπὶ σκηναῖς σε ναυτικαῖς ὁρῶ/Αἴαντος, 3–4).[1] In *Trachiniae,* after describing her situation and the long absence of her husband Heracles, Deianira locates herself at the house of a friend 'here in Trachis' (ἐν Τραχῖνι τῇδ', 39). In *Oedipus Rex*, Oedipus suggests a Theban setting when he addresses the suppliants in the opening line as 'offspring of Cadmus' (Κάδμου τροφή, 1), which suggestion is confirmed by the priest's response (ἐπ' Ἰσμηνοῦ τε μαντείᾳ σποδῷ, 21). And in *Antigone*, the protagonist, speaking to her sister Ismene about their family misfortunes, sets the scene in Thebes by mentioning a 'proclamation to all the people of the city' (πανδήμῳ πόλει/κήρυγμα, 7–8). In two late plays, *Philoctetes* and *Oedipus Coloneus*, Sophocles experiments with dramatic setting, describing a barren island in one case and a grove outside Athens in the other. Although in both cases the unusual setting is further accentuated by a moment of suspense as the protagonists try to find the cave of Philoctetes in one case, or learn about the grove in the other, nevertheless Sophocles still paints each scene with deft and efficient strokes. In the first line of *Philoctetes*, Odysseus tersely announces that 'this here is the coast of Lemnos' (Ἀκτὴ μὲν ἥδε . . ./Λήμνου, 1–2), and in *Oedipus Coloneus*, despite continuing uncertainty about the nature of the grove, Antigone briefly reports that they are just outside Athens, to which her father replies that he knew as much long ago (24–25).

In *Electra*, by contrast, the Tutor describes the setting in a manner that is as inconsistent as it is lengthy. In the first three lines of the play, the Tutor tells Orestes that he can now behold what he has long yearned to see (1–3). He then proceeds to point out no fewer than seven landmarks in the next seven lines:

> τὸ γὰρ παλαιὸν Ἄργος οὑπόθεις τόδε,
> τῆς οἰστροπλῆγος ἄλσος Ἰνάχου κόρης·
> αὕτη δ', Ὀρέστα, τοῦ λυκοκτόνου θεοῦ

[1] All citations are from Lloyd-Jones & Wilson (1990a).

ἀγορὰ Λύκειος· οὑξ ἀριστερᾶς δ’ ὅδε
Ἥρας ὁ κλεινὸς ναός· οἷ δ’ ἱκάνομεν,
φάσκειν Μυκήνας τὰς πολυχρύσους ὁρᾶν,
πολύφθορόν τε δῶμα Πελοπιδῶν τόδε, . . . (*El.* 4–10)

These landmarks are (i) ancient Argos, (ii) the grove of the daughter of Inachus, (iii) the temple of wolf-killing Apollo along with (iv) the *agora* of Apollo Lykeios,[2] (v) the famous temple of Hera, (vi) Mycene rich with gold, and (vii) the murderous house of the Pelopidae. This extraordinary catalogue poses two related questions. First, why so many indications of the setting, when Sophocles is usually so succinct and economical in establishing the scene? Second, why such a heterogeneous list, including the cities of Argos and Mycene, the temples of Hera and Apollo, a grove, a marketplace, and a house? Elsewhere in Sophocles, as we have seen, the scene is simple, almost stark; in *Electra* it is not.

I do not mean to imply that Sophocles' usual method of setting the scene is altogether different from what we find in *Electra*. Setting the scene invariably involves a willing suspension of disbelief as the spectators take the physical space before them for a place long ago and far away. But such a leap of faith is much easier, say, at the beginning of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, where the *skênê*-building represents the palace of Atreus, than at the beginning of *Philoctetes*, where it stands for a barren shore. Moreover, the dramatic illusion may be established with minimal fanfare, as at the beginning of *Oedipus Rex*, or with playful humor as in Euripides' *Ion*, where the chorus enters like a busload of tourists eagerly pointing out sculptures on Apollo's temple at Delphi.[3] In general, the process of setting the scene may be

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[2] Even Prof. Kamerbeek nods, namely by stating (*ad* 6, 7) that there was a single temple of Apollo at Argos, located not by the *agora* but on the Aspis. Pausanias describes two temples, the famous one of Apollo Lykios (2.19.3) and a temple of Apollo Deiradiotes (2.24.1). Concerning the temple of Apollo Lykios or Lykeios, Frazer observed in 1913 that 'from Thucydides (v. 47), Sophocles (*Electra*, 6 sq., with the Scholiast), and Plutarch (*Pyrrhus*, 32, compared with Pausanias, ii. 19.7) we know that the temple abutted on the market-place; and from Livy (xxxii. 25) we learn that the market-place was at the foot of the citadel [Larisa]' (1913: 190). The temple of Apollo Deiradiotes or Pythian Apollo stood on the Deiras, adjoining the lower citadel or Aspis, as Vollgraff showed when he published its excavation in 1956. The temple of Apollo Lykeios remains covered by the modern city, but archaeologists have identified a terrace and foundations apparently belonging to it; see Marchetti & Rizakis (1995: 445–454). On these opening lines see also Ruijgh, this volume pp. 155 and 157.

[3] Knox (1979: 259) develops the comparison with sightseers identifying sculptures 'for all the world as if one of them had a *Guide Bleu* in hand'.

limitlessly exploited; for example, in *Oedipus Coloneus* (as I have argued elsewhere,)[4] the blind man's slow recognition of his surroundings is the theatrical correlative to the spectators' gradual acceptance of the dramatic illusion.

What warrants attention in *Electra*, I argue, is the number and variety of topographical landmarks. Bernard Knox (1983: 7) is the scholar who has best appreciated this, noting that *Electra* 'opens with the most precise location of the action in a city landscape to be found in extant Greek tragedy', but his observation serves only to mark a contrast with the relentlessly domestic and apolitical concerns of the drama, whereas a closer look reveals that precision is truly not the issue. In fact, the prologue in *Electra* works against topographical precision by including widely scattered landmarks; it likewise works against temporal precision by including landmarks from different eras; and finally, it works against ideological precision by including landmarks of varying significance. To appreciate the effects of this extraordinary prologue, one must first examine in more detail the multiple places, times, and values it evokes through such heterogeneous landmarks.

The task of closer examination is hampered, however, by the tendency of commentators to conflate these very landmarks. On the one hand, a general claim is that, taken as a whole, these places form a sweeping panorama visible to the travelers from Mycene (I will return to this and similar arguments below); on the other hand, a more specific claim might be that the first two landmarks, because they stand in syntactical apposition, describe the same thing. Certainly, if we take Sophocles' language literally, the Tutor begins his list with two separate and distinct landmarks—the ancient city of Argos and a grove of Io presumably outside the city,

> τὸ γὰρ παλαιὸν Ἄργος οὑπόθεις τόδε,
> τῆς οἰστροπλῆγος ἄλσος Ἰνάχου κόρης (4–5)

—although the landmarks are related, the grove being a more specific or concrete feature of the city (just as in the *Odyssey* a city on Cyprus becomes by apposition a more specific focus of that island: ἡ δ' ἄρα Κύπρον ἵκανε φιλομμειδὴς Ἀφροδίτη,/ἐς Πάφον, *Od.* 8.362–363).[5] Commentators maintain, however, that both landmarks, the city and the

[4] Dunn (1992: 1–9).

[5] Further examples of restrictive apposition are cited in Kühner-Gerth (I: 289, Anm. 12).

grove, denote the entire Argolid plain. Yet for neither term is such a claim supportable. Regarding the city of Argos, Kamerbeek notes without further comment that by Ἄργος 'the plain of Argolis is meant', implying that the city stands by metonymy for the entire region. Jebb goes one step further, arguing that the metonymic meaning has become routine: '"Ἄργος in prose usu. means the town only, the territory being ἡ Ἀργεία or ἡ Ἀργολίς. But poetry retained the larger sense which Homer had made familiar.' I would say that Jebb overstates his case on several counts. First of all, the larger sense in Homer is not 'the Argolid' but 'the Peloponnese', as in *Odyssey* 18.246: εἰ πάντες σε ἴδοιεν ἀν' Ἴασον Ἄργος Ἀχαιοί.[6] Second, in poetry other than Homer, a larger or extended meaning is the exception rather than the rule (Jebb cites only Euripides, *IT* 508 and fragment 228.6 from his *Archelaus*), and third, in these two Euripidean passages Ἄργος means something more like the city than the plain. For instance, in *Iphigenia among the Taurians* Orestes tells his sister 'I am proud to claim Argos as my homeland' (τὸ κλεινὸν Ἄργος πατρίδ' ἐμὴν ἐπεύχομαι, 508), adding two lines later that he was born in Mycene (510). If in this play, as in Euripides' *Electra*, Mycene is understood to be a small town dependent upon Argos, then Orestes first names for his Taurian captor the larger and more powerful city (just as a traveller from Torrance might first tell those she meets in Europe that she comes from Los Angeles). In the fragment from *Archelaus* which Jebb cites in support of his hypothesis, we are told that Danaus ἐλθὼν ἐς Ἄργος ᾤκισ' Ἰνάχου πόλιν, 'having reached Argos, founded the city of Inachus', where Ἄργος is more likely to be proleptic (giving the place its future name) than metonymic (since the metonymy produces a clearer meaning, 'having reached the region, founded a city', at the price of a new ambiguity that arises if the region takes the name of a city yet to be established). Finally, in the single example that Jebb cites from prose (Th. 6.105.1), the historian's usage is similar to that of Euripides: for Spartan cross-border raids into Argive territory, Thucydides regularly uses the phrase ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν (5.75.4, 116.1; 6.7.1), but in this particular case, since he is referring to a major invasion that directly threatened the city, he says ἐς τὸ Ἄργος ἐσέβαλον.[7] In all these cases, 'Argos' bears a different weight than 'Argeia' or 'Argolid' and is not merely poetic variation.

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[6] For discussion, see Russo, Fernandez Galliano & Heubeck (1992: 64–65).

[7] Compare Th. 5.83.1, ἐστράτευσαν ἐς τὸ Ἄργος, where the Spartan objective is the city proper.

The word Ἄργος therefore did not demonstrably mean 'the Argolid', nor does the context here support such a meaning. As the audience would have come to this play already familiar with its prior versions set in the city of Argos, the Tutor's words τὸ γὰρ παλαιὸν Ἄργος οὑπόθεις τόδε, at least before landmarks elsewhere have been mentioned, would have denoted the city and not the surrounding countryside. Furthermore, the epithet παλαιός, which clearly applies to the city ruled in earliest times by Inachus and not to the whole region, reinforces this impression. Likewise the phrase οὑπόθεις can apply either to the city of Argos (as in previous versions of the story) or to Mycene (as we shall find is true in this version), but not in any meaningful sense to the Argolid plain. Finally, the literal meaning '(the city of) Argos' is borne out by the landmarks mentioned next—the grove of Io and the temple and marketplace of Apollo—which all belong to the city proper.

As for the commentators' claim regarding the grove, Jebb says that ἄλσος refers to 'the whole region, regarded as ground which her story has made sacred', and his thinking is closely followed by Kamerbeek. Yet this would require the meaning of ἄλσος to be grossly extended, from a small spot thick with trees and sacred to a god or nymph or hero, to an entire plain that was neither primarily wooded nor sacred to one figure. In support, Jebb cites the scholiast to Pindar, *Olympian* 3.31, where a slight prolepsis allows the poet to call the sanctuary of Zeus an ἄλσος *before* Heracles planted it with trees, and *Antigone* 845, where a slight metonymy lets the playwright speak of 'the springs of Dirce and the grove of Thebe' to indicate Thebes. In actuality, neither passage supports Jebb's interpretation which is also rendered less plausible by the rest of the line, as Sophocles gives no indication that ἄλσος denotes a large geographical region, but reinforces its literal meaning as a place holy to one figure, Io the daughter of Inachus.

Thus far I have been debunking an alleged use of figurative language that (so we are told) collapses the difference between 'Argos' and 'grove' by radically extending the meanings of each term. Yet these two lines *do* contain a real and effective figure, namely the apposition that links the lines syntactically while semantically linking the city with the grove—an association reinforced by the emphatic repetition of sound (Ἄργος . . . ἄλσος) at exactly the same position before the caesura. According to Jebb's interpretation the apposition is superfluous, as both terms mean 'Argolid', but if one accepts the literal meanings of city and grove, then the figure serves to conflate

city with nature, present world with mythical past, Orestes' human longing with Io's numinous presence. In other words, the first two items on the Tutor's list constitute a juxtaposition of disparate places, times, and meanings, at the same time that they constitute an apposition asserting that these are somehow identical. Therefore this figure associating 'Argos' with 'grove' anticipates the more extended trope which, I shall argue, associates seven distinct landmarks in order to establish a single dramatic setting. It is now time to take a closer look at these seven sites.

It is no accident that in the opening lines the Tutor points out to Orestes 'those things', ἐκεῖνα.[7a] In doing so, he is drawing attention not to a single place but to multiple landmarks along with their multiple and sometimes conflicting connotations:

νῦν ἐκεῖν' ἔξεστί σοι
παρόντι λεύσσειν, ὧν πρόθυμος ἦσθ' ἀεί. (2–3)

(i) the ancient city. The Tutor first indicates the setting by pointing out, τὸ γὰρ παλαιὸν Ἄργος οὑπόθεις τόδε, 'this here is ancient Argos, which you have been longing for' (4). The longing of Orestes for Argos may be understood by the audience as a reference to earlier versions of the story, especially the *Oresteia* where the exiled Orestes is eager to return to reclaim his inheritance; so in a subtle manner both here and more emphatically in lines 9–10, multiple landmarks recall multiple texts. Furthermore, the epithet παλαιός recalls the claims of the Argives that they were the oldest of the Hellenes; that their hero Phoroneus was the first human king and he, not Prometheus, gave the world fire; and that the earliest inhabitants of Greece, the Pelasgians, got their name from the Argive Pelasgus.[8] The epithet thus invokes not just the venerable age of the city but its reputed stature as the source of human culture and civilization.

(ii) the grove of Io. The next indication of setting comes in the following line, τῆς οἰστροπλῆγος ἄλσος Ἰνάχου κόρης, 'the grove of the daughter of Inachus, stung by a gadfly' (5). We have no other evidence for a grove of Io; whether it actually existed, or was invented by Sophocles on the model of the grove sacred to the eponymous hero Argos, we should imagine it standing outside the city on the

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[7a] On ἐκεῖνα see also Ruijgh, this volume p. 155.

[8] On the antiquity of the Argives, see Aristid. *Panathen.* 357 and Schol. on S. *El.* 4; on the antiquity of Phoroneus, see Hyg. 143, and on his gift of fire, see Paus. 2.19.5; on Pelasgus and the Pelasgians, see A. *Supp.* 251–253.

banks of the Inachus (where the grove of Argos stood before the Spartans destroyed it).[9] Whereas the previous site, παλαιὸν Ἄργος, clearly referred to human institutions and so belonged to the human world, the river-god Inachus and his daughter Io belong to that mythical epoch when humans mingled freely with gods and when rivers, gods, and kings were often indistinguishable.

(iii) and (iv) the temple of Apollo and the marketplace. The Tutor next observes, αὕτη δ', Ὀρέστα, τοῦ λυκοκτόνου θεοῦ/ἀγορὰ Λύκειος, 'and this, Orestes, is the Lykeian market of the wolf-killing god' (6–7). While Jebb in his commentary and his appendix devotes considerable space to unraveling the etymological and ritual associations of the epithets Λύκειος and λυκοκτόνος, I am more interested here in the rhetorical conflation of the two separate landmarks, the temple of Apollo and the neighboring *agora*. Properly speaking, the temple was that of Apollo Lykeios, 'Wolfish Apollo', and near it was the marketplace, generally identified as 'the *agora* in the sanctuary of Apollo'. By itself, the phrase ἀγορὰ Λύκειος would be a convenient shorthand for the marketplace, but the additional epithet λυκοκτόνος together with mention of the god alludes more precisely to the adjoining temple. Both sites were important. (iii) First, the temple, according to Pausanias, was the most conspicuous building in the city, a fact that coincides with Wolfish Apollo's prominence in civic ideology.[10] According to legend, Danaus founded the temple in response to an omen of a wolf defeating a bull, whereby Apollo proclaimed him the rightful ruler of Argos. Thus wolfish Apollo was the patron of the kings of Argos, and under the democracy the wolf became an icon for the city itself, struck upon Argive coins even as the owl was upon Athenian coins.[11] (iv) Next, the marketplace or *agora* was bordered on one side by the temple of Lykeian Apollo and on another by that of Nemean Zeus.[12] Not only was this marketplace the primary

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[9] On the grove of Argos, see Hdt. 6.78–80 and Paus. 2.20.8.

[10] Paus. 2.19.3: Ἀργείοις δὲ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸ ἐπιφανέστατόν ἐστιν Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερὸν Λυκίου.

[11] On the legend of the omen proclaiming Danaus king of Argos, see Paus. 2.19.3–4; Plu. *Pyrrh.* 32.5; Serv. on Verg. *Aen.* 4.377. For the wolf as an icon for the city, comparable to the owl on Athenian coins, see the Schol. on S. *El.* 6, τῷ νομίσματι τῶν Ἀργείων ἐγχαράττεσθαι <τὸν> λύκον ὡς καὶ τὰς γλαῦκας Ἀθήναζε, and compare Head (1911: 437–438).

[12] On the location of the *agora*, see Paus. 2.19.3–7 and 2.20.3; Plu. *Pyrrh.* 32.4–5; Schol. on S. *El.* 6; and Liv. 32.25.5. Compare the archaeological reconstruction in Marchetti & Rizakis (1995), and the report on physical remains in Pariente, Piérart & Thalmann (1998).

venue for public inscriptions and decrees, but also, as Thucydides informs us, the treaty of 420 between Argos and Athens distinctly stipulated its own display 'in the *agora* in the sanctuary of Apollo' (5.47.11).[13] With this unusual expression, then, Sophocles both transfers the epithet Λύκειος, which properly belongs to Apollo,[14] to the *agora*—implying that the deity presides over the marketplace rather than the temple—and gives the god what would seem to be a newly-coined epithet, λυκοκτόνος, or 'killer of wolves'.[15] Thus in conflating the two landmarks, Sophocles ends up endowing the civic space of the *agora* that embodies the democratic deliberations of the city with the ancestral prestige of Apollo's temple, at the same time that he gives the presiding deity an epithet tailor-made for Orestes: just as Apollo the wolf-killer presumably protects the flocks from predators, so Orestes, the Tutor admonishes, must protect his family estates from the predatory Aegisthus. The city with its public legal procedures is thus associated with the wild and with the lawless retribution practiced there.

(v) the Heraion. The Tutor's next indication of setting seems rhetorically straightforward: οὐξ ἀριστερᾶς δ᾽ ὅδε/Ἥρας ὁ κλεινὸς ναός, 'and here on the left is the famous temple of Hera' (8). The Tutor is referring to the temple of Hera or the Heraion which stood, not in the city of Argos, but about thirteen kilometers to the northeast, on the lower slopes of Mount Euboea near the road leading from Argos to Corinth. He calls it famous, no doubt, because it was the most important sanctuary in the region and, as Tomlinson (1972: 3) puts it, 'ranked as one of the major religious sites in Greece'. Recalling that immediately before this, the Tutor gave pride of place to the

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[13] Th. 5.47.11: ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν τοῦ ᾿Απόλλωνος τῷ ἱερῷ. Argive honorary decrees regularly included a provision to display them ἐν στάλαι ἐν τῷ τοῦ Λυκείου <ἱερῷ> (*SEG* 25: 362; 30: 355, 357, 360).

[14] The epithet Λύκειος (or Λύκιος) was variously derived from λύκος (either because Apollo kills wolves or because he protects them), from Λύκος (the son of Pandion in Athens), from Λυκία (because Apollo was worshipped there), or from λυκόφως (reflecting Apollo's associations with light and the sun); for citations and discussion, see Jebb (Appendix) and Gershenson (1991: 13–19).

[15] Whereas Λύκειος is a well-attested cult title (see e.g. Graf 1985: 219–226), λυκοκτόνος is an uncommon literary epithet otherwise found only in later sources such as the *Greek Anthology* (13.22, Phaedimus, describing the god's quiver), Plutarch (*Mor.* 966a) and Porphyry (*Abst.* 1.22). This suggests that Sophocles invented the epithet as a gloss for Λύκειος, by this means explaining that Apollo protects the flocks from wolves.

agora—a local venue that was used to display treaties and proclaim the city's decisions as widely as possible—we find that Sophocles has moved from the mythical past (with ancient Argos and Io) to his contemporary world. Yet whereas the marketplace was a landmark exclusively associated with the city of Argos, the temple of Hera had long been independent, only becoming subject to Argive hegemony in the course of the fifth century.[16] For this reason, the temple marks what we might call a third point in the triangulation of Argive power: in Homer and in the archaic period, the center of power in the region was Mycene; in Aeschylus and the classical period, the center of power was Argos; and until the mid-fifth century, there was also a third venue, the famous Heraion, which could vie with the other two by virtue of its religious authority. This temple's special authority is reflected not only in the well-known story of Cleobis and Biton,[17] but also in the prestige of the temple's priestesses, whose periods of office were used to date historical events. Indeed, Thucydides (2.1) mentions the Argive priestesses of Hera as constituting one of three local offices—including the Spartan ephors and the Athenian archons—commonly used as benchmarks to date events of Panhellenic importance. Or, to reiterate the situation more precisely, the prestige of these local priestesses once transcended the claims of city-states in the region until expanding Argive hegemony subsumed it.

Since Sophocles' audience would have viewed both the temple and the *agora* primarily as fifth-century institutions, both are also implicated in a kind of 'chronological irony'. By shifting his focus from ancient and mythical times (in the preceding mention of παλαιὸν Ἄργος and Ἰνάχου κόρης) to the fifth-century Argive democracy (in pointing now to the ἀγορὰ Λύκειος and κλεινὸς ναός), Sophocles accentuates the contrast between the two eras. Perhaps a member of his audience might imagine Argos as embracing both its venerable, mythic past and its democratic present, but from the point of view of Orestes and the Tutor (belonging as they do to the generation after the fall of Troy), the observation that 'this here is the famous temple of Hera' (ὅδε/. . . ὁ κλεινὸς ναός, 7–8) projects onto characters *within* the world of the play a degree of historical understanding

[16] Hall (1995) reconstructs the competing spheres of influence in the Argive plain, and concludes (612–613) that Argos most likely gained control over the Heraion in the 460s.

[17] Hdt. 1.30–32; discussion in Sansone (1991).

in reality available only to the spectators.[18] This chronological irony becomes even more pronounced when we consider certain facts. First of all, the temple was destroyed in an infamous blaze in 423, and the new temple was probably still under construction at the time of the play.[19] Second, as the Heraion was not visible from Mycene, when the actor playing the Tutor was delivering the line ὅδε/. . . ὁ κλεινὸς ναός, he would be gesturing offstage and not pointing to anything concrete. Thus his implicit meaning, 'please imagine, dear spectators—and you, Orestes—the temple of Hera', would be given an added twist by the fact that the spectators would most likely be thinking of a new and splendid but unfinished building.

(vi) Mycene. With the next two landmarks, we turn at last from features of the setting imagined offstage to the scene onstage and the *skênê*-building. 'But where we have arrived', the Tutor says, 'know that you see Mycene of much gold' (οἷ δ' ἱκάνομεν,/φάσκειν Μυκήνας τὰς πολυχρύσους ὁρᾶν, 8–9). Paradoxically, now that the speaker is describing not places imagined as existing elsewhere but the physical space before the audience, his aptly chosen words (φάσκειν . . . ὁρᾶν, 'rest assured that you see') may remind the viewer of the leap of faith that was involved in accepting the dramatic illusion ('rest assured that you are looking at a palace in Mycene, not a stage in Athens'). This shift from landmarks offstage to the scene onstage is actually a threefold shift involving a change in the sphere visualized by the spectators (from offstage to *skênê*), a change in venue chosen by the author (from Argos to Mycene) and a consequent change in connotations. Whereas the Tutor's preceding catalogue of landmarks might have given the impression that the action takes place in the city of Argos, where Athenian drama from Aeschylus onwards traditionally situated the story, with οἷ δέ the spectators learn that Sophocles has chosen for his immediate venue the town of Mycene so prominent in Homer. As John Davidson has pointed out (1988: 51), Sophocles' shift from tragic to epic setting is accompanied by many Homeric echoes, including the distinctive Μυκήνας τὰς πολυχρύσους.[20] Indeed, this is an expression which occurs twice in the

[18] For a good account of the decorum observed in tragic anachronism, see Easterling (1985).

[19] Pfaff (2003: 191), who observes that 'construction may have continued to the very end of the 5th century, if not slightly later'.

[20] Davidson notes that these allusions suggest not just a general Homeric coloring but a specifically Odyssean story-pattern, and he reminds us (1988: 56–58) that these echoes are especially concentrated in the prologue.

Iliad, both times describing Agamemnon as king with the formula βασιλῆα πολυχρύσοιο Μυκήνης (7.180 and 11.46), and once in the *Odyssey*, where Nestor uses a variation of the formula, ἤνασσε πολυχρύσοιο Μυκήνης (3.304), to describe Aegisthus ruling over Mycene after killing Agamemnon. Homer's phrase 'Mycene of much gold' is thus always accompanied by mention of its king, and so in these contexts the abundant gold of Mycene would seem to connote not riches in general but more specifically the wealth that the lands of Mycene bestow on their ruler. Therefore, when the Tutor directs our attention to the setting preferred in epic, he is perhaps on another level reminding Orestes of the prize he has come back to claim. Nevertheless, allusion to Homer does not mean that the world of tragedy has been upstaged by that of epic; more likely it leads to a question: to what extent will the action follow the precedents of Aeschylus and tragedy and to what extent those of Homer and epic? The question is underscored by a second instance of chronological irony: the town of Mycene was destroyed in Sophocles' lifetime, some time in the 460s, as the city of Argos extended its control over the surrounding territory, so even as the Tutor is pointing out the gold-rich city of epic, some spectators might be reflecting on the fact that the city is no more.

(vii) the house of Pelops. Finally the Tutor comes to the last item in his catalogue, the one that corresponds to the visible façade of the *skênê*: πολύφθορόν τε δῶμα Πελοπιδῶν τόδε, 'and this here is the death-laden house of the Pelopidae' (10). The line's connotations are, in contrast with what immediately preceded, post-Homeric and tragic, and may in fact allude to the words of Orestes in *Libation Bearers*, καὶ μὴ 'ξαλείψῃς σπέρμα Πελοπιδῶν τόδε, 'do not obliterate the seed here of the Pelopidae' (503). Thus the Tutor's list, beginning with the mythic origins of Argos and now ending with the mythical ancestors of Orestes, has moved from the general landmarks of the region to the bloody cycle of revenge described in the *Oresteia*. As Kamerbeek notes, a double figure, consisting of anaphora of πολυ- and chiastic word order, sharpens the contrast between splendid Mycene and the bloody house of Atreus: Μυκήνας τὰς πολυχρύσους/πολύφθορόν τε δῶμα. To put it another way, the corresponding sounds and words of the two lines suggest their equivalence, even as the allusions to Homer and Aeschylus emphasize the gap between views of the palace as golden prize or place of destruction. The effect is once again paradoxical, as this climax to the Tutor's lengthy catalogue focuses the spectators' eyes most directly upon the scene before them, at the same time that these

competing connotations invite them to look at the scene indirectly (*via* allusions) and indistinctly (*via* competing allusions).

Once the Tutor has established the scene, he sets the plot in motion by challenging Orestes and Pylades to agree on a plan for revenge and carry it out without delay (13–22). For this purpose, all the prologue really needs is one line of typical Sophoclean economy stating, 'Here we are at last in Mycene'. Instead, the Tutor's litany of landmarks ranges widely across Argive geography, history, and cultural values. I call this a seven-fold theatrical trope because, just as the two-fold literary figure of hendiadys expresses a single idea by stating two, so the opening lines of *Electra* perform a single theatrical task by presenting to the imagination seven separate indications of the setting. But what is the purpose of such a trope?

As I have been pointing out, the explanations of commentators do not do justice to these lines. Kaibel argues that the Tutor picks out landmarks in four-stages, 'vom weiteren zum engeren fortschreitend', going from the Argolid first to the city of Argos, then to the nearby Heraion, and finally to Mycene.[21] In Kaibel's view, the Tutor gradually trains the spectators' eyes upon the *skênê*-building before them, while Jebb (6) maintains that the old man does just the opposite, allowing the spectators to imagine the panorama present to his own eyes as he gazes out across the audience. 'The old man, looking southward, points out the chief features of the landscape', he says, and defends this reconstruction against the charge of inaccuracy (the Heraion would not have been visible from Mycene) by adding that neither the poet 'nor his Athenian hearers would care whether the topography was minutely accurate'. Knox (1983: 7–8), however, argues that the Tutor's description amounts to thematic negation: although the old man points to landmarks that will remind viewers of the political themes of the *Oresteia*, nevertheless the ensuing action is relentlessly personal and domestic.[22] Charles Segal (1981: 250) offers a structuralist version of this argument that opposes the 'expansive' perspective of the Tutor to the claustrophobic outlook of Electra, while Mary Kuntz

[21] Kaibel (1896: 68). Compare Campbell (1881: 132), 'The description passes from what is general and remote to what is nearest to the eye', and Saïd (1993: 171), 'a description [. . .] that focuses gradually upon the *skênê*'. Kells (1973: 79) distinguishes more specifically background, middle distance, and immediate foreground.

[22] Compare Saïd (1993: 189), 'the city is brushed aside by a palace where the action remains concentrated'.

(1993: 26–27), in combining Knox with Kaibel, maintains that the landmarks begin with the political and dynastic concerns of Homer and Aeschylus but 'narrow abruptly' with mention of the bloody house of the Pelopidae to focus upon the personal vengeance so prominent in Sophocles.

While it is true that, theatrically, the final items in the Tutor's list, as Kaibel maintains, direct attention to the scene of this play, the preceding items are on this view largely superfluous. Although Knox and those who follow him, by contrast, correctly note that these items do seem extraneous, nevertheless they do not explain why the last items (which most clearly pertain to Sophocles' *own* drama in the phrases οἷ δ' ἱκάνομεν, φάσκειν . . . ὁρᾶν, and δῶμα . . . τόδε) most explicitly allude to the *competing* versions of Homer and Aeschylus. Furthermore, Jebb's notion of a vicarious panorama, though allowing a pleasant play of the imagination, adds little to our understanding of the prologue. Thus the catalogue of landmarks is indeed more complex than critics have recognized, demanding fuller exegesis.

When the playwright sets the scene, he is not merely naming a location but generating certain expectations. As Knox points out (1983: 8), Sophocles' list of concrete landmarks in and around Argos recited by the Tutor creates an initial expectation that the drama will somehow address political issues such as 'the overthrow of a tyranny, the restoration of freedom'. Mention of the murderous house of the Pelopidae, in alluding to the *Oresteia*, suggests that this tragedy may center upon justice and the cycle of revenge. In discussing each landmark, I have shown how it implies a time, a place, and a meaning or meanings: the *agora*, for example, was in the city of Argos next to the temple of Apollo Lykeios; it was a feature of the contemporary, fifth-century city, and it embodied democratic values, especially since resolutions of the Assembly were put on display there. In suggesting a time, place, and meaning, each landmark also establishes what I shall call an 'ethical framework'. Let us suppose, for example, that the *only* landmark were the *agora* and that Sophocles chose to set the action there. Aside from the obvious anachronism, this would not only establish a space within which events might take place, but would also create expectations about the behavior of any character within that space. In a democratic venue, Orestes could not plausibly arrive by stealth and exact vengeance on his own; he would instead have to do what he does in the *Orestes* of Euripides, namely appear before the Assembly to plead his case, and accept the decision of

the people as final. But the first two landmarks that the playwright does mention establish a very different ethical framework from the start. If Orestes has always been longing for the ancient city and the grove of Io, then on his return he would seem to be not an individual acting for himself but an Argive reaffirming the most venerable and enduring features of his culture. However, it is not entirely clear just how Orestes the son of Agamemnon should behave in such a context. On the one hand, the world of Io is one in which humans do not belong; not only is her father Inachus a river, but she herself has been turned into a cow by one god, only to be goaded into a frenzy by another.[23] On the other hand, the allusion to Io's painful wanderings in connection with a sacred grove seems to promise that the corresponding *human* suffering involved in the exile of Orestes and grief of Electra may find timeless commemoration.

Allusion to the temple of Wolfish Apollo suggests a different role (or roles) for the young man. Insofar as it recalls the legend of Danaus, who was proclaimed king of Argos by an omen from Apollo, it would seem to launch Orestes on the path of reclaiming his rightful inheritance with divine encouragement. Yet the novel epithet λυκοκτόνος introduces a very different role, namely that of the shepherd protecting his flock from wolves.[24] In this case, the individual acts from personal self-interest when, rather than proving his own worth against a deserving adversary, he succeeds in ridding his estates of predators. Since allusion to prior texts will also inevitably involve allusion to the ethical frameworks of those texts, the Tutor's pointed reference to the temple of Hera seems to promise a context for events distinct from the contexts suggested by Mycene and Argos. As I further note below, the conduct of Orestes in Mycene would seem to be governed by the norms of warrior princes, whereas his conduct in Argos would be governed by the collective norms of the democratic *polis*. Inasmuch as the Heraion's religious authority triangulated and transcended the more secular authority of Mycene and Argos, it offers an alternative ethical framework—that of the religious devotion of Cleobis and Biton. This prospect, however, is doubly impeded, first by the chronological obstacle that sixth- and fifth-century stan-

[23] Sophocles' *Inachus* gives a substantial role to another god, Hermes, although this may have been a satyr-play.

[24] Hence Aristarchus connected Wolfish Apollo with Apollo Nomios or 'Shepherd' (Hsch. *s.v.* λυκοκτόνου θεοῦ).

dards are not, after all, available to characters in the mythical plot and then by the added obstacle that, to this play's audience, the Heraion may not have existed at all.

Finally, 'Mycene of much gold' recalls not only the world of epic but the Homeric version of our story in which Aegisthus usurps the throne but Orestes rightfully regains it. Within that context, revenge itself is not problematic; at issue is whether the young prince has the resolve to avenge his father's death and reclaim his rich inheritance. 'The death-laden house of the Pelopidae', by contrast, recalls the *Oresteia* and its concentration upon the matricide, bringing to the fore the problem of reciprocal justice. By the end of the second play in that trilogy, *Libation Bearers*, Orestes seems mad and is driven from Argos by the Furies, and within such an ethical framework he would seem to share the guilt and pollution of the slaughtering Pelopidae.

On the one hand, I do not want to imply that every spectator of Sophocles' *Electra* would have paused to digest every allusion together with its ethical implications. On the other hand, the unique prologue with its diverse series of topographical landmarks would have brought to mind competing associations. At the very least we can be sure that few spectators would come away from the Tutor's sightseeing list with the same clear sense of time, place, and expectations as they did from Athena's words in the prologue of *Ajax*, where ἐπὶ σκηναῖς σε ναυτικαῖς ὁρῶ/Αἴαντος fixes the time and place in the Greek camp during the Trojan War, suggesting the corresponding context of aristocratic honor among the warrior kings and princes. Previous commentators have implied that the unusual catalogue of landmarks is essentially irrelevant to the drama (Jebb), focuses attention upon its central concerns (Kaibel, Kuntz), or concentrates upon themes that are completely opposed to those of the drama (Knox, Segal). In a sense, all are possible because the Tutor's catalogue raises a series of competing expectations and does not go on to decide among them.

In practical terms, this theatrical trope produces an effect quite different from that of more conventional or simpler techniques of setting the scene. When Athena refers to the Greek camp at Troy, she sets clear parameters for the action; she does not determine how it will develop, nor does she prepare the spectators for the eventual debate over funeral rites for the hero; she does, however, prepare them for the play's central concern with heroic honor. When the Tutor sets the scene by describing multiple landmarks which in turn

invoke multiple ethical frameworks, he leaves Orestes and the audience with a difficult task. Orestes, as the Tutor reminds him, must devise a plan and, recognizing that this is the critical moment for action (ἔργων ἀκμή, 22), set it in motion, and he must somehow do all this in the midst of conflicting demands and competing sets of expectations. Furthermore, while the spectators listening to this prologue know that the time has come for Orestes to act, they do not know how he will justify or authorize his deeds. Hence they see someone about to embark on a terrible mission all the while having no idea how he will work through the conflicts that his return to Argos inevitably raises.

Dramatic setting, then, is part of that extended vocabulary, so to speak, by which the playwright creates his meaning. Aeschylus, in placing the events of his *Oresteia* at Argos rather than Mycene, opened up new possibilities for the plot, as did Euripides when he moved these same events to a farmer's cottage in the countryside. In his late plays, Sophocles experiments with this dramatic vocabulary when he creates a rocky, uninhabited island for Philoctetes and a mysterious, numinous grove for Oedipus outside Athens, and in *Electra*, he creates new meaning from old when he places the action not in a new or unexpected locale but in one that is an evocative syncretism of familiar sites. Once the prologue is over, the action moves from the wider world of Argive landmarks to the much narrower space outside the doors of the royal house. But that will be another story.[25]

[25] I am grateful to our hosts, Professors De Jong and Rijksbaron, for their hospitality, to my colleagues at the conference for their generous insights, and to my research assistant, Christine Maisto, for her astute editing.

KILLING WORDS.
SPEECH ACTS AND NON-VERBAL ACTIONS IN SOPHOCLEAN TRAGEDIES[1]

Ulf Heuner

Are words able to kill? I think so. For instance, if I said to someone 'I am going to kill you!', and he is so scared by my words that he has a heart attack and dies; in that case, my utterance 'I am going to kill you!' would be a performative utterance, such as described by John Austin at the beginning of his book *How to Do Things with Words* (1975). An utterance is performative if '[. . .] *by* saying or *in* saying something we are doing something'.[2] If I kill somebody with my words 'I am going to kill you!', I obviously do something by saying something. But Austin gives some 'necessary conditions' for a 'happy functioning of a performative'. The first is: 'There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect'.[3] Killing a person immediately by saying 'I am going to kill you!' can hardly be called a *conventional procedure having a conventional effect*. In most cases, the 'illocutionary act'[4] of the utterance 'I am going to kill you!' would be to threaten, and the perlocutionary effect would not be to kill, but to frighten.

Words are also able to kill in a more mediated manner. For example, a king orders one of his soldiers to kill somebody and the soldier does it. Or someone learns that a person he loves has died, and as a consequence commits suicide. Or, he becomes so depressed because of this bad news that he is more dead than alive. In this case, words kill in a metaphorical way.

According to Hölderlin, words in Greek tragedies kill in a mediated manner. In his 'Anmerkungen zur Antigonae' ('Remarks on *Antigone*')

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[1] I wish to thank Irene de Jong and Albert Rijksbaron for editing my text. I also thank Jeremy McIntosh, Simon Srebrny and Steve Haring for their careful reading of earlier versions.

[2] Austin (1975: 12).

[3] Austin (1975: 14).

[4] Austin distinguishes between a 'locutionary act', an 'illocutionary act' and a 'perlocutionary act' of an utterance. Cf. Austin (1975: 94ff.).

Hölderlin writes: 'Das griechischtragische Wort ist tödtlichfactisch, weil der Leib, den es ergreifet, wirklich tödtet'.[5] Thomas Pfau translates this sentence as follows: 'The Greek-tragic word is deadly-factual, for the body which it seizes truly kills'.[6] Killing is a consequence of the word, but the word itself does not kill. It needs a body as medium which kills. Hölderlin makes a distinction between Greek tragedies and dramas of his own age, of modern times. Words in modern ('patriotic') dramas are able to kill immediately. They are 'tödtendfactisch' ('murderous-factual') in contrast to 'tödtlichfactisch' ('deadly-factual').[7] This means, as far as I understand Hölderlin's neologism, that while words in a modern drama kill immediately, they do so in a metaphorical manner:

> [. . .] it ends not in murder and death, for the tragic must be comprehended herein, but more in the manner of *Oedipus at Colonus*, such that the enthusiastic word is terrible and kills, not concretely Greek, in the athletic and plastic spirit where the word seizes the body so that it is the latter which kills.[8]

In Hölderlin's view, *Oedipus Coloneus* is not a real Greek tragedy; it is rather a modern drama, because we cannot find any real murder in it but only the 'enthusiastic word'. A real Greek tragedy requires murder, it requires a body which really kills.

Hölderlin's distinction between deadly-factual words in Greek tragedies and murderous-factual words in dramas of his own age is often neglected or ignored by scholars who interpret Sophocles with the help of Hölderlin. For example, in her book *Antigone's Claim* (2000), Judith Butler writes about the words in Sophoclean tragedies:

> They act, they exercise performative force of a certain kind, sometimes they are clearly violent in their consequences, as words that either constitute or beget violence. Indeed, sometimes it seems that the words act in illocutionary ways, enacting the very deed that they name in the very moment of the naming. For Hölderlin, this constitutes something of the murderous force of the word in Sophocles.[9]

I think that only the first part of Butler's quote applies to Hölderlin's theory of tragic Greek words. In Hölderlin's view, words in Greek

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5 Hölderlin (1962: 269).
6 Hölderlin (1988: 113).
7 Cf. Hölderlin (1962: 270; 1988: 114).
8 Hölderlin (1988: 114).
9 Butler (2000: 63).

tragedies are only 'violent in their consequences' in a mediated way. To put it in terms of speech act philosophy: according to Hölderlin, words in Greek tragedy act in perlocutionary ways, but not 'in illocutionary ways', as Butler writes.[10]

But whose words make the body kill? I think Hölderlin means, above all, divine words. The words of the gods seize the bodies of the tragic heroes and force them to kill. The body of a hero becomes the medium of the gods. Hölderlin does not distinguish between heroes in Greek tragedies and heroes in the Homeric epics. He is discussing the Greek mind in general.[11] I think his argument applies more to the epics than to Greek tragedies. In the *Iliad*, the heroes on both sides are very often seized by the words of the gods who help them. For example, in Book 15, Hector is ordered by Apollo to attack the enemy ships once again. Hector, seized by the word of his god, immediately spurs on his fighters:

> ὣς Ἕκτωρ λαιψηρὰ πόδας καὶ γούνατ' ἐνώμα
> ὀτρύνων ἱππῆας, ἐπεὶ θεοῦ ἔκλυεν αὐδήν. (*Il.* 15.269–270)

> so Hector moving rapidly his feet and his knees went
> onward, stirring the horsemen when he heard the god's voice speak. (trans. Lattimore)

As a consequence he kills some more enemies. The words of the god kill through the body of Hector.

In this episode, the god speaks directly to the hero. But heroes' bodies can also be seized by the divine words of seers. In Book 7, Helenus hears in his mind the decision of Apollo and Athena that Hector shall fight alone against one of the Greeks, and tells his brother Hector. He also informs him that the gods have not yet decided when he will die, so he can fight the best enemy warrior without fear (*Il.* 7.43–53). Then the fight between Hector and Ajax that follows is interrupted by nightfall, and the heroes decide to continue another day (*Il.* 7.273–312). It does not make any difference whether they continue the fight that day or the next, nor whether they talk to

[10] Butler refers to *Oedipus Coloneus*: 'Consider this moment in which the chorus in *Oedipus at Colonus* reminds Oedipus of his crime, a verbal narration *of* the deed that becomes the violent punishment *for* the deed' (2000: 63); cf. *OC* 542–545. But for Hölderlin, as I said, *Oedipus Coloneus* is not a real Greek tragedy. The 'violent punishment' of the chorus by words is from Hölderlin's point of view more 'tödtendfactisch' than 'tödtlichfactisch'.

[11] Cf. Hölderlin (1962: 269–270; 1988: 113–114).

each other at that moment or go on fighting. Time is not running out, because it is the gods who decide a hero's fate. The words and actions of heroes are never independent. They are subordinated to the divine world. The heroes live in baneful harmony with the gods.

This harmony is destroyed in Greek tragedy. The words and deeds of the heroes—as human beings—oppose the words and deeds of the gods. This tension is not only a result of the ambiguous semantics of tragic words.[12] It is also an aspect of the new dramatic structure itself. The dramatic structure of Greek tragedy—especially of Sophocles—creates a tension between secular and divine tragic dimensions. The dramatic structure creates a new human experience of time and space. Time quite often runs short in Greek tragedies. There is no time for exchanging gifts. The words and actions of the heroes receive a status of their own. They are no longer subordinated to the divine temporal order. It now becomes very important when the heroes say and do something. It also becomes clear that saying something is always doing something. Not only do the words and actions of the heroes oppose the divine order, saying something also comes to stand in opposition to doing something in general.

Dramatic texts only consist of words, and since Greek tragedies lack stage directions, they only consist of the speech acts of their dramatis personae. Non-verbal actions are directly linked to speech acts, because all non-verbal actions are indicated by speech acts. The utterances of the dramatis personae are the only source of information about non-verbal actions. This internal relationship contrasts with an external relationship. Deeds are sharply separated from words within the dramatic structure. In most cases, important non-verbal actions like fights, suicides etc. take place offstage, whereas the dramatic action onstage is dominated by verbal acts.[13] Onstage we find the 'word' which, according to Hölderlin, becomes 'tödtlichfactisch', deadly-factual, when it seizes a body. This word can be either divine or human. Offstage, bodies act and kill. This clear separation shows that the Greek tragic word does not kill in an immediate manner

[12] Jean-Pierre Vernant has analysed this in several publications; see for instance Vernant (1994).

[13] In his book *Greek Tragedy in Action* (1978), Oliver Taplin demonstrates that we can find many actions on stage in Greek tragedies. But I focus on the most brutal or drastic actions like murders; and these actions take place offstage in nearly all cases. (The suicide of Ajax in Sophocles' play is a remarkable exception.)

but in a mediated manner. Killing onstage (whether with words or weapons) belongs to modern drama.

On the one hand, words and deeds are separated. On the other hand, they are linked within the dramatic development. Speech acts onstage can be analysed as consequences of, or reactions to, non-verbal actions which take place offstage, and offstage actions can be interpreted as the results of speech acts onstage. In Sophoclean tragedy, most significant dramatic turns do not take place in the dialogues onstage, but in the interaction of onstage and offstage actions or in the crossing of the border between onstage and offstage. By crossing the border, words onstage become actions offstage, and actions offstage become words onstage. This occurs paradigmatically in *Antigone*.

The starting point of *Antigone* is an edict: the edict of Creon not to bury the body of Polynices. We are informed about it for the first time in the prologue by Antigone (*Ant.* 21–38). Creon's edict is a kind of order, a negative order. It does not tell somebody to do something, it tells everybody not to do something, to bury Polynices.[14] But in order to ensure that no one disobeys his edict, he orders watchmen to guard over the body of Polynices. This is a positive order to do something.

An order can only be given by someone who is in power. If someone is in power, he is able to do something by saying something, by giving orders. What he effects in this way he does not do directly but in a mediated manner. An order is a speech act which implies a time lag between the illocutionary act of giving an order (doing something by saying something) and its perlocutionary effect (doing the thing which is said or ordered). What is ordered will be done at a later point in time, but not by the king himself who gives the order. He needs others to do the things he orders. So the power of a king is limited, because he can never be sure that his subordinates will really do what he tells them to do. Maybe they do not want to do it or cannot do it. Someone who gives an order can never foresee the consequences of and reactions to his orders. In fact, he is powerless. To give an order is like making a bet. The drama begins.

[14] Mark Griffith pointed out to me that Creon's edict cannot simply be identified with an order, as I had supposed in my lecture at the Sophocles Colloquium in Amsterdam.

The first consequence of Creon's edict, which had been given before the play started, is another speech act—Antigone's announcement that she will ignore Creon's order and will bury her brother Polynices.

> . . . κεῖνον δ' ἐγὼ
> θάψω. . . . (*Ant.* 71–72)
>
> . . . but I shall bury him! (trans. Lloyd-Jones)

It is the first significant speech act onstage. Like an order, an announcement implies a time lag between doing something by saying something (the illocutionary act of announcing) and doing what has been announced. It presents information about something which will be done. When Antigone tells her sister Ismene that she is going to bury Polynices, the burial is for her a fact already. What is announced will not be done by somebody else, but by the person who announces it. So whoever makes a first-person announcement is not in the same way dependent on others as someone who gives an order. Antigone can bury Polynices herself. Of course others, like Creon's watchmen for example, can try to prevent her from doing so. But they cannot prevent Antigone from trying to bury her brother. Someone who announces that he or she will do something is more powerful than someone who issues an order, if the one who makes the announcement is willing to die.

No dramatic turning points occur in the prologue dialogue between Ismene and Antigone, but Antigone's exit marks the transition from word to action, from announcement to deed.[15] This is a new dramatic impulse, and the offstage action of the burial will give a fresh impetus to the onstage action once it becomes the subject of another significant tragic speech act, a report.

Before I speak about the report, I would like to take another look at Antigone's announcement in the prologue. The words Antigone utters in the prologue become 'factual'; they become a deed, not at that very moment but later, offstage. Eventually, they become a fatal fact when Antigone kills herself at the end of the tragedy. She kills herself after her body is seized, not by the words of a god, but by her own words. A god never appears as a dramatis persona in this play. Antigone does not act like a puppet of the gods. Of course, she refers

[15] Some of the following arguments are from my article *Sophokles' Antigone. Zur tragischen Ironie von Zeit und Handlung* (1997, republished in Heuner 2001: 9–34). Here they are presented in abbreviated form and new contexts.

in the second epeisodion to the unchangeable divine laws that demand the burial of Polynices. She subjects human time to the unchangeable divine temporal order. She tries to resist every change in time. But then, surprisingly, between her exit in the second epeisodion and her entrance in the fourth, Antigone changes her mind. Now, the burial of Polynices is not a necessity under divine law, but one she has identified by means of thought (*Ant.* 904–912). No reasons can be found in the play for this significant change in Antigone's thinking. It is the empty time between exit and entrance which has changed her mind; the new secular dramatic time which destroys the divine temporal order to which Antigone referred in the second epeisodion. I argue that it is not the gods who seize Antigone's body, as they seized the bodies of the heroes in the *Iliad*, but time. Time seizes her and forces her to say things she would never have said before.[16]

When Creon appears onstage for the first time in the first epeisodion he is already one step behind Antigone in the dramatic race. When he once more proclaims his edict to the chorus of the old men, Antigone is at the same time violating it off stage (*Ant.* 162–210). The offstage action of the burial is already relevant for the characters onstage when it takes place. But this relevance is only virtual. The burial actually becomes a dramatic effect only then when it is reported onstage by the watchman, after Creon's public edict (cf. *Ant.* 223ff.).

The messenger's report is one of the most important speech acts in Greek tragedy. It implies specific internal and external relationships between saying and doing. Like an order or an announcement, a report implies a time difference between saying something and doing something. But the doing occurs *before* the saying. A messenger normally gives information in the present about what others did in the past. This is the external relationship.

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[16] In his book on *Change of Mind in Greek Tragedy* (1995) John Gibert excludes lines 904–912 from his survey because the scene is 'retrospective' and presents 'second thoughts' (28–31). Gibert's exclusion is surprising because this passage is very important for the discussion of 'Sophocles' attitude to consistency in characterisation' (Lloyd-Jones & Wilson) along with the problem of the authenticity of these lines. Lloyd-Jones & Wilson (1997: 81) mention important texts concerning this problem. See also Rösler (1993). In my view, the 'second thoughts' of Antigone signal her change of mind and constitute the special tragic irony of this figure: At the very moment when Antigone realizes that before the burial she had an open future, it is already too late. She no longer has one. The same changing time which is responsible for her change of mind and forces her to realize that she in fact once had an open future, now brings total desperation, because events in time are irreversible.

The report informs about a fact in the past. But it does not only inform. The fact in the past now becomes relevant for the characters onstage who listen to the report. For them it is as if it were happening at the moment. The report becomes the representative of the past event.[17] The past event becomes present and part of the dramatic continuity onstage. But nobody can contest it. It is like a spear which is thrown onstage and nobody can swerve out of the way. It is too late. Every report signals a Too-Late.[18] The deeds offstage are of no interest to the characters onstage until they are informed about them. It is the messenger who makes the deed an important fact for those who were not witnesses to the deed. This is the internal relationship between saying and doing: reporting a fact is making a fact. And this is the reason why messengers are so often criticized or punished for their reports.

The body of Antigone had been seized by her own words onstage before it subsequently acted offstage. Then, the words of the watchman were seized by the action of Antigone's body. Now, by reporting, the messenger makes the characters onstage victims of the offstage action. The offstage action dominates the characters onstage. Deeds rule over words because of their spatial and temporal separation. When the characters act by speaking onstage, something can happen offstage that is very important for them but they have no chance of having any influence. It is simply too far away for them. And when they are informed about it later by a messenger onstage, it is too late. The event is already an irreversible fact. In *Antigone*, the verbal reflections onstage always run after the non-verbal actions. The words of Creon especially lag behind the deeds of Antigone. Offstage is the place where Antigone acts physically with her body. Onstage is the

[17] Irene de Jong concludes from her examinations of the Euripidean messenger-speeches that the messenger is not '[. . .] an emotionless camera which registers off-stage events, [. . .]'; the messenger '[. . .] contributes a perspective of his own, [. . .]' (1991: 115–116). This conclusion also applies to the messenger-speeches in Sophoclean plays, especially to the speech of the watchman in *Antigone*. By calling this report a representative of a past event I neglect the personal perspective of the messenger.

[18] This argument only applies to an objective and ontological viewpoint: every report signals a Too-Late, because the reported events are irreversible. But from a subjective point of view, as Rush Rehm pointed out to me, a report can also signal a 'finally'; if, for instance, somebody is informed by a report about the death of an enemy. Of course, the death of his enemy is irreversible, but he does not care about it.

place of Creon acting with—too many—words. And when he exits and begins to act physically at the end of the play, he is too late.

The characters onstage think and speak. But thinking and speaking take time. Time which the tragic heroes do not have any more (in contrast to the epic heroes). Somebody who thinks and speaks too much is always physically too late or is caught up by the reports of violent deeds done by others.

The starting point of the play was Creon's edict, followed by Antigone's announcement that she will violate it. Then followed the burial, the actual violation, and finally the report of this violation. The report is like the kickback of a punching ball, which Creon hit when giving his edict. It demonstrates the powerlessness of human edicts and orders, even if they are given by kings. The physical action of a lonely woman is more powerful than the word of a king. Physical deeds are more powerful than words in general. The strong separation of deeds and words in *Antigone* makes that clear. A physical action always effects an irreversible fact. No words can cancel it. But words, human words, can be cancelled by physical actions.

But what about divine words in *Antigone*? The divine appears onstage with the entrance of the seer Tiresias in the fifth epeisodion. After trying to persuade Creon to change his mind, he prophesies that Creon will be punished by the gods and that therefore a member of his family will die (*Ant.* 1064–1090). This is a divine prophecy. It tells us what is going to happen in the future. Furthermore, it tells us that what is going to happen is to be done by the gods. A god is able to do everything by saying it. A divine prophecy in Greek tragedy is a speech act with perlocutionary effects which are not contingent but determined. If a god prophesies by a seer that he is going to do something, it is now already done by the words of the seer. On that score, it is already too late for Creon when he hears the prophecy of Tiresias. But Creon does not realize this. He asks himself whether he should yield or resist. He asks the chorus what to do. The chorus tells him to release Antigone and to hurry before the divine avengers catch up (*Ant.* 1095–1104). Then Creon leaves the realm of the word for the first time. He exits and enters the realm of physical acting offstage. When he arrives at the burial vault of Antigone, she has already killed herself and his son Haemon is killing himself. Creon is too late. But why? Three answers may be given, which do not exclude each other:

(i) Creon is too late because of the divine prophecy. He is a victim of the divine temporal order. It was already too late when Tiresias prophesied the divine punishment. In this way Creon's race against time was senseless.
(ii) Creon is too late because he has lost the race against the divine avengers. This is the point of view of Creon and the chorus.
(iii) Creon looses the race against Antigone or against the dramatic development. He was always one step behind Antigone's physical actions. When he then tries to catch up by going offstage it is too late. He and the others onstage have been thinking and speaking too much. Even Tiresias' prophecy as a divine speech act is given in human, secular time. The gods need somebody who prophesies within the human temporal order. It takes ordinary time. The time the prophecy takes could be exactly that which makes Creon come too late when he tries to release Antigone afterwards offstage. The divine 'Too Late' of the content of the prophecy opposes the secular 'Too Late' in its form. The form contradicts the content. The prophecy is the point of intersection, where the vertical axis of the divine tragic dimension intersects with the horizontal axis of the secular tragic dimension. I would like to call the prophecy an ironic performative utterance. It is doing what it is saying in two ways. On the one hand, the gods do what is said by determining the future. All that is going to happen until the time Creon looses a member of his family is determined by the gods. All actions and words are parts of the divine temporal order, as in the epics. On the other hand, the divine speech act is part of the new secular time. It is doing what it is being said but in a contradictorily ironic manner. The dramatic time undermines the divine time, making a divine speech act a human action; an action within the human, secular world.

I would like to conclude by speaking about another speech act: the curse. At first glance, a curse in Greek tragedy is just like a prophecy, an utterance with determined perlocutionary effects. In contrast to a divine prophecy, a curse is a human speech act with metaphysical power. Human characters in Greek tragedy can determine the future by curses. What is said is going to be done because it has been said. That is the difference between a curse and a divine prophecy in Greek tragedy. A god can do what is said in a prophecy without prophesying it. A curse must be said. The magic power is created

by the speech act. A curse creates a paradox of time: that which happens in the future is done now by the speech act. For the one who is cursed, it is too late. From now on, he is unable to act independently.

According to Judith Butler, the whole story of *Antigone* is determined by the curses of Oedipus in *Oedipus Coloneus*. He predicts that his sons Polynices and Eteocles are going to kill each other (*OC* 1383–1396). Butler says: '[. . .] his words seize and kill his sons, seize them and make them murderous, [. . .]'.[19] And later on:

> The relation between word and deed becomes hopelessly entangled in the familial scene, every word transmutes into event, or, indeed, "fatal fact," [*sic*] in Hölderlin's phrase. Every deed is the apparent temporal effect of some prior word, instituting the temporality of tragic belatedness, that all that happens has already happened, will come to appear as the always already happening, a word and a deed entangled and extended through time through the force of repetition. (2000: 64)

I would like to contradict her. First of all, I think it is problematic that Butler treats the Theban Plays of Sophocles like a trilogy.[20] But even if we ignore this problem, I would not agree with her ideas about the relationship between words and deeds. In my view, the 'tragic belatedness' is not instituted by deeds as the effects of prior words. Of course, this is one of the relationships in *Antigone* between words onstage and deeds offstage. But eventually, deeds in *Antigone* rule over words because of the belatedness of the latter.

I began my article—following Hölderlin—with killing words, with divine words which kill by seizing the bodies of tragic heroes. But in the progression of my argumentation, I have come to the conclusion that words in Greek tragedies are not so much killing words, but rather words 'being killed'. The Sophoclean plays (especially *Antigone*) demonstrate the powerlessness of speech acts in relation to non-verbal

[19] Butler (2000: 64).

[20] On the one hand, Butler treats the dramatic actions of *Oedipus Coloneus* and of *Antigone* as parts of a fictitious time continuity. On the other hand, she notices: 'Although Sophocles wrote *Antigone* several years before *Oedipus at Colonus*, the action that takes place in the former *follows* the action of the latter. What is the significance of this belatedness? [. . .] The action predicted by the curse for the future turns out to be an action that has been happening all along, [. . .] The curse establishes a temporality for the action it ordains that predates the curse itself.' (2000: 61) This paradox of time is a constructed paradox, because Butler combines three time structures in an illegitimate way: the fictitious time structures of the two plays and the chronological order of the playwriting.

actions. Human deeds rule over human words because of the spatio-temporal separation of words and deeds, so that words always lag behind the deeds.[21] Divine and magic speech acts are transformed into human, secular speech acts by the undermining dramatic time. Therefore, they have to contest with the physical actions, as every human speech act.

[21] Sophocles' *Ajax* is an exception. In the second half of this play words rule over non-verbal actions. Cf. Heuner (2001: 35–64).

THE POLYSEMY OF GNOMIC EXPRESSIONS AND AJAX' DECEPTION SPEECH

André Lardinois

One of the most controversial passages in the extant plays of Sophocles is the so-called *Trugrede* or deception speech of Ajax (*Aj.* 646–692).[1] The speech has sparked an intense scholarly debate because the chorus and Tecmessa, who listen to it, interpret it to mean that Ajax has given up his desire to commit suicide, which he expressed earlier in the play. When Ajax reappears on stage, however, he is still intent upon killing himself and does not appear to have undergone any change in this respect. So what is Ajax' speech all about, and has he changed or has he not?

Three main interpretations have been offered to explain the reaction of the chorus and Tecmessa. According to the first interpretation, Ajax at this point in the play has, temporarily, given up his intention to commit suicide. Tecmessa and the chorus therefore understand his words correctly. According to the second interpretation, Ajax still intends to kill himself, but he deliberately misleads the chorus and Tecmessa with words that hide the truth from them. The third interpretation agrees with the second that Ajax still wishes to kill himself but maintains that he does not deliberately try to mislead Tecmessa or the chorus. Instead, it is they who fail to understand his words, which point quite clearly at a suicide.[2]

Few modern critics defend the first interpretation, which presupposes an unmotivated change in Ajax' attitude, both here and again in the third epeisodion, where Ajax does kill himself. I will therefore leave this interpretation out of consideration. The debate really centers on the second and third interpretations and on the question as to

[1] I would like to thank Ruth Scodel, Vincent Hunink and the two editors for their valuable comments and suggestions to this paper. I alone remain responsible for any flaws in the argument.

[2] For an overview of recent opinions, see Garvie (1998: 184–186) and Hesk (2003: 74–95). For earlier views on the scene: Stanford (1963: 281–288) and Kamerbeek (1934: 115–125).

whether or not Ajax deliberately tries to deceive his interlocutors. Most scholars prefer the second interpretation, but I will argue in this paper in favor of the third interpretation, according to which Ajax does not lie to Tecmessa and the chorus but they fail to understand his words.[3]

In the development of my argument, the writings of the honorand of this volume, Coen Kamerbeek, were indispensable. Although Kamerbeek favors the second interpretation, both in his dissertation and later in his commentary on the play,[4] he in fact offers several arguments in support of the third interpretation through his precise and careful reading of the language of Ajax' speech, the strongest aspect of Kamerbeek's commentaries in general. Kamerbeek is very good at detecting ambiguities in the text, which help to explain how Tecmessa and the chorus can misunderstand Ajax' words. My interpretation differs from his in that Kamerbeek believes that Ajax *intends* to deceive Tecmessa and the chorus with these ambiguities, whereas I believe that they are unintentional.

My interpretation will focus on the six *gnômai* Ajax delivers in the speech, grouped together in four sections: lines 646–649, 665, 669–676 and 679–683. Together they make up almost a third of the whole speech, which is much more than the usual number in Sophoclean speeches.[5] Gnomic expressions are notoriously difficult to interpret because they are by definition polysemous and applicable to many different situations. They are sometimes referred to as *ainoi* or riddles in Greek literature, and Sir Richard Jebb comes close to the truth when he says that Ajax' speech is so composed as to 'give the spectators the kind of pleasure which is felt in guessing a riddle'.[6]

In Book 2 of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle delivers his famous definition of a Greek *gnômê*, according to which it is a statement not about

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[3] This interpretation was first proposed by Welcker (1845) and is supported by Ebeling (1941: 299); Knox (1961); Taplin (1979); Seaford (1994: 395); and Gibert (1995: 120–135). I do not understand Garvie's objection to it, namely that 'the many verbal ambiguities [in the speech] [. . .] must indicate a conscious attempt to deceive' (1998: 185). Sophocles' tragedies are full of ambiguities unintended by their speakers: one need only think of Oedipus' words in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* or Creon's speeches in *Antigone*, on which see Markantonatos (1973).

[4] Kamerbeek (1934; 1963).

[5] The gnomic content of Ajax' speech was already noted by Wolf (1910: 88–91), whose analysis of the speech is otherwise disappointing. He judges Ajax' use of gnomic wisdom in the speech to be ironic or even sarcastic.

[6] Jebb (1896: xxxv). For ancient references to *gnômai* as riddles, see Martin (1889: 3–4); Kindstrand (1978: 79); and Lardinois (1995: 27–28).

particulars but about general things, and not about all general things but about human actions (Arist. *Rh.* 1394a21–26). Later on, in the same section, Aristotle adds another important characteristic, when he says that 'people are pleased if someone in a general observation hits upon opinions that they themselves have about a particular instance'.[7] One can deduce from this comment that *gnômai* relate to particular situations, even though they are voiced in general terms, and that it is the listener who applies the general statement to the particular case.

Sophocles' plays abound with examples. In the first epeisodion of *Ajax*, for instance, Tecmessa tells the chorus how she tried to persuade Ajax to stay with her in the tent, but, as she recalls, he spoke to her 'the brief and oft quoted words: "Woman, silence is an adornment for women." 'Having understood this', Tecmessa continues, 'I stopped speaking'.[8] Tecmessa, in other words, understands Ajax' general statement about women to be applicable to her own, particular situation and therefore stops speaking.

In modern research of proverbial expressions, the context in which such sayings are used has gained critical importance.[9] This research has shown not only that proverbial expressions are, in normal usage, always applied to a particular situation, but also that the particular situation helps to determine the meaning of the proverb. Thus the English proverb 'A friend in need is a friend indeed' can be about someone giving or receiving friendship, depending on the context in which the expression is being used, and it is ultimately up to the listener to decide to which particular situation the saying applies.[10] In the application of a proverbial expression lies part of its rhetorical force. When Tecmessa applies the saying 'silence is an adornment for women' to herself and stops speaking, she at the same time acknowledges the validity of the gnomic thought.

In most situations the listener is not entirely left to his or her own devices, because the speaker can steer the interpretation of the general

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[7] Trans. G.A. Kennedy. Arist. *Rh.* 1395b5–6: χαίρουσι δὲ καθόλου λεγομένων ἃ κατὰ μέρος προϋπολαμβάνοντες τυγχάνουσιν.

[8] *Aj.* 292–294: ὁ δ' εἶπε πρός με βαί', ἀεὶ δ' ὑμνούμενα/'γύναι, γυναιξὶ κόσμον ἡ σιγὴ φέρει'./κἀγὼ μαθοῦσ' ἔληξ', ὁ δ' ἐσσύθη μόνος. The Greek text is that of Lloyd-Jones & Wilson (1990a); translations are loosely based on those of Lloyd-Jones (1994–1996) and Garvie (1998).

[9] Greek *gnômai* are not the same as modern proverbs, but they share important characteristics and can be effectively studied in the same way (Lardinois 1997; 2001).

[10] Kirschenblatt-Gimblett (1981: 113). For more recent studies dealing with modern proverbs and their contexts, see Mieder (1989: 20–21).

expression by mentioning at the same time the particular situation to which he wants the saying to be applied. Such a statement by the speaker of the manner in which a proverbial expression applies to a particular situation is called an 'explanation' by modern paroemiologists.[11] Very often such explanations use words similar to those employed in the general expression. In the example from the *Ajax* just quoted, Ajax addresses Tecmessa with the same word, γύναι ('woman'), he uses in the gnomic saying, thus clearly inviting Tecmessa to identify herself, as woman, with the women (γυναιξί) of the general expression. In this case, Ajax' 'explanation' precedes the general expression, but an explanation can follow the expression as well. Explanations of Greek *gnômai* may consist of exact word repetitions, as in this case, but also of synonyms, verbal echoes, or even antonyms.[12]

A Greek speaker can also connect a gnomic statement to the particular situation to which he wants the saying to apply, by inserting a particle or conjunction, such as γάρ or ἐπεί, at the beginning of the gnomic expression. Ajax adopts both strategies in lines 669–670 of his great speech, where he quotes the general expression: 'for even the formidable and most powerful things bow to office' (καὶ γὰρ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰ καρτερώτατα/τιμαῖς ὑπείκει). Here the finite verb ὑπείκει picks up on ὑπεικτέον in line 668 and on the infinitive εἴκειν in line 667, which both are part of Ajax' 'explanation' preceding the gnomic expression. The particle γάρ, here strengthened by καί, forms another indication that Ajax intends the saying to apply to the situation he described in the preceding lines.[13] The hero thus tries to guide the chorus and Tecmessa in the interpretation of his words, but it is important to remember that gnomic expressions are in and of themselves polysemous: they can apply to many different situations and it is the listener who must ultimately make a cogent interpretation.

In the case of Ajax' speech, moreover, as with all general expressions embedded in a literary discourse, one has to distinguish between two different listeners, namely the text-internal and the text-external addressees. It is not uncommon for proverbial expressions in literature to have different meanings at the level of the internal and external

[11] Kirschenblatt-Gimblett (1974: 303) and Seitel (1977: 91).

[12] For a discussion of explanations surrounding the 'proverb text' of Greek *gnômai*, see Lardinois (1997: 218–219).

[13] For the pairing of καὶ and γάρ in arguments, see Denniston (1954: 108–109).

addressees.[14] The polysemous nature of such expressions increases the different layers of interpretation. In this case, as so often in tragedy, there is a discrepancy between the things the text-internal addressees (Tecmessa and the chorus) know and those which the text-external addressee (the Athenian audience) knows, creating the well-known effect of dramatic irony. The audience of the play, for example, knows from the mythical tradition that Ajax will die by committing suicide, and is therefore more likely to interpret Ajax' words in this light than Tecmessa or the chorus, who at this point in the play still hope that he will decide to live.

I will now go through the speech in order to determine how Ajax, in my opinion, intends his gnomic sayings to be understood and how the chorus and Tecmessa may have understood them instead. In most cases the text-external audience will have been able to comprehend Ajax' intentions because of their superior knowledge about the course of events. Their response contrasts with the limited understanding of Tecmessa and the chorus on stage. Tecmessa will maintain till the very end that Ajax deceived her, but the chorus recognizes its own responsibility, when it blames itself for being 'completely deaf and completely without understanding' (911) in its dealings with Ajax.

Ajax opens his speech with a double *gnômê* (646–649): ἅπανθ' ὁ μακρὸς κἀναρίθμητος χρόνος/φύει τ' ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται·/κοὐκ ἔστ' ἄελπτον οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἁλίσκεται/χὠ δεινὸς ὅρκος χαὶ περισκελεῖς φρένες, 'Long and immeasurable time brings forth all things that are obscure and when they have come to light hides them again. There is nothing that is beyond expectation, but the dread oath and obstinate minds are brought to heel.' Ajax picks up on the second of these two *gnômai* in the explanation that follows in lines 650–651: τὰ δείν' (line 650) echoes δεινὸς in the previous line and ἐκαρτέρουν picks up on the hardness implied in περισκελεῖς φρένες. Ajax thus wants the saying to apply to himself, as is also shown by the emphatic placement of καὶ ἐγώ at the beginning of line 650 and the subsequent particle γάρ, which draws a logical connection between the previous statement and the following explanation. Ajax admits that he behaved like a man who had sworn a dreadful oath or had stubborn ideas, but now he has changed.

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[14] See Abrahams & Babcock (1977); also Foley (1994) on some special ways in which epics can use proverbial expressions, and Lardinois (1997: 229–233).

This change is expressed by the words ἐθηλύνθην στόμα in line 651: whereas Ajax first was obstinate or strong with regard to his thoughts, he is now weak and feminine with regard to his mouth or 'edge', because, as Kamerbeek points out in his commentary, the word στόμα in this line is ambivalent: it can refer to Ajax' mouth but also to the sharp edge of a sword, with which the hero compares himself in the preceding simile.[15] Ajax, in other words, has undergone a real change and, when he says in the next line that he feels pity for Tecmessa and his son, we may take his pronouncement as genuine, although it is not immediately clear to what this pity will lead.

Tecmessa had called on Ajax to soften his character in the previous scene (594). It is therefore understandable that she and the chorus take ἐθηλύνθην στόμα to mean that Ajax has come around to their point of view. These words are, however, part of an extended comparison between Ajax and an iron sword that is hardened by a process of alternate heating and cooling. The whole process by which swords were forged is well explained by Jebb in an appendix to his commentary and, more recently, by Elizabeth Belfiore.[16] After the iron ore was melted and forged in the shape of a sword, the newly fashioned sword would be dipped in cold water. This process not only cooled the sword off but actually strengthened the iron. In the same way, when a sword had become dull, its 'edge' or στόμα would be reheated, hammered out, and again dipped in cold water to strengthen it.

It is this process that Ajax describes in lines 650 and following. Ajax says that he once was wonderfully strong (ἐκαρτέρουν), like an iron sword hardened by being dipped in cold water, but now his edge (στόμα) has been made soft again, because of the pity he feels for Tecmessa and his son. If Ajax abandoned the process at this stage, he would remain weak, like melted iron, but he continues: he will go to bathe himself in the sea (*Aj.* 654–655). It is this bathing, in the cold water of the sea, that will restore the sharp edge of his disposition, like the edge of a reheated sword. Ajax, in other words, uses the warm feelings Tecmessa and his son invoke in him not to abandon his resolve, but to strengthen it.[17]

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[15] Kamerbeek (1963: *ad* 650–652).

[16] Jebb (1896: 229–230); Belfiore (2000: 114).

[17] Belfiore (2000: 114). The alternate meaning of ἐθηλύνθην στόμα, namely 'the feminizing of the mouth as the organ of speech', may refer to the present speech,

This same passage shows that the first *gnômê* Ajax speaks (*Aj.* 646–647) is applicable to himself as well, but again in a different way than Tecmessa or the chorus understand. Ajax is willing to undergo the changes with time that are described in these opening lines: Ajax was hardened, now soft, and will be hardened again. Tecmessa and the chorus take Ajax' words to mean that he has gone one time from hard to soft; the changes effected by time, however, often repeat themselves or are reversed, like the alternations of the seasons or the transition from night to day or from sleep to awakening which Ajax will describe in lines 670–676. At the same time, Ajax' words in lines 646–647 may refer to another, more permanent change in time: the transition from life to death. As Kamerbeek observes in his dissertation, the words φανέντα κρύπτεται most naturally pertain to Ajax' approaching death and the text-external audience probably would have understood them in this way.[18] How, then, could Tecmessa and the chorus have missed this meaning? The reason is the inherent polysemy of the gnomic expression, which can refer to a multitude of changes over time: from hard to soft and from obstinate thoughts to flexible ones, but also from soft to hard or from life to death. Without the superior knowledge of the text-external audience, which knows that Ajax will kill himself, it is easy to misinterpret these words.

Ajax proclaims his next gnomic expression, which he introduces as a truthful *paroimia* of mortals, in lines 664–665: 'But truthful is the saying of mortals: Gifts of enemies are no gifts and bring no profit' (ἀλλ' ἔστ' ἀληθὴς ἡ βροτῶν παροιμία,/ἐχθρῶν ἄδωρα δῶρα κοὐκ ὀνήσιμα). I will not discuss here the difference between *gnômai* and *paroimiai*, which is slight,[19] nor what it means for a speaker to introduce a general expression as 'a truthful saying of mortals'.[20] It is interesting to contrast this introduction, however, with that of the two *gnômai* Ajax speaks in lines 678–683. There Ajax proclaims that it was his own understanding (ἐπίσταμαι) which led him to believe that one must hate an enemy as one who will sometime become a

which is exceptionally lyrical (see below). Poetry and rhetoric were often associated with the feminine in ancient Greece (Bergren 1983 and McClure 2001: 5). For the ideal spectator all these meanings of the phrase can be operative at the same time.

[18] Kamerbeek (1934: 120). Cf. Ferguson (1970: 18).

[19] See Lardinois (1995: 14–17) and Russo (1997: 55–57).

[20] Basically, a speaker validates the expression in this way by appealing to an outside authority: Lardinois (1997: 220, esp. note 42).

friend. This contrast is the more poignant because these two *gnômai* deconstruct, as it were, the *paroimia* of line 665: they show that the enemies mentioned in the *paroimia* are not a stable category. But even at line 665 it is not entirely clear to what Ajax wants this saying to refer, due to the polysemy of the expression: the many possible gifts it can apply to and the uncertainty as to who Ajax' friends are and who his enemies.

One possible reading, which most commentators together with Tecmessa and the chorus seem to adopt, is to make the saying apply to Ajax' sword, which he received as a gift from Hector: Ajax refers to this sword as a 'gift' (δώρημα) of the most hostile Hector in line 662. It is also possible, however, in light of the changing make-up of Ajax' friends and enemies, to apply the saying to anything he might get in the future from the Atridae, whom he has identified earlier in the speech as his 'enemies' (ἐχθροῖς, 653).

The particle τοιγάρ ('therefore, in consequence') at the beginning of line 666 also suggests that Ajax wants this saying to apply not just to Hector and his sword, but also to the Atridae. It is because he cannot expect anything good from them in the future, while alive, that he *therefore* (τοιγάρ) will yield to the gods and show reverence to the Atridae. This so-called 'yielding', in turn, will be different from what Tecmessa and the chorus expect: Ajax will not surrender but, instead, reconcile himself with the gods and with the Greek army by killing himself. At lines 654–656, Ajax had said that he wanted to go to the seashore to purify himself and to escape the grievous anger of the goddess Athena. This purification and reconciliation with the goddess take the form of a self-immolation.[21] At the same time, by killing himself, he yields to the Atridae in so far as his death can be seen as punishment for his treacherous attack on them. Exacting with his own hand the retribution they seek, he repays his debt to them and forestalls the need to further punish him or his relatives.[22]

Tecmessa and the chorus apply the saying about the 'giftless gifts of enemies' to the sword of Hector, because they have not under-

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[21] Jebb (1896: xxxviii), Sicherl (1977: 96–97); and Belfiore (2000: 111). Cf. Scodel: 'Ajax sees his death as a reconciliation with the gods, and the reconciliation is successful' (1984: 20). Garvie (1998: 188) disagrees.

[22] Taplin (1979: 125) and Belfiore (2000: 112–113). Agamemnon and Menelaus, of course, will want to punish Ajax further by denying his corpse burial, but this is seen by the chorus (1092), Teucer (1096, 1129, 1388) and Odysseus (1335, 1342–1345) as excessive and unjust, and it ultimately does not happen.

stood what Ajax intends to do with it. Ajax says in lines 658–659 that he wants to dig away the earth and hide the sword, where no one will see it (κρύψω τόδ' ἔγχος τοὐμόν, ἔχθιστον βελῶν,/γαίας ὀρύξας ἔνθα μή τις ὄψεται). Tecmessa and the chorus understand these words to mean that he will dig a hole in the ground in which he will hide the sword, so that no one will ever see it again. This is not what his words have to mean, however, nor what he wants them to say: Ajax intends to hide the sword not in the earth, but in himself; he will dig away the earth not to bury the whole sword but only its hilt, so he can fall on it; and he will ensure not only that the sword is unseen but his act of suicide.[23] The fact that Tecmessa and the chorus misunderstand his intentions is due again, in no small part, to the polysemy of the gnomic expression in line 665, which precisely because of its general validity can apply to different sets of enemies, both Greek and Trojan, and different kinds of gifts, both in the future and in the past.

In lines 669–670 Ajax delivers a *gnômê* that illustrates the need to yield: καὶ γὰρ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰ καρτερώτατα/τιμαῖς ὑπείκει ('For even the most formidable and powerful things bow to office'). I already pointed to the verb ὑπείκει, which echoes the verbal adjective ὑπεικτέον and the infinitive εἴκειν in lines 667–668, thus demonstrating that Ajax refers to his own need to yield. Ajax augments this thought with four examples from nature, which technically constitute an 'expansion' of the initial gnomic saying: winter gives way to summer, night to day, storm to calm sea, and sleep to awakening.[24] Tecmessa and the chorus seem to think that Ajax has come around to their point of view, but it is obvious that the changes Ajax speaks about can apply, just like the change effected by time in lines 646–647, to a different kind of transition as well, namely from life to death. Several words he employs are ambiguous and seem to indicate that Ajax is, as Kamerbeek says, 'possessed with the thought of suicide'.[25] The verb ἐκοίμισε, with which the fierce wind 'lulls to rest' the groaning sea, is later used by Ajax to refer to his own death (*Aj.* 832), and Sleep, who 'releases' those whom he has bound, is the

[23] Kamerbeek (1934: 122; 1963: *ad* 658). Cf. Hesk (2003: 79).

[24] *Aj.* 670–676. On the expansion of *gnômai*, which gives them greater weight, see Lardinois (2001: 99).

[25] Kamerbeek (1963: *ad* 674, 675). The two examples cited in the following sentence also come from his commentary. Cf. Ferguson (1970: 19).

same as the sleep of death, whose coming Ajax welcomes as a release from troubles (cf. σεσωμένον, 692). Tecmessa and the chorus, however, misunderstand his words and continue to hope that he will surrender himself to the Atridae.

The two final *gnômai* in lines 678–683 pertain to another change: that from friend to enemy and enemy to friend.[26] I have already commented on the way these sayings, in retrospect, help to color the meaning of the *paroimia* in line 665. They allow us to see that Ajax' former friends, the Atridae, have become his enemies, while his former enemy, Hector, has become his friend: at line 822, Ajax will declare that Hector's sword now serves him 'most loyally' (εὐνούστατον). Ajax' words also predict, in a way, the change of Odysseus at the end of the play, from his sworn enemy to his champion. While this is all quite clear to the external audience (or will be), Tecmessa and the chorus apply Ajax' sayings to the hoped for reconciliation of Ajax with the Atridae, who consequently would change from being his enemies back to being his friends.[27] Their misreading of Ajax' words is understandable because of the polysemous nature of the gnomic expression, which makes it hard to determine to which friends or enemies, in the future or in the past, Ajax refers.

There are more predictions in this speech, outside the gnomic references, not only about Ajax' death but even about the time after his death, when Ajax will be rehabilitated. They are best brought out in Oliver Taplin's reading of the speech.[28] The clearest examples are Ajax' comment in line 684 that all will be well (εὖ σχήσει) and the last line of the speech, in which he predicts that he will be saved (σεσωμένον). These words refer to Ajax' exoneration and heroization in the second half of the play.[29] The external audience, which venerated Ajax as one of the eponymous heroes of Attica, may well

[26] Lines 678–682 constitute, in my view, a general expression despite its personal wording ('in helping a friend I shall aim to assist him as one assists a man who will not remain a friend forever'). One finds similar first-person indefinite statements in Pindar: see Lardinois (1995: 265) with full references.

[27] Cf. Stevens (1986: 334).

[28] Taplin (1979: esp. 125–127).

[29] See Burian (1972); Henrichs (1993); and Seaford (1994: 129–130, esp. note 121) on the heroization of Ajax in the second half of the play, and Taplin (1979: 126) on line 692 as alluding to Ajax' rehabilitation. All will be well not just for Ajax but also for Tecmessa, who will not only return to Salamis safely with her son, Eurysaces, but actually will gain in status, as former wife of Ajax and mother of his only surving son (Ormand 1999: 116–119; Belfiore 2000: 113).

have picked up on these positive allusions at the end of the speech.[30] But what about Ajax himself? How could he know that all would be well or that Odysseus would change to being his friend?

According to Taplin, Ajax himself could not have foreseen what would happen to him after his death, because 'he is no seer'.[31] But in a way he is a seer, because he is a man who is about to die.[32] The ancient Greeks believed that people at the brink of death had visions of the future, as the Homeric examples of Patroclus and Hector, who both predict the slaying of their enemies, show.[33] The Athenian audience, which knew about his impending suicide, therefore may have recognized Ajax' speech as that of a man about to die. The special moment at which Ajax delivers his speech, just before his death, helps to explain not only its prophetic character but also its extraordinary lyrical quality and the broad vistas it paints.[34] Ajax' speech is in part a prophetic speech and the riddling aspects of its *gnômai* matches the riddling aspect of prophecies. It can be compared to the speech of Cassandra in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, whose riddling words are understood by the text-external audience, which knows the myth and knows that Cassandra and Agamemnon are about to die, but not by the characters on stage. Ajax' speech is not a deceptive speech, but a speech misunderstood.

[30] Griffin (1999: 86) is unduly sceptical about possible allusions to Ajax' heroization in the play and ignores what Robert Parker (1999: 19), in the same volume, calls 'the mechanism of triggered responses', i.e. 'necessary reactions by the audience, sometimes involving its prior knowledge of myth, to structural features of the play, or to words spoken, or to both'. Ajax' heroization was a historical and religious reality for Sophocles' audience, and it would need little encouragement to recognize allusions to it in the play.

[31] Taplin (1979: 126), who later speaks, however, of Ajax' 'almost mantic lines' (129).

[32] Cf. Scodel (1984: 23).

[33] Hom. *Il.* 16.851–854; 22.355–360. For more examples from antiquity, see Janko (1992: *ad Il.* 16.852–854) and Ogden (2001: 261).

[34] See Richard Buxton's contribution to this volume for the special register of Ajax' speech, and Macintosh (1994: 91–126, esp. 97–98; 1996) for the broad vistas and temporal expansions of final speeches in tragedy generally. It may be noted that the speech of Macbeth ('Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow'), to which Buxton compares Ajax' speech, is also delivered just before his death.

SOPHOCLES IN THE LIGHT OF FACE-THREAT POLITENESS THEORY

Michael Lloyd

Kamerbeek does not on the whole have much to say about politeness in Sophocles, but he makes some perceptive comments on the divine voice which summons Oedipus to his final resting-place:

> ὦ οὗτος οὗτος, Οἰδίπους, τί μέλλομεν
> χωρεῖν; πάλαι δὴ τἀπὸ σοῦ βραδύνεται. (*OC* 1627–1628)
>
> You there, Oedipus, why do we wait to go? There has been too much delay on your part.[1]

Kamerbeek points out that the god would have been less polite if he had said τί μέλλεις ('why do you wait?') and πάλαι δὴ σὺ βραδύνεις ('you have delayed too long'). This is plausible, and it is worth considering exactly why Kamerbeek's alternatives would have been less polite. The matter is complicated by the god's opening words ὦ οὗτος οὗτος ('you there'). LSJ (*s.v.* οὗτος C.I.5) think that this idiomatic use of οὗτος (lit. 'this man') 'mostly implies anger, impatience, or scorn'. Eleanor Dickey, by contrast, argues that it is 'extremely informal' rather than offensive.[2] Here are two very different views of the god's words, and there have been others. The tone of this divine summons expresses the god's attitude to Oedipus at an intensely significant moment, and will thus do much to determine our understanding of the whole play.

Face-threat politeness theory

Politeness has been helpfully analysed as a universal human phenomenon by Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson (1987). Their theory has been applied not only to contemporary societies but also

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[1] Texts and translations from Sophocles are taken, slightly adapted, from the Loeb edition of H. Lloyd-Jones (1994–1996).

[2] Dickey (1996: 154–156); cf. Stevens (1976: 37–38). On οὗτος see also Ruijgh in this volume, pp. 155ff.

to works of literature (e.g. Brown & Gilman 1989; Sifianou 1992). The first basic concept in Brown and Levinson's theory is 'face'. The term 'face' is familiar in English from such expressions as 'saving face' and 'losing face', but it is used in politeness theory in a somewhat specialized sense (derived from Goffman 1967). There are two kinds of face. The first, termed 'positive face', is the want to be approved of or admired. This want is assumed to be universal. The positive face of the hearer in a talk exchange would be threatened (e.g.) by criticism or abuse. The positive face of the speaker would be threatened (e.g.) by an apology or a confession. The second kind of face, termed 'negative face', is the want not to be imposed upon or impeded. This, too, is assumed to be universal. The negative face of the hearer would be threatened (e.g.) by a request or a threat. The negative face of the speaker would be threatened (e.g.) by expressing thanks or accepting an offer.[3]

The other basic concept in Brown and Levinson's theory is the bald-on-record utterance, the most direct and efficient mode of communication. This is defined according to Grice's maxims of conversation (Grice 1975). Grice proposed four maxims which specify the principles governing maximally efficient communication. The maxims are: relevance (be relevant), quantity (say no more or less than is required), quality (be truthful, sincere), and manner (be perspicuous, avoid ambiguity and obscurity). A bald-on-record utterance would frequently be face-threatening, and Brown and Levinson define politeness as deviation from bald-on-record communication in order to reduce the face threat. A distinctive feature of their theory is the argument that every act of politeness is oriented to a face-threatening act ('FTA'). They treat politeness in terms of the rational choices of individuals, rather than in terms of obedience to rules. The cultural specifications of politeness may vary, but the deep structure is universal.

Politeness theory distinguishes two completely different types of politeness. Positive politeness offers redress to positive face (e.g. by expressions of interest, approval, sympathy, agreement, or affection). 'Positive-politeness utterances are used as a kind of metaphorical extension of intimacy' (Brown & Levinson 1987: 103). Negative politeness is

[3] Brown & Levinson (1987: 43–44) observe that they borrow the distinction between positive and negative politeness from Durkheim's distinction between positive and negative rites (Durkheim 1915: 299, 326). They give a useful classification of face-threatening acts on pp. 65–68.

oriented to negative face, and thus aims to leave the hearer an 'out' (i.e. scope for evading or ignoring the FTA) and to minimize the imposition (e.g. by indirectness, deference, or apologies).

The god's summons at the end of *Oedipus Coloneus* threatens Oedipus' positive face by criticizing him for delaying, and his negative face by giving him an order. Eleanor Dickey (1996: 154–156) rightly observes, against LSJ, that the οὗτος locution does not in itself insult the addressee or express ill-will. It does not, in other words, threaten the addressee's positive face. On the other hand, it obviously does threaten the addressee's negative face, as attention-getting expressions inevitably do. This can be impolite, but is not necessarily so. Dickey's suggestion that the οὗτος locution is 'informal' is refuted by a number of examples in tragedy, and above all by the solemnity of the present one. Her English equivalent, 'hey!', seems to belong to a lower register than that required here.

The god redresses this face threat by both positive and negative politeness. The inclusive first-person plural μέλλομεν (*OC* 1627) is a positive politeness gambit, of a kind which is common in Greek and other languages.[4] The indirect τἀπὸ σοῦ βραδύνεται (*OC* 1628) is a negative politeness gambit.[5] The summons thus has polite features, but its overall politeness will depend on two further factors: the relative weighting of the face threat and the redress, and the relationship between the speaker and the hearer.

Face-threat politeness theory takes account of the relative status of speaker and hearer. Oedipus addresses the Theban herdsman as follows:

> οὗτος σύ, πρέσβυ, δεῦρό μοι φώνει βλέπων
> ὅσ' ἄν σ' ἐρωτῶ. Λαΐου ποτ' ἦσθα σύ; (*OT* 1121–1122)
>
> You there, old man, look at me and answer my questions! Did you once belong to Laius?

[4] E.g. Hom. *Il.* 18.273 (εἰ δ' ἂν ἐμοῖς ἐπέεσσι πιθώμεθα is a polite way of saying 'if you follow my advice'); Hom. *Od.* 4.138, 632 (ἴδμεν is polite for 'do *you* know?'); Pl. *R.* 562e (πῶς τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγομεν; is polite for 'what do *you* mean?'); S. *Ph.* 836 (πρὸς τί μενοῦμεν πράσσειν; is polite for 'why do *you* delay?'). Cf. Wackernagel (1926: I.43); Lammermann (1935: 78–80); Brown & Levinson (1987: 119–120, 127–128); Martin (1989: 123–124, 140).

[5] Cf. Poseidon's ἕτοιμ' ἃ βούλῃ τἀπ' ἐμοῦ (E. *Tr.* 74), an indirect way of saying 'I am ready to do what you want'. The whole conversation is extremely polite. For τἀπὸ σοῦ, see LSJ *s.v.* ἀπό III.4.

The οὗτος σύ locution, the unredressed imperative, and the direct question all threaten the herdsman's negative face, but there is nothing particularly offensive about this in view of Oedipus' vastly superior power and status. Unredressed orders are appropriate when addressing inferiors such as slaves (e.g. *El.* 1106; *OT* 144, 945–946, 957, 1069; *OC* 897; οὗτος, βλέπε δεῦρο, Men. *Sam.* 312). It would be a different matter if the hearer did not accept a position of considerable inferiority, and was thus offended by the relationship implied by the whole situation. The messenger's οὗτος, βλέφ' ὧδε ('You there, look this way!') to Lichas (*Tr.* 402) is more offensive, because the hearer is at least the speaker's equal. There are also circumstances where unredressed orders are acceptable even when addressing social equals or superiors, for example if the situation is urgent (e.g. *Aj.* 803–808; *El.* 1236, 1399; *OT* 952–953; *Tr.* 83–85, 340–341; *Ph.* 201, 576–577, 865; *OC* 36–37). Another mitigating factor is 'task orientation', when speaker and hearer are already engaged in co-operative activity and there is no need for every individual exchange to have politeness markers (e.g. *El.* 1367–1371; *Tr.* 598–599; *Ph.* 45–46, 123; *OC* 21, 188, 507–509).[6] The first two of these factors (superiority of the speaker, and urgency) are relevant both to Oedipus' address to the herdsman and to the god's summons to Oedipus.

Gods in tragedy normally adopt a bald-on-record style when addressing humans, in accordance with their vastly superior status and power (e.g. S. *Aj.* 71–73, 89–90; E. *Hipp.* 1283–1284; *Hel.* 1642–1645; *Or.* 1625–1628; *Ba.* 912–917). The same is true in Homer. Bruno Snell famously cited Athena's polite command to Achilles (Hom. *Il.* 1.207–214) as an example of courtesy by the gods,[7] but Homer's gods are not usually polite to mortals (contrast, e.g., *Il.* 3.390–394; 5.124–132, 440–442; 24.460–467; *Od.* 15.10–42). Achilles' unique status is recognized even by the gods (cf. *Il.* 21.293, also with the negatively polite αἴ κε πίθηαι; 24.56–63; *Od.* 24.92). Athena's politeness shows early in the poem the respect which even the gods have for him. For all that, she tells him decisively what to do, and he has no hesitation in complying. Something similar seems to be the case with the god's summons to Oedipus in *Oedipus Coloneus*. It would not be very polite if addressed to an equal, but the element of politeness which it does have is a mark of unusual favour in a command by a god to a mortal.

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[6] Cf. Brown & Levinson (1987: 97).

[7] Snell (1975: 36–37 = Eng. trans. 1960: 32).

Positive Politeness

Oedipus appeals to the chorus when he hears of the approach of Creon:

> ὦ φίλτατοι γέροντες, ἐξ ὑμῶν ἐμοὶ
> φαίνοιτ' ἂν ἤδη τέρμα τῆς σωτηρίας. (*OC* 724–725)

> Dearest elders, now may you show to me the final goal of safety!

Oedipus' expression of affection is positive-politeness redress for a substantial FTA, a request to defend him. Friendship terms (φίλε, etc.) are often used as redress for FTAs.[8] Politeness is essentially dynamic, involving tension between an FTA and the redress for it. The relationship between the speaker and the hearer cannot be gauged from the politeness expression alone, without reference to the FTA which it is redressing. The speaker may actually be on good terms with the hearer (as Oedipus is here with the elders of Colonus), but it still needs to be explained why a friendship term is used on a particular occasion, since even friends do not use these terms all the time.

Friendship terms can even be used as positive-politeness redress when speaker and hearer are on bad terms. Socrates addresses hostile characters such as Polus (*Grg.* 465d4, 466c7, 471a3, 479d) and Meletus (*Ap.* 26d6) as φίλε at least as often as he does real friends like Crito. When Socrates uses φίλε or any other friendship term, he is invariably doing an FTA (e.g. refuting someone). Friendship terms can only be used as evidence for the relationship between speaker and hearer when they are weighed against the FTAs which they are redressing. The overall effect may even be offensive if the positive politeness is insufficient to redress the FTA, to which it may actually serve to draw attention. Plato's Socrates is a master of this use of politeness.[9]

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[8] Cf. Hom. *Il.* 7.279; S. *El.* 465, 469; E. *Hipp.* 288, 473; *Andr.* 530, 842; *Hec.* 286, 1114; *Ph.* 158; *Or.* 136–138; Lammermann (1935: 34–35, 42–45). Other forms of positive-politeness redress: compliments (*OT* 300–304; *Ph.* 79–80, 1244; *OC* 237); limited agreement (*Aj.* 1393–1399; *Ph.* 86–95, 364–366); pseudo-agreement (*Ph.* 1235–1236; cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 113–115).

[9] Halliwell (1995: 90–94), on the other hand, takes these friendship terms at face value, arguing that they show Socrates including even uncouth individuals like Polus in constructive and amicable dialectic. He needs to treat obvious counterexamples (e.g. *Ap.* 26d6) as ironic. The invaluable discussion by Dickey (1996: 109–127, 274–283) perhaps underestimates the dynamic relationship between friendship terms (FTs) and face-threatening acts (FTAs—the acronyms are inconveniently similar).

Politeness tends to be oriented to a pessimistic estimate of any given offence (the 'virtual offence'), and thus to have an inbuilt element of exaggeration.[10] One may thus say (e.g.) 'I am extremely sorry to bother you' even when the probable inconvenience to the hearer is quite small. The hearer may correspondingly be offended if the apology is oriented to the actual inconvenience rather than to this exaggerated view of it. Oedipus' initial words when Jocasta summons him to hear the Corinthian messenger's report of the death of Polybus may seem remarkably fulsome:

> ὦ φίλτατον γυναικὸς Ἰοκάστης κάρα,
> τί μ' ἐξεπέμψω δεῦρο τῶνδε δωμάτων; (*OT* 950–951)
>
> My dearest wife, Jocasta, why have you summoned me here from the house?

'A very formal address for a man to give his wife, but as at *Ant.* 1 [. . .] we are at a point of much gravity' (Dawe 1982: 193). In the first line of *Antigone*, however, Antigone emphasizes her blood-tie to Ismene as the prelude to an onerous request based on that tie.[11] Oedipus' reply to Jocasta does not seem to be such a substantial FTA, and he has no reason as yet to suspect the significance of the moment. Why, then, does he not address her simply ὦ γύναι or γύναι, as he does in other grave contexts (642, 1054)?[12] Politeness theory provides an answer. Jocasta's summons inevitably threatens Oedipus' negative face. Any response by Oedipus—even a favourable one—is an FTA in turn, because it puts her FTA on record and thus implies a comment on it. For the same reason, it is paradoxically an FTA even to accept an offer, let alone to reject one.[13] A favourable response of this kind is obviously not offensive in itself, but in the context the hearer needs to be reassured that no offence was given by the original summons or offer. The lack of such reassurance would in practice be impolite. Oedipus thus orients his reply

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[10] Brown & Levinson (1987: 1–2, 33, 51 note 7) adopt this concept of the 'virtual offence' from Goffman (1971: 108–109).

[11] It may also be relevant that *Ant.* 1 is unusually elaborate because it is the first line of the play. Cf. *El.* 1–2; *Ph.* 3–4; *OC* 1 (but reference to the fathers in all three passages is relevant to the tasks being required of their children). Athena's address to Odysseus (*Aj.* 1) is much less elaborate: her status is greater, and she is not doing an FTA.

[12] The precise function of ὦ is still unclear (see Dickey 1996: 199–206).

[13] Cf. Lloyd (1999: 36–38).

to the virtual offence, and redresses what may seem rather a small threat to Jocasta's face with positive politeness (cf. *Aj.* 1328–1331; *OC* 464–465, 1414–1415). James Redfield observes that Oedipus and Jocasta are 'the most contented married couple in all tragedy' (1995: 158). Positive politeness exaggeration may also have the dramatic function of giving scope for an expression of affection which would otherwise hardly be possible within the limits of tragic decorum.

Oedipus showed similar sensitivity to an interlocutor's face-vulnerability when he responded to an offer of advice by the chorus:

> Χο. τὰ δεύτερ' ἐκ τῶνδ' ἂν λέγοιμ' ἁμοὶ δοκεῖ.
> Οι. εἰ καὶ τρίτ' ἐστί, μὴ παρῇς τὸ μὴ οὐ φράσαι. (*OT* 282–283)
>
> Cho. May I say what seems to me the next best thing?
> Oed. If there is even a third best, do not omit to tell it me.

The exaggeration, oriented to the virtual offence, is typical of positive politeness. Oedipus is consistently more polite than Creon in *Antigone*, who favours the bald-on-record τί δ' ἔστι ('What is it?') in such contexts (*Ant.* 386–387; cf. 991, 997).

There is positive politeness for similar reasons in Achilles' greeting to the ambassadors at *Iliad* 9.197–198:

> χαίρετον· ἦ φίλοι ἄνδρες ἱκάνετον· ἦ τι μάλα χρεώ,
> οἵ μοι σκυζομένῳ περ Ἀχαιῶν φίλτατοί ἐστον.
>
> Welcome! You are indeed dear friends who have come—there must indeed be great need—you who even in my anger are the dearest to me of the Achaeans.

'Akhilleus' greeting is effusive. There is small indication elsewhere that the three were particular friends' (Hainsworth 1993: 89). The exaggerated tone of these words is evidence of politeness rather than effusiveness (cf. Hom. *Il.* 9.96–103; 14.235; *Od.* 13.140–145). Positive politeness by the host is normal, but Achilles immediately realizes that the potential face threat to his visitors is unusually great, and takes correspondingly energetic steps to redress the virtual offence.

Positive politeness is common in thanks, e.g. the formulaic 'bless you!': εὐτυχοίης (*OT* 1478); ὄναιο, ὄναισθε (*OC* 1042; E. *IT* 1078; *IA* 1359); εὐδαιμονοίης (e.g. E. *Alc.* 1137; *El.* 231; *Ph.* 1086; Ar. *Ach.* 446). Athena's καλῶς ἔλεξας (*Aj.* 94; lit. 'you spoke well') is an (ironical) expression of thanks (cf. E. *Med.* 1127; *Heracl.* 726; *Hipp.* 715; *Hec.* 990).

Negative politeness

Initiation of contact is an area where the face of both parties is threatened, and where negative politeness is especially common. Polite behaviour in such contexts can be illustrated by its opposite. Aegisthus adopts an extremely face-threatening approach in his initial address to the chorus and Electra:

> τίς οἶδεν ὑμῶν ποῦ ποθ' οἱ Φωκῆς ξένοι,
> οὕς φασ' Ὀρέστην ἡμὶν ἀγγεῖλαι βίον
> λελοιπόθ' ἱππικοῖσιν ἐν ναυαγίοις;
> σέ τοι, σὲ κρίνω, ναὶ σέ, τὴν ἐν τῷ πάρος
> χρόνῳ θρασεῖαν· ὡς μάλιστα σοὶ μέλειν
> οἶμαι, μάλιστα δ' ἂν κατειδυῖαν φράσαι. (S. *El.* 1442–1447)
>
> Which of you knows where are the Phocian strangers who they say have announced that Orestes has lost his life in the wreck of a chariot? You, it is you I ask, yes you, so insolent in former times, for I think you have it most at heart, and can tell me best from knowledge!

Aegisthus compounds the FTA of initiating contact with the further FTA of asking a direct question. Second-person singular pronouns threaten negative face by leaving the hearer no 'out', no option (however formal) of interpreting the utterance as referring to someone else. This is a plausible explanation of the widespread use of second-person *plural* pronouns to refer politely to a single addressee.[14] Greek did not employ a 'T/V system' of this kind (as in the *tu/vous* distinction in French), but the impoliteness of (singular) 'you' as an address form is nonetheless evident. Direct questions also threaten negative face by demanding an immediate response from the hearer.

Negative-face threat is typical of tyrants and other authoritarian figures in Sophocles (cf. *Aj.* 1047–1048, 1226–1228). It is not necessarily impolite to disregard the negative face of the addressee (cf. the discussion above of *OT* 1121–1122 and *OC* 1627–1628), but such behaviour is clearly offensive when it is accompanied by positive-face threat (i.e. expressions of ill-will), especially when the speaker's claim to superior status is open to question. Creon shows this in his first words to Antigone:

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[14] For discussion, with references to studies of various languages, see Brown & Levinson (1987: 198–204).

> σὲ δή, σὲ τὴν νεύουσαν ἐς πέδον κάρα,
> φής, ἢ καταρνῇ μὴ δεδρακέναι τάδε; (*Ant.* 441–442)
>
> You there, you that are bowing down your head towards the ground, do you admit, or do you deny, that you have done this?

The negative-face threat here resides in Creon's repeated use of the second-person singular pronoun, the definite description, and the direct question. All these features combine to leave Antigone no 'out', by identifying her as someone who is present and of whom an immediate response is being demanded. The style resembles Athena's summons to Ajax (*Aj.* 71–73, 89–90), which is not so impolite because she affects good will and is undeniably superior.

The Paedagogus in *Electra* begins much more politely than Aegisthus (*El.* 660–665):

> Πα. ξέναι γυναῖκες, πῶς ἂν εἰδείην σαφῶς
> εἰ τοῦ τυράννου δώματ' Αἰγίσθου τάδε;
> Χο. τάδ' ἐστίν, ὦ ξέν'· αὐτὸς ᾔκασας καλῶς.
> Πα. καὶ δάμαρτα τήνδ' ἐπεικάζων κυρῶ
> κείνου; πρέπει γὰρ ὡς τύραννος εἰσορᾶν.
> Χο. μάλιστα πάντων· ἥδε σοι κείνη πάρα.
>
> Pa. Ladies of Mycenae, how can I know for certain if this is the house of the king Aegisthus?
> Cho. This is it, stranger; your own guess is correct.
> Pa. Should I be right in guessing this lady is his wife? She has the aspect of a queen.
> Cho. Yes, indeed! Here she is!

The Paedagogus minimizes the imposition by avoiding any explicit second-person reference in his request (cf. *OT* 924–944; *OC* 557 ~ 560, 575), and by expressing his wish indirectly.[15] The 'Am I right in thinking?' gambit (cf. *Ph.* 222–223; Ar. *Pl.* 959–961) similarly transfers the emphasis from second to first person (contrast 'Who do you think that is?'). The chorus responds with the positive-politeness strategy of exaggerating a favourable response. Both parties to the dialogue employ positive politeness in the form of conventionally respectful address terms (cf. Dickey 1996: 146–149). The emphasis of a request can also be transferred from second to third person, as in Oedipus' request to Jocasta to summon the Theban herdsman πῶς ἂν μόλοι δῆθ' ἡμῖν ἐν τάχει πάλιν; (*OT* 765; cf. 1047–1050; *OC*

[15] For πῶς ἄν; + optative, see Kühner-Gerth (I: 235).

1457–1458, corresponding to the more urgent 1475–1476). Oedipus' words ('Would, then, that he could return to us without delay!', Jebb) are treated by Jocasta as an order (ἐφίεσαι, 766), and Oedipus later makes this explicit with an imperative (πέμψον, 860).

One of the commonest forms of politeness is to give deference, indicating that the particular FTA is not part of any wider strategy to threaten the hearer's face. This can work either by raising the status of the hearer or humbling that of the speaker (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 178–187). The former tends more to positive politeness, and the latter to negative politeness. Antigone thus introduces her advice to Oedipus with the negatively polite πάτερ, πιθοῦ μοι, κεἰ νέα παραινέσω ('Father, let me persuade you, even though I am young to give advice!', *OC* 1181; cf. *Ant.* 719–720; *Tr.* 52–53). Speakers can express 'please' by reinforcing the hearer's freedom of choice and thus reducing negative-face threat, e.g. Neoptolemus' ἕρπ' εἰ θέλεις (lit. 'come, if you want') to Philoctetes (*Ph.* 730; cf. *OT* 649; *OC* 757). Supplicatory language (e.g. πρὸς θεῶν + imperative) is also common in such contexts, although it usually has an element of urgency (e.g. *Aj.* 76; *El.* 1119, 1484; *OT* 326, 697, 1432; *Ph.* 770, 967–968; *OC* 49).[16] The standard polite request reduces negative-face threat by employing second person optative + ἄν instead of imperative: στείχοις ἂν ἤδη (*Tr.* 624); χωροῖς ἂν εἴσω (*Ph.* 674); κλύοις ἂν ἤδη (*El.* 637). An ironical example is Orestes' χωροῖς ἂν εἴσω to Aegisthus, when he is ordering him into the palace to be killed (*El.* 1491). The (even more polite) pessimistic form can also be used ironically when the speaker is actually impatient: οὔκουν ἂν εἴποις ἥντιν' αἰτίαν προθείς (*Aj.* 1051); οὐκ ἂν φράσειας . . .; (*Ph.* 1222). Creon's σὺ μὲν κομίζοις ἂν σεαυτὸν ᾗ θέλεις to the Guard (*Ant.* 444) is treated by Goodwin (1889: section 237) as 'a milder expression than κόμιζε σεαυτόν', but it is inconceivable that Creon is being in any way polite to the Guard. The weakening of the command is contemptuous here, signifying indifference to what the Guard does.[17] Contrast Creon's imperative to Antigone σὺ δ' εἰπέ μοι . . . (*Ant.* 446), when he really does want a response.

Politeness is often treated as if it were oriented solely to the face

[16] For ἱκετεύω and ἀντιβολῶ = 'please', see Willi (2003: 25). Cf. Bakker (1966: 31–66); Rijksbaron (1991: 32; 2002a: 42).

[17] See Moorhouse (1982: 231). But Moorhouse can hardly be right that Orestes is 'pretending unconcern' at *El.* 1491, in view of the following words σὺν τάχει.

of the hearer, as when Andreas Willi writes that 'politeness essentially consists in respecting other people's feelings' (Willi 2003: 166). The face of the speaker is also relevant, and politeness is essentially a negotiation between the face-requirements of both parties. The act of thanking is socially problematic, and thus hedged about in many cultures with devices to mitigate the threat to the speaker's face in accepting a debt. The distancing effect of the 'tragic aorist' serves this purpose in tragedy.[18] A notable example in Sophocles is Ajax' expression of thanks to Tecmessa for keeping their son out of his way while he was mad: ἐπῄνεσ' ἔργον καὶ πρόνοιαν ἣν ἔθου (S. *Aj.* 536). Ajax' tone is stiffly formal, in marked contrast to Tecmessa's more directly emotional language (e.g. 527–529). The aorist (lit. 'I praised') distances him somewhat from his acknowledgement of the face-threatening obligations incurred by his madness. Neoptolemus similarly employs the aorist ἥσθην (lit. 'I was pleased') when he replies to Philoctetes' praise (S. *Ph.* 1314). The acceptance of a compliment potentially threatens the face both of the speaker and of the hearer, and is thus an area where negative politeness is common.

Off-Record Strategies

Brown and Levinson (1987: 211) identify a third politeness strategy, along with positive and negative politeness, and that is going off-record:

> A communicative act is done off record if it is done in such a way that it is not possible to attribute only one clear communicative intention to the act. In other words, the actor leaves himself an 'out' by providing himself with a number of defensible interpretations; he cannot be held to have committed himself to just one particular interpretation of his act.

The presence of an off-record meaning in an utterance is signalled by breaches of Grice's maxims.[19] The maxims are the basic assumptions of any talk exchange, and departures from them are always significant. The hearer initially assumes that the speaker is following the four maxims. If any of the maxims appears to have been violated, then

[18] Cf. Lloyd (1999: 36–40); Rijksbaron (2002a: 29–30).
[19] Grice (1975); cf. Lloyd (2004).

the hearer will try to interpret the utterance as conforming to the maxims at some deeper level. The speaker may thus violate the maxim of relevance by saying something apparently irrelevant, thereby inviting the hearer to search for the real relevance of the utterance. The maxim of quantity would be violated by exaggeration or understatement, the maxim of quality by irony or rhetorical questions, and the maxim of manner by vagueness or ambiguity. Brown and Levinson regard going off record as the most polite of the three politeness strategies, and suggest that it is 'a natural extension of negative politeness' (Brown & Levinson 1987: 21). They recognize, however, that its exact relationship to the other two strategies needs further investigation. The problem seems to be that an off-record strategy conceals the FTA more effectively, and is therefore more polite, but also has fewer overt politeness markers, and is therefore less polite.

There may often in practice be only one viable interpretation of an off-record utterance, but the usefulness of the strategy resides in the degree of formal latitude allowed by an indirect formulation. The speaker can always repudiate the hearer's inference about the off-record significance of an utterance, and take refuge in its literal meaning. An off-record strategy can also serve to give a formal indication of polite intent. Off-record criticism can thus be expressed counterfactually, as in Haemon's words to Creon εἰ μὴ πατὴρ ἦσθ', εἶπον ἄν σ'οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν ('If you were not my father, I would say you had no sense', *Ant.* 755; cf. 1053; *OT* 1367). Alternatively, criticism can be expressed by a question such as 'Do you really intend . . .?' (*Ant.* 770; cf. 568, 574). No one could doubt the intended meaning, but polite intent is signalled by the off-record formulation.

Orestes employs a more subtle off-record strategy when he arrives in disguise at the palace (*El.* 1098–1102):

Ορ. ἆρ', ὦ γυναῖκες, ὀρθά τ' εἰσηκούσαμεν
ὀρθῶς θ' ὁδοιποροῦμεν ἔνθα χρῄζομεν;
Χο. τί δ' ἐξερευνᾷς καὶ τί βουληθεὶς πάρει;
Ορ. Αἴγισθον ἔνθ' ᾤκηκεν ἱστορῶ πάλαι.
Χο. ἄλλ' εὖ θ' ἱκάνεις χὠ φράσας ἀζήμιος.

Or. Ladies, have we heard right instructions, and are we on the right way to where we wish to go?
Cho. What are you looking for? and what is the purpose that brings you here?
Or. For a while I have been asking where Aegisthus has made his dwelling.
Cho. You have come the right way, and whoever directed you cannot be faulted.

'The opening of the conversation is all the more natural for being illogical. The chorus obviously cannot direct Orestes until they know where he wishes to go' (Kells 1973: 185). Sophocles is not, however, in the habit of writing 'natural' dialogue for the sake of it, especially at crucial moments like this. Initiation of contact threatens the negative face of both parties, and this face threat is regularly redressed by elaborate politeness even in relatively routine cases. This situation is far from routine, even if taken at face value. Orestes, in his fictive persona, is an emissary of Strophius, an ally of Agamemnon and therefore an enemy of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. Orestes is returning to Clytemnestra the ashes of the man whom Strophius had hitherto been sheltering from her. He is thus constrained not only to impinge on the chorus, thereby putting himself in their debt and risking a humiliating rebuff, but also to communicate news which Strophius' enemies may be expected to welcome. The real situation is even more face-threatening than the fictive one, and one would expect Orestes to orient his utterance not only to the face of the addressee but also to his own.

The off-record meaning is signalled here by a breach of Grice's maxim of manner. Orestes' utterance is far from perspicuous, as Kells observes, and this prompts the chorus to consider its real meaning. Orestes' request is oriented to the face of the chorus, with the conventionally polite address ὦ γυναῖκες ('Ladies') and the use of a preliminary question, but it is also oriented to his own face.[20] He indirectly communicates that he is a stranger, which is a good reason for the request. Giving reasons is a common positive politeness gambit, including both parties in a co-operative process of practical reasoning and thus oriented to the face of both speaker and hearer (cf. Hom. *Od.* 7.22–26; Brown & Levinson 1987: 128–129). Orestes also dissociates himself from the FTA by attributing responsibility for his presence to someone else ('have we heard right instructions?'). The chorus correctly interprets his utterance as a request for directions, and asks him what he wants. His actual request is thus expressed as a reply to their question (cf. *El.* 310–316). He could not have distanced himself more effectively from the imposition involved in

[20] A common politeness gambit is to divide the FTA into a number of separate stages, e.g. by beginning with a general request for permission to speak (cf. *Aj.* 1328–1331; *OC* 464–465, 1414–1415; E. *Tr.* 48–66). Orestes' unanswerable introductory question at E. *IT* 658 ('Pylades, do you have the same feeling as I do?') has a similar function (i.e. 'I have something interesting to say, if you want to hear it').

accosting the chorus. There is an even more elaborate example of this strategy in Euripides' *Alcestis*, where the Servant repeatedly violates the Gricean maxims in the attempt to soften the FTA of telling Heracles that Alcestis is dead, and that he has thus been deceived into behaving in a wholly inappropriate manner (E. *Alc.* 803–825; cf. *Hipp.* 88–99; *Ion* 752–762). His purpose is to communicate this embarrassing news in the form of an answer to a leading question by Heracles, even if the latter cannot be prompted to work it out for himself.

Orestes distances himself from his question (1101) by projecting it into the past. Kells (1973: 185) rightly translates: 'What I have been asking all along . . .' (i.e. with πάλαι referring back only as far as his previous utterance). This seems more pointed than a reference to any enquiries of his before arriving at the palace. At any rate, 'point-of-view distancing' (deixis manipulation) is a common politeness gambit.[21] It is evidently oriented here to Orestes' face, since for the reasons given above it is face-threatening for him to present himself as a visitor under these circumstances. A further point is his use of the perfect ᾤκηκεν ('has made his dwelling'). Campbell (*ad loc.*) remarks that 'the perfect tense suggests the supposed permanence of Aegisthus' rule', and sees irony in the fact that his rule is soon to be terminated. The parallels suggest rather that Orestes avoids asking a question of the standard type 'Is this Aegisthus' house?' (e.g. S. *El.* 660–661; *OT* 924–925; E. *Andr.* 881–882; Ar. *Pl.* 959–961; Hom. *Od.* 7.22–23). He does not want to imply that the house belongs to Aegisthus.

Politeness and characterization

Sophocles exploits politeness phenomena for specific dramatic purposes, rather than merely to portray a courtly mode of speech. The Paedagogus' elaborate negative politeness has the dramatic effect of stressing his pose as a friendly stranger (*El.* 660–667). His politeness marks the arrival of something unknown from outside, in contrast

[21] See Brown & Levinson (1987: 118–119, 204); Lloyd (1999: 33 note 25). The future can also be used for polite point-of-view distancing: see Polynices' βουλήσομαι in *OC* 1289; cf. E. *Med.* 259.

to the enclosed female world of the preceding six hundred lines (cf. *OT* 924–934).

Sophocles can also use politeness for large-scale characterization. Ajax is startlingly impolite, with little respect for anyone else's face, and with a propensity to issue unredressed commands. Politeness in *Ajax* is mostly associated with Athena and Odysseus. *Oedipus Coloneus* contains very little negative politeness, most of it near the beginning of the play (33–35, 49–50, 70, 724–725), but a great deal of positive politeness. This occurs mainly in Oedipus' effusive supplications and thanks to the Athenians.

Most of the politeness in *Oedipus Tyrannus* is by Oedipus himself (9–13, 85–86, 216–221, 300–315, 765, 950, 1047–1050, 1110–1116). This partly serves to stress his formal and public role, in contrast to Creon and Jocasta, who are more associated with a domestic role, out of the public eye (as Creon himself remarks, 91–92, 583–602). They are less formal in their conversation with the chorus than Oedipus is. Oedipus' politeness also shows his sensitivity to the face of others, despite his tendency to lose his temper when thwarted.

Creon in *Antigone*, by contrast, is much less polite. He tends to initiate contact bluntly, even when he is not actually trying to be offensive (162, 387, 531, 632–634, 991), and he can be very impolite (244, 280–281, 444–447, 1055). Griffith (1999: 20) remarks on 'his disrespectful habit of referring to people in the third person even when they are present' (473–496, 561–562, 726–727, 883–890, 931–966)'. His relatively polite request ἄγοιτ' ἄν ('please take me away', 1339) suggests that politeness may be one of the lessons which he has learned by the end of the play.

Face-threat politeness theory sees politeness as much more than merely decorative or superficial. 'Face' is broadly defined and easily threatened. Deviations from bald-on-record communication in order to redress or minimize face threat are common in all but the most basic forms of dialogue. Sophocles' mastery of dialogue includes a mastery of the varieties of politeness.[22]

[22] I am most grateful to the editors for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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